GOLDEN CREEK HOLDINGS INC DELAWARE CORPORATION v. NEWREZ LLC SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (2026)

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART

Golden Creek Holdings, Inc. (Golden Creek) appeals from district court post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson, Judge.

Golden Creek sued respondent Newrez, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) for quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, and injunctive and declaratory relief. In the original complaint, Golden Creek alleged that it was the owner of the relevant property and that a deed of trust encumbered the property. Golden Creek alleged the promissory note and deed of trust had been split and not reunified and, because Shellpoint did not possess the promissory note, it lacked the authority to foreclose. Golden Creek further asserted it was entitled to relief under NRS 107.200, et seq. Golden Creek also recorded a notice of lis pendens against the relevant property.

Shellpoint subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, contending that all of the allegations contained within Golden Creek's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support of its motion, Shellpoint explained that the promissory note was in its possession and that Golden Creek's counsel had inspected the note on April 13, 2023. Shellpoint further asserted that it had provided the information to Golden Creek as required by NRS 107.200, et seq.

Golden Creek subsequently filed an amended complaint in which it raised a new cause of action, alleging that the deed of trust was extinguished pursuant to NRS 106.240 as more than ten years had passed since the debt that secured the deed of trust had become wholly due. Golden Creek's amended complaint also repeated its claims alleging Shellpoint did not possess the promissory note and violated NRS 107.200, et seq.

Approximately one month later, the parties entered into a stipulation for Golden Creek to dismiss its note-based claim. Shellpoint thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and to expunge the lis pendens. Shellpoint contended, among other things, that decisions issued by the Nevada Supreme Court demonstrated that Golden Creek's NRS 106.240 claim lacked merit. Shellpoint submitted documents in support of its motion and in support of its request for dismissal of this matter, including its responses to Golden Creek's request for information under NRS 107.200, et. seq. Golden Creek opposed the motion, and Shellpoint later filed a reply.

The district court subsequently issued an order in which it elected to treat the motion as one for summary judgment as Shellpoint relied on documentary evidence filed in support of the motion. The court also determined that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Shellpoint was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The court agreed with Shellpoint that decisions issued by the supreme court demonstrated Golden Creek's NRS 106.240 claim lacked merit. The court further determined that the undisputed facts demonstrated Shellpoint complied with NRS 107.200, et. seq.’s requirements by responding to Golden Creek's request for information. In addition, the court noted that Golden Creek included the note-based claim in its amended complaint but acknowledged that the claim had since been withdrawn. The district court also expunged the lis pendens recorded against the property.

Shellpoint thereafter filed a motion for an award of attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b). It contended that it was the prevailing party. Shellpoint also argued that Golden Creek brought or maintained its claims without reasonable grounds or to harass. In addition, Shellpoint argued the factors under Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969), supported its request for an award of attorney fees, and it submitted billing records in support of its motion. Golden Creek opposed the motion.

The district court conducted a hearing concerning Shellpoint's motion for attorney fees. During that hearing, the parties discussed the claims Golden Creek had raised in this action. In particular, Shellpoint urged the district court to find that Golden Creek brought or maintained all claims without reasonable grounds and to harass Shellpoint, noting that there were no factual bases for its claims or that decisions from the Nevada Supreme Court demonstrated they lacked merit.

Ultimately, the district court issued a written decision granting Shellpoint's motion but did not award Shellpoint all of the fees it requested. The court explained it did not determine that Golden Creek brought the action without reasonable grounds. Instead, the court found that, as of April 13, 2023, Golden Creek maintained its lawsuit without reasonable grounds and/or with an intent to harass Shellpoint. Thus, the court found that Shellpoint was entitled to the attorney fees incurred from that date pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b). Based on the aforementioned findings, the district court awarded Shellpoint attorney fees in the amount of $16,740.50.

Golden Creek thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend the order awarding attorney fees. Golden Creek asserted that the district court erroneously awarded fees based only on its determination that the note-based claim was maintained without reasonable grounds and that the court failed to recognize that Golden Creek acknowledged, after inspecting the note, that the claim was no longer viable and it ultimately withdrew that claim.

Shellpoint opposed the motion to alter or amend and filed a countermotion for an award of attorney fees and costs related to opposing Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend. Shellpoint argued that the motion to alter or amend mischaracterized the district court's order awarding fees, as the award was not based solely upon Golden Creek's note-based claim, but instead referred to the lawsuit as a whole. Shellpoint asserted that because the motion to alter or amend was frivolous, Golden Creek had multiplied the proceedings in this matter and had unreasonably increased the costs, such that an additional award of attorney fees under EDCR 7.60(b) was warranted. Shellpoint also urged the district court to award attorney fees under NRS 7.085 and require Golden Creek's counsel to personally pay those fees. Shellpoint filed additional documentation in support of its countermotion, which included discussion of the Brunzell factors and its billing records.

