Anthony Novak, Trustee v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The plaintiff, Anthony Novak, Trustee of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate of ONE/CHANE, Inc. filed a three-count first amended complaint against the defendant, Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (“CRRA”) seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment.   The plaintiff alleges that ONE/CHANE, a non-profit neighborhood revitalization organization, entered into a “Community Support Agreement” with CRRA in which ONE/CHANE agreed not to oppose CRRA's May 1999 landfill expansion permit application in exchange for grant payments totaling almost $10 million into a neighborhood economic development account.   CRRA subsequently withdrew the permit application and filed a new application, which was granted by the Department of Environmental Protection.   The plaintiff claims that CRRA breached its agreement with ONE/CRANE because it did not make any payments into the neighborhood economic development account.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant have filed motions for summary judgment.   After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the court finds that there are numerous disputed factual issues remaining that preclude the granting of either motion.

“A court shall render summary judgment ‘if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’   Practice Book § 17-49.  ‘In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ․ The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The test is whether the party moving for summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.’  “ Stearns & Wheler v. Kowalsky Brothers, 289 Conn. 1, 9, 955 A.2d 538 (2008).   Summary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.  Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751, 660 A.2d 810 (1995).

Turning first to the plaintiff's motion, the issue of whether the defendant acted in bad faith is certainly a genuine issue of material fact disputed by the defendant.   While the plaintiff characterizes the defendant's conduct as “a ruse,” the court will not make determinations regarding the defendant's intent on a motion for summary judgment.   See Town Bank & Trust Co. v. Benson, 176 Conn. 304, 309, 407 A.2d 971 (1978).   Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding whether the withdrawal of the original permit application, the later applications and ultimately whether the granting of the later permit expanded the landfill or whether the withdrawal and resubmission constituted a “ruse” as claimed by the plaintiff all involve factual issues that require a full trial, including testimony, so the court gets a full picture of the entire process, which spans many years of negotiation and applications.   Finally, CRRA raises the significant issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim money damages as a result of the alleged breach by CRRA, rather than seeking specific performance.   The Community Support Agreement calls for no payments directly to ONE/CHANE, but for deposits into a neighborhood economic development account.   The court is troubled by the plaintiff's failure to seek specific performance and questions the plaintiff's right to seek money damages for the alleged breach.   The court will not, however, make a determination as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim money damages at this point in the proceedings, without giving the plaintiff the full opportunity to present its claim at trial.

With respect to CRRA's motion, the court similarly will not make factual determinations at this juncture based upon the paper record presented regarding the years of negotiation and circumstances surrounding the history of the permit applications, their effect on the size or capacity of the landfill and their impact on the agreement between ONE/CHANE and CRRA. Both parties have presented differing versions and interpretations of the facts and it would be improper, at this stage, to make factual determinations based solely upon the documents and transcripts submitted by the parties.  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to decide issues of fact;  its function is to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact.”   Vaillancourt v. Latifi, 81 Conn.App. 541, 544 n.4, 840 A.2d 1209 (2004).   The motions for summary judgment are therefore denied.

So ordered,

Miller, J.

Miller, Grant H., J.