KEON REED v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Keon Reed appeals from a district court order denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed on December 16, 2024. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Jones, Judge.

Reed argues the district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, Reed claimed the sentencing court erroneously relied upon his conviction in district court case no. CR04-0924 in adjudicating him a habitual criminal. Reed contended that this prior conviction was not a qualifying conviction for enhancement purposes because the conviction post-dated the instant offense.

A motion to correct an illegal sentence may only challenge the facial legality of the sentence: either the district court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence or the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). Beyond this, any claims challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence must be raised in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.¹ See id. at 707, 918 P.2d at 324.

Reed's claim that the sentencing court erred in relying upon a specific prior conviction to adjudicate him a habitual criminal does not implicate the facial legality of his sentence. See Steinhauer v. State, No. 88706-COA, 2024 WL 5220212, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2024) (Order of Affirmance). Specifically, Reed's claim does not implicate the district court's jurisdiction to impose a habitual criminal sentence, see Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 124, 178 P.3d 154, 163-64 (2008) (stating “the district court's authority to impose a habitual criminal sentence [is premised] on the State's filing of an allegation of habitual criminality”), nor does it allege that his sentence exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by statute, see 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 314, § 8, at 1184-85 (stating a habitual criminal may be sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after a minimum of 10 years has been served); see also Dawson v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 72, 559 P.3d 356, 359 (2024) (holding that “the operative statute for habitual criminal adjudication is the one in effect when the charged crime was committed, not the one in effect at the time of sentencing”).

Therefore, without considering the merits of this claim, we conclude that it falls outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to correct an illegal sentence and that the district court did not err by denying the motion.² Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Reed's claim does not implicate the standards applicable to a motion to modify sentence. See id. at 707, 918 P.2d at 323-24 (recognizing “two types of post-conviction challenges to judgments of conviction that are ․ excepted by NRS 34.724(2)(a) from the provisions of the habeas statutes: A motion to modify a sentence based on very narrow due process grounds, and a motion to correct a facially illegal sentence”). Moreover, we express no opinion as to whether Reed could meet the procedural requirements of NRS Chapter 34.

2.   The district court erred to the extent it implicitly determined Reed's claim was within the scope of claims permissible in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated herein. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason).