IN RE: Derrick G. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

STATEMENT OF CASE

The following matters are pending before the court:  motion for revocation of commitment, motion to review permanency plan and termination of parental rights (TPR) petition.   The case was tried on November 3 & 5, 2009.   Several witnesses testified, and numerous exhibits were received into evidence.   The motion for revocation of commitment was heard first and will be addressed initially.

On May 5, 2008, the respondent father, Derrick G., Sr., filed a motion for revocation of commitment of the child, Derrick G., Jr., either with or without protective supervision, on the grounds that:  “(1) He has materially complied with the Specific Steps that were signed on June 19, 2006;  (2) Absent the incident of domestic violence that occurred between the child's biological mother (Keisha G.) and [the father], the child would have been returned to his parents;  (3) The Termination of Parental Rights petition filed by DCF on March 14, 2007, alleged that the Child was abandoned and that there was no On-Going Parent-Child Relationship.   Both counts were denied at trial;  (4) the TPR petition did not list as grounds for termination that the Child was neglected and/or uncared for;  [and] (5) [The father] is complying with DCF and the Court in undergoing an evaluation of his ability to care for the child on May 1, 2008, by the Hon. Judge Baldwin.”

The petitioner, the commissioner of the department of children and families, (DCF or department) filed an objection on May 12, 2008.   In support of the objection, DCF states that:  “(1) To date, the Respondent Father has not substantially complied with the Specific Steps ordered by the court;  (2) Due to the Respondent Father's minimal visitation since December 2006, the child does not recognize [Derrick G., Sr.] as his father and has no relationship with him;  (3) The cause for commitment continues to exist;  (4) Denial of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, in and of itself, is not basis for revocation of commitment;  and (5) It is not the child's best interests to be returned to his father's care.”

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following procedural history and facts, proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, are relevant to this disposition of this case.

A

Procedural History

In June 2006, the father, Derrick G., Sr., and the mother, Keisha G., were traveling through Connecticut for work.   They were accompanied by their two-month-old son, Derrick G., Jr. They were not residents of Connecticut.   On June 15, 2006, there was an incident of domestic violence between the mother and father resulting in the arrest of both parents.   Derrick G., Jr. was not present during the dispute.   He was removed from his parents on that date by DCF via a ninety-six-hour hold.   On June 19, 2006, the court granted an order of temporary custody (OTC) and ordered specific steps.   On July 13, 2006, the court sustained the OTC after a contested hearing that was held on July 5, 2006.

On March 21, 2007, the court defaulted the parents for failure to appear and entered a neglect adjudication based on denied proper care and attention.   The child was committed to the department.   On May 5, 2008, the father filed a motion for revocation of commitment.   On May 12, 2008, the petitioner filed an objection to motion to revoke.   On June 16, 2008, after a case status conference, the father was ordered to comply with specific steps.¹

B

Family

The father was born on May 19, 1964.   In June 2006, he was working as a traveling salesman, selling books and magazines.   After the domestic violence arrest and OTC, the father stayed on and off in Connecticut for several months.   However, he did not have any family in Connecticut and did not have any intention to reside in the state.   The father had limited options and had to make a living.   He was not receiving any government assistance.   In December 2006, due to his financial situation, the father left Connecticut to return to his out-of-state employment.

In early 2007, the father experienced serious health problems.   He suffered an aneurism/stroke and was hospitalized for an extended period of time.   The father testified that he missed visits with the child in 2007 due, in part, to his health problems.   From November 2006 through January 2008, the father only had two visits with the child.   In the spring of 2008, the father was living and working in Long Island, New York. He decided to move to Connecticut in hopes of being reunified with his son.

Since May 2008, the father has been gainfully employed and has been residing in same apartment.   He has developed ties to the community, including through his church.   The father has visited his son on a regular basis for over a year.   He has demonstrated and expressed love and affection for the child.   There is an attachment between father and son.   During the visits, the father demonstrated an ability to care for the child, although there is room for improvement.   There is no allegation that the father ever physically harmed the child.

The mother, Keisha G., was born on June 27, 1980.   Her whereabouts are unknown.   She has not been involved with the child for several years.   The mother has not maintained any contact with the department or the child.   She has not demonstrated any interest in maintaining a relationship with the child or being reunified with the child.