The district court conducted a hearing concerning the motion to alter or amend and the countermotion for fees. It later issued a written order in which it denied Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend and granted Shellpoint's countermotion for attorney fees and costs. The court explained that Golden Creek had mischaracterized its earlier order, as its prior order stated its findings that Golden Creek had no reasonable basis to maintain any of its claims after April 13, 2023, which rendered Golden Creek's continued litigation of this matter harassing. The district court further explained that the award of fees was not limited to the fees Shellpoint incurred defending against the note-based claim, but rather were for defending all of Golden Creek's claims, which Golden Creek maintained without reasonable grounds.

The district court also found that Golden Creek and its counsel, through its motion to alter or amend, took positions that were obviously frivolous, unnecessary, and unwarranted. The court found that Golden Creek and its counsel took positions that were not well grounded in fact or were not warranted by existing law, and they did not have a good faith argument for changing existing law. In addition, the district court found Golden Creek and its counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied and extended the proceedings in this matter so as to unnecessarily increase the costs.

The district court accordingly found that an award of attorney fees was warranted pursuant to EDCR 7.60(b). The court determined that Golden Creek's counsel should also be liable for the attorney fees pursuant to NRS 7.085. In addition, the court addressed the appropriate Brunzell factors. Based on the aforementioned findings, the court awarded Shellpoint an additional $17,230.60 in attorney fees. The court also awarded Shellpoint $292.99 in costs. The district court ultimately determined that Golden Creek and its counsel were jointly and severally liable for the payment of the award of fees. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Golden Creek challenges the district court's decisions to order it to pay Shellpoint's attorney fees. First, Golden Creek argues the district court abused its discretion in its first order awarding Shellpoint attorney fees by basing its decision on the sole determination that the note-based claim was maintained without reasonable grounds. Golden Creek further contends the district court failed to recognize that Golden Creek did not actually maintain the note-based claim after it inspected the note, as it acknowledged that claim was no longer viable and it ultimately withdrew it.

This court reviews awards of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 485, 851 P.2d 459, 464 (1993). A district court abuses its discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018).

Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), the district court may award attorney fees to a “prevailing party” when “the court finds that the claim ․ of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass the prevailing party.” There must be evidence in the record supporting the proposition that a claim was brought or maintained without reasonable grounds. Chowdhry, 109 Nev. at 486, 851 P.2d at 464. “For purposes of NRS 18.010(2)(b), a claim is frivolous or groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it.” Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., 125 Nev. 578, 588, 216 P.3d 793, 800 (2009). In addition, when awarding attorney fees, the district court must consider the factors set forth in Brunzell, 85 Nev. at 349, 455 P.2d at 33.

Here, Shellpoint was the prevailing party because the court granted summary judgment in its favor. Contrary to Golden Creek's assertions on appeal, the district court specifically referred to Golden Creek's entire lawsuit in its order awarding attorney fees in favor of Shellpoint and did not solely award fees due to Golden Creek's note-based claim. Further, the record belies Golden Creek's contention that it did not maintain the note-based claim after it viewed the promissory note, as after viewing the note in Shellpoint's possession, it subsequently filed an amended complaint that alleged Shellpoint did not possess the promissory note.

Moreover, to the extent Golden Creek argues the district court's order was ambiguous, the record plainly demonstrates that Shellpoint's motion, and the discussion of the parties and the district court during the relevant hearing, implicated the entirety of Golden Creek's action. See Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 895, 266 P.3d 602, 608 (2011) (providing that courts interpret an ambiguous order by consulting the record and proceedings giving rise to the order). The record also supports the district court's determination that Golden Creek maintained this action after it had no reasonable basis to do so and that it accordingly pursued this action to harass Shellpoint. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 996, 860 P.2d 720, 724 (1993) (“[I]f the record reveals that counsel or any party has brought, maintained, or defended an action in bad faith, the rationale for awarding attorney fees is even stronger.”).

Therefore, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Golden Creek's claims were maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass Shellpoint, see Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 675, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993) (explaining that an analysis under NRS 18.010(2)(b) “depends upon the actual circumstances of the case rather than a hypothetical set of facts favoring plaintiff's averments”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re DISH Network Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 451 n.6, 401 P.3d 1081, 1093 n.6 (2017), and that the court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by determining that attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) were warranted.

