David Colson v. Diane Colson (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law by a preponderance of the evidence.

The parties intermarried on September 18, 1982.   Both parties have resided continuously in the state of Connecticut for at least one year prior to the commencement of this dissolution action.   Neither the parties nor their children have been recipients of federal or state assistance.   Two children are issues of the marriage, Michael, born March 23, 1990 and Matthew, born October 2, 1995.   The defendant, Diane Colson, initiated a dissolution action in 2007 but on the eve of trial in March of 2009 she withdrew the action.   The plaintiff, David Colson, filed this present dissolution action in April of 2009.   Both parties are represented by counsel and the dissolution trial commenced on December 22, 2009 and was continued to and concluded on January 4, 2010.

In January of 2010 the plaintiff turns forty-seven years old.   During the course of the marriage the plaintiff, who attended one semester of college upon his graduation from high school, has primarily been employed by various oil companies.   From 1986 to 1989 plaintiff drove an oil truck for City Fuel. In 1989 he went to work for East River Oil and in 1992 became a dispatcher for the company.   In 1992 the plaintiff went to work for Kasden Oil and at some point Kasden Oil became Petroleum Heat and Power (Petro).   The plaintiff is a supervisor for Petro and as such is a salaried employee who works five to seven days a week and is not eligible for overtime.¹  The plaintiff's gross income in 2007 was approximately $76,395 and in 2008 he grossed $78,078.   As of December 17, 2009 the plaintiff had grossed $79,953 for 2009.

The defendant is forty-seven years old.   She was the primary physical caregiver to the parties' sons and continues in the role for Matthew.   The defendant worked part time, initially as a dental assistant and then after going back to night school, as a dental hygienist.   From 2007 through 2009 the defendant earned anywhere from $45,000 to $62,000 working part time for various dental practices.   In early 2009 ² the defendant went to work for Dr. Proto but she was discharged in early December of 2009, allegedly due to her excessive texting and unnecessary conversations with the patients regarding her divorce.³  The defendant earned $38.00/hour in 2008 and she testified that in 2009 she was being paid approximately $41.00 or $42.00/hour.

In 2002, the parties purchased the plaintiff's grandmother's home from the plaintiff's mother and uncle for $142,000.   The parties put no down payment on the purchase of the home.⁴  In or by 2005 the parties spent approximately $40,600 on home improvements;  said home improvements were financed with a $100,000 prime equity line of credit.⁵

The parties agree that the present fair market value of the marital home is approximately $175,000.   The defendant estimates the balance owed on the first mortgage is approximately $117,000.   As will be discussed in greater detail shortly, the $100,000 line of credit has been completely expended.   Therefore the parties' only substantive asset, aside from the plaintiff's deferred compensation plans, has a negative equity of approximately $42,000.

The present value of the plaintiff's pension, based on an 8.5% return rate is $7,000, (defendant's exhibit C), and his deferred compensation fund is worth $100,188.80.⁶

Michael is in his second year of college at Massachusetts Maritime Academy.   Without consulting with the plaintiff, the defendant cosigned $20,000 in student loans to finance Michael's first year(s) of college.

Matthew resides in the marital home with his mother and the plaintiff has been paying a $450/week pendente lite support order at least since April of 2009.   The April 2009 court order granted the defendant exclusive possession of the marital home.   Pursuant to a pendente lite agreement and subsequent order, the parties share joint legal custody of Matthew with primary physical custody vested in the defendant.   The plaintiff is estranged from both his sons although the pendente lite order details specific parenting time allotted to the plaintiff regarding Matthew.

