IN RE: Andrea S.1 (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

The commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”, the “Department” or the “petitioner”) seeks the termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother, Jasnelly S. (“Mother”), and the respondent father, John Doe (“Father”), to Andrea S. (“Andrea”) pursuant to a termination of parental rights (“TPR”) petition filed on July 7, 2009.

The court has jurisdiction and there is no known action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child.   There is no claim of Native American affiliation of the child.

The proceedings relative to the termination of parental rights are governed by General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 (1991);  Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7.   Notwithstanding the foregoing, “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  (Emphasis in original.)   In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

Only one ground need be established for the granting of a TPR petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 242-43 (2000).   If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage.   Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence termination is in the child's best interest.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial and a review of the judicially noticed court orders, memoranda and findings supports the finding of the following facts.²  Unless otherwise specified, all facts are found by clear and convincing evidence.

A. Procedural History

On January 3, 2007, after having received a report from St. Francis Hospital of the birth of a child to Mother and of Mother functioning at the level of a thirteen year old, being homeless and having no place to take the baby, the Department invoked a ninety-six-hour administrative hold on the child.   On January 5, 2007, the Department filed an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (“OTC”) and a Neglect Petition.   The OTC was granted on the same date.   Mother elected to contest the OTC. The court, Wollenberg, J., after a contested hearing, sustained the OTC on January 26, 2007.   On June 14, 2007, Andrea was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Department.   She has remained committed to date.   On July 10, 2008, Mother filed a motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship of Andrea to maternal grandmother.   The petitioner filed an objection to the same on September 8, 2008.   On April 9, 2009, this court denied the Mother's motion and sustained the petitioner's objection thereto.   On July 7, 2009, the Department filed the TPR petition.

Father has not appeared in these proceedings and a default was entered on August 6, 2009.   With respect to Father, juvenile proceedings being, essentially, civil proceedings, the default against the Father effectively admits the truth of the petitioner's material allegations.   This admission satisfies the petitioner's obligations.   However, this Court will review the evidence submitted by the petitioner in making its determination.

B. Mother

Mother is twenty-five years old.   She was born in Puerto Rico and came to the United States sometime around 1987.   Mother has a heart condition having been born with five holes in her heart.   She has two siblings.   Her sister reportedly resides in the Hartford area although Mother has denied having knowledge of her whereabouts.   Her younger brother until relatively recently resided with maternal grandmother.   Maternal grandmother has a reported history with DCF in Connecticut and with the equivalent child protection agencies in New Jersey and Puerto Rico relating to her care of all three of her children.

At the time of Andrea's birth, Mother presented as having cognitive limitations;  she had difficulty understanding and remembering basic information.   The hospital reported Mother functioned at the level of a thirteen year old.   Mother was homeless after having been evicted from her apartment due to her failure to pay rent.   She did not have a safe place to take Andrea.   Maternal grandmother reported to DCF that she, due to Mother's aggressive behaviors, would not allow Andrea and Mother to reside with her.

Mother reportedly graduated from high school.   She also reported receiving special education services in eleventh and twelfth grade.   Although she has previously worked in her “step-father's” clothing store in Hartford, she is not currently employed.   During her psychological evaluation Mother indicated she was trying to get a job, but was being rejected as “[e]very place I go they tell me I'm too slow.” ³

Mother has denied any history of drug or alcohol abuse.   There were reports of Mother's previous paramour, “Alex”, being actively involved with illegal drugs and concerns were raised by maternal grandmother that Mother was providing her money to Alex for the purchase of drugs.   There were also reports of Alex engaging in domestic violence with Mother.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

C. Father

The biological father of Andrea is not known.   Mother initially named a previous neighbor, a fifty-four-year old male.   He was ruled out by a paternity test.   Mother has not named any other possible father and no father has come forward of his own volition.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

B. The Child

Andrea was born on December 24, 2006.   Prior to her discharge from the hospital, the Department invoked a ninety-six-hour hold.   She was placed with her current non-relative foster family when she was three months old.

