HARRISON ARTHUR JAMES GOLDBERG v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Harrison Arthur James Goldberg appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a bench trial, of indecent or obscene exposure, first offense. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; David A. Hardy, Judge.

For the offense, a woman at a park in Reno observed Goldberg for several hours and noticed he was naked every time she looked over at him. The witness eventually called the police. When officers approached Goldberg, he was wearing only a black thong. As the officers questioned Goldberg about whether he had been naked in the park, Goldberg related a prior incident with California law enforcement where he had been naked at a lake and was simply told to leave the area. He stated he was only given a warning during the California incident. The officers asked Goldberg if he was an exhibitionist and Goldberg responded that he had an OnlyFans account and a Pornhub account where he posted videos of himself. Goldberg also discussed public nudity being common at Burning Man and at “Secret Cove” and he said he thought the park was similar. The officers arrested Goldberg for indecent exposure. After he was arrested, Goldberg told the officers what his username was for the online accounts. The officers then investigated the online accounts. They found numerous videos uploaded to the accounts within the seven months leading up to Goldberg's arrest on February 22, 2024, that depicted him naked in what appeared to be public places.

The State sought to admit Goldberg's statements regarding his prior police encounter in California and the videos uploaded to his online accounts as evidence of intent, motive, and lack of mistake or accident pursuant to NRS 48.045(2). The State also sought to admit the evidence as evidence of other sexual offenses under NRS 48.045(3). The district court allowed the State to introduce the previous incidents pursuant to NRS 48.045(2) after conducting a pretrial hearing in which it heard evidence concerning the incidents and determining that they were relevant to demonstrate Goldberg's intent and motive, that they were proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court also admitted the evidence as other sexual offenses under NRS 48.045(3). Goldberg argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting this other act evidence at the bench trial.

The prosecution may not use other act evidence to establish the accused's character to show that the accused acted in conformity with that character, NRS 48.045(1), but such evidence may be admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” NRS 48.045(2). There is “a presumption of inadmissibility [that] attaches to all [other] act evidence,” Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108, 116, 270 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2012) (alteration and quotation marks omitted), but “the court may find the presumption rebutted and admit other act evidence if the act is (1) relevant, (2) proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) not substantially more prejudicial than probative,” Dickey v. State, 140 Nev. 8, 11, 540 P.3d 442, 448 (2024). If the three-part test is satisfied, “the evidence may be admitted for limited nonpropensity purposes as found by the court.” Id. “The trial court's determination to admit or exclude evidence of prior bad acts is a decision within its discretionary authority and is to be given great deference[;] [i]t will not be reversed absent manifest error.” Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 72, 40 P.3d 413, 416 (2002).

Goldberg contends that, because he did not put intent at issue at trial and because indecent or obscene exposure is a general intent crime, the evidence should not have been admitted for the purpose of proving intent. The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that a conviction for indecent or obscene exposure “does not require proof of intent to offend an observer or even that the exposure was observed” but only “that the public sexual conduct or exposure was intentional.” Young v. State, 109 Nev. 205, 215, 849 P.2d 336, 343 (1993) (citations omitted); see also Quiriconi v. State, 95 Nev. 195, 196, 591 P.2d 1133, 1134 (1979) (stating the only disputed fact left in the indecent exposure case was whether the exposure was intentional). Thus, the State was required to prove that any exposure by Goldberg was intentional. And Goldberg denied he exposed himself at the park. We conclude his statements that he had previously exposed himself in public and the videos showing him exposing himself were relevant for the nonpropensity purpose of showing Goldberg's intent to expose himself on the day in question.

Goldberg also argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting the other act evidence as proof of motive. He contends that the “exhibitionist motive” offered by the State was precisely the type of evidence not allowed under NRS 48.045 as it constituted propensity evidence, i.e., because prior conduct showed he was an exhibitionist, he acted in conformity with that tendency on the day of the incident.

“Even though motive is not an element of a crime and need not be proven, it has virtually always been an integral element of proof in a criminal trial.” Chadwick v. State, 140 Nev. 104, 110, 546 P.3d 215, 223 (Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Motive has been described as the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent,” and thus, “operates as an incentive for criminal behavior.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, we conclude the statements and videos were relevant for the nonpropensity purpose of showing Goldberg's motive to expose himself on that day and showing he had the will to indulge in the criminal intent to expose himself.

Having considered the record, we further conclude that the other acts were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other act evidence.

Even assuming the other act evidence should not have been admitted, any error was harmless. See Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2001) (stating we will not overturn a conviction due to the erroneous admission of other act evidence if the error is harmless and did not affect substantial rights). The State presented sufficient evidence to support Goldberg's conviction for indecent or obscene exposure. The eyewitness testified she observed Goldberg and saw his genitalia. See NRS 201.220(1): see also State v. Castenada, 126 Nev. 478, 489, 245 P.3d 550, 557 (2010) (holding that indecent exposure requires exposure of the genitals or anus). We note identity was not at issue in this case.

Further, “where inadmissible evidence has been received by the court, sitting without a jury, and there is other substantial evidence upon which the court based its findings, the court will be presumed to have disregarded the improper evidence.” See State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways v. Campbell, 80 Nev. 23, 33, 388 P.2d 733, 738 (1964); cf. Randell v. State, 109 Nev. 5, 7, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (1993) (stating that judges “spend much of their professional lives separating the wheat from the chaff’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the district court indicated it understood its duty in reviewing the evidence when it stated at trial, just prior to its deliberation on guilt, that “this case is probably going to come down to how I view the percipient witness’ testimony, whether it is believable to me beyond a reasonable doubt.” This court will not “evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of the trier of fact.” Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). Therefore, Goldberg fails to demonstrate his substantial rights were affected and we conclude any error in admitting the other acts was harmless. We need not address whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the other act evidence for propensity purposes under NRS 48.045(3) because any such error was harmless in light of the evidence supporting Goldberg's conviction for indecent or obscene exposure. Thus, we conclude Goldberg fails to demonstrate he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.