The parties have accumulated significant debt.   Although the parties grossed almost $106,000 in 2006, over $119,000 in 2007 and almost $126,000 in 2008 they also drew out over $10,000 from the home equity line in 2006, in excess of $20,000 in 2007 ⁷ and the balance of just under $10,000 that existed in February of 2008 was down to under $6,000 in June of 2009 and subsequently extinguished by the defendant in October or November of 2009.   It is undisputed that the defendant handled the family's finances and that the plaintiff rarely even touched the checkbook.   It was clear from the testimony of the parties that the plaintiff lacked even the rudimentary knowledge about the family's fiscal state and completely deferred to and relied on the defendant in the managing of the family's finances.⁸

The plaintiff, as the “bookkeeper” for the family dealt with the family's finances.   She testified she did what she needed to do to maintain the family's lifestyle.   When confronted with the reality that the parties' weekly income was approximately $100/week less than their weekly expenses, she characterized her handling of the family's finances as requiring her to be “creative” and that she has spent all of her life “playing catch up” and she just hoped for the best.   In essence the defendant routinely paid bills using available cash on hand and then opening up new lines of credit to cover other expenses.   At times the defendant would pay off or down one creditor or line of credit by opening up another credit card and transferring the outstanding balance.   The parties report credit card debt in the amount of approximately $30,000 and an orthodontic/hospital copay of $2,200.⁹  The plaintiff was unaware of the defendant's extensive use of credit cards and her extensive use of the home equity line of credit.

Both parties allude to the other's problems with alcohol.   The court concludes neither party proved the other's use of alcohol constituted abuse.   The court, after a careful assessment, concludes that although the parties had a combined respectable level of income, they led a lifestyle so steeped in social entertainment and discretionary spending that they incurred significant debt with little to show for it.¹⁰  The plaintiff was completely oblivious to the defendant's financing strategies and the defendant projected a level of financial acumen that she in actuality did not possess.

The plaintiff claims the marriage became problematic years ago and for years even prior to 2007, the marriage was nothing more than a business arrangement.   The defendant claims that the plaintiff's acquisition of a girlfriend (Ms. Agvent) in 2007 and his refusal to sever contact with her in 2008 is the cause of the breakdown of the marriage.   Although the parties briefly attempted marriage counseling in late 2007 and reconciled in early 2008 (to the extent that the plaintiff moved back into the marital home) the parties have remained separated since June of 2008.   Sexual relations between the plaintiff and his Ms. Agvent did not commence until the summer of 2008 and the plaintiff and his girlfriend began cohabitating in August of 2009.

The court finds that it has jurisdiction of the matter presently before it.   All statutory stays have expired.   The court finds that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.   The marriage is hereby dissolved and the parties are declared to be single and unmarried.   After considering all of the statutory criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 46b-56 et seq., as to custody, visitation and child support, C.G.S. § 46b-84 as to maintenance of health insurance coverage for the minor child, C.G.S. § 46b-82, as to the assignment of alimony, C.G.S. § 46b-81, as to assignment of property and transfer of title, C.G.S. § 46b-66a, as to the conveyance of property, C.G.S. § 46b-62, as to counsel fees, C.G.S. § 46b-56c, as to post-majority educational support orders, and C.G.S. § 46b-63, restoration of former name of spouse, as well as the applicable case law and the evidence presented at trial, the court enters the following additional orders:

Parenting Plan

(a) The father and mother will discuss and confer with each other with reference to the important issues involving the health, education, and welfare of the minor child, including but not limited to, her residence, camps, schools, religious training, non-emergency medical attention, school records and activities and all other issues that significantly involve the health, welfare and education of the child.   The parties will attempt to adopt a harmonious policy suited to the best interests of the child.

(b) Each of the parties agree to keep the other reasonably informed of the whereabouts of the child when the child is taken out of state by that parent.   If either parent has knowledge of any illness, injury, accident or other circumstances seriously affecting the health, education or welfare of said child, the parent will promptly notify the other.   The word “illness” shall mean any sickness or ailment which requires the services of a physician.   The word “injury” shall mean any injury which requires the services of a physician.   During any illness or injury or accident, both the mother and father shall have the right of reasonable access and contact with the child in addition to the other rights provided herein.

(c) Each parent shall have reasonable access to the minor child while she is with the other parent, including free and uninterrupted telephone access at reasonable hours, as well as access by mail.   Each parent shall keep the other informed of all telephone and cell phone numbers and any changes thereto.   Neither parent shall disclose the other's phone numbers to any third persons.

(d) Both parents shall exert every effort to foster a feeling of affection between the child and the other parent and neither parent shall make any disparaging remarks about the other parent to or in the presence of the child, nor do anything which may estrange the child from the other parent or which in any way may hamper the free and natural development of the child's love and respect for the other parent.

