CHARLES EUGENE KEMP v. THE STATE OF NEVADA BOARD OF PAROLE (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus challenges the Board of Parole Commissioners’ (Board) denial of parole for petitioner Charles Eugene Kemp. Kemp argues the Board failed to follow its own internal guidelines when it improperly applied an aggravating factor and failed to apply two mitigating factors in denying him parole.

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). The writ will not issue if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate alternate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. Petitions for extraordinary writs are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, see State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1338, 1339 (1983), and the “[p]etitioner[ ] carr[ies] the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted,” Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

Because there is no applicable statutory vehicle through which Kemp may challenge the Board's actions, we consider whether the Board's actions warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus. See Anselmo v. Bisbee, 133 Nev. 317, 319, 396 P.3d 848, 850 (2017). “[G]iven its discretionary language, Nevada's parole statute creates no protectable liberty interest sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 320, 396 P.3d at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “eligible Nevada inmates have a statutory right to be considered for parole by the Board,” and “[t]his court cannot say that an inmate receives proper consideration when the Board's decision is based in part on an inapplicable aggravating factor.” Id. at 323, 396 P.3d at 853.

First, Kemp contends the Board improperly relied on an aggravating factor: the nature of his criminal record becoming increasingly more serious. See NAC 213.518(2)(i). In particular, Kemp contends the Board applied this factor to consider him a future danger to the community even though it had assessed him as a low risk to reoffend and that these findings were contradictory.

The Board's internal guidelines do not preclude the application of NAC 213.518(2)(i) if an objective risk assessment, conducted as part of the initial assessment and pursuant to NAC 213.514, results in a low risk level. See Nevada Parole Guidelines Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Definitions Rev – April 30, 2024, https://parole.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/parolenvgov/content/Information/Aggr avating_and_Mitigating_Factors_Definitions-1-2018.pdf (last visited March 17, 2026) (hereinafter, Nev. Parole Guidelines).¹ Moreover, there is no apparent contradiction, as the Board's objective risk assessment does not consider whether a prisoner's criminal conduct has escalated over time to include violence or whether the scale of criminal activity has increased over time. See Nevada Parole Recidivism Risk & Crime Severity Guidelines, https://parole.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/parolenvgov/content/Information/Parol eRiskAssessmentValues.pdf (last visited March 17, 2026). Therefore, Kemp fails to demonstrate the Board clearly misapplied its own internal guidelines in denying him parole. See Anselmo, 133 Nev. at 318, 396 P.3d at 849 (explaining that the Board's decision is not reviewable unless the Board “clearly misapplies its own internal guidelines in assessing whether to grant parole”). Therefore, we conclude our intervention by way of extraordinary relief is not warranted as to this claim.

Kemp also contends the Board failed to apply two mitigating factors in denying him parole: “[w]hether the results of any assessment of the prisoner conducted pursuant to NRS 213.1214 indicate a low risk that the prisoner will reoffend in a sexual manner,” NAC 213.518(3)(k); and “[a]ny other factor which indicates that the release of the prisoner on parole would benefit, or would not be dangerous to, society or the prisoner,” NAC 213.518(3)(o). Regarding the latter, Kemp claimed the fact that he is 65 years old and has served 32 years in prison indicates he would not be a danger to society or himself if released on parole.

As to the first mitigating factor Kemp challenges, NRS 213.1214(1) requires the Nevada Department of Corrections to “assess each prisoner who has been convicted of a sexual offense to determine the prisoner's risk to reoffend in a sexual manner” and to “ensure a completed assessment is provided to the Board before” a parole hearing. In his petition, Kemp concedes the Board was aware that he was deemed a low risk to reoffend in a sexual manner. In so doing, Kemp fails to demonstrate the Board did not consider the results of an NRS 213.1214 assessment as required by law. See NRS 213.1214(4) (“The Board shall consider an assessment prepared pursuant to this section before determining whether to grant or revoke the parole of a person convicted of a sexual offense.”); see also NAC 213.514(4) (stating “the Board will consider the risk assessment conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to NRS 213.1214 when determining whether to grant parole”). To the extent Kemp suggests the Board failed to apply this factor because it did not give enough weight to this factor, this court does not review the evidence supporting the Board's decision. See Anselmo, 133 Nev. at 320, 396 P.3d at 851.

Moreover, the fact that the order denying parole and parole risk assessment do not reference either of the aforementioned mitigating factors does not indicate the Board failed to follow its own internal guidelines.² Under the guidelines, “[t]he Board defines and determines how to apply each factor and whether to apply any factor,” and it “is not required to indicate every potential aggravating or mitigating factor that may apply to a case and may select only those factors it deems most relevant to the hearing.” Nev. Parole Guidelines at 1; see also NAC 213.518(3) (listing “mitigating factors which the Board may consider to determine whether to grant parole” (emphasis added)). Therefore, Kemp fails to demonstrate the Board did not follow its own internal guidelines in denying him parole. Accordingly, we conclude our intervention by way of extraordinary relief is not warranted as to this claim.

For the foregoing reasons,³ we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As relevant here, the guidelines state that “[t]his factor may be indicated if criminal conduct of the person has escalated over time to include violence toward victims or others, or the scale of criminal activity has increased over time. This factor is used as a possible indicator of serious activity in the future.” Id. at 2.

2.   We note that the Board's parole risk assessment considered the fact that Kemp was 59 years of age or older in determining his risk level.

3.   We deny Kemp's March 17, 2026, motion to the extent it requests writ relief based on the respondent's failure to file an answer. See Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991) (stating “issuance of a writ of mandamus ․ is purely discretionary with this court”).