Andrea exhibited developmental delays and, as a result thereof, was referred by her pediatrician to Birth to Three services.   Birth to Three assisted in the development of her motor skills and provided services to address her language and speech delays.   Andrea has progressed as a result of the services provided to her and shall be transitioned from Birth to Three services to the Hartford Board of Education services on her third birthday.

Mother visits Andrea consistently.   She loves Andrea and seeks to be reunified with her.   They are clearly bonded to each other.

Andrea has been with her present foster family for almost her entire life.   She seeks them out for comfort and is thriving in their care.   Foster mother has been receptive to the services offered to Andrea and has worked to create an environment conducive to Andrea's continued development.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

E. Specific Steps

Preliminary specific steps were ordered by the court for Mother on January 26, 2007.   Final specific steps were ordered on June 14, 2007.   The court finds the following with respect to Mother's compliance with the Specific Steps:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem.

Mother attended two out of four scheduled Administrative Case Reviews as of August 8, 2008.   Otherwise, Mother cooperated with this step.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.

Mother cooperated with this step.

Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified goals.   Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting and individual ․ counseling ․

Mother's general goals were parenting and individual counseling.   Her specific goals were to increase competency and ability to meet child's developmental needs;  address trauma, anxiety;  increase independence and support networks.

As to the general parenting goal and to assist Mother in increasing her competency and ability to meet Andrea's developmental needs Mother was referred, in January 2007, to a parenting group at Klingberg Family Centers.   Mother completed the twelve-week program on April 4, 2007.   In April 2007, Mother was referred to the Preschool Intervention Program (PIP) at Connecticut Regional Education Council (CREC) Mother was not able to complete the program as it was closed due to lack of funds.   In May 2007, Mother was also referred to the Parent Aide Program at CREC. Under the Parent Aide Program Mother was provided with six months of in home parenting services.   Upon completion of the program, it was extended for a second six-month period to continue to educate Mother in the areas of parenting and child development.   The second extension of the Parent Aide Program ended May 30, 2008.

Mother willingly participated in the parenting programs.   She self-referred to the Parents Academy offered by the City of Hartford Department of Health and Human Services and successfully completed a 12-week program on the Essentials of Parenting on December 14, 2007.

All providers consistently noted Mother, during visits, cared for Andrea's physical and emotional needs although she frequently looked to the staff for support and approval.   However, despite Mother's willingness to attend and participate in parenting classes and services, Mother continued to demonstrate an inability to independently parent Andrea.   The PIP program reported that Mother continued to have difficulty retaining information and did not have a good support network to assist her to care for Andrea.   The PIP coordinator testified that she did not recommend reunification of Mother with Andrea unless Mother had the support of another adult so Mother could be aware of the child's needs.   The CREC parent aide program was extended beyond the initial six-month program as Mother had made very limited progress.   Upon the termination of the second six-month program it was reported Mother needed constant guidance and encouragement and she appeared to have difficulty understanding Andrea's developmental stages.

As to the individual counseling goal to address trauma and anxiety and to increase her independence and support networks, Mother was referred to Hartford Behavioral Health for individual counseling and, in May 2007, to the Mothercare Program at Interval House for a twenty-six-week support and advocacy group for women who have experienced domestic violence.

Mother successfully completed the Mothercare program on March 10, 2008.   She was reported to have “participated when asked.” ⁴

Mother attended a clinical intake assessment at Hartford Behavioral Health on May 9, 2007.   She began individual therapy on June 12, 2007 and attended weekly for about one month.   Her last attendance was on July 26, 2007 and she failed to attend scheduled appointments thereafter.   She was unsuccessfully discharged in October 2007.   The clinician testified she was concerned about Mother's perceived cognitive limitations and further testified Mother was experiencing anxiety but unable to verbalize effectively.   Mother reported she would no longer attend counseling at Hartford Behavioral Health as it was uncomfortable for her and she did not want to speak ill of maternal grandmother.   DCF offered to make other referrals for individual counseling for Mother;  the offers were rebuffed.   The worker was told that the family would arrange for counseling for Mother.   There is no evidence such arrangements were made, although Mother reported to DCF seeing someone named David, but she was not aware of David's full name, his business or agency name or what type of therapy, if any, he provided.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

Mother was compliant with this step.   She cooperated with the CREC parent aide program during both six-month periods in which the program was offered.

Cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing.

Mother was compliant with this step.   She attended a psychological evaluation with Dr. Franklin on February 20, 2007 and an update conducted on June 4, 2008.   She also participated in an interactive assessment with Andrea on February 21, 2007 and an update of the same of June 27, 2008.   She also attended a psychiatric evaluation on July 30, 2007 and was diagnosed with anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified.

Dr. Franklin, opined, in the first evaluation, with respect to expressed concerns of Mother functioning at a level indicative of mental retardation that Mother appears to have the intellectual wherewithal to function and her low level of functioning to be more likely due to social immaturity and developmental delays that are indicative of social development arrest and psychological variables than to limited cognitive function.   His opinion is that Mother “presents with such a degree of gross anxieties that it is likely sufficiently impacting upon her capacity to sufficiently engage others and navigate social systems ․” ⁵ He further opined that her ability to provide independent child care is influenced by Mother's “significant social immaturity, high dependence on others, paranoia and the influence of a mild thought disturbance.” ⁶  Dr. Franklin recommended a panoply of services, including, individual counseling to address her mood disturbance.   In the updated evaluation, Dr. Franklin reviewed the services DCF offered and provided to Mother and opined that despite Mother's increased level of involvement in the same, she had not been able to reach a level of independence that would allow her to independently care for Andrea.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.   Immediately advise DCF of changes in the composition of the household.

Mother obtained and has maintained, with assistance, a one-bedroom studio apartment since March 2007.   She has not obtained employment and relies on state assistance and subsidies together with assistance from family for her expenses.

Have no involvement or further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Mother has been compliant with this step.

Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.

Mother has been compliant with this step.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits.

Mother has been compliant with this step.   She was late for and missed only a few of her scheduled visits.

II

ADJUDICATION

The TPR petition filed by DCF for the termination of respondents' parental rights to Andrea alleges one ground in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3), ground B(i), for Mother and two grounds, grounds A and D for Father.

A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)

In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent.”  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).  “The court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 (2005).

“The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.”  Id. at 48.  “Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ․ defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted;  citation omitted.)  In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).   The court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made, In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.

As set forth above in the preceding findings of facts, Mother has been referred to numerous service providers, including, without limitation, Hartford Behavioral Health, the PIP program at CREC, the CREC parent aide program, and supervised visitation at Klingberg Family Centers.   When Mother indicated she would not attend and cooperate with Hartford Behavioral Health for individual counseling, the Department offered to make other referrals for Mother.   Mother declined the same.   The Department also provided case management services to Mother.   The court finds the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Andrea.   Mother willingly attended the parenting services offered to her, yet, despite her stated desire to reunify with her daughter, she has been unable to grasp the information imparted to her.   Despite her attendance and completion of the parenting programs, Mother continues to have difficulty comprehending and retaining information.   She does not possess sufficient skills to independently care for her child.   As noted in the recent case of In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, “[l]amentably, motivation to parent is not enough;  ability is required.”   Accordingly, the court further finds that Mother is unable to benefit from the reunification services afforded her.

The evidence is clear and convincing that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Father.   As Father has made himself unavailable to DCF, DCF was precluded from offering any services to him to facilitate his reunification with the child.   Accordingly, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, Father is unable or unwilling to benefit from any reunification efforts.

B. Termination of Father's Parental Rights to Andrea on Ground A

DCF claims Father has abandoned Andrea.   Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct.   A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment.  “Section [17a-112(j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 37 (2000).

Father has not maintained any showing of concern or responsibility for Andrea.   He has never sent cards, letters or gifts to the child.   He has never acknowledged the child's birthday or other special days.   He has not provided any financial support for Andrea.   He has not inquired as to Andrea's welfare.   He has never presented himself to assume the responsibilities of being her father.   The evidence is clear and convincing that Father has abandoned Andrea.