The child, Derrick G., Jr., was born on April 7, 2006.   Derrick G., Jr. has been in foster care since June 15, 2006.   He has lived with the current foster parents since May 2007.   The child is doing well and no concerns are reported.   He is bonded with the foster parents and foster sibling(s).  The child is at ease in the foster home, and the foster family is committed to adopting the child.   He refers to the foster parents as Mommy and Daddy.   The child has had visits with the father since May 2008.   During the visits, the child has demonstrated a positive attachment to the father.   The child knows who his father is and calls him “Daddy.”

C

Specific Steps

After the father moved to Connecticut in May 2008, the case returned to court for a case status conference.   On June 16, 2008, he was ordered to comply with specific steps.

Before moving here, the father did not always keep DCF notified of his whereabouts.   Since May 2008, when the father began residing full time in Connecticut, he has kept DCF informed of his whereabouts.   He has also kept appointments set by or with DCF. He has attended administrative case reviews.

The father was ordered to participate in parenting and individual counseling and to make progress toward the identified treatment goals.   The goals were to learn parenting skills;  address anger and domestic violence and understand the impact on the child.   He was also ordered to cooperate with recommended service providers.

He successfully completed the Wheeler Clinic Family Violence Education Program in November 2006.   He completed a parenting education classes at the Bristol Parent and Child Center in October 2008.   The father completed an anger management program at Catholic Family Services in March 2009.   He also participated in the Fatherhood Initiative.   The father testified that he found the programs helpful, and he learned how to better control his anger.

The father submitted to a substance abuse assessment in July 2008.   He was referred for random urine screens.   Three tests were administered, all of which were negative.   No substance abuse treatment was recommended.

He has not been arrested since June 2006.   Court records reflect that his domestic violence case was dismissed after his successful completion of the Family Violence Education Program on March 27, 2007.

The father has secured and maintained housing.   Since May 2008, he has rented an apartment in Hartford pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease.   The rent is $440 per month plus utilities.   The father is the only person currently living there.   The apartment has three bedrooms, a living room, and a kitchen.   The child would have his own bedroom with furniture (bed, cabinets).   One of the bedrooms is used by the landlord for storage.   The landlord lets the father know when he needs to come into the apartment to access the storage space.   Jillian Brady, a reunification worker with Community Residences, Inc. (CRI), began supervising the father's visitation with the child on October 15, 2008.   On December 26, 2008, Brady went to the father's apartment.   The apartment was clean.   There were no safety concerns with the apartment.   However, one of the bedrooms was locked and not viewed by Brady.   The assigned DCF social worker has not conducted a recent home visit.

The father has also secured and maintained legal income.   On May 26, 2008, the father began working at Wendy's in Newington.   He now makes $8.15 per hour and works at Wendy's on Prospect Street in Hartford.   He works between thirty and forty hours per week.

The father has explored daycare programs through Community Renewal Team (CRT) and local schools.   He has flexible hours at work.   The father is willing to work with DCF and CRT to establish daycare.

Although the evidence demonstrates that the father complied with the majority of the specific steps, there are causes for concern.

The father does not feel that he and the mother have been treated fairly by DCF. He believes that from the beginning, DCF was not committed to reunifying them with the child.   Erin Huber is the DCF social worker who has been assigned to the case since December 1, 2008.   She testified that the father was one of the most difficult cases and that the relationship between the father and DCF was strained.

After he moved to Connecticut in May 2008, the father began having more regular supervised visits.   He was referred to CRI for reunification services in response to a psychological evaluation in September 2008.   DCF made the referral to assist the father with reunification.   Brady began supervising the father's visitation on October 15, 2008.

In October 2008, Brady developed a treatment plan that was focused on having productive visits and provided the father with the opportunity to demonstrate that he could parent the child.   There was a prior issue with the father taking the child to the bathroom and videotaping the child.   Brady worked with the father to have him pack a lunch for the visit to demonstrate that he was able to take care of the child.   Once the child became potty trained, the father was to bring underwear.   Brady testified that the father began displaying a lack of compliance with CRI as soon as he was asked to follow through with the plan.   During subsequent supervised visits, the father was not always compliant with the rules.   On one occasion, Brady had to discuss with the father the appropriate amounts of food to feed the child.   There was an issue about the child being cleared by a physician for an injury.   Issues arose due to the father arguing with DCF and CRI during the visits.   The father was focused on the case, rather than on the visits.   During visits, the father demonstrated hostility toward Brady while the child was present.   There were arguments about whether the father could take pictures of his son with his cell phone.   Huber met with the father multiple times to discuss the father's behavior at visits including advising the father not to discuss the case during his visits with the child.   DCF included these issues in written treatment plans because verbal discussions did not seem to work.

