WILLIAMS v. PEOPLE (1969)

I dissent. The writ of prohibition should issue.

The purpose of a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is to ‘weed out groundless or unsupported charges * * * and * * * relieve the accused of the degradation and the expense of a criminal trial.’ (Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338, 135 A.L.R. 775.) The hearing is ‘designed to protect the rights of the accused and to see to it that no one is detained in custody indefinitely or capriciously in order that a case may be developed in the future, or circumstances arise that will justify a trial.’ (People v. Bucher, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 346, 346 P.2d 202, 204.)

Although every legitimate inference must be drawn in favor of the information (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197), there must be some evidence from which the committing magistrate can reasonably infer the existence of each essential element of the crime charged. (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Supra, at pp. 474—475, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197; Garabedian v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 59 Cal.2d 124, 127, 28 Cal.Rptr. 318, 378 P.2d 590.)

To establish grand theft of an automobile, the state must prove (1) the taking away of an automobile (2) from the owner (3) into the possession of the accused (4) without the consent of the owner or under claim of right (5) with the specific intent to deprive the owner of his property wholly and permanently. (Compare Pen.Code, s 487, subd. 3, with People v. Walther, 263 Cal.App.2d 310, 316, 69 Cal.Rptr. 434.)

To establish the crime of receiving stolen property, the state must prove (1) that the property found in the possession of the accused was acquired by theft or extortion; (2) that the accused received, concealed, or withheld the property from its owner; and (3) that the accused knew the property was stolen. (Pen.Code, s 496; People v. Williams, 253 Cal.App.2d 952, 957, 61 Cal.Rptr. 238.) These elements were not proved here.

It is settled that evidence of possession of recently stolen goods is insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft, burglary, or receiving stolen property. There must be, in addition, evidence in the form of suspicious circumstances or statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt. (E.g., People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 258, 324 P.2d 556; People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288, 294 P.2d 32; People v. Wissenfeld, 36 Cal.2d 758, 763, 227 P.2d 833.)

The question presented in the instant case is: If mere evidence of possession of recently stolen goods coupled with a defendant's failure to explain possession will not support a Conviction for theft, burglary, or receiving stolen property, will it nonetheless support an order of commitment for prosecution under section 872 of the Penal Code?

The answer must be no; the mere fact of possession of recently stolen property does Not provide the basis for a reasonable inference either that the possessor was the one who stole the property or that the possessor knew that it had been stolen, and thus cannot be sufficient to support a conviction (e.g., People v. Wissenfeld, Supra, 36 Cal.2d 758, 763, 227 P.2d 833) or to hold a defendant to answer.

Were the rule otherwise, any person purchasing or receiving as a gift a chattel, whether new or used, could be held for trail if the chattel turned out to have been recently stolen. Even persons seeking to explain their possession as legal might be held since the magistrate need not believe their explanation. And the reviewing court is obliged to view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the validity of the information and to draw every legitimate inference from the evidence in favor of the information. (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Supra, 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197.) Only if the explanation established legality of possession as a matter of law would the magistrate be prevented from disregarding it. Allowing authorities to hold all persons for trial who are found to be in possession of recently stolen goods would impose an undue burden on many innocent purchasers and donees, a burden of the sort which the preliminary hearing is designed to obviate. (Jaffe v. Stone, Supra, 18 Cal.2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775; People v. Bucher, Supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 346, 346 P.2d 202.)

The majority do not contest this point. They do Not rely on the mere fact of possession of recently stolen property to provide the basis for holding petitioner to answer, but admit that in a case of mere possession of a stolen item, without more, ‘perhaps * * * the mere fact of possession affords less than significant support for an inference that the possessor was the thief or had received it with guilty knowledge, * * *.’

In the present case the majority purport to find the corroborative evidence needed in addition to evidence of possession of recently stolen property in order to convict or to hold defendant to answer. For such corroborative evidence, the majority rely on what they consider to be the ‘highly significant’ fact that ‘defendant was found in possession of all or practically all of the accessories which were stripped from Tom's car. * * *’

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is ‘difficult to infer that ‘practically everything’ stolen from one Chevrolet would normally be found incorporated in another Chevrolet of the same year within a relatively short time (eight weeks) thereafter.' The fact that petitioner was apparently found in possession of ‘practically everything’ that had been ‘stripped’ from the stolen car, approximately eight customized items, reasonably suggests at most that petitioner obtained the customized accessories as a ‘package deal’ for his car, which was the same type of car (1956 Chevrolet) as that from which the accessories were ‘stripped.’ It is probably as ‘normal’—or even more so—for customized accessories to be sold in ‘packages' as singly.

