CORRAL MONTENEGRO REVOCABLE TRUST DATED 26 20 SAUL AND EVA CORRAL AS TRUSTEES OF THE CORRAL MONTENEGRO REVOCABLE TRUST DATED 26 20 AND SAUL AND EVA CORRAL INDIVIDUALLY v. MARGARITO CORRAL (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to challenge a district court's order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.

Real party in interest Margarito Corral initiated an action against petitioners to quiet title to a residential property in Las Vegas and asserting other various causes of action stemming from an ownership dispute over the property. The case proceeded to a court-ordered settlement conference, and the court minutes reflect that the parties reached a settlement agreement. During the conference, the parties’ attorneys exchanged emails setting forth the terms of their settlement and confirming that the terms were correct. Following the settlement conference, petitioners refused to move forward with the agreement, and Margarito filed a motion to enforce the settlement, which the district court granted, noting the parties reached an agreement and complied with DCR 16 and EDCR 7.50. The district court further stated that it maintained jurisdiction over the matter “to enforce the settlement and until dismissal consistent with the terms.” Petitioners then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus. Petitioners Corral-Montenegro Revocable Trust and Saul and Eva Corral, as trustees and individually, argue that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the parties reached a settlement agreement and enforcing that agreement.

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see also NRS 34.160. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of this court to determine if a petition will be considered. Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Petitioners bear the burden to show that extraordinary relief is warranted, and such relief is proper only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841, 844 (2004). An appeal is generally an adequate remedy precluding writ relief. Id. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. Even when an appeal is not immediately available because the challenged order is interlocutory in nature, the fact that the order may ultimately be challenged on appeal from a final judgment generally precludes writ relief. Id. at 225, 88 P.3d at 841. Moreover, an order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement becomes final and appealable only after a judgment on the settlement is entered and the case is dismissed. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 347-48, 301 P.3d 850, 853 (2013).

Having considered the petition, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary intervention is warranted. Petitioners may pursue an appeal following entry of a final judgment enforcing the settlement agreement and dismissing the underlying case. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) (stating that an appeal may be taken from “[a] final judgment entered in an action or proceeding commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered”). Petitioners have not demonstrated that an appeal from entry of a final judgment would not afford a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy or that the district court's order otherwise falls within any of the narrow grounds that may warrant extraordinary relief. See Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 228, 88 P.3d at 841, 844. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.