ANTHONY DEMARIO GLASPER v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Anthony Demario Glasper appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a jury verdict, of battery constituting domestic violence and coercion constituting domestic violence. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, and the district court subsequently sentenced Glasper to an aggregate prison term of three to twenty-one years. On appeal, Glasper raises four claims regarding alleged errors during jury selection, three claims pertaining to alleged trial errors, four claims regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and a claim that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors at trial warrant reversal. We address each claim in turn.

Alleged jury selection errors

First, Glasper asserts the district court abused its discretion when instructing prospective jurors during voir dire. Specifically, Glasper argues the district court improperly influenced prospective jurors when it created an “anchoring bias” by comparing the sacrifice of jury service to the sacrifice of military service and engaged in a “campaign of psychological manipulation” by allegedly praising jurors who did not claim a hardship and admonishing prospective jurors to pay attention to the questions asked during voir dire. “The district court has broad discretion in conducting voir dire.” Azucena v. State, 1.35 Nev. 269, 271, 448 P.3d 534, 537 (2019). Where the challenge is based on misconduct by the trial judge, the courts will typically determine de novo whether judicial misconduct occurred. Id. at 272, 448 P.3d at 537.

The record reflects that Glasper did not object to the district court's conduct during voir dire, and he does not argue plain error on appeal. See Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43. 48, 343 P.3d 590, 593 (2015) (stating “all unpreserved errors are to be reviewed for plain error without regard as to whether they are of constitutional dimension”). Specifically, Glasper does not argue that any error is “clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). We thus conclude he has forfeited this claim, and we decline to review it on appeal. See id. at 52, 412 P.3d at 49 (“[T]he decision whether to correct a forfeited error is discretionary.”); see also Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 99, 110 P.3d 53, 58 (2005) (stating it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate plain error); State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane), 138 Nev. 896, 900, 521 P.3d 1215, 1221 (2022) (recognizing the Nevada appellate courts “follow the principle of party presentation” and thus “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decisions and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))); Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 633-34, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) (“We will not supply an argument on a party's behalf but review only the issues the parties present.”).

Second, Glasper claims the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Prospective Juror No. 15, who disclosed during voir dire that they were convicted of two felonies in or around 2020, However, the record reflects that Glasper stated he had no objection to dismissing Prospective Juror No. 15, and he does not argue plain error on appeal. Glasper has therefore forfeited this claim, and we decline to review it on appeal. Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 52, 412 P.3d at 49; see also Miller, 121 Nev. at 99, 110 P.3d at 58; Doane, 138 Nev. at 900, 521 P.3d at 1221; Senjab, 137 Nev. at 633-34, 497 P.3d at 619,

Third, Glasper claims the district court systematically excluded potential jurors “who expressed hesitation about domestic violence cases or who had experiences that might lead to empathy for the defendant.” However, the record demonstrates that the two potential jurors Glasper identifies in his opening brief as improperly excluded actually expressed bias against defendants in domestic violence cases because of their personal experiences with domestic violence or the experiences of their family members who were victims of domestic violence. More crucially, Glasper expressly stipulated to strike these two potential jurors because “they both said they couldn't be fair and impartial.” Given this stipulation, Glasper has waived the right to raise this issue on appeal. See Ford v. State, 122 Nev. 796, 805, 138 P.3d 500, 506 (2006) (recognizing that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right); cf. Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 28 3, 288, 419 P.3d 184, 190 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a party waives any challenge to the seating of a juror on appeal where the party was aware of the basis for the challenge at the time of voir dire, had the opportunity to challenge the prospective juror on those facts but ultimately declined to do so, and approved the juror's presence on the jury panel), overruled on other grounds by Young v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op, 47, 577 P.3d 691, 700 (2025). Therefore, we decline to consider this issue on appeal.

Fourth, Glasper claims the district court abused its discretion by “systematically” excluding non-native English speakers who expressed difficulty understanding English. Glasper specifically argues the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Prospective Juror No. 145 due to the juror's inability to understand the proceedings. Glasper, however, stipulated to the dismissal of Prospective Juror No. 145. Glasper has thus waived the right to raise this issue. Ford, 122 Nev. at 805, 138 P.3d at 506. Therefore, we decline to consider this issue on appeal.

Alleged trial errors

First, Glasper claims the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for coercion constituting domestic violence. Specifically, Glasper alleges the State failed to establish Glasper acted with the specific intent to coerce or prevent the victim from taking a specific action. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). It is the jury's place “to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.” McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). Thus, “a verdict supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Id.