(e) Neither parent shall relocate with the minor child outside the State of Connecticut or to a location in Connecticut substantially further from the other parent's home as exists at the present time without 90 days advance written notice to the other parent and further order of the court.

(f) In the event of the illness or personal injury of the child, the first party to learn of such illness or injury shall notify the other immediately and each party shall keep the other informed at all times of the whereabouts of the child.   For the purposes of this paragraph, the word “illness” shall mean any sickness or ailment, which requires the service of a physician.   The word “injury” shall mean any injury, which requires the services of a physician.   During any illness or accident, the parents shall have the rights of reasonable access to see the child in addition to the other parenting time provided herein.   Notification shall be made promptly by the fastest method of communication available to the parent with the child.

(g) Each of the parties shall keep the other informed of the whereabouts of the child while the child is with the Father or the Mother and outside the State of Connecticut overnight.   The information shall be provided in writing and shall contain the date of the trip, the location, name of hotel or overnight accommodations (if any) and a telephone number where the parent and child may be reached.   During any trips if either parent has knowledge of any illness or accident or other circumstances seriously affecting the health or welfare of the child, he/she shall promptly notify the other party.

(h) Each of the parties shall furnish the other copies of any reports from third persons concerning health, education or welfare of the child if not provided to the other parent directly.   Each parent has the responsibility to contact the child's schools, teachers, day care providers, coaches and team managers to secure the information for him/her self.   If possible, each parent shall give the other forty-eight (48) hours advance notice of any special events involving the minor child including but not limited to plays, recitals, award ceremonies, banquets, sports activities, religious ceremonies, marriages, graduations, school conferences, sports meets and other ceremonies.   Each party shall be responsible to transport the child to sports events, ceremonies, concerts and school functions that are scheduled during their parenting responsibility.

(i) The Father and Mother shall both have liberal telephone access to the child at all times and the child shall be free to contact the Father or Mother by telephone at all times.

Custody and Visitation

The parties shall share joint legal custody of Matthew with physical custody of the child to be vested with the defendant.   At a minimum, the plaintiff shall have parenting time with Matthew as previously ordered by the court in April of 2009.   Specifically, the plaintiff shall have parenting time with Matthew on Tuesdays and Thursdays each week from 5 p.m. (or sooner by agreement) until 7:30 p.m. and the plaintiff shall parent Matthew every other weekend.   The father shall transport the child in exercise of visitation.

Holidays:  Easter, Thanksgiving and Christmas shall be equally divided by the parties.   Mother's Day shall be with the mother and Father's Day shall be with the father.   Each party shall be entitled to two consecutive weeks of vacation with Matthew during the summer school vacation.

The etiology of the estrangement between father and son may in some part be due to the plaintiff's pursuance of a relationship with and eventual cohabitation with Ms. Agvent.   Although the court ordered the parties to select a communication counselor within 48 hours of the April 30th order to assist them with child related issues no evidence was presented at trial that any such counseling was attempted.   The parties are hereby ordered to immediately engage Matthew in counseling to address the child's issues surrounding this dissolution and his estrangement from his father.   The parties are to equally share in the unreimbursed cost of said counseling.

The parties shall share equally in the reasonable costs associated with Matthew's extracurricular activities.   The plaintiff shall be consulted with and be in agreement regarding said extracurricular costs prior to the costs being incurred.   If the parties cannot agree the court shall decide what constitutes a reasonable extracurricular expense.   The defendant's failure to discuss said expenses with the plaintiff in a timely manner shall negate the plaintiff's obligation to pay for fifty percent of any disputed expense.

Health Insurance

The plaintiff shall maintain health insurance for Matthew.   Provided the plaintiff's current employer continues to offer the health insurance plan currently utilized for Matthew at a reasonable cost then said health insurance shall remain the operative policy.   If the present health insurance were to become unavailable at a reasonable cost, the plaintiff shall obtain alternative but comparable health insurance for Matthew.   The parties will equally split the costs of unreimbursed medical expenses for the minor child.

Given the court's other financial orders the defendant shall be solely responsible for the cost of health insurance for herself.   The plaintiff shall cooperate fully in any attempt by the defendant to obtain COBRA insurance through his employer.