The court finds the petitioner has satisfied her burden and Ground A, the claim of abandonment, has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

C. Termination of Mother's Parental Rights to Andrea on Ground B(i)

The petitioner alleges that Mother's parental rights to Andrea should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

On June 14, 2007, Andrea was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF. Thus, the critical issue for this court is whether Mother has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would allow the court to find that she would be able to care for Andrea within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of the child.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85 (2001), quoting In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).   In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.  In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

In assessing rehabilitative progress, the question is not simply how far the parent has come, but has the parent come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume the role as parent in the life of the child.  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.   See also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80 (2001).  “What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.”  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694 (2000)).   Further, the court may, in considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume or resume within a reasonable time a useful role in the child's life, rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the termination of parental rights petition.  In re Stanley D., supra.   61 Conn.App. 230.

Mother:  With the above standards as the court's parameters, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, she could assume her role as a parent for Andrea.   At the time of the neglect adjudication, Mother's presenting problems arose from her apparent cognitive limitations, lack of independence, need to address previous traumas and anxieties, lack of parenting skills, homelessness and a concomitant inability to provide a safe, stable and nurturing home for Andrea.

Although Mother complied with many of the specific steps, it is not enough.

Mother had difficulty comprehending and implementing simple instructions provided to her by the parent aides.   The staff had to demonstrate to Mother what they wanted Mother to do and then had to supervise Mother as she tried to implement that which had been shown to her.   The PIP program, prior to its termination, noted that Mother was not aware of Andrea's developmental milestones and Mother needed to be prompted to engage in age appropriate activities with Andrea.   One of the PIP aides reported, for example, that, although Andrea was not yet crawling, Mother had Andrea on her feet and was indicating to the aide that Andrea was ready to walk.

One of the areas of child development Mother continued to fail to grasp was the child's need for proper nutrition.   At a February 11, 2009 visit (after completion of several parenting programs), Mother, prior to Andrea's meal time, placed donuts, a large lollipop and a muffin on the table for Andrea.   When the supervising aide stated the combination of those foods offered too much sugar for Andrea, who was then two years and two months old, Mother disagreed and indicated she was not providing too much sugar to the child.   Respondent has demonstrated that she is unable to retain and apply the parenting information presented to her.

Rehabilitation has a context and must take into consideration the age and needs of the child.   The linchpin to a determination of rehabilitation necessarily includes a finding that the parent can begin or resume parenting within a reasonable period of time.   The question is not simply one of rehabilitation;  it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe.   See, In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85.

Andrea has been in care since she was a few days old.   She is now approximately three years old.   She has experienced developmental delays which have been addressed by Birth to Three services.   She will continue to need to receive the benefit of special education services, at least for the foreseeable future.   She needs someone who can, in addition to meeting her basic needs for proper and nutritious food and providing her with safe and appropriate housing, consistently advocate for her to ensure she receives the educational services she will require.   She needs consistency, stability and a parent with good enough judgment to know how to promote a healthy development and attend to her day-to-day and long term needs.   She needs and deserves permanency in her life.

Mother has difficulty meeting her own needs, including her own medical needs.   She was unable to advise DCF of the name of her cardiologist or of the date of her last medical appointment with the same.   Her inability to manage her own medical affairs inexorably leads the court to find that she would, likewise, be unable to manage Andrea's medical needs.

She does not function independently.   She presents as immature and childlike.   Dr. Franklin noted that Mother doesn't do well when presented with too many choices.   It leads to inertia.   He further noted that her “logical thinking is sufficiently impaired.” ⁷  Mother is easily distracted, nervous, confused and has a difficult time problem solving.   This behavior is not conducive to meeting the needs of a young, dependent child.

She did not engage in therapy that may have assisted her in addressing her anxiety which, in part, precludes her from functioning at a level consistent with her intellect.

