State of Connecticut v. Christopher Cleary (2010)

Ruling on Motion to Suppress

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, kidnapping, and strangulation, moves to suppress his February 8, 2008 statement to the Waterbury police department on the ground that he did not make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.   For the following reasons, the court denies the motion.

In order to establish entitlement to Miranda rights, the defendant must first prove custodial interrogation.   See State v. Tomaski, 238 Conn. 253, 267-69, 681 A.2d 922 (1996).   Here the defendant has failed to prove custody.   The ultimate issue in determining custody for Miranda purposes is whether “a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 758, 670 A.2d 276 (1996).   In resolving this issue, the court credits the testimony of Officer Harkins and Detective Tirado.¹  Based on that testimony, the court finds that the defendant voluntarily went to the police station in a police cruiser and remained unrestrained throughout the course of the subsequent interview at the detective bureau.   While this situation was not completely free of coercive effect, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that his movement was restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest.   See id., 759-61.   Accordingly, the defendant has failed to prove custody.   Therefore, there was no requirement that the police advise the defendant of his Miranda rights or that the defendant waive them prior to answering questions.²

In any event, the court finds that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the Miranda rights that the police gave him.   The state, of course, bears the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted).  State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 99, 944 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).   The court must look to the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver.   See id., 100.

Here the defendant's only colorable argument is that he had a psychiatric illness and did not comprehend what was taking place.   In the competency context, the court has held that an accused may be suffering from a mental illness and nonetheless be able to understand the charges against him and to assist in his own defense.   See State v. DeAngelis, 200 Conn. 224, 230, 511 A.2d 310 (1986).   The same principle applies here.   The credible testimony at the hearing establishes that the defendant showed no confusion, understood the questions asked of him, and provided answers that the police understood.   Similarly, in court during the suppression hearing, the defendant, while claiming to be receiving two of the same medications that he was taking in 2008, provided answers that, while incredible at times, were at least responsive to the questions asked.

In all other respects, the interview with the defendant raises no constitutional concerns.   The defendant had fourteen years of education and was familiar with Miranda from his previous arrests.   See State v. Linarte, supra, 99.   He read and signed a written waiver of rights form on two occasions.   In both instances, the defendant indicated that he understood his rights and wished to waive them.   The defendant was talkative and very articulate.   There was no valid evidence of any improper police conduct.   In fact, Detective Tirado had almost no prior knowledge about the case and thus had to depend on the defendant to provide the facts for the written statement.   The defendant read and signed the written statement in front of several officers.   Therefore, the totality of these circumstances establishes a knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver.

The court denies the motion to suppress.

It is so ordered.

Carl J. Schuman

Judge, Superior Court

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court does not credit the defendant's testimony in any material respect.   Nonetheless, the court is unaware of any authority prohibiting the state from using in its case-in-chief the defendant's testimony at a hearing, such as the present one, to suppress statements on fifth amendment grounds.   The authority that does exist bars the state from using the testimony of a defendant seeking to establish standing to challenge a search or seizure on fourth amendment grounds, since otherwise the defendant might have to admit possession of contraband or otherwise incriminate himself merely to assert fourth amendment rights.   See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968);  State v. Kasprzyk, 255 Conn. 186, 202, 763 A.2d 655 (2001).   The defendant did not face the same dilemma in this case..  FN1. The court does not credit the defendant's testimony in any material respect.   Nonetheless, the court is unaware of any authority prohibiting the state from using in its case-in-chief the defendant's testimony at a hearing, such as the present one, to suppress statements on fifth amendment grounds.   The authority that does exist bars the state from using the testimony of a defendant seeking to establish standing to challenge a search or seizure on fourth amendment grounds, since otherwise the defendant might have to admit possession of contraband or otherwise incriminate himself merely to assert fourth amendment rights.   See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968);  State v. Kasprzyk, 255 Conn. 186, 202, 763 A.2d 655 (2001).   The defendant did not face the same dilemma in this case.

FN2. Even if the court credited the defendant's testimony that the police put him in handcuffs for a few minutes before he went to the police station, that sort of brief Terry-type detention does not constitute custody for Miranda purposes.   See State v. Jackson, 23 Conn.App. 151, 154-55, 585 A.2d 694 (1990)..  FN2. Even if the court credited the defendant's testimony that the police put him in handcuffs for a few minutes before he went to the police station, that sort of brief Terry-type detention does not constitute custody for Miranda purposes.   See State v. Jackson, 23 Conn.App. 151, 154-55, 585 A.2d 694 (1990).

Schuman, Carl J., J.