Post-Majority Educational Support

In accordance with the parties' wishes the court shall not retain jurisdiction over this issue.

Support

Obviously, the plaintiff's pursuit of an extramarital relationship significantly contributed to the demise of the marriage.   Although the plaintiff initially agreed in late 2007 to sever contact with Ms. Agvent, in March of 2008, the defendant learned that Ms. Agvent had contacted the plaintiff.   The plaintiff refused to terminate his then platonic relationship with Ms. Agvent.   When the plaintiff refused to stop speaking to Ms. Agvent the parties separated permanently and Ms. Colson pursued a divorce.   However on the eve of the first scheduled dissolution trial in March of 2009, Mrs. Colson withdrew her complaint.   Although she elected not to proceed with the divorce, the defendant never discussed with her husband the fact that she withdrew the dissolution action or her reasons behind her decision.   No subsequent discussion occurred between the parties about the future of their relationship.   The defendant claims she just hoped things would get better.

The lack of communication that existed between the parties at least during the latter part of their marriage is a major contributing factor to the demise of the marriage and is equally attributable to both of the parties.   The defendant worked hard during the course of the marriage to project to the outside world an image of family life, both from a financial and emotional standpoint that in fact did not exist.   The family's extrovertish lifestyle did not equate to a family life with open and genuine lines of communication.   The plaintiff did little to convey to his wife he felt like he was nothing more than a paycheck to the family and the defendant was so intent on maintaining a certain socioeconomic facade that she ignored the emotional and financial realities within the confines of the marriage.

On a more positive note both parties worked diligently to improve their earning capacity during the course of the marriage.   Balancing the demands of motherhood and the primary homemaker, the defendant went back to school to become a dental hygienist.   The defendant has significant earning capacity and given Matthew's age she has the ability to seek full-time employment.   If she obtains full-time employment (35 hours a week) at a rate of $42.00 an hour she has the potential to almost match the plaintiff's current earning capacity.¹¹

To his credit, the plaintiff has risen to the supervisory ranks at Petro.   He puts in long days and has a lengthy commute but has achieved an admirable earning capacity with just a high school education.

The court has endeavored to reach a fair and just distribution of the marital assets and the marital debt.   The court has also considered the best interests of Matthew;  he deserves the opportunity to remain in his childhood home until he reaches the age of majority and/or graduates from high school.   In an attempt to balance the competing interests at stake and to minimize the risk of future fiscal folly the court enters the following financial orders:

The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay an unallocated support order of $1600 per month.   From that support order the plaintiff shall pay directly to the bank/lender the monthly mortgage/HELOC equaling $1,600.   Said support order shall remain in effect until June 30, 2014.¹²

Commencing on July 1, 2014, the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant $150.00/week in alimony.   The $150.00/week alimony shall be for a term of ten years (until July 27, 2024, the defendant's sixty second birthday).   Alimony shall be nonmodifiable upward and shall be modifiable downward.   Alimony shall terminate on the first to occur of (a) the death of either party, (b) the remarriage or cohabitation of the defendant pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-86(b), or (c) July 27, 2024.¹³

Property

The plaintiff shall quit claim his interest in the marital home located at 180 Foote Street, Hamden, Ct. to the defendant within thirty days of judgment.   Commencing with the quit claim transfer and every six months thereafter, the defendant shall make a good faith effort to refinance the home to remove the plaintiff from the mortgage and the home equity line of credit.   No later than July 1, 2014, if the defendant has not completely refinanced the home and removed the plaintiff from the mortgage and home equity line, said marital home shall be immediately placed on the real estate market for sale.   The parties are ordered to cooperate in the listing and sale of the home and the house shall be listed at the fair market value.   Any offer within five percent of the listing price shall be accepted.   If no acceptable offer is forthcoming within the first thirty days then the price shall be reduced by three percent and then again by another three percent after sixty days.

Prior to placing the home on the real estate market, the plaintiff shall be afforded the opportunity to first purchase the marital home from the defendant at a fair market price.   The plaintiff shall have the right of first refusal in the event that an offer is forthcoming on the house.

