CRYSLER II v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Crysler argues that NRS 484C.410 ¹ and NRS 484C.420 ² are unconstitutional because they require a mandatory prison term rather than allowing the district court to consider probation, treatment, rehabilitation, and the mitigating factors of a particular defendant. He contends the mandatory prison terms: (1) violated his procedural due process right to individualized sentencing; (2) violated substantive due process because the mandatory prison sentences produce arbitrary sentencing outcomes; and (3) violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual sentences.

Because Crysler failed to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes in the district court, he has forfeited review of this claim. See Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). We can still review forfeited error for plain error; however, Crysler failed to argue plain error on appeal. Therefore, we need not review this claim on appeal. See id. at 50, 52, 412 P.3d at 48-49; see also Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (explaining this court need not consider issues unaccompanied by cogent argument and relevant authority). However, even reviewing for plain error, Crysler's claim fails. To demonstrate plain error, Crysler must show that “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning that it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights.” Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Crysler fails to provide any authority that mandatory sentencing schemes are unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Nevada Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that mandatory sentencing schemes are constitutional. See Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 640, 218 P.3d 501, 505 (2009) (holding “it is within the Legislature's power to completely remove any judicial discretion to determine a criminal penalty by creating mandatory sentencing schemes”); Mariscal-Ochoa v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 42, 550 P.3d 813, 824 (2024) (declining to overrule the holding in Mendoza-Lobos); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (“Congress has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.”). Thus, Crysler fails to demonstrate any error that is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record. Therefore, we conclude Crysler fails to demonstrate he is entitled to relief, and we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   NRS 484C.410(1) requires a “minimum [prison] term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15 years” when a person has previously been convicted of a felony DUI offense and commits a new DUI offense.

2.   NRS 484C.420(1) prohibits probation, with some exceptions that are not applicable here, and limits the suspension of a sentence for those convicted of DUI.