Michael Torres v. Khankeo Siriphongsavath (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE, # 101

On June 8, 2009, the plaintiff, Michael Torres, filed this two-count complaint against the defendant, Khankeo Siriphongsavath, alleging that on June 15, 2008, Torres was seated in a parked motor vehicle when the vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant, which in turn caused the plaintiff's vehicle to strike a parked vehicle in front of it.

Count one alleges that the defendant was negligent in operating his motor vehicle.   Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in a number of ways, including failing to keep his vehicle under proper control, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to apply his brakes in time to avoid the collision, failing to turn his vehicle so as to avoid a collision, operating his vehicle with inadequate brakes, and violating General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-227a, and 14-230(a).

Count two alleges that the defendant was reckless in operating his motor vehicle in that his injuries were caused by the defendant due to his operation of his motor vehicle “with reckless disregard and in violation of” General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-227a, and 14-230(a).   Specifically, he alleges that the defendant (a) “operated said vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 14-218a”;  (b) “operated said motor vehicle while his ability to operate same was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 14-227a”;  and (c) “failed to drive upon the right-hand side of the highway, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 14-230(a).”   The plaintiff alleges the defendant's violation of §§ 14-218a, 14-227a, and 14-230(a), were a substantial factor in causing his injuries and losses, he is seeking double and treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 under count two.

The defendant has filed a motion to strike count two and the request for double or treble damages, arguing that the plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to sustain a recklessness claim.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   “A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006).  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006).

The defendant argues in his motion to strike that the recklessness count pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 should be stricken on the grounds that the plaintiff “has failed to allege any supporting facts to establish the essential elements of reckless conduct.”   Any claim for relief on that basis should also be stricken.   The defendant contends that the plaintiff has merely adopted and repeated the allegations of count one of simple negligence.

General Statutes § 14-295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.”

The appellate courts have not decided what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness under § 14-295 and, thus, a division of opinion has occurred amongst the judges of the superior court.   See e.g., Flores v. Viveros-Velazquez, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. 063971 (November 21, 2000).   There are two lines of cases, the first representing the minority view, which holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory violation as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law.¹  “Relying on the usual rules of pleading, these courts generally reason that a plaintiff who is alleging recklessness must allege specific facts that informs both the court and the defendant what conduct is relied upon.”   Robbins v. Gondek, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 07-6000285 (March 18, 2008).

The second line of cases, referred to as the majority view, distinguishes between pleading common law recklessness and statutory recklessness, thus holding that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14-295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.²  “The majority view is based on both an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself.   These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 140295.”   Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 00-509116 (October 11, 2001).   After a careful review of both lines of cases, this court agrees that the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14-295 requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.

The essential allegations of count two in the plaintiff's complaint in this case are that when the defendant drove his car at an unsafe speed in violation of § 14-218a, or drove under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, in violation of § 14-227a, or failed to drive on the proper side of the road, in violation of § 14-230(a), such that the defendant caused a collision that injured the plaintiff, the defendant engaged in reckless conduct under § 14-295, and that those violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   As pleaded, the second count sounding in statutory recklessness is legally sufficient as is the accompanying claim for double or treble damages.

CONCLUSION

The motion to strike is denied.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. See McGuire-Kelley v. Sciuto, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 99-428860 (October 1, 1999);  Chatterton v. Infinity Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 98-064615 (October 1, 1999);  Nocera v. Besso, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 98-086777 (September 29, 1999);  Reed v. Sesta, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 98-5777273 (June 19, 1998)..  FN1. See McGuire-Kelley v. Sciuto, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 99-428860 (October 1, 1999);  Chatterton v. Infinity Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 98-064615 (October 1, 1999);  Nocera v. Besso, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 98-086777 (September 29, 1999);  Reed v. Sesta, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 98-5777273 (June 19, 1998).

FN2. See Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 08-5008707 (August 28, 2008);  Sony v. Arselli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01-0386408 (May 14, 2002);  Woolums v. Deveny, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 01-454434 (November 7, 2001);  Donahue v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 01-161182 (February 28, 2001);  Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99-0169861 (September 27, 1999);  Nelson-Hlebogiannis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 98-0167571 (May 17, 1999);  Carta v. Cohn, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 98-0262531..  FN2. See Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 08-5008707 (August 28, 2008);  Sony v. Arselli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01-0386408 (May 14, 2002);  Woolums v. Deveny, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 01-454434 (November 7, 2001);  Donahue v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 01-161182 (February 28, 2001);  Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99-0169861 (September 27, 1999);  Nelson-Hlebogiannis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 98-0167571 (May 17, 1999);  Carta v. Cohn, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 98-0262531.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.