The father believes the problems with CRI originated from the December 30, 2008 visit at the New Britain public library.   During the visit, he questioned Brady about how successful she had been in reunifying families.   The father believes that Brady took it personally, and after that conversation, the relationship between CRI and the father deteriorated.   The father feels that he has not had problems with other services providers.

On April 7, 2009, there were issues surrounding a birthday visit with the child.   The father came to the visit with two women who had not been cleared by DCF to visit.   He was previously told that if he wanted to bring guests to a visit, they had to be cleared first.   The father became upset when the guests were not allowed to visit.   The visit ended early.

After the birthday visit incident, Brady made a recommendation to decrease the father's visits from two hours to one hour per week.   DCF decreased the visits to one hour per week.   The father administratively appealed the decision and lost.   Since the visits have been reduced, the father has more fully engaged with the child, rather than focusing on issues he had with DCF and CRI.

Another issue arose regarding the father talking on his cell phone during visits.   CRI did not want the father to use his cell phone during visits.   The parties eventually agreed that the father would turn his cell phone off during visit.   Since the rule was agreed to in June 2009, the father has not always followed it, and he has used his cell phone during visits.

On August 18, 2009, there was a delay in getting the visit started because a room was not readily available.   The father became upset and demonstrated his hostility to Brady.   Brady felt that the father was becoming aggressive toward her, and she subsequently made a report of the incident to the New Britain police department.

The relationship between the father and CRI deteriorated to the point that DCF had discussions regarding switching from CRI to another service provider.   DCF concluded that the father had a pattern of behavior and that simply changing the provider would not address issues with the father's behavior.

Overall, the father has met some of the objectives of the treatment plans.   The father is consistent with his visits.   When he is focused on the child, he acts appropriately.   He brings food, age appropriate toys and underwear to the visits.   He eventually stopped arguing with Brady about taking the child to the bathroom.   The father also stopped talking about the foster parents during the visits.   The father testified that he has made an effort to improve his relationship with DCF and CRI.

The father did not meet some of the objectives of the treatment plans.   He did not always behave appropriately, and he demonstrated hostility toward DCF and CRI. He was not always able to follow through with the consequences when addressing the child's behavior issues.   Questions were raised regarding the father's ability to discipline the child.   The father sometimes tries to manage the child's behavior by calling the child's name repeatedly.   Brady testified that CRI did not recommend reunification after working with the father for one year because of the father's lack of compliance with treatment plans.   Although the father has made some progress, CRI still believes that he has not made sufficient progress to recommend reunification with the child.

Additional evidence proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence will be provided as needed.

III

DISCUSSION

The threshold issue is whether the commitment should be revoked and guardianship of the child returned to the father.

The father argues that he has addressed the issues of domestic violence and transient living.   He had to leave the state for economic reasons.   The father views DCF as not helping him reunify with the child.   He has secured housing and has had no domestic violence arrests since June 2006.   He has employment and a plan for his son if the child is returned to his care.   The father is willing to work with DCF. He does not have any substance abuse issues and is willing to undergo drug testing.   The father has not physically hurt the child.   He has roots in the community.   The father agrees to verify his employment, housing and daycare.

The child's attorney argues that the father has met some objectives but has not met all of them.   Before May 2008, the father was missing in action.   Since May 2008, the father has done certain things.   The child's attorney does not believe it is in the child's best interests to be reunified with the father.

The department argues that although the father has addressed some of the causes of commitment relating to domestic violence, he has not sufficiently addressed the underlying anger management issues.   Even after completing the programs, the father had angry outburst (April 2009 visit/August 2009 visit).   The father's anger issues have not been resolved.   He has not totally addressed the transient living cause for commitment.   He only has a verbal month-to-month lease.   There is contradictory information about whether the father is renting the whole apartment, minus the landlord's use of one bedroom for storage, or only renting one room.   The father testified about needing to be near his family to help raise the child.   He is biding his time to leave the state.   DCF is not recommending reunification with the father.   The department is recommending termination and adoption by the foster parents.   DCF's position is that it is in the best interests of the child for him to remain with the foster family and be adopted.

