GUZMAN CARAPIA v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Guzman-Carapia contends the State produced insufficient evidence of the use or existence of a firearm at trial. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). “In a criminal case, a verdict supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992).

The testimony and evidence introduced at trial established that Guzman-Carapia and the victim were previously married and share one child together. On the evening of the incident, the victim went over to Guzman-Carapia's residence. When she walked into Guzman-Carapia's home, the victim noticed two “long guns” on the kitchen counter. Guzman-Carapia asked the victim to go to the primary bedroom to talk. Guzman-Carapia and the victim started getting intimate in the primary bedroom, but the victim changed her mind and told Guzman-Carapia to stop. He became upset and walked out of the room. When the victim walked out of the bedroom, Guzman-Carapia was standing in the living room pointing one of the guns at her. The victim had her back to a wood stove in the living room. Guzman-Carapia wanted the victim to stay, but she told him, “You go your way and I go my way.” Guzman-Carapia then shot the gun toward the victim's left side. The victim saw a shell casing and smoke come out of the gun.

The victim tried to call 9-1-1, but Guzman-Carapia reached out and grabbed her cell phone. The two struggled over the phone and ended up back in the primary bedroom. Guzman-Carapia threw the cell phone on the floor, then threw the victim on the bed and pinned her down on her back. The victim told Guzman-Carapia she would stay and talk, so he released her. Once she was free, she grabbed her phone off the floor and ran out of the residence. As she was running to her car, she heard Guzman-Carapia behind her and “heard him pull the trigger again from the gun.” She saw him get into his car carrying just the “long gun” he had fired and drive away.

The victim drove to a nearby gas station and called 9-1-1. A deputy with the Washoe County Sheriff's Office (WCSO) responded to the gas station. After speaking with the victim and getting a statement from her, the deputy called Guzman-Carapia and asked to meet with him, but Guzman-Carapia said he would prefer to meet the next morning. Another WCSO deputy drove by Guzman-Carapia's residence and observed a vehicle matching the description provided by the victim parked outside. Law enforcement continued to monitor Guzman-Carapia's residence and obtained a warrant to search the home. When Guzman-Carapia left the residence in his vehicle the next morning, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop and took him into custody. During a pat down search, deputies found a shell casing and an unfired but damaged bullet in the pocket of Guzman-Carapia's hoodie.

After taking Guzman-Carapia into custody, WCSO deputies executed the search warrant at Guzman-Carapia's residence. Deputies did not find the “long guns” or any ammunition. The deputies did, however, find a hole in the wall above the wood stove that appeared consistent with a bullet hole. Similar holes were found in the walls of the bedroom on the opposite side of the wood stove, leading to a hole on the exterior of the house. The deputies searched the backyard for the bullet but were unable to find anything.

Although Guzman-Carapia testified at trial that he did not own a firearm or shoot at the victim, this court “will not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of the trier of fact.” Mitchell, 124 Nev. at 816, 192 P.3d at 727. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Guzman-Carapia used a firearm during the commission of the charged offenses. Therefore, we conclude Guzman-Carapia is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Guzman-Carapia also argues the district court abused its discretion in submitting a flight instruction to the jury over his objection. Guzman-Carapia asserts that there was insufficient evidence of flight to justify the instruction and that the instruction reduced the State's burden of proof. We review the decision to issue a flight instruction for an abuse of discretion, see Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 734 & n.21, 30 P.3d 1128, 1133 & n.21 (2001), holding modified on other grounds by Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 268, 182 P.3d 106, 110 (2008), subject to harmless error analysis, see NRS 178.598 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). “A flight instruction is proper when there is evidence that the defendant fled ‘with a consciousness of guilt’ in order to avoid arrest.” Camacho v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 578 P.3d 949, 961 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Flight is more than merely leaving the scene of the crime,” Potter v. State, 96 Nev. 875, 876, 619 P.2d 1222, 1222 (1980), and “[e]vidence that a defendant fled with a consciousness of guilt and to avoid arrest must be more than speculative,” Camacho, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 578 P.3d at 961.

Here, the primary evidence of flight the State presented was the victim's 9-1-1 call and her testimony that she saw Guzman-Carapia get in his vehicle with a long gun and drive away as she left his residence. The State presented little evidence that Guzman-Carapia left the crime scene with a consciousness of guilt to avoid arrest and points to few facts beyond “a mere going away” to support the flight instruction. See Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 582, 119 P.3d 107, 126 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. State, 133 Nev. 693, 698, 405 P.3d 114, 120 (2017). Moreover, the WCSO deputies testified that they observed Guzman-Carapia's vehicle parked in front of the residence after the incident and that Guzman-Carapia did not leave the residence until the next morning. However, when searching the residence and car, no long guns were found. Under these facts, it may have been improper to instruct the jury regarding flight. However, we conclude that the district court's alleged error in giving the flight instruction was harmless in light of the evidence adduced at trial. See Potter, 96 Nev. at 876, 619 P.2d at 1222-23 (affirming a judgment of conviction despite the district court's erroneous use of a flight instruction because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice or prejudice the defendant's substantial rights); accord Camacho, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 578 P.3d at 961. For these reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.