The court credits the opinion of Dr. Franklin that despite Mother reporting that she “loves” and “misses” Andrea, “there is a high likelihood of neglect of the child's [sic] and emotional needs.” ⁸  “Psychological testimony from professionals is appropriately accorded great weight in termination proceedings.”  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 176, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).

Taking into considerations the findings made above together with the age of the child, her time spent in the care of the Department and her need to be raised in a home that can meet her special needs, the court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother has failed to rehabilitate to a degree as to allow for any reasonable assurance that the child could safely be returned to her care within any foreseeable time period.  “Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate;  it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her.”  In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998).

The court finds, the petitioner has met her burden and, Ground B(i), the “failure to rehabilitate” ground for termination of Mother's parental rights to Andrea, is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

D. Termination of Father's Parental Rights to Andrea on Ground D

The petitioner also seeks to terminate the parental rights of Father on the ground that there is no ongoing parent child relationship between Father and Andrea.   This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.   General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).  No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates, among others, a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them.  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46 (1980).

In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondent:  (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists;  and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child.  In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525 (2001).

As Andrea's father is unknown, there have, obviously been no visits between them.   He has chosen to absent himself from Andrea's life and as a result thereof, Andrea would not recognize Father;  he is a virtual stranger to Andrea.   It is not possible for Andrea to have developed a positive memory of Father.   It is clear that there is no ongoing parent child relationship between Father and Andrea.   Andrea is approximately three years old.   There is no reason to allow additional time for the establishment of a relationship due to Andrea's age, her time in care and her biological father's failure to come forward.

The court finds the petitioner has met her burden and Ground D is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

To conclude, the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one statutory ground exists for the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to Andrea.   Having so determined, the court must next consider whether clear and convincing evidence has been presented that it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights of the respondents to Andrea be terminated.

III

DISPOSITION

During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.”  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 863, cert. den., 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).  “In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k) ].”  In re Jonathon C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)).   The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate the parental rights of the respondents.

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondent.   The court finds DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Mother and Andrea.   DCF was unable to offer services to Father.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.   The court finds the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Andrea;  however, Mother has been unable to benefit from the offered services.   The Department was precluded from making reasonable efforts to reunite Father with Andrea by virtue of him being unknown.

(3) As to the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent Mother.   As set forth above, Mother has complied with many of the steps, but she has been unable to benefit therefrom to a degree that would permit the court to find she could parent this child within a reasonable period of time.   DCF complied with such steps.   As Father is unknown, specific steps DP1⌑(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.   Andrea has, basically, had only one placement as she has been with her foster family since she was three months old.   Dr. Franklin, in his second evaluation, stated that the psychological parent of a child is that individual or individuals who provide consistent and readily available, psychological, emotional and physical care to a child.   The foster family has provided such care.   They love her and are meeting her day-to-day needs as well as helping to address her developmental delays.   The court further finds that Mother loves her child and Andrea loves Mother.   They are bonded to each other.   Mother has never, however, provided care for Andrea in any setting other than in supervised visits.   Father has not demonstrated that he has any feelings for this child.

At the termination of parental rights trial, Mother requested the court consider alternative dispositions in determining what would be in the best interest of Andrea.   The court notes, however, at the time of the trial on the TPR petition, there was no motion pending for a transfer of guardianship to maternal grandmother or to any other person.

Mother's extended family has been offered as a resource to assist Mother in parenting Andrea.   The court finds Mother and her family to have a complex and conflicted relationship with each other.   Mother has not demonstrated she can independently form her own opinions as to what is in her and Andrea's best interest.   Mother has, at times, been influenced by the inappropriate behaviors and opinions of maternal grandmother and uncle.   At the inception of the case, Mother, at her extended family's behest, was not participating in services.   At a visit on March 16, 2009, Andrea was observed to be playing with her fingers.   Maternal grandmother and uncle became upset and concerned about what Andrea was being taught at the foster home as they, improbably, stated to the supervising aide that Andrea was flashing gang signs.   At the same visit, Mother was observed telling Andrea to tell maternal grandmother to shut up and also to hit and slap maternal grandmother.   At a recent visit, the current worker attempted to sit in and observe the relationship of Mother and Andrea and maternal uncle prevented her from doing so.