“General Statutes § 46b-129(m) sets forth the procedure by which a commitment may be challenged and vests primary authority for revocation of commitment with the trial court.”  In re Cameron C., 103 Conn.App. 746, 752, 930 A.2d 826 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).   Pursuant to the statute, “[t]he commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth.   No such motion shall be filed more often than once every six months.”   General Statutes § 46b-129(m).  See also Practice Book § 35a-14A.²

Therefore, “[t]o revoke the commitment, the respondent must first prove that no cause for commitment presently exists.   Second, the commissioner must fail in her burden to establish that it would be in the best interests of the children to remain committed.   Both prongs must be satisfied in favor of the respondent in order for the commitment to be revoked.”  In re Patricia C., 93 Conn.App. 25, 31-32, 887 A.2d 929 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 101 (2006).  “The court, in determining whether cause for commitment no longer exists, would obviously look to the original cause for commitment to see whether the conduct or circumstances that resulted in commitment continue to exist.”  In re Cesar G., 56 Conn.App. 289, 294, 742 A.2d 428 (2000).

In deciding a motion to revoke commitment, the standard of proof is a fair preponderance of the evidence.   See In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 751, n.5;  Practice Book § 35a-14A.   The standard of proof, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is “properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981).   The phrase a “fair preponderance of the evidence” “simply means that evidence which outweighs that which is offered to oppose it ․” Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1983).

“This court's analysis in In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006), provides guidance on applying § 46b-129(m).  ‘[A] natural parent, whose child has been committed to the custody of a third party, is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate that no cause for commitment still exists ․ The initial burden is placed on the persons applying for the revocation of commitment to allege and prove that cause for commitment no longer exists ․ If the party challenging the commitment meets that initial burden, the commitment to the third party may then be modified if such change is in the best interest of the child ․ The burden falls on the persons vested with guardianship to prove that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to his or her natural parents.’  ․ Id., 352 n.4.' “ In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 752.

“[R]evocation of commitment proceedings under § 46b-129(m) [are] conducted with a presumption similar to that found in § 46b-56b.   See In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 659, 420 A.2d 875 (1979).   Under the In re Stacy G. framework, after the natural parent establishes that the cause for commitment no longer exists, the guardian is saddled with the burden of establishing that placement with the natural parent is not in the child's best interest.   The natural parent, therefore, has the benefit of a presumption that revocation of commitment is in the child's best interest.  In re Stacy G., supra, 94 Conn.App. 353 n.4. As our Supreme Court has stated, ‘parents are entitled to the presumption, absent a continuing cause for commitment, that revocation will be in the child's best interests unless the [guardian] can prove otherwise.’  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 659.'  “ In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 755-56.

“[T]he specific steps provide a benchmark by which the court measures whether ․ reunification ․ is appropriate ․” In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 161, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005).   The court looks to whether the parent complies with the various service providers and whether the parent benefited from the services.   See In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, 980 A.2d 935 (“The respondent ․ made a concerted effort to comply with the specific steps ordered and to avail herself of the services provided.   For that effort, the respondent should be commended.   At the same time, the ultimate measure ․ is not whether the respondent complies with the various services provided but whether she benefits therefrom”), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 919, 920, 984 A.2d 67 (2009).

In deciding the issues in this case, the court has also been guided by General Statutes § 17a-101(a), which provides in relevant part;  “The public policy of this state is:  To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect;  to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental capacity for good child care;  to provide a temporary or permanent nurturing and safe environment for children when necessary ․” “The statement of public policy in § 17a-101 thus establishes that an important goal of the child protection statutes, in addition to protecting children from abuse and neglect, is to preserve family integrity by allowing children to remain with their parents and by teaching parents the skills they need to nurture and care for their children.”  Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 754, 865 A.2d 428 (2005).   Furthermore, “[c]oncomitant reunification efforts on the part of the parents and the department help to preserve the integrity of the family and are based on the well settled notion that [t]he right of a parent to raise his or her children [is] recognized as a basic constitutional right.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 696, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).