I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of the stolen items found in petitioner's car as ‘functionally unrelated.’ That characterization flies in the face of the facts of this case. The items stolen were ‘customized accessories' for a car 12 years old at the time of its theft, a 1956 Chevrolet. When those stolen items were recovered eight weeks later, they were found on another 12-year-old car, again a 1956 Chevrolet. There is no showing that the ‘customized accessories' were suitable for use on other automobile models without substantial modification.

We are not here dealing with functionally unrelated items like a watch, an umbrella, and a car. We are dealing with items which can be expected to be sold as often in packages as singly because they are of utility only to a small part of the populace and a purchaser of one would be expected to be interested in the others. In the present case the items are so closely related and it is so normal for them to be sold as a ‘package’ rather than singly, that it is unreasonable to infer that a person in possession of the ‘package’ eight weeks after the theft is either the thief or a knowing receiver of the stolen property.

I consider that the majority's reasoning in footnote 7 reaches a conclusion based on so-called ‘knowledge of practical realities' by magistrates which is not only erroneous but is slanderous to many of the citizens of this state. The footnote reads: ‘In drawing this inference of guilty knowledge the magistrate would have been warranted in reasoning on the basis of his knowledge of practical realities that one who receives from another individual a collection of diverse automotive accessories such as those here involved (which included items ranging from a transmission and tires to window mouldings and an etched glove compartment cover) does so with an awareness that they might well have been obtained by stripping a stolen car.’

At the outset I cannot agree with the thought implicit in this footnote that a magistrate has knowledge of the ‘practical realities' of the practices of trade in customized automobile accessories. I know many justices and judges in this state; none of them are ‘hot rodders,’ and on the basis of my own associations, I would guess that there are not more than one or two judges or justices in the entire State of California, if any, who have engaged in or who have expert knowledge of the practices of trade as too customized accessories. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the magistrate had such expertise. Nor do I believe that the justices or judges of this state are experts as to the trade practices involving automotive accessories generally. Thus, the majority and the magistrate can only guess as to what are the ‘practical realities.’ Although I am against indulging in such guesses, if forced to, I would guess that there is a substantial trade among private individuals in automotive accessories, including customized accessories, that the great majority of the transactions are entirely innocent, and that most buyers do not believe that the purchased objects were obtained by stripping a stolen car.

Although many people when their cars fail to function properly and repairs involve unreasonable costs will sell the cars to wreckers, there are also many who will salvage and seek to sell the usable parts, particularly where they are expensive customized parts. Ordinarily, they will be at least as willing to sell them in a package as individually. I see no reason to believe that the unfortunate victim of an accident, for example, who tries to salvage the useful parts of his car will limit his customers to the purchase of a single part; if he has found a potential buyer who owns the proper make and model of car, he will attempt to sell him all of the accessories.

It is apparent from the want ad section of local newspapers that there is a substantial market in private sales of used automobile parts where the seller advertises ‘parts,’ generally without specification of the names of the parts but with specification of a year and model car. Depending upon prices, I should think that the sellers would want to sell all of their parts to any owner of the same model and year car. Likewise an owner in the market for such items would be likely to buy many of them from a single seller because it would be difficult for him to find used accessories for this particular year and model.¹

The footnote states that anyone buying a package of accessories from such sellers does so ‘with an awareness that they might well have been obtained by stripping a stolen car.’ I have never had occasion to purchase accessories from a private person, but I would not be so intolerant as to characterize those who sell packages of car accessories as probable thieves; nor do I believe that those buying the accessories believe that the accessories are probably stolen.

Moreover, even assuming as the majority in effect asserts that common experience showed that sellers of several customized accessories were more often than not sellers of stolen goods, this fact would not warrant holding that mere possession or recently stolen accessories is sufficient to hold a defendant to answer for theft and knowingly receiving stolen goods. The basic rule that mere possession of recently stolen goods is not sufficient to convict of such crimes was not based upon probabilities reflected by common experience but upon a policy fundamental to our democracy and judicial system, which is as relevant to our society today as it was in 1861 when we adopted the rule.