NRS 207.190(1)(b) provides it is unlawful to “[d]eprive [a] person of any tool, implement or clothing, or hinder any person in the use thereof” with “the intent to compel another to do or abstain from doing an act which the other person has a right to do or abstain from doing.” Because on appeal all inferences must favor the State, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, the question is whether any reasonable juror could have inferred Glasper acted with the specific intent to compel the victim to do or abstain from doing an act she had the right to do or abstain from doing.

The evidence at trial established that Glasper and the victim were drinking at a local bar when they got into a dispute. The victim left the bar, got into her vehicle, and briefly drove away before returning to pick up Glasper. Glasper insisted the victim move over to the front passenger seat. The victim complied, and Glasper began driving the vehicle. As he was driving, Glasper repeatedly punched the victim in her head and face. Glasper stopped at a gas station to fill up the vehicle. Before leaving the vehicle, Glasper took the victim's wallet, cell phone, and the keys to her car. When Glasper entered the gas station, the victim fled on foot to a nearby convenience store and used the store's phone to call her son and then 9-1-1. This evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of coercion constituting domestic violence beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore conclude that Glasper is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Second, Glasper claims the trial court abused its discretion by-allowing for the admission of body-worn camera footage which apparently depicted him in police custody and handcuffed. We generally review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. McLellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). Glasper argues on appeal that he objected to the admission of the body-worn camera footage and that the district court “summarily overrul[ed]” his objection. The record, however, demonstrates that Glasper stated he had “[n]o objection” to the admission of the body-worn camera footage, and he does not argue plain error on appeal. Glasper has therefore forfeited this claim, and we decline to review it on appeal. Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 52. 412 P.3d at 49; see also Miller, 121 Nev. at 99, 110 P.3d at 58; Doane, 138 Nev. at 900, 521 P.3d at 1221; Senjab, 137 Nev. at 633-34, 497 P.3d at 619.¹

Third, Glasper claims the district court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by failing to inform the jury that Juror No. 8 was excused from service due to testing positive for COVID-19. Glasper argues the district court's failure to inform the remaining jurors that Juror No. 8 had tested positive for COVID-19 was prejudicial because “any jurors experiencing anxiety or symptoms might have been distracted, fatigued, or eager to conclude deliberations quickly.” The record reflects that on the final day of trial Juror No. 8 notified the district court they had tested positive for COVID-19. Outside the presence of the jury, the district court asked the parties whether they wanted to inform the remaining jurors why Juror No. 8 was excused. Glasper responded, “I think that if you were to tell [the other jurors] it was COVID. you'd run the risk of causing a panic, which might make them deliberate faster, which is not good for the defense in my mind.”

Given these facts, even assuming the district court abused its discretion by not informing the jury that Juror No. 8 had tested positive for COVID-19, Glasper invited such error. The doctrine of invited error contemplates that “a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself has introduced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.” Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 429, 537 P.3d 476. 494 (Ct. App. 2023). Based on the record before us, we conclude the invited error doctrine applies, and Glasper is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Alleged prosecutorial misconduct

First, Glasper claims the State violated his right to fair notice of the charges against him by filing an amended information on the first day of trial. Pursuant to NRS 173.095(1), a district court may permit an information to be amended “at any time before verdict ․ if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” The record indicates that on the first day of trial, the State advised Glasper and the district court that it had filed an amended information that corrected the victim's surname and added the verbiage “and/or face” to the end of the allegation that Glasper battered the victim “by striking the said [victim] on the head and/or arm[.]” Upon reviewing the amended information, Glasper stated that “[t]here is no material change” to the information and that he had “[n]o objection” to it. This claim would therefore be subject to plain error review. However, Glasper did not argue plain error on appeal. We therefore conclude Glasper has forfeited this claim, and we decline to review it on appeal. Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 52, 412 P.3d at 49; see also Miller, 121 Nev. at 99, 110 P.3d at 58; Doane, 138 Nev. at 900, 521 P.3d at 1221; Senjab, 137 Nev. at 633-34, 497 P.3d at 619.²

Second, Glasper claims the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire by asking the potential jurors hypothetical questions which he claims lowered the State's burden of proof. Glasper specifically claims the State engaged in misconduct by asking a juror, “If you believe that one witness beyond a reasonable doubt, would you still be able to convict?” Glasper did not object to the State's voir dire questions below. We therefore review this claim for plain error. Martinorellan, 131 Nev. at 48. 343 P.3d at 593.

