JUSTIN TYLER KING v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Justin Tyler King appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault and coercion. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.

King argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, NRS 176.165, and “a district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just,” Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 604, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2015). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if they are supported by the record, id., and review the district court's decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion, Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 191, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

In his motion, King contended he had a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea because (1) counsel coerced him into entering his plea so counsel would not have to put on a trial; (2) the settlement judge coerced him into entering his plea by stating he could receive a sentence of life in prison if he went to trial; (3) he did not have an opportunity to take the plea agreement with him and consider it further or review it with counsel directly; and (4) he was in an “overemotional and unintelligent stupor” when he entered his plea.¹

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which King and counsel testified. Of note, counsel testified that (1) she informed King there was no harm in participating in a settlement conference because he would not be forced to do anything; (2) the settlement judge was open to hearing King's position, let King speak without interruption, and never yelled or raised her voice at King; (3) counsel never told King that she would not go to trial; (4) she had an opportunity to speak with King privately and to go over the plea agreement with King at the settlement conference; (5) King was very emotional, but there was no indication King did not understand the plea agreement; and (6) the settlement judge told King that she believed he could get convicted if he went to trial and informed King that he faced a life sentence.

Although King's testimony contradicted counsel's testimony in several respects, the district court found King's testimony was not credible, and this court will not “evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of the trier of fact.” Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). Moreover, candid advice about the likely outcome at trial does not constitute coercion. Cf. Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs., Ltd., 134 Nev. 61, 69, 412 P.3d 56, 62 (2018) (noting that one of the roles of an attorney is to provide candid advice to his or her client); see also Whitman v. Warden, 90 Nev. 434, 436, 529 P.2d 792, 793 (1974) (“A guilty plea is not coerced merely because motivated by a desire to avoid the possibility of a higher penalty.”). Furthermore, the district court found that King's claim of coercion was contradicted by the plea agreement and plea canvass, and the district court's findings are supported by the record.² In light of the foregoing, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying King's presentence motion to withdraw plea. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   King also contended that counsel failed to advise him of his defenses. However, King subsequently abandoned this claim at the evidentiary hearing held on his motion, and no evidence was offered as to this claim. Thus, to the extent King contends counsel was ineffective as to this claim on appeal, we decline to consider this claim in the first instance. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 534 (2001) (“[W]e have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary.”), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.12 (2018).

2.   In the plea agreement and at the plea canvass, King affirmed that he was entering his plea voluntarily, that he was not acting under duress or coercion, and that he was satisfied with counsel's representation.