The defendant shall solely be responsible for the costs associated with maintaining the home, included but not limited to homeowner's insurance in an amount that reasonably protects the marital home.   The defendant shall have exclusive possession of the home provided she maintains the home and keeps current on the utilities.   Prior to the deletion of the plaintiff's name from the mortgage and HELOC or the sale of the marital home, if the defendant becomes deficient in the costs associated with maintaining the home the plaintiff shall have the right to have the court reconsider the exclusive possession order and the July 1, 2014 sale date.

The court hereby retains jurisdiction over the sale of the marital home.

Debt

The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the credit card debt listed on the parties' financial affidavit in an amount not to exceed $30,000 ¹⁴ and that is to include the $2,200 owed to the orthodontist/hospital copay and the approximately $1,500 owed on the Tunnxis student loan.   Any credit card debt incurred after January 4, 2010 is the sole responsibility of the party who engaged in said transaction.   For reasons discussed previously, to the extent that the $20,000 college loan that the defendant cosigned becomes due and Michael defaults, the defendant shall indemnify the plaintiff and he shall be held harmless.

It is the intent of the court to offset the $42,000 debt the defendant is incurring by assuming ownership of the marital home against the credit card and miscellaneous loans now being assigned to the plaintiff.   Any facial disparity in the division of the debt is offset by the significantly increased support payment the plaintiff is obligated to meet until the home is refinanced by the defendant or sold.

The division of debt is deemed to be in the nature of support and not intended by the court to be dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Deferred Compensation/Pension

The plaintiff's 401-k and two IRAs total approximately $100,188.   The defendant's IRA totals $3,433.   In addition, the plaintiff's Petro retirement pension is presently worth approximately $7,000.   The court orders that the plaintiff's 401-k and his IRAs and the defendant's IRA be totaled and divided so that the plaintiff receives $48,310.50 and the defendant receives $55,310.50 The plaintiff shall retain his pension plan.¹⁵  A qualified domestic relation order shall be utilized if necessary and the costs for said QDRO shall be equally shared by the parties.

Bank Accounts/Bonds

Each party shall retain possession of their individual bank accounts.   Any joint accounts shall be closed and the outstanding balance/deficit equally distributed, except that any joint funds earmarked for the payment of liabilities shall be addressed prior to the closure of any joint account.

The plaintiff shall retain possession of the savings bonds listed on his financial affidavit.

Life Insurance

Each party presently has a life insurance policy with a death benefit of $150,000.   Effective immediately, each of the parties shall be liable for the premium payments as to their individual policy.   The plaintiff shall retain his life insurance policy with the defendant as the designated beneficiary until July 27, 2024, as collateral to the support/alimony order.   The defendant shall retain her life insurance policy with the plaintiff as the named beneficiary to July 1, 2014 or until the plaintiff's name is removed from the mortgage/HELOC or until the marital home is sold, whichever occurs first.

Personal Property

Automobiles:  The defendant shall immediately resume timely payment of the last four car payments owed on the Santa Fe SUV.¹⁶ Said vehicle shall belong to the defendant and she will indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless as to any costs associated with said vehicle.   The plaintiff shall retain the Ford explorer and be responsible for the costs associated with said vehicle.   The plaintiff shall indemnify and hold the defendant harmless as to any costs involving the Ford Explorer.

The parties shall attempt to harmoniously and cooperatively divide up their remaining personal property.   If they are unable to come to an agreement, Family Relations shall mediate the process.   The court shall retain jurisdiction over the parties' personal property.

Dependency Deduction and Tax Liability

For the tax year of 2009, regardless of how the parties file their taxes, they shall share equally in any tax return and likewise share equally in any tax liability for 2009.   Commencing with the first tax year in which the parties file separately and every year thereafter the plaintiff shall be entitled to take Matthew as a dependency deduction for as long as it is permitted.   The defendant shall be entitled to take Michael as a dependency deduction for as long as is permitted.

Commencing in 2010 the defendant shall be entitled to any tax deductions as to the mortgage/HELOC.

Name Change

As requested the defendant's last name shall be restored to Gruszkowski.

Attorneys Fees

Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees.