In the landmark case of People v. Chambers (1861) 18 Cal. 382, 383—384, the court stated: ‘It is well settled that the possession of the fruits of a crime is a circumstance to be considered in determining the guilt of the possessor, but the authorities seem to hold that this circumstance is not of itself sufficient to authorize a conviction. ‘The real criminal,’ says Greenleaf, ‘may have artfully placed the article in the possession or on the premises of an innocent person, the better to conceal his own guilt; or it may have been thrown away by the felon in his flight, and found by the possessor, or have been taken from him in order to restore it to the true owner, or otherwise have come lawfully into his possession.’ (3 Greenl. Ev. sec. 31.) Our sense of justice would revolt at the idea of convicting a person under such circumstances; but it is obvious that if the mere possession is sufficient to convict, the innocent are as likely to suffer as the guilty. There are many cases in which an explanation would be impossible; and in such cases to throw the burden of explanation upon the accused would be to slam the door of justice in his face.' (Italics added.) The court went on to state that the circumstances needed in addition to possession to secure a conviction ‘must be such as are naturally calculated to awaken suspicion against the party charged, and to corroborate the inference of guilty possession.’

It bears emphasis that the court in Chambers did not dispute that possession of recently stolen goods gives rise to an inference of guilt; the court assumed it did, but it in effect held that, even assuming the existence of the inference, the inference should not be indulged because, in the light of the difficulty in disproving guilt, conviction on the basis of the inference alone would mean that ‘the innocent are as likely to suffer as the guilty.’

These considerations are applicable here. The majority has determined that from the possession an inference of guilt may be drawn. How may the defendant meet the inference? Under the majority view, he may not rebut the inference by producing a cancelled check, bill of sale, or witnesses to the purchase. The majority state in footnote 7 that the magistrate may still infer, even when there is a sale, that the defendant was aware that these were probably stolen goods. Ordinarily, it would seem that he can rebut the inference of guilty knowledge only through his own testimony.² But the guilty purchaser may proclaim lack of knowledge as loudly as the innocent purchaser, and in the words of Chambers ‘the innocent are as likely to suffer as the guilty.’ We should not permit the inference of guilty knowledge to be indulged, unless, again in the words of Chambers, there is, in addition to the possession, proof of circumstances ‘naturally calculated to awaken suspicion against the party charged, and to corroborate the inference of guilty possession.’

I must also point out that the implications of today's majority opinion will probably have grave practical effects upon our economic life. If an inference of guilt may be drawn from mere possession of several recently stolen items a citizen should never buy two or more so-called ‘functionally unrelated’ items from a single individual. A purchaser of such items, should he later find they are stolen, may be held, under the majority opinion, to answer for felony charges. Athough the risk that the items will turn out to be stolen may be remote, the jeopardy should this unlikely event occur is so great that any prudent person should in no event ever purchse more than a single item from any private individual. Such a restriction, although concededly indirect, on individual conduct in a trading society like ours is not justified by the need to apprehend thieves and traffickers in stolen goods.

In summary, in order to give meaning to simultaneous possession of practically all of the items stolen, as the majority purport to do, it is essential to characterize them as functionally unrelated. But to do so misstates the facts. In order to infer the crucial element of guilty knowledge, it is necessary to suggest something suspicious about the sale of packages of automobile accessories fitting a particular make and model car. The majority do so by saying that all private sellers of such packages are probable thieves and by charging with guilty knowledge all purchasers of such packages. The majority's ‘practical realities' is warranted by neither evidence nor experience and is slanderous to many of the citizens of this state. Furthermore, the rule adopted by the majority today should be rejected because under it the innocent are as likely to suffer as the guilty.

Finally, it should be noted that holding that mere evidence of possession of recently stolen goods is insufficient to warrant holding an accused for trial will not impose an undue burden on prosecuting officials in general or in the present case. They must always secure additional evidence in order to convict. And in the instant case, the majority is willing to assume that additional evidence is necessary to convict. If this is the case, then if the prosecutor has such additional evidence, he can easily present it at a new preliminary hearing; if he does not, at this late date, petitioner is entitled to be released.

I would issue the writ of prohibition.

FOOTNOTES

1.  It might also be pointed out that a seller having found a buyer for several of the accessories at a reasonable price would recognize that his market is limited and would be prone to ‘throw in’ the remaining accessories to close the deal.

2.  Even producing a seller who would waive his privilege against self-incrimination and state that he told the buyer the goods were not stolen would not defeat the inference indulged by the majority because the inference is based on probable awareness arising from the nature of the goods.