We conclude Glasper has not shown error affecting his substantial rights. The district court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the State's burden of proof. See Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1333, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006) (“[T]his court generally presumes that juries follow district court orders and instructions.”). Further, while Glasper argues on appeal the State's case “rested on the testimony of a single witness,” the record shows the State introduced substantial testimonial and documentary evidence to demonstrate Glasper's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including the testimony of the victim, her son, and the investigating officer, video surveillance from the gas station and the convenience store, and photographs depicting the injuries the victim suffered. Based on the above, we conclude Gasper has not shown the State's questioning of the potential jurors “cause[d] actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice (defined as a ‘grossly unfair’ outcome),” Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 51, 412 P.3d at 49 (explaining when error affects a defendant's substantial rights). We therefore conclude Glasper is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Third, Glasper claims the State engaged in misconduct by researching Prospective Juror No, 15's felony convictions. The record reflects that the State researched Prospective Juror No. 15's convictions at the request of the district court. Glasper did not object to the district court's request and, as discussed above, stipulated to the dismissal of Prospective Juror No. 15. Thus, we review this claim for plain error. Glasper argues the “prosecutor's actions signaled to the venire that their personal histories could be investigated without oversight, likely suppressing open disclosure of relevant information.” However, the discussion of Prospective Juror No. 15's convictions—and the parties’ stipulation to dismiss Prospective Juror No. 15—occurred outside the presence of the jury. Glasper therefore has not established an error that is plain from the record. Moreover, Glasper has not established the State's conduct affected his substantial rights. We therefore conclude Glasper is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Fourth, Glasper claims the State deliberately introduced and argued inadmissible, prejudicial hearsay in the form of a 9-1-1 call. Shortly before the victim called 9-1-1 from the convenience store, law enforcement received a 9-1-1 call from a third party driving in the same general area as Glasper and the victim; the third-party driver reported seeing a man hitting a woman while driving a vehicle that matched the description of the victim's vehicle. At trial, an officer testified regarding the 9-1-1 caller's statements, which Glasper objected to as hearsay. The district court sustained the objection. The district court also admonished the jury it could not consider the hearsay portion of the officer's testimony.

At the start of trial the next day, the State argued it should be allowed to elicit testimony from the officer—who had not completed his testimony—about the 9-1-1 call for the sole purpose of establishing the timeline of events. The district court allowed the State to elicit testimony that the officer responded to a call about a domestic disturbance and that he was looking for a specific vehicle. When the officer resumed testifying, the State elicited testimony from the officer that he was responding to a domestic disturbance and looking for a specific vehicle. During closing argument, the State argued, “What you also heard was there was [an] initial call at 11:47 [in the vicinity of the convenience store]. Domestic disturbance in a white Chevy Impala.” At a bench conference, Glasper moved for a mistrial; the district court denied the motion. The district court then admonished the jury to “disregard the existence” of the 9-1-1 call and instructed the jury that it could not consider the call “in any way’’ in its deliberations.

Although the State's reference to the content of the 9-1-1 call may have been contrary to the district court's initial ruling, we conclude relief on this claim is not warranted because the district court advised the jury not to consider the 9-1-1 call during its deliberations. The district court's instructions to the jury were sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by the State's argument, and we are confident any error in this regard did not contribute to the verdict. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188-89, 1192, 196 P.3d 465, 476, 478 (2008) (outlining the analysis for prosecutorial misconduct claims before determining a comment by the prosecutor was improper but concluding “there was no prejudice because the district court sustained [the defendant's] objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment”). Thus, we conclude Glasper is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Cumulative error

Finally, Glasper claims the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. Reversal is warranted where individually harmless errors, viewed collectively, nevertheless violate the defendant's right to a fair trial. See id. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481. In reviewing claims of cumulative error, we consider “(1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Although the charged crimes are serious, the issue of guilt was not close, and to the extent there were errors, they were neither pervasive nor consequential as related to the charges considering the evidence against Glasper. Cf. id. at 1197, 196 P.3d at 482 (concluding there was cumulative error where “’[t]he prosecutorial misconduct occurred throughout the trial” and another error “resulted in serious jury misconduct”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Even were we to review Glasper's claim on appeal, we cannot assess whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the body-worn camera footage because Glasper did not include a copy of the footage in the record on appeal. See McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 256 n.13, 212 P.3d 307, 316 n.13 (2009) (“The burden is on the appellant to provide this court with an adequate record enabling this court to review assignments of error.”); see also Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (“When an appellant fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing portion supports the district court's decision.”).

2.   Moreover, even were we to review Glasper's claim for plain error, we would not be able to assess this claim because he failed to include a copy of the original information in the record on appeal. See McConnell, 125 Nev. at 256 n.13, 212 P.3d at 316 n.13; Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135.