Bernadette Conway, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff has on occasion received a yearly bonus.   The issuance of a bonus is dependent on the company's but not the plaintiff's performance and the plaintiff has no input into the decision as whether a bonus will be issued to him.   Within the last five years the plaintiff has received three bonus with the most recent bonus in December of 2009 of $4,000 (before taxes).   The plaintiff's reported 2009 salary includes said bonus..  FN1. The plaintiff has on occasion received a yearly bonus.   The issuance of a bonus is dependent on the company's but not the plaintiff's performance and the plaintiff has no input into the decision as whether a bonus will be issued to him.   Within the last five years the plaintiff has received three bonus with the most recent bonus in December of 2009 of $4,000 (before taxes).   The plaintiff's reported 2009 salary includes said bonus.

FN2. Apparently in 2008 the defendant began working for Dr. Proto one day a week and only commenced working twenty-four hours a week for Dr. Proto in April of 2009.  (See plaintiff's exhibit 13.).  FN2. Apparently in 2008 the defendant began working for Dr. Proto one day a week and only commenced working twenty-four hours a week for Dr. Proto in April of 2009.  (See plaintiff's exhibit 13.)

FN3. A hearing occurred in December of 2009 regarding the defendant's eligibility for unemployment compensation.   The defendant reported that on or about December 18, 2009 she began receiving $577/week in unemployment benefits and if she works a Saturday it is reduced to $460/week..  FN3. A hearing occurred in December of 2009 regarding the defendant's eligibility for unemployment compensation.   The defendant reported that on or about December 18, 2009 she began receiving $577/week in unemployment benefits and if she works a Saturday it is reduced to $460/week.

FN4. Prior to the purchase of the present marital home the parties resided in a condominium.   The court heard no evidence as to whether the parties rented or owned said condominium.   Additionally, defendant's exhibit H reflects a HUD settlement statement for May of 2003 in which the parties secured a loan amount for $132,000.   Both parties testified the house was completely financed with no down payment..  FN4. Prior to the purchase of the present marital home the parties resided in a condominium.   The court heard no evidence as to whether the parties rented or owned said condominium.   Additionally, defendant's exhibit H reflects a HUD settlement statement for May of 2003 in which the parties secured a loan amount for $132,000.   Both parties testified the house was completely financed with no down payment.

FN5. In 2005 an approximately $18,000 disbursement was made from the $100,000 line of credit to reimburse the plaintiff's mother for a loan she had extended to the parties..  FN5. In 2005 an approximately $18,000 disbursement was made from the $100,000 line of credit to reimburse the plaintiff's mother for a loan she had extended to the parties.

FN6. The defendant has an IRA of $3,433.00..  FN6. The defendant has an IRA of $3,433.00.

FN7. The court notes that the January 2008 statement, (plaintiff's exhibit 7), reflects an outstanding cash availability of over $35,000.   However, by February 2008 the cash available balance was again under $10,000.   (Plaintiff's exhibit 6.).  FN7. The court notes that the January 2008 statement, (plaintiff's exhibit 7), reflects an outstanding cash availability of over $35,000.   However, by February 2008 the cash available balance was again under $10,000.   (Plaintiff's exhibit 6.)

FN8. The plaintiff's paycheck was turned over to the defendant or subsequently directly deposited into the family's checking account.   Routinely, the plaintiff received a $60.00/week allowance from the defendant..  FN8. The plaintiff's paycheck was turned over to the defendant or subsequently directly deposited into the family's checking account.   Routinely, the plaintiff received a $60.00/week allowance from the defendant.

FN9. Without consulting with the plaintiff, the defendant cosigned a $20,000 college student loan for son Michael.   The defendant would only become responsible for payment on that loan if Michael were to default on it.   The court does not consider that an outstanding debt of the marriage and the plaintiff shall be held harmless regarding that loan..  FN9. Without consulting with the plaintiff, the defendant cosigned a $20,000 college student loan for son Michael.   The defendant would only become responsible for payment on that loan if Michael were to default on it.   The court does not consider that an outstanding debt of the marriage and the plaintiff shall be held harmless regarding that loan.

