CHINN v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Chinn first argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence on the luring or attempting to lure a child offense (luring offense) that exceeded the sentence recommended by the State. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued for a prison sentence of 24 to 60 months for the luring offense, and the district court imposed a prison sentence of 28 to 72 months, to run consecutive to the prison sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 10 years for the lewdness offense.

The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

The sentence imposed for the luring offense is within the parameters provided by the relevant statute. See NRS 201.560(5)(b). And Chinn does not allege the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Having considered the sentence and the crime, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Chinn on the luring offense.

Chinn next asserts the district court violated SCR 252(2) by imposing a sentence on the luring offense that exceeded the sentencing recommendation agreed to by the State after the parties participated in a settlement conference. Because Chinn did not object below, he is not entitled to relief absent a demonstration of plain error. See Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48-49 (2018). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show there was an error, the error is plain or clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record, and the error affected the appellant's substantial rights. Id. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48.

When a settlement conference results in a guilty plea agreement that involves sentencing stipulations, “such a settlement shall be conditioned on the trial judge's acceptance of and agreement to follow the stipulations.” SCR 252(2)(f). However, absent entry of a conditional plea based upon the district court's acceptance of the parties’ sentencing recommendation or the judge's expression of an inclination to follow the parties’ sentencing recommendation, the district court is not bound by the parties’ sentencing recommendations. See NRS 174.035(4); cf. Cripps v. State, 122 Nev. 764, 771, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (2006).

The guilty plea agreement provided that the State would recommend no more than 24 to 60 months’ imprisonment for the luring offense, that Chinn was free to argue for any legal sentence, and that the parties would be free to argue as to whether the sentence for the luring offense would be imposed concurrently or consecutively to the lewdness offense. The agreement did not provide for any sentencing stipulation. Rather, Chinn acknowledged in the plea agreement that he had not been promised any specific sentence and that the district court was not bound by the parties’ agreement. The district court also did not express an inclination to accept the recommended sentence. We therefore conclude Chinn has failed to demonstrate that the district court plainly erred in imposing sentence on the luring offense.¹

Finally, Chinn claims the State breached the plea agreement by failing to return his seized property prior to sentencing. The plea agreement here provided that the State would release Chinn's seized property “prior to sentencing.” At sentencing, Chinn's counsel noted the State had not returned Chinn's property but stated she had “full faith that it will be taken care of immediately,” and affirmed there was no legal reason why the district court should not enter judgment. Based on this record, we conclude Chinn invited the very error of which he now complains. See Chadwick v. State, 140 Nev. 104, 115, 546 P.3d 215, 227 (Ct. App. 2024) (stating “a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit” (quoting Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994))).

Therefore, Chinn is not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As part of this claim, Chinn also requests this court permit him to withdraw his guilty plea based on the district court's alleged violation of SCR 252(2). See SCR 252(2)(f). Based on our conclusion that the district court did not violate SCR 252(2) in sentencing Chinn, we conclude he is not entitled to the relief he has requested.