The facts in this case are somewhat analogous to In re Cameron C. There, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the father's motion to revoke the transfer of guardianship of the child (C) to the (maternal) grandmother and reinstating the guardianship of C in the father.   In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 748.   C lived primarily with the maternal grandmother in Connecticut from his birth in October 1999.  Id. In September 2003, the father moved to Florida.  Id. In December 2003, C needed medical attention, and the mother was not available to care for him.  Id. The grandmother then went to Probate Court and was awarded immediate temporary custody.  Id. “[The grandmother] also made a referral to the department, alleging that the mother was not caring for C and had passed responsibility for the child to the respondent.   On December 9, 2003, the Probate Court issued an order of temporary custody that removed custody [of C] from the mother and awarded it to the respondent.   The department subsequently brought a neglect petition on June 15, 2004.   On February 16, 2005, the trial court adjudicated the child neglected, with the mother pleading nolo contendere and the father standing silent.   In its ruling, the court also transferred guardianship to the [grandmother] with six months protective supervision.”  Id.

On May 31, 2005, the father moved to revoke the transfer of guardianship.   Id., 749.  “At the conclusion of the hearings, the court ruled that the cause for the transfer of guardianship no longer existed and that the [grandmother] failed to prove that it would not be in the best interest of the child to be returned to his father.   Furthermore, the court found that placement with the father was in the child's best interest.”  Id., 749.

“In reaching its conclusion that [the] father had satisfied his burden of showing that the cause for transfer of guardianship no longer existed, the court found that [the] father consistently attended counseling sessions, completed parenting classes and an anger management assessment and had stable employment and appropriate housing for the child.”  Id. Based on these findings, the trial court granted the motion to revoke commitment and reinstated guardianship in the father with protective supervision for six months.  Id. The court also ordered that the grandmother and mother were to have visitation rights.  Id.

A

Cause for Commitment

The court must first determine whether the respondent father proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that no cause for commitment presently exists.

“[U]nder § 46b-129(j), prior to awarding custody of the child to the department pursuant to an order of commitment, the trial court must both find and adjudicate the child on one of three grounds:  uncared for, neglected or dependent.   The grounds are distinct, each statutorily defined ․ Adjudication on any of these grounds thus requires attendant findings, on the record, in support thereof.   The trial court's determination thereafter as to whether to maintain or revoke the commitment is largely premised on that prior adjudication.   See Practice Book § 35a-14(c) [now § 35a-14A] (‘[w]hether to maintain or revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to maintain or revoke upon a fair preponderance of the evidence’).  ‘The court, in determining whether cause for commitment no longer exists, would obviously look to the original cause for commitment to see whether the conduct or circumstances that resulted in commitment continue to exist.’  In re Cesar G., 56 Conn.App. 289, 294, 742 A.2d 428 (2000).   Accordingly, the trial court considers not only the adjudication, but also the attendant facts.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Allison G., supra, 276 Conn. 159-60.

In the addendum to the neglect petition in this case, the commissioner set forth the following:  “On the morning of June 15, 2006, mother and father were involved in a domestic dispute while said child was present;  By virtue of the child's age, said child is unable to protect itself and is unable to summon for help should the need arise;  Based on the domestic dispute between mother and father, neither parent was able to protect said child.”   On May 21, 2007, the court, Baldwin, J., defaulted the parents for failure to appear and adjudicated the child neglected based on denied proper care and attention and ordered that the child be committed to the care and custody of the commissioner.   The causes for commitment at that time were domestic violence and transient living.

Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the father has met his burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that no cause for commitment presently exists.   In reaching this conclusion, the court finds the following.

As to domestic violence, the father has satisfactorily addressed this cause for commitment.   The father successfully completed the Wheeler Clinic Family Violence Education Program in November 2006.   He completed a parenting education classes at the Bristol Parent and Child Center in October 2008.   The father completed an anger management program at Catholic Family Services in March 2009.   He also participated in the Fatherhood Initiative.   He has not been arrested for any crime since June 2006.   Like the father in In re Cameron C., Derrick G., Sr. attended recommended counseling sessions.   The evidence demonstrates that the father has benefited from the services provided to him to a positive extent, although there is still room for improvement.   He is better able to control his anger.   His anger has never been directed at the child.

As to transient living, the father has adequately addressed this cause for commitment.   As in In re Cameron C., the father has secured and maintained adequate housing and stable employment.   He rents a three-bedroom apartment.   The child would have his own bedroom.   Although the father only has an oral month-to-month agreement with the landlord to rent the apartment, it is a valid lease.   Brady conducted a home visit, and, based on what she was able to see of it, the apartment was clean and there were no safety concerns.   The father has been able to maintain stable employment since May 2008.   He is able to afford to pay the rent of $440 per month plus utilities.

