Pamela Thomas v. LLC (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is an application for discharge or reduction of mechanic's liens filed by the plaintiff seeking to discharge or reduce a mechanic's lien placed by the defendant on the plaintiff's property located at 149 Scotland Road, Sprague, Connecticut.

The facts are not in dispute.   The plaintiff entered into a construction contract dated April 2, 2008, with Malek Construction.   A certificate of mechanic's lien, dated March 18, 2009, was filed by Malek Construction, LLC. The LLC is not registered to do the work under the contract.   Only Seth Malek d/b/a Malek Construction is registered to do such work.

The sole issue before the court is whether the use of the term “Malek Construction, LLC” in the certificate of mechanic's lien rather than “Seth Malek d/b/a/ Malek Construction” invalidates the mechanic's lien.

The law as to construction of a mechanic's lien was set forth in First Constitution Bank v. Harbor Village Ltd. Partnership, 230 Conn. 807, 815-17 (1994), as follows:

It is well established that a mechanic's lien will not be valid unless the person having such claim shall, within a stated time, lodge with the town clerk of the town in which said building is situated a certificate in writing, describing the premises, the amount claimed as a lien thereon, and the date of the commencement of the services or the furnishing of materials.   We also have repeatedly stated, however, that, although a mechanic's lien is in derogation of the common law, we do not compel a strict construction of its requirements.   We have long endorsed a policy favoring liberal construction of claimed inadequacies in certificates of mechanic's liens in order to achieve the remedial purposes of the mechanic's lien statutes.   We recognize that the remedial purpose of mechanic's lien law is to furnish security for a contractor's labor and materials and that this beneficent purpose requires a generous construction.

In accordance with this policy, our courts have been liberal in validating liens despite claimed errors on the face of the lien certificate where the mistake was made in good faith and no resulting prejudice was claimed.   As we have reasoned many times, we do not think a court of equity can be called upon to declare [a] lien utterly void upon the motion of persons who have lost nothing by [the] mistake.

Therefore, where the misstatement of the claim is intentional, that is, where the statement of the claim is intentionally false, or where it is fraudulent, the lien will be void;  but where it is the result of a mistake, the misstatement of the claim will not invalidate the lien.  (Citations and quotation marks omitted.)

In Shattuck v. Beardsley, 46 Conn. 386 (1878), the description of the party furnishing materials under a mechanic's lien was “A.T. Beardsley, W.H. Wilson and W.H. Edwards, copartners under the firm name Beardsley, Edwards & Co.” and the certificate was signed “Beardsley Wilson & Co.” In finding the lien to be valid, the Supreme Court said, at page 388:

But the certificate correctly specifies the individuals who have furnished the materials, and it is signed by them in their proper partnership name.   As it does not appear that the mistake misled or prejudiced the petitioners or any one else it should not work the destruction of the lien.

In Pierce, Butler & Pierce Mfg. Corporation v. Enders, 118 Conn. 610 (1934), the Supreme Court found that an inaccuracy in a certificate of mechanic's lien describing a subcontractor as “contractor and agent” for the defendant did not invalidate the mechanic's lien.   The court said, at page 615, “the present plaintiff gained and the defendant lost nothing, and no one was misled by the error in the immaterial description of Theodore Townsend as contractor and agent of the defendant instead of subcontractor under Otis Townsend, and it is insufficient to invalidate the lien.”

In Northeastern Clearing, Inc. v. Applegate Estates, LLC et al., 48 Conn. L. Rptr. No 11, 401 (Nov. 30, 2009), a mechanic's lien filed by the plaintiff stated an erroneous date for the commencement of the work covered by the lien.   After quoting the law as to the construction of a mechanic's lien set forth in the First Constitution Bank case, the court stated, at page 403:

Employing these equitable tests, the court finds that the defendants have presented no evidence of intentional misrepresentation by the plaintiff in mistakenly reciting the date of commencement of services.   Also, there is no persuasive evidence of prejudice to the defendants by plaintiff's use of the older date in the lien.   To the contrary, this appears to be a good faith mistake by the plaintiff in stating the date of the commencement of services.   Also, this is not a case where the plaintiff has completely failed to supply a commencement date.   It did supply a commencement date.   There was a mistake in the date only.   Thus, the equities tip in favor of the plaintiff.   Therefore, there is no reason to invalidate the lien.

In the present case, the error made by the defendant in the name used in the mechanic's lien certificate was the result of a mistake made in good faith and not an intentional misrepresentation and no resulting prejudice was claimed by the plaintiff.

Accordingly, based on the above cases, the court finds that the mechanic's lien is not invalidated because of the error in the defendant's name.

Counsel for the parties have agreed that if the court does not invalidate the mechanic's lien because of the error in the defendant's name, the plaintiff will be allowed to offer an additional witness to establish its claims.   Counsel should arrange with the caseflow office for a date to offer such witness.

Seymour L. Hendel, J.T.R.

Hendel, Seymour L., J.T.R.