CAMPBELL v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

In his motion seeking correction of his sentence, Campbell contended that the amended judgment of conviction was not a final judgment because it did not state the statute that allowed for restitution, name the victims who were owed restitution, or set an amount of restitution for each victim. A motion to correct an illegal sentence may only challenge the facial legality of the sentence: either the district court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence or the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). Such a motion may not “be used as a vehicle for challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing.” Id.

Campbell previously filed a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence in which he argued that the amended judgment of conviction was not a final judgment because it did not adequately define the terms of restitution. On appeal, this court concluded that Campbell's claims were outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. See Campbell v. State, No. 86265-COA, 2023 WL 6139418 (Nev. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2023) (Order of Affirmance). This holding is the law of the case, and “[t]he doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.” Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). Therefore, Campbell was not entitled to relief on his restitution claims.

Campbell also contended that he was entitled to additional presentence credit. A claim challenging the amount of presentence credit awarded “is a challenge to the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence, which may be raised on direct appeal or in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus complying with the statutory procedures governing petitions that challenge the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence.” Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737, 739, 137 P.3d 1165, 1166 (2006). Therefore, without considering the merits of Campbell's claim, we conclude that it falls outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.¹ Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Campbell's motion.

On appeal, Campbell argues the sentencing court erroneously sentenced him without ensuring he had read the presentence investigation report and that counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Campbell did not raise these claims in his motion below, and we decline to consider them on appeal in the first instance. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989). For the foregoing reasons,² we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Campbell's motion did not substantially comply with the statutory form for a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see NRS 34.730(2)(b); NRS 34.735, and we express no opinion as to whether Campbell could meet the procedural requirements of NRS Chapter 34, see NRS 34.726; NRS 34.810.

2.   Campbell does not argue that the district court erred in denying his motion for the appointment of counsel. Thus, we conclude Campbell fails to demonstrate any error with respect to said motion.