The evidence demonstrates that Derrick G., Sr. has his faults.   He needs to continue to improve his parenting skills and manage his anger toward DCF. However, since May 2008, the father has sufficiently addressed the causes for commitment:  domestic violence and transient living.   He has successfully completed a family violence education program, an anger management program and parenting education classes.   He has not been arrested since June 2006.   He has also secured and maintained adequate housing and stable employment.

The father has met his burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that cause for commitment no longer exists.   The court finds in favor of the father regarding the no cause for commitment presently exists element of proof.

B

Best Interests

The court must next address whether the department has met its burden of establishing that placement with the natural parent is not in the child's best interest.   See In re Patricia C., supra, 93 Conn.App. 30 (“[w]ith respect to the best interest prong, when it is the natural parents who have moved to revoke the commitment, the state must prove that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to his or her natural parents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“To determine whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 759;  In re Patricia C., supra, 93 Conn.App. 32.   In determining the best interests of the child in this case, the court has also been guided by the following:  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection;  (2) express personal concern for child's health, education, and general well being;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Angelica W., 49 Conn.App. 541, 551, 714 A.2d 1265 (1998).

Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the department has failed to meet its burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to his father.

In reaching this conclusion, the court finds the following.   Since May 2008, the father has complied with the majority of the specific steps and benefited from the services provided to him to a positive extent.   His progress is similar to that made by the father in In re Cameron C. The father has kept in contact with the department.   He has attended administrative case reviews.   He has successfully completed a family violence education program, an anger management program and parenting education classes.   He participated in the Fatherhood Initiative.   He has demonstrated improvement in his parenting skills and renewed interest in his son.   He has made an effort to work with the department, although there have been serious strains in their relationship.   The father has submitted to random urine screens to rule out substance abuse.   The drug screens were all negative.   The father's home is adequate.   He has maintained continuous employment since May 2008.   The father has ties to the community and is a member of a local church.   He has maintained regular visitation for well over a year.   The visits have helped the father develop a closer relationship with his son.   The interaction of father and son was, for the most part, appropriate and the child enjoyed the time he spent with his father.   The child has not exhibited any serious behavioral issues surrounding his visits with the father.   There is a developing bond between the child and the father.   The father has a better understanding of his parental role and is demonstrating responsibility.

Overall, the father has improved his situation.   Although he has faults, the father has learned sufficient skills needed to nurture and care for Derrick G., Jr. He has demonstrated love, affection and personal concern for the child.   He moved to Connecticut in May 2008, in hopes of being reunified with the child.   The father is able to meet the child's basic needs for food, clothing and shelter.   He seems capable of furnishing social and religious guidance.   The father has demonstrated an ability to meet his parental duties and a commitment to fulfill his parental rights and responsibilities.

The department has not met its burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that placement with the father is not in the child's best interest.   The court finds that placement with the father is in the child's best interests.   Placement with the father will foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of the child's environment.   The department's concerns for the child warrant monitoring of the father's restored guardianship for a period of time.   The court finds in favor of the father regarding the best interests of the child element of proof.

The court would be remiss if it did not note that the foster family has provided the child with excellent care since May 2007.   The child has done very well and is bonded with the foster family.   The foster family is to be commended.   The father should seriously consider allowing the foster family to have contact with the child after revocation of commitment and transfer of guardianship, if the foster family wishes to do so.

C

Motion to Review Permanency Plan

The court must next address the issue of the permanency plan.   On September 25, 2008, the department filed a permanency plan of TPR and adoption.   On October 20, 2008, the father filed an objection to permanency plan.   On October 15, 2009, the department again filed a permanency plan of TPR and adoption.   The court heard the motion to review permanency plan after hearing the motion for revocation of commitment.

General Statutes § 46b-129(k) governs the approval of a permanency plan.   The statute provides in pertinent part:  “The court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child or youth and takes into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency.   The child's or youth's health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan.”  General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2).   Further, “[t]he court shall review the status of the child, the progress being made to implement the permanency plan, determine a timetable for attaining the permanency plan, determine the services to be provided to the parent if the court approves a permanency plan of reunification and the timetable for such services, and determine whether the commissioner has made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan.   The court may revoke commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child or youth.”   General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(3);  see also Practice Book § 35a-14(d).

