REESER v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Reeser argues the statute which mandates that “whenever a person under sentence of imprisonment for committing a felony commits another crime constituting a felony and is sentenced to another term of imprisonment for that felony, the latter term must not begin until the expiration of all prior terms, including the expiration of any prior aggregated terms,” is unconstitutional because it infringes on the district court's discretion to order her sentence in this matter to run concurrent with her prior sentence for a felony conviction. NRS 176.035(3).¹ Reeser requests that this court vacate her sentence and remand for resentencing without the limitation on the district court's sentencing discretion.

In the guilty plea agreement, Reeser and the State stipulated to recommend a prison term of 12 to 30 months “which must run consecutive, by operation of law, to” Reeser's prior felony sentence. Because Reeser was aware that her sentence had to run consecutive to her previous sentence by operation of law and did not challenge that law but instead stipulated to the sentence she ultimately received, she cannot challenge the imposition of that sentence on appeal. See Burns v. State, 137 Nev. 494, 504, 495 P.3d 1091, 1102-03 (2021) (recognizing that “[g]enerally, when a defendant pleads guilty and agrees to a specific sentence, [they] waive[ ] [their] right to challenge the propriety of [their] sentence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 52, 412 P.3d 43, 50 (2018) (recognizing waiver as the intentional relinquishment of a known right). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Reeser challenges NRS 176.055(2)(a) or (b) on appeal, it is NRS 176.035(3) that precludes concurrent sentences in this matter.