VOSS v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Voss contends the district court erred by denying his motion as untimely pursuant to NRS 176.515 because he was invoking the district court's “inherent power and authority to correct its judgments for good cause shown.” In his motion, Voss claimed (1) “murder with the use of a deadly weapon” is not a crime and, thus, the district attorney unlawfully exercised legislative power when it charged him with this crime and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this crime; (2) the trial court erred in issuing several jury instructions that informed the jury he had been charged with first-degree murder instead of open murder and that relieved the State of its burden to demonstrate the elements of first-degree murder; and (3) the jury was not provided verdict forms or instructions regarding second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Voss requested that the district court vacate his judgment of conviction, and he claimed the district court had authority to vacate his judgment of conviction pursuant to its “inherent power” and NRS 176.515.

Contrary to Voss’ assertion, a district court does not have inherent power to vacate a judgment for good cause shown. Rather, a district court may vacate a judgment under certain circumstances pursuant to NRS 176.515, and it has the inherent authority to modify or correct an illegal sentence based on certain “very narrow” grounds. See Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708 & n.2, 918 P.2d 321, 324-25 & n.2 (1996). “In all other cases, post-conviction challenges to the validity of a conviction or sentence must be brought pursuant to NRS 34.720 through NRS 34.830.” Id. at 707, 918 P.2d at 324 (cleaned up).

Because Voss did not claim that his sentence was based on mistaken assumptions about his criminal record that worked to his extreme detriment or that his sentence was facially illegal, his claims fell outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence.¹ See id. And to the extent Voss filed his motion pursuant to NRS 176.515, the motion was untimely as it was filed more than 26 years after the jury entered its verdict on June 3, 1998. See NRS 176.515(3)-(4) (stating a motion for a new trial must be made within two years after the verdict if based on newly discovered evidence or within seven days after the verdict if based on any other grounds); see also Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 371, 91 P.3d 39, 56 (2004) (recognizing a defendant may seek relief by way of a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus where an NRS 176.515 motion would be untimely).² Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Voss’ motion.

Voss also contends the district court erred in determining that his claims fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a petition for a writ of coram nobis. A petition for a writ of coram nobis is only available to persons who are not in custody on the conviction being challenged. Trujillo v. State, 129 Nev. 706, 716, 310 P.3d 594, 601 (2013). As Voss is currently serving his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction challenged, a postconviction habeas petition was the exclusive remedy with which to challenge his conviction. See id. at 716, 310 P.3d at 600; see also NRS 34.724(2)(b) (stating a postconviction habeas petition “[c]omprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them”). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Voss’ alternative petition for a writ of coram nobis.

Finally, Voss appears to contend the district court was biased against him because it determined his petition for a writ of coram nobis was procedurally defaulted. The district court's ruling is not indicative of bias. See Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022) (stating a party alleging judicial bias must generally “show that the judge learned prejudicial information from an extrajudicial source” and that “[a]n extrajudicial source of bias is predicated on something other than rulings, opinions formed, or statements made by the judge during the course of trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (“Moreover, rulings and actions of a judge during the course of official judicial proceedings do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification.”). And as previously discussed, the district court properly denied Voss’ petition for a writ of coram nobis. Therefore, we conclude Voss is not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly,³ we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We also note that any claim that a judgment of conviction is void is necessarily outside the scope of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which “presupposes a valid conviction and may not ․ be used to challenge alleged errors in proceedings that occur prior to the imposition of sentence.” Id. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324 (quotation marks omitted).

2.   We note that Voss’ motion did not substantially comply with the statutory form for a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see NRS 34.735, and we express no opinion as to whether Voss could meet the procedural requirements of NRS Chapter 34, see NRS 34.726; NRS 34.810.

3.   To the extent Voss raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.