PEOPLE v. CORDERO (2018)

On February 22, 2018, I conducted a Huntley hearing. At the hearing, Detective Christopher Dimase of the Mount Vernon Police Department testified for the People. The defendant called no witnesses. For the reasons set forth in this decision, I find that the People have met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement was voluntarily made. (People v. Thomas, 22 NY3d 629, 641 [2014]; People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]; People v. Velez, 211 AD2d 524, 524 [1st Dept 1995].)

The defendant voluntarily came to the Mount Vernon Police Department on March 22, 2017 after she was informed that the police were looking to speak with her. On that date, and at approximately 8:30 pm, the defendant was placed in a room and questioned by Officer Andy Rivera and Detective Dimase. After being Mirandized the defendant acknowledged participating in an altercation with a complainant under a separate accusatory instrument. Det. Dimase testified that approximately thirty minutes after the interview began, he informed the defendant that she was under arrest for the assault on the complainant. The defendant allegedly refused to be handcuffed by male officers. A female officer was called and the defendant was handcuffed. Det. Dimase further testified that while he and Officer Rivera were escorting the defendant to a holding cell, she broke free of the handcuffs, but was unable to get far before being restrained and re-handcuffed. After handcuffing the defendant, Det. Dimase admitted on cross examination that he asked the defendant “what happened”? The defendant allegedly replied, “You can handcuff me, but I'm going to do it again.” The defendant was then charged with Escape in the Third Degree, a violation of Penal Law § 205.05.

At issue in the hearing was the admissibility of the statement the defendant made to Det. Dimase after being re-handcuffed. Defendant argues that the Detective failed to re-mirandize the defendant before asking her “what happened” after she broke free from her handcuffs. Defendant argues that the Miranda warnings that were read while she was in the interview room approximately 30 minutes earlier was not effective once the interrogation was concluded and she was being moved to a holding cell. Defendant further contends that before Det. Dimase asked her a question that was likely to illicit an incriminating response, he was required to re-read the Miranda warnings to her. The People, while acknowledging that the initial interrogation had ended, argue that new Miranda warnings were not needed because there was not a significant break in time from the initial warnings.

This Court finds the testimony of Det. Dimase credible. Contrary to the defendant's position, repetition of previously given Miranda warnings is not necessary “where there ha[s] been no break in custody and defendant's statement [is] made within a reasonable time after his initial ․ waiver of Miranda rights.” (People v. Irizarry, 199 Ad2d 180, 181 [1st Dept 1993]; see People v. Encarnacion, 259 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 1999] [“Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6–hour interval was unnecessary, since defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights (initially) and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during (the interval)” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ]; People v. Shomo, 235 AD2d 208, 208 [1st Dept 1997] [readministration of Miranda rights unnecessary where “defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived those rights five hours earlier and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during that period”]; People v. Glinsman, 107 AD2d 710, 710 [2d Dept 1985] [“It is well settled that where a person in police custody has been issued Miranda warnings and voluntarily and intelligently waives those rights, it is not necessary to repeat the warnings prior to subsequent questioning within a reasonable time thereafter, so long as the custody has remained continuous”].) Here, of course, there was no break in custody, and no evidence at the hearing, and no assertion by the defendant, that the environment was in any way coercive. As such, since the defendant had just been Mirandized approximately thirty minutes earlier, it was not necessary to repeat the warnings prior to the subsequent questioning of the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress the statement she made to the police while being transported to a holding cell is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Adrian N. Armstrong, J.