BAILEY v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Bailey argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing a harsh aggregate sentence and by structuring her sentence as a series of short, consecutive terms. In particular, Bailey contended that the district court should have imposed a lesser sentence given her relative level of culpability, contrition, cooperation, and potential for rehabilitation as compared to her codefendant and that she could have accessed final-term programs sooner had the district court imposed more “densely clustered sentences,” which would have had several benefits.

The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision, including the decision to impose consecutive sentences. See NRS 176.035(1.): Pitmon v. State, 131. Nev. 123, 128-29, 352 P.3d 655, 659 (Ct. App. 2015); see also Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987) (“The sentencing judge has wide discretion in imposing a sentence ․”). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

Each of the sentences comprising Bailey's aggregate sentence of 14 to 48 years in prison is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, see NRS 205.060(2)(d), (5); NRS 205.275(2)(d); NRS 453.336(2)(a); NRS 193.130(2)(e); NRS 205.273(3); NRS 193.130(2)(c); NRS 453.3385(1)(a); NRS 205.080(1); NRS 193.140; NRS 202.360(1), and Bailey does not allege the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Moreover. Bailey concedes the district court was not required to structure her sentence so as to minimize the amount of time she must serve before becoming eligible for final-term reentry programs. Having considered the aggregate sentence and the crimes, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bailey.¹

Bailey also argues the district court erred by denying her a meaningful opportunity to argue that her sentence for the trafficking charge should be reduced or suspended pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2). NRS 453.3405(2) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he court, upon an appropriate motion, may reduce or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of NRS 453.3385 ․ if the court finds that the convicted person rendered substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any offense.” (Emphasis added.)

The record indicates Bailey did not file a motion to have her trafficking sentence reduced or suspended pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2).² Rather, Bailey specifically requested that the district court impose a prison sentence of 24 to 60 months or, alternatively, 36 to 90 months in her sentencing memorandum and during her sentencing argument. Although defense counsel made some vague statements about how he might want to discuss the trafficking charge at a later time, and some “brief comments” recognizing the existence of the substantial-assistance provision after the State had concluded its argument, defense counsel never requested that the district court apply this provision or that it conduct an in camera hearing on the matter. See NRS 453.3405(2) (“Upon good cause shown, the motion may be heard in camera.”). Thus, Bailey did not file an appropriate motion as required by NRS 453.3405(2), and we conclude the district court did not err by declining to hear argument on the matter. Cf. Matos v. State, 110 Nev. 834, 836, 838, 878 P.2d 288, 289, 291 (1994) (concluding a defendant's due process rights were not violated when the district court allowed the defendant to present arguments regarding substantial assistance after he filed a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2)). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note the district court pronounced an “extremely significant [aggregate] sentence” of 27 to 80 years in prison for Bailey's codefendant.

2.   We note the State filed a sealed memorandum on substantial assistance which acknowledged Bailey had not filed a motion pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2) and indicated the State's motion was filed “in the event” Bailey sought such relief in the future.