NATHANIEL CHARLES HARRIEL v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Nathaniel Charles Harriel appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and selling, transporting, giving, or attempting to sell, transport, give a schedule I controlled substance. Second Judicial. District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Jones, Judge.

Harriel argues the district court abused its discretion by adjudicating him as a habitual criminal because several of the prior felony convictions presented by the State were stale in that they were more than ten years old. Harriel contends the district court should have exercised its discretion to not adjudicate him as a habitual criminal and should have instead suspended his sentence or imposed the minimum sentence.¹

The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision, see Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987), including the decision to adjudicate a defendant as a habitual criminal, see Clark v. State, 109 Nev. 426, 428, 851 P.2d 426, 427 (1993); see also LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 276, 321 P.3d 919, 929 (2014) (“Adjudication of a defendant as a habitual criminal is subject to the broadest kind of judicial discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). “In determining if a finding of habitual criminal is proper, this court looks to the record as a whole to determine whether the sentencing court actually exercised its discretion.” LaChance, 130 Nev. at 277, 321 P.3d at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentencing court meets its obligations so long as it was not operating under a misconception of the law regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual criminal adjudication.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The record reveals the district court understood its sentencing authority and properly exercised its discretion to adjudicate Harriel as a habitual criminal. The district court reviewed Harriel's prior felony convictions, noted Harriel committed new felonies every few years, and ultimately determined adjudication as a habitual criminal was warranted under the circumstances in this matter. See Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 983, 843 P.2d 800, 805 (1992) (“NRS 207.010 makes no special allowance for non-violent crimes or for the remoteness of convictions; instead, these are considerations within the discretion of the district court.”); see also Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1004, 946 P.2d 148, 152 (1997) (holding a district court did not abuse its “very broad’’ discretion in adjudicating a defendant as a habitual criminal where the defendant argued all three of his prior convictions were stale and two of his three convictions were nonviolent). In addition, the sentences imposed are within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. See NRS 193.130(2)(c); NRS 207.010(1)(b)(3), NRS 453.321(2)(c); see also NRS 176A.100(1)(a) (providing that a district court “shall not suspend the execution of the sentence imposed or grant probation” to a “person [who] is found to be a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010”). And Harriel does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Having considered the sentences and the crimes, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating Harriel as a habitual criminal or in sentencing Harriel.

Harriel also argues that this court should interpret the staleness of prior convictions used to adjudicate a defendant as a habitual criminal in the context of NRS 50.095(2) and NRS 179.245(1)(a). NRS 50.095(2) provides that a witness's prior felony conviction is inadmissible for impeachment if it is more than ten years old. In addition, NRS 179.245(1)(a) provides for the sealing of criminal records of certain convictions after ten years. Based on these statutes, Harriel contends this court should hold that a prior felony conviction more than ten years old should be considered stale and thus be precluded from a district court's consideration in its decision to adjudicate a defendant as a habitual criminal. As stated above, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that NRS 207.010 makes no special allowance for the remoteness of prior convictions and whether a conviction is too remote is a consideration within the district court's sentencing discretion. See Arajakis, 108 Nev. at 983, 843 P.2d at 805. Harriel's argument would require this court to overrule supreme court precedent, which it cannot do. See Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 418 n.7, 537 P.3d 476, 487 n.7 (Ct. App. 2023). Therefore, we conclude Harriel is not entitled to relief based on this argument. For these reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court adjudicated Harriel as a habitual criminal in relation to the prohibited person count and imposed a 10-to-25-year prison term. The district court also imposed a concurrent 28-to-60-month prison term for the controlled substance count.