BELLISARIO v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Bellisario argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his Alford plea without conducting an evidentiary hearing.² A defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, NRS 176.165, and “a district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just,” Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 604, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2015). In considering the motion, “the district court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing would be fair and just.” Id. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281. We give deference to the district court's factual findings if they are supported by the record. Id. at 604, 354 P.3d at 1281. The district court's ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is discretionary and will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion,” State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Bernardelli), 85 Nev. 381, 385, 455 P.2d 923, 926 (1969). To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Bellisario asserts that he felt compelled to enter the Alford plea so that the State would lift the no contact order with his children. However, despite his plea and being in compliance with the plea agreement, he had not been permitted to visit or communicate with his children. He further contends that the district court looked too narrowly at his behavior and responses during the plea hearing and did not consider the record as a whole, including the diagnostic impressions from his competency evaluations, and the potential effects his mental health issues had on his decision to enter a plea.

A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and a petitioner carries the burden of establishing the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). In determining the validity of a guilty plea, this court looks to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448 (2000). “A court must be able to conclude from the oral canvass, any written plea memorandum and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the memorandum (i.e., did the defendant read it, have any questions about it, etc.) that the defendant's plea was freely, voluntarily and knowingly made.” Id. at 1106, 13 P.3d at 448.

We conclude that Bellisario fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw his Alford plea. Bellisario acknowledged in the plea agreement that contact with his children would be governed by the family court and its orders. Bellisario's divorce decree, which was filed about six months before he pleaded guilty, provided that he was not permitted parenting time with his children until the completion of the criminal proceedings. Because he was aware that the family court orders governed contact with his children—and prohibited contact with his children until he resolved his criminal cases—he did not demonstrate that his belief that the State would drop the no contact order if he entered an Alford plea constituted a fair and just reason to withdraw.

We further conclude that Bellisario fails to demonstrate that the district court's consideration of the totality of the circumstances was impermissibly limited. The district court indicated that it considered the totality of the circumstances at the time of the plea in determining if the plea canvass was sufficient to assess whether Bellisario's mental health issues hindered his ability to enter a valid plea. The court did not limit its consideration to the time of the plea to the exclusion of all other evidence. Rather, it noted both Bellisario's behavior in prior proceedings and the observations in the competency evaluations conducted after the plea canvass.

Further, it was within the district court's discretion to consider the circumstances attendant to the plea canvass more relevant to Bellisario's ability to enter a valid plea than the more remote evidence about his mental health. The evaluations which noted potential mental health diagnoses were conducted over two years after the plea canvass.³ Bellisario acknowledged, and the presentence investigation reflects, that he had been treated for mental health issues in the years before entering his Alford plea. During his plea canvass, Bellisario insisted that his prior mental health issues did not affect his ability to render a voluntary plea and he had the opportunity to provide context or concerns regarding those issues but did not. Further, the court observed that Bellisario was more focused and attentive at the plea hearing than he had been during prior proceedings. See Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996) (“[T]rial judges are much more competent to judge a defendant's understanding than this court.”). The court also noted that Bellisario was represented by competent counsel throughout the proceedings and his counsel did not raise any concern about Bellisario's mental health issues affecting his ability to proceed until well after he pleaded guilty. Therefore, based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court appropriately evaluated Bellisario's motion and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bellisario failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea in light of the totality of the circumstances at issue in this matter. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   We note that Bellisario waived his direct appeal as part of the plea agreement. Because Bellisario challenges whether his plea was knowing and voluntary in this appeal, we do not apply the waiver contained in the plea agreement. See Aldape v. State, 139 Nev. 388, 389, 535 P.3d 1184, 1188 (2023) (providing that one of the elements for determining whether a defendant has waived his direct appeal by way of a waiver clause is whether “both the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily”).

3.   The evaluations included in the record opined that Bellisario was competent to stand trial.