COVINO v. BERNSTEIN POISSON (2023)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

On October 7, 2021, Covino filed the underlying action for legal malpractice against the law firm of Bernstein & Poisson (B & P), which she had retained in connection with an automobile collision. In her complaint, Covino summarily alleged that B & P provided substandard service and that they settled her case for less than it was worth and without her permission. B & P filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds that it was time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice set forth in NRS 11.207. It argued that Covino's claim accrued at the latest on March 14, 2019, when she signed a closing statement approving the settlement amount and authorizing B & P to disburse the funds. In opposition, Covino argued vaguely that she did not discover the alleged malpractice until later because B & P had concealed its conduct. The district court granted B & P's motion to dismiss, agreeing with it that Covino's claim accrued on March 14, 2019, and was therefore time-barred. Covino then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. This appeal followed.

When the facts are uncontroverted, we review a district court order dismissing a complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds de novo. Nelson v. Burr, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 521 P.3d 1207, 1210 (2022). Under NRS 11.207(1), an action for legal malpractice “must be commenced within 4 years after the plaintiff sustains damage or within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the material facts which constitute the cause of action, whichever occurs earlier.” The limitation period “is tolled for any period during which the attorney ․ conceals any act, error or omission upon which the action is founded and which is known or through the use of reasonable diligence should have been known to the attorney.” NRS 11.207(2).

In her informal brief on appeal, Covino again vaguely contends that her claim is not time-barred because she did not discover the facts underlying it until sometime after March 14, 2019, as a result of supposed concealment by B & P. But Covino fails to cogently explain why it supposedly took her so long to discover the claim or why she believes the district court erred in determining that she was on notice of the claim as soon as she signed the closing statement, at which point she became aware of and approved the settlement amount. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that the appellate courts need not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument). Indeed, although she summarily states that it is “impossible” and “inconceivable” that her claim could have accrued before March 14, she makes no effort to explain why the district court was supposedly wrong in determining that she had either actual or constructive notice of the facts underlying her claim on that date. In the absence of any cogent argument on appeal, we discern no error in the district court's application of NRS 11.207, see Nelson, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 521 P.3d at 1210, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.