In addition, as discussed previously, Shellpoint discussed the Brunzell factors in the motion for attorney fees and the record demonstrates the district court reviewed the motion and the supporting documents, and concluded the request for an award of attorney fees was warranted based on a review of the motion and the documents filed in support of it.¹ See Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015) (explaining it is preferable that the district court “expressly analyze each [Brunzell] factor relating to an award of attorney fees,” but the court “need only demonstrate that it considered the required factors, and the award must be supported by substantial evidence”). Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorney fees in favor of Shellpoint. See Chowdhry, 109 Nev. at 485, 851 P.2d at 464. Because we affirm the district court's decision to grant Shellpoint's motion and award attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend. See AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (reviewing an order denying a motion to alter or amend for an abuse of discretion).

Turning to Golden Creek's challenge to the district court's decision to grant Shellpoint's countermotion for attorney fees and costs associated with its opposition to Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend, Golden Creek argues that its motion to alter or amend was well grounded and not brought for an improper purpose, and for those reasons, the award of attorney fees was unwarranted. However, we conclude Golden Creek fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion. See Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 440-41, 216 P.3d 213, 234 (2009) (reviewing an award of attorney fees under EDCR 7.60(b) for an abuse of discretion), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022).

A district “court may, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose upon an attorney or a party any and all sanctions that may, under the facts of the case, be reasonable, including the imposition of fines, costs, or attorney fees when an attorney or a party without just cause ․ [p]resents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion that is obviously frivolous, unnecessary, or unwarranted.” EDCR 7.60(b); see also Rivero, 125 Nev. at440-41, at 216 P.3d at 234 (“The district court may award attorney fees as a sanction under ․ EDCR 7.60(b) if it concludes that a party brought a frivolous claim.”).

As noted previously, the district court reviewed Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend the order awarding attorney fees to Shellpoint and determined that Golden Creek mischaracterized the district court's earlier decision. The court also determined Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend and its responses to Shellpoint's countermotion for fees were “obviously frivolous, unnecessary and unwarranted.” The court further found that Golden Creek's actions unreasonably increased Shellpoint's costs associated with this matter. In addition, the district court explained it reviewed the documents Shellpoint filed in support of its countermotion, considered the Brunzell factors, and found the fees requested to be reasonable.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Golden Creek's motion to alter or amend was frivolous, unnecessary, or unwarranted and that the court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by determining that attorney fees were warranted pursuant to EDCR 7.60(b). In addition, the findings pursuant to the Brunzell factors are supported by the record. Therefore, we conclude Golden Creek fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees in favor of Shellpoint under EDCR 7.60(b).² See Rivero, 125 Nev. at 440, 216 P.3d at 234.

To the extent Golden Creek challenges the district court's decision to impose sanctions against its counsel under NRS 7.085, only an aggrieved party has standing to appeal and Golden Creek has not demonstrated it was the party aggrieved by that decision. See NRAP 3A(a); see also Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994) (“A party is aggrieved within the meaning of NRAP 3A(a) when either a personal right or right of property is adversely and substantially affected by a district court's ruling.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because counsel was not a party to the litigation below, counsel cannot pursue an appeal from the district court's order imposing an award of attorney fees under NRS 7.085. See Emerson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. 672, 676, 263 P.3d 224, 227 (2011) (noting that an attorney may not appeal from a district court order imposing sanctions upon the attorney because the attorney was not a party to the litigation below and therefore permitting the attorney to pursue mandamus relief because there was no other remedy at law to challenge the imposition of sanctions).

Because Golden Creek lacks standing to challenge the district court's decision to require counsel to pay the award of attorney fees pursuant to NRS 7.085, and because counsel was not a party to the litigation, we dismiss the portion of this appeal challenging that decision. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED in part and DISMISS this appeal in part.³

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note Golden Creek does not challenge the reasonableness of the amount of the award of fees under the Brunzell factors and it has accordingly forfeited any argument related to the same. See Palmieri v. Clark Cnty., 131 Nev. 1028, 1033 n.2, 367 P.3d 442, 446 n.2 (2015) (stating that issues that are not raised on appeal are deemed forfeited).

2.   To the extent Shellpoint also challenges the district court's award of costs, it fails to provide cogent argument or relevant authority regarding the propriety of this award, and therefore, we decline to consider this issue on appeal. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that appellate courts need not consider issues that are not supported by cogent argument and relevant authority).

3.   We deny Shellpoint's request for NRAP 38 sanctions.