As stated above, the court finds that cause for commitment no longer exists and that it is in the best interests of the child to be reunified with the father.   Accordingly, the department's motion to review permanency plan of TPR and adoption is denied.   The father's objection to permanency plan is sustained.   DCF must file a revised permanency plan as required by law.

D

Termination of Parental Rights

Finally, the court must address the TPR petitions for the father and mother.   The court heard the pending TPR petitions for the father and mother after hearing the motion for revocation of commitment.

The TPR procedural history is as follows.   On March 15, 2007, the first TPR petition was filed regarding both parents.   On December 14, 2007, the court, Baldwin J., issued a memorandum of decision, dated December 11, 2007, denying the first TPR petition.   On January 2, 2008, DCF filed a motion for reconsideration/open and a motion for stay.   On January 3, 2008, the motion to stay was granted.   On June 25, 2008, the second TPR petition was filed regarding both parents.   On July 10, 2008, the father filed a motion to strike the TPR grounds.   On July 21, 2008, the department filed an objection to motion to strike.   On August 26, 2008, the court, Baldwin, J., granted, in part, the father's motion to strike.   On September 23, 2008, the department filed the third TPR petition regarding the father.   On November 12, 2008, the father filed a motion to strike.   On June 11, 2009, the petitioner filed an opposition to motion to strike.   On June 16, 2009, the court, Bear, J., denied the motion to strike.

By granting the motion for revocation of commitment and reinstating the guardianship of the father, the court has determined that reunification with the father is the disposition that is in the best interests of the child and, therefore, the TPR petitions are rendered moot.   See In re Mark T., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain (October 20, 2005, Rubinow, J.) n.3 (court granted respondent's motion to revoke, which “rendered moot” DCF's motion to modify visitation “and the court makes no ruling thereon”);  In re Takwon S., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (October 11, 2001, Levin, J.) (court granted TPR, and stated that, “[h]ad the court denied the petition, it would have ruled on the merits of the motion to revoke the commitment.   However, that aspect of the motion now is moot”).   In re Takeyma R., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (March 17, 2000, Schuman, J.) (court granted TPR and denied respondent's motion to revoke commitment as moot);  In re William B., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Middletown (December 29, 1999, Goldstein, J.) (court granted TPR and stated respondent's “motion to revoke is denied as moot.   Even if it were not, the motion would be denied on its merits”);  In re Tyscheicka H., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (November 5, 1999, Schuman, J.) (court granted TPR and denied respondent's motion to revoke commitment as moot), aff'd, 61 Conn.App. 19, 762 A.2d 916 (2000);  In re Stanley D., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (October 28, 1999, Schuman, J.) (court granted TPR and denied respondent's motions to revoke commitment and review permanency plan as moot), aff'd, 61 Conn.App. 224, 763 A.2d 83 (2000).

For all the reasons stated above, the termination of parental rights petitions for the father and mother are denied as moot.

IV

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

After due consideration, the court enters the following orders concerning the pending matters:

Motion for Revocation of Commitment:  GRANTED;

Motion to Review Permanency Plan:  DENIED;

TPR Petitions for the father and mother:  DENIED AS MOOT.

The court orders the disposition of revocation of commitment and reinstatement of guardianship to the father subject to a term of protective supervision by the department.

The disposition of revocation of commitment and reinstatement of guardianship with protective supervision is STAYED subject to the following orders as in the best interests of the child:

1.  The father must submit to three random urine screens, the first screen no later than five business days from the date of this order.   DCF must make the arrangements for the drug testing;

2.  The father must cooperate with a home visit by the department.   DCF must conduct the home visit within ten business days of this order;

3.  The father's supervised visits are to increase to 2 two-hour visits per week;

4.  The father must make arrangements to enroll the child in a licensed childcare facility where the child will remain while the father is working.   DCF must assist the father with child care arrangements;

5.  DCF should refer the father to a different reunification service provider as soon as possible.   The father must cooperate with any reunification service provider;

6.  The father must cooperate with a court-ordered psychological evaluation.   The case is to be scheduled for a case status conference to discuss the details of the evaluation.   The evaluation must take into consideration that the child has not been in the father's care and custody since June 15, 2006.   The evaluation must include a clinical assessment of the father and a Father-Child interaction session.   The evaluator must make recommendations including, but not limited to, the following:  (a) a step-by-step reunification plan which increases parenting time through extended supervised visits, unsupervised visits and overnight visits;  (b) an appropriate safety plan, if recommended;  (c) additional services for the father, including anger management counseling and parenting education classes, if recommended;  (d) counseling for the child, if recommended;  and (e) any specific steps recommended.

