RANDOLPH v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

In his motion, Randolph claimed the judgment of conviction required him to serve his sentences consecutive to “a non-existent count III” and failed to set forth the minimum prison term he must serve before he was eligible for parole as required by NRS 176.105. “[A] motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the defendant's extreme detriment.” Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). A motion to correct an illegal sentence may only challenge the facial legality of the sentence: either the district court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence or the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. Id. The district court may summarily deny a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence if the motion raises issues that fall outside of the very narrow scope of issues permissible in such motions. Id. at 708 n.2, 918 P.2d at 325 n.2.

Without considering the merits of Randolph's claims, we conclude they fall outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence.¹ Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Randolph's motion, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Nonetheless, we note that two separate judgments of conviction were entered in Randolph's criminal case: one in 1995, in which Randolph was convicted of battery with the use of a deadly weapon (Count III); and one in 1997, in which Randolph was convicted of burglary, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon (Counts I, II, and IV). The 1997 judgment reflected Randolph's sentences for Counts I, II, and IV, and properly noted that these sentences were imposed consecutive to Randolph's sentence on Count III, which was reflected in the 1995 judgment.