This court on April 9, 2009, denied a transfer of guardianship of Andrea to maternal grandmother.   The court, in denying the Mother's motion, found, inter alia, the child protective services history of maternal grandmother revealed a disturbing pattern of abuse and neglect.   The evidence introduced at the termination of parental rights trial has not, by any standard of evidence, swayed the court from the decision made earlier-to deny any transfer of guardianship to maternal grandmother.   She is free to present herself to DCF as an adoptive resource for consideration by DCF in the ordinary course.

Furthermore, Mother at the TPR trial called as a witness David R. (“David”).  David is a staff sergeant in the United States Army. He recently, within the past month or so, married maternal grandmother.   David testified that he would, together with MGM, be willing to raise Andrea.   David also testified that he will be deploying to Iraq on or about November 18, 2009.   He will be gone for not less than one year and, accordingly, for at least the next year of this young child's life, he will be unavailable to her.   David has never met Andrea.   He testified that he provided transportation to Mother and maternal grandmother to visits with Andrea, but he did not attend the visits.   He did not ask to attend the visits.   He, until the trial on the TPR never presented himself as a resource.   The court finds that David is not a viable resource for Andrea at this time or at any time that is reasonable given her age and need for permanency.

(5) As to the age of the child:  Andrea, having been born on December 24, 2006, is almost three years old.

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the children;  the court finds as follows:  Mother has made efforts to address her parenting deficits.   She has not made efforts to address her past trauma and present anxiety by participating in individual therapy.   The court finds she has not been able to adjust her circumstances, conduct and behavior to make it in the best interest of Andrea that she should be reunified with Mother in the foreseeable future.

Father has made no effort to adjust his circumstances, condition or conduct.   He has not maintained contact with his child, he has made no contribution to her welfare and he has failed to maintain contact with the guardian of the child.   The court finds he has not adjusted his circumstances, conduct and behavior to make it in the best interest of Andrea that she be reunified with Father in the foreseeable future.   Giving Father a reasonable period of additional time would not bring his performance as a parent to an acceptable level.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parent(s) or third parties nor does the court find economic circumstances of the respondents preventing a meaningful relationship with Andrea.

In addition to considering the evidence presented in this case, the court has also considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the child including the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, continuity of her environment, length of stay in foster care, the nature of the child's relationship with the foster and biological parents and the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the biological parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).   Although Mother loves her child and is bonded to her, the best interest of the child calls for permanency and the court accordingly finds that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is in the best interest of this child.   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 768 (2007).

In determining the best interests of this child, the court has also considered the attorney for the child advocated for the termination of the respondents' parental rights.   Based upon all of the foregoing, the court by clear and convincing evidence finds termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father as to Andrea to be in the best interest of the child.

IV

ORDERS

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Mother to Andrea are hereby terminated.

It is further, ORDERED, that the parental rights of Father to Andrea are hereby terminated.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for this child.

The Commissioner will file, within thirty days hereof, a report as to the status of this child and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court all as required by Law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over the subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date an adoption is finalized.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

It is so ordered this 16h day of November 2009.

BY THE COURT,

Olear, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect.   See Cohn C. Tait & Eliot D. Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed.2008)..  FN2. The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect.   See Cohn C. Tait & Eliot D. Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed.2008).

FN3. Exhibit K, page 3..  FN3. Exhibit K, page 3.

FN4. Exhibit 5..  FN4. Exhibit 5.

FN5. Exhibit K, page 6..  FN5. Exhibit K, page 6.

FN6. Exhibit K, page 7..  FN6. Exhibit K, page 7.

FN7. Exhibit L, page 14..  FN7. Exhibit L, page 14.

FN8. Exhibit K, page 7..  FN8. Exhibit K, page 7.

Olear, Leslie I., J.