The case is to be scheduled for a case status conference for review of the court-ordered evaluation report and consideration of a reunification plan and specific steps.³  The conference is to be followed by a dispositional hearing.

DCF is ordered to file a case status report, with copies to all the attorneys in the case, no later than five business days before the conference.   The case status report must include, but is not limited to, information regarding the father's compliance with services provided, childcare arrangements, home visit result, random urine screen results, and reunification plans.   The attorneys in the case are ordered to submit to the Court any applicable pleadings and proposed orders, no later than two business days prior to the conference, for use by the Court in establishing or modifying any orders.

After the dispositional hearing, the court will enter orders in the best interests of the child including, but not limited to, vacating the stay and imposing a term of protective supervision or modifying the disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Bentivegna, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The father was ordered to comply with the following specific steps:Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.Keep child(ren)'s whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child(ren).Participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals:  parenting, individual.Goals (specify):  learn parenting skills;  address anger and DV and understand the impact on the child.Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including in-patient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.Submit to random drug testing;  time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.Bristol Parent and Child Center-parenting educationWheeler Clinic or similar agency for anger management or DV counseling services ABH, Wheeler Clinic-substance abuse evaluation.Cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing.Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.Sign releases within 30 days authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this Court.Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.Not engage in substance abuse.Have no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child(ren).Visit the child(ren) as often as DCF permits..  FN1. The father was ordered to comply with the following specific steps:Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.Keep child(ren)'s whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child(ren).Participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals:  parenting, individual.Goals (specify):  learn parenting skills;  address anger and DV and understand the impact on the child.Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including in-patient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.Submit to random drug testing;  time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.Bristol Parent and Child Center-parenting educationWheeler Clinic or similar agency for anger management or DV counseling services ABH, Wheeler Clinic-substance abuse evaluation.Cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing.Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.Sign releases within 30 days authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this Court.Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.Not engage in substance abuse.Have no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child(ren).Visit the child(ren) as often as DCF permits.

FN2. Practice Book § 35a-14A provides:  “A party may file a motion seeking revocation of commitment.   The judicial authority may revoke commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child or youth.   Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.   The party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists.   If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.   If a motion for revocation is denied, a new motion shall not be filed by the movant until at least six months have elapsed from the date of the filing of the prior motion unless waived by the judicial authority.”.  FN2. Practice Book § 35a-14A provides:  “A party may file a motion seeking revocation of commitment.   The judicial authority may revoke commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child or youth.   Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.   The party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists.   If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.   If a motion for revocation is denied, a new motion shall not be filed by the movant until at least six months have elapsed from the date of the filing of the prior motion unless waived by the judicial authority.”

FN3. Practice Book § 35a-12 provides in relevant part:  “(a) When protective supervision is ordered, the judicial authority will set forth any conditions of said supervision including duration, specific steps and review dates. (b) A protective supervision order shall be scheduled for an in court review and reviewed by the judicial authority at least thirty days prior to its expiration.   At said review, an updated social study shall be provided to the judicial authority ․ (d) Parental or guardian noncompliance with the order of protective supervision shall be a ground for a motion to modify the disposition.   Upon finding that the best interests of the child so warrant, the judicial authority on its own motion or acting on a motion of any party and after notice is given and hearing has been held, may modify a previously entered disposition of protective supervision in accordance with the applicable General Statutes.”.  FN3. Practice Book § 35a-12 provides in relevant part:  “(a) When protective supervision is ordered, the judicial authority will set forth any conditions of said supervision including duration, specific steps and review dates. (b) A protective supervision order shall be scheduled for an in court review and reviewed by the judicial authority at least thirty days prior to its expiration.   At said review, an updated social study shall be provided to the judicial authority ․ (d) Parental or guardian noncompliance with the order of protective supervision shall be a ground for a motion to modify the disposition.   Upon finding that the best interests of the child so warrant, the judicial authority on its own motion or acting on a motion of any party and after notice is given and hearing has been held, may modify a previously entered disposition of protective supervision in accordance with the applicable General Statutes.”

Bentivegna, James M., J.