STOVALL v. and (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS

Petitioners Julie Quigley Stovall and Alan Stovall bring these consolidated original petitions for writs of mandamus challenging district court orders granting a motion to dismiss petitioners’ crossclaim with prejudice under NRCP 12(b)(5) and denying petitioners’ motion for leave to amend their crossclaim under NRCP 15(a) in an ongoing construction dispute.

This court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4(1). Nonetheless, “[t]he decision to entertain a writ petition lies solely within the discretion of this court.” Okada v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 6, 8, 408 P.3d 566, 569 (2018). Where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, extraordinary relief may be available. NRS 34.170; Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). “A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires ․ or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see also NRS 34.160. Petitioners bear the ultimate “burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted.” Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004); see also Walker v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 678, 680, 476 P.3d 1194, 1196 (2020) (“Where a district court is entrusted with discretion on an issue, the petitioner's burden to demonstrate a clear legal right to a particular course of action by the court is substantial ․”).

Here, petitioners challenge orders entered early in the underlying civil proceedings: specifically, the district court (1) dismissed their crossclaims against real parties in interest Level Development Group, LLC, Jeffrey and Adrianne Gibson (the Gibsons), and their affiliated entity, JAG Development LLC (JAG), with prejudice on NRCP 12(b)(5) grounds; and (2) denied them leave to file a proposed first amended crossclaim adding expanded alter ego, fraudulent transfer, and constructive trust allegations against the Gibsons, JAG, and affiliates. Petitioners assert that writ relief is appropriate because, among other things, the dismissal and denial for leave to amend will prevent them from litigating claims against certain parties, complicate their ability to reach insider-transferred assets, and may intersect with limitation periods under Nevada's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and NRS Chapter 166.

Having considered the petitions, the answers, and the supporting documentation from the underlying proceedings, we deny the petitions because petitioners have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. See NRS 34.170; Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 844. The rulings petitioners challenge are orders on an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion and an NRCP 15(a) motion in a still-pending civil case where no final judgments are in the record before us. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) (providing that final judgments are appealable). Petitioners, therefore, retain an adequate remedy by trying their remaining claims against the parties still in the case, obtaining a final judgment, and then seeking appellate review of the dismissal of their crossclaims and the denial of leave to amend. See Pan, 120 Nev. at 224-25, 88 P.3d at 841-42 (“[T]he right to appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy that precludes writ relief.”); County of Washoe v. City of Reno, 77 Nev. 152, 156, 360 P.2d 602, 603 (1961) (“A remedy does not fail to be speedy and adequate, because, by pursuing it through the ordinary course of law, more time probably would be consumed than in a mandamus proceeding.”).

Moreover, petitioners could have sought certification by the district court as to the finality of dismissed claims made against JAG and the Gibsons, so that they could pursue an appeal—but neither the briefing nor the record suggests that this request was made. See NRCP 54(b) (providing that a district court may certify as a final judgment one that disposes of more than one, but fewer than all, claims or parties named to an action). Although not absolute, the mere availability of certification under NRCP 54(b) generally precludes writ relief. See Cervantes-Guevara, v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 87, 90, 505 P.3d 393, 396-97 (2022) (citing Dattala v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 83939, 2022 WL 510112, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 18, 2022) (Order Denying Petition); see also McLynn v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 74749, 2018 WL 1009261, at *1 n.1 (Nev. Feb. 15, 2018) (Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus) (concluding that, among other reasons, final judgment was not an inadequate remedy for purposes of NRS 34.170 because petitioner did not request NRCP 54(b) certification of the challenged order).

Accordingly, because we deny writ relief under the statutory threshold in NRS 34.170, and because an appeal from any final judgment provides a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, we need not address the substantive merits of the arguments presented in the petitions, which remain matters for any potential future appeal. See Pan, 120 Nev. at 224-25, 88 P.3d at 841-42; see also Archon Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 816, 824, 407 P.3d 702, 709 (2017) (explaining that advisory mandamus “must be issued sparingly and thoughtfully due to its disruptive nature”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petitions DENIED.