FN10. The defendant contends the children's involvement in youth/school hockey resulted in the parties incurring debt.   The court concludes the cost of hockey, even considering the costs associated with tournaments, does not adequately explain or justify the magnitude of debt the parties have incurred over the past several years.   It is clear to the court that the parties' mismanagement of their finances centered around a social and entertainment lifestyle that exceeded their means..  FN10. The defendant contends the children's involvement in youth/school hockey resulted in the parties incurring debt.   The court concludes the cost of hockey, even considering the costs associated with tournaments, does not adequately explain or justify the magnitude of debt the parties have incurred over the past several years.   It is clear to the court that the parties' mismanagement of their finances centered around a social and entertainment lifestyle that exceeded their means.

FN11. The defendant testified that she earns $42.00/hour. If she were to work a thirty-five hour work week for 52 weeks a year she would gross $76,440.   The plaintiff's 2009 income at the time of trial was $79,953..  FN11. The defendant testified that she earns $42.00/hour. If she were to work a thirty-five hour work week for 52 weeks a year she would gross $76,440.   The plaintiff's 2009 income at the time of trial was $79,953.

FN12. Matthew will turn eighteen years old in October of 2013.   It is unclear as to whether he will graduate from high school in 2013 or 2014, thus June 30, 2014 ensures that Matthew will be able to remain in the family home with appropriate financial support through graduation..  FN12. Matthew will turn eighteen years old in October of 2013.   It is unclear as to whether he will graduate from high school in 2013 or 2014, thus June 30, 2014 ensures that Matthew will be able to remain in the family home with appropriate financial support through graduation.

FN13. Obviously, both parties are under a continuing obligation of child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.   It is the court's intent that the $1,600/month support payment is in the nature of support and thus not dischargeable in bankruptcy..  FN13. Obviously, both parties are under a continuing obligation of child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines.   It is the court's intent that the $1,600/month support payment is in the nature of support and thus not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

FN14. It was difficult to ascertain the exact amount of credit card debt.   Any amount in excess of $30,000 that was incurred prior to January 4, 2010 shall be equally split between the parties..  FN14. It was difficult to ascertain the exact amount of credit card debt.   Any amount in excess of $30,000 that was incurred prior to January 4, 2010 shall be equally split between the parties.

FN15. If the actual value of the funds differ from the amounts reported at trial it is the intent of the court that the parties equally split said funds.   Defendant's counsel suggested during closing argument that in order to avoid the expense of a qualified domestic relation order, the plaintiff exclusively retain his pension and the defendant receive a proportionately greater portion of the deferred compensation to offset her not receiving 50% of the pension.   Hence the total value of the 401-k and the three IRA's equal $103,621.   A equitable split would equal $51,810.50.   Adding $3,500 to $51,810.50 equals $55,310.50 and subtracting $3,500 equals $48,310.50.   It is the order of the court that a similar calculation be done with the exact totals as they exist at the time of the judgment..  FN15. If the actual value of the funds differ from the amounts reported at trial it is the intent of the court that the parties equally split said funds.   Defendant's counsel suggested during closing argument that in order to avoid the expense of a qualified domestic relation order, the plaintiff exclusively retain his pension and the defendant receive a proportionately greater portion of the deferred compensation to offset her not receiving 50% of the pension.   Hence the total value of the 401-k and the three IRA's equal $103,621.   A equitable split would equal $51,810.50.   Adding $3,500 to $51,810.50 equals $55,310.50 and subtracting $3,500 equals $48,310.50.   It is the order of the court that a similar calculation be done with the exact totals as they exist at the time of the judgment.

FN16. The defendant stopped making payments on the Sante Fe in August of 2009, even though there were only four payments left on the vehicle.   When questioned as to whether the vehicle is in jeopardy of being repossessed the defendant testified that a letter had arrived at the home regarding the vehicle but that she had not opened the letter because she was afraid to do so..  FN16. The defendant stopped making payments on the Sante Fe in August of 2009, even though there were only four payments left on the vehicle.   When questioned as to whether the vehicle is in jeopardy of being repossessed the defendant testified that a letter had arrived at the home regarding the vehicle but that she had not opened the letter because she was afraid to do so.

Conway, Bernadette, J.