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STROMERSON et ux. v. AVERILL.
In an action by plaintiffs, husband and wife, to quiet title to 562 acres of land, defendant in his answer claimed title thereto asserting that plaintiff, H. C. Stromerson, as defendant's agent had entered into a contract to purchase the land from Miller & Lux, Inc., a corporation, for defendant. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
Prior to 1933, defendant, Roger Averill, was engaged in farming operations in the San Joaquin Valley. Two men, Lincoln and Davis, were working for him in that enterprise. Plaintiff, H. C. Stromerson, and defendant had been friends of long standing. While said plaintiff was residing in Los Angeles it was agreed between him and defendant that Stromerson would move to Madera County where he would be trained to be a farmer and employed by defendant in the latter's farming activities and be paid a salary. Stromerson took the position of foreman; Lincoln was also a foreman while Davis was the superintendent. A parcel of land with an area of 160 acres was purchased from Miller & Lux, Inc., by contract in Stromerson's name as vendee. All the payments were later made under the contract and a deed was executed by the vendor to Stromerson as grantee. Presumably that parcel of land was the same that was involved in an action by Stromerson against Averill in which the former's title was quieted against the latter. An appeal from that judgment was pending when the instant action was tried; the judgment was thereafter affirmed. Stromerson v. Averill, 39 Cal.App.2d 118, 102 P.2d 571. That parcel was leveled and prepared for cultivation, a house was built on it for Stromerson's use and he resided therein. Some property stood in the name of Averill and other in the names of Lincoln and Davis. All the properties were farmed together as a whole. Prior to March 6, 1936, Averill entered into negotiations with Miller & Lux, Inc., to purchase the 562 acre parcel involved in this litigation which is contiguous to the 160 acres above-mentioned. Averill told Stromerson he had bought the 562 acres. A contract of purchase was executed by Miller & Lux, Inc., as vendor and Stromerson, as vendee, providing that title would be conveyed upon the payment of the purchase price which was $16,876.50, payable $1,775 down, $334.50 on May 20, 1936, $1,054.75 on April 20, 1937, $1,054.74 on December 15, 1937, and the balance in nine installments payable annually commencing on March 6, 1938. All the payments falling due under the contract have been made. Averill made the down payment from funds borrowed from a Mr. Allen to whom he gave a promissory note signed by himself, Davis and Stromerson. Most of the principal of this note was subsequently paid by moneys coming from accounts in the names of defendant's associates which in turn were created by advances from the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company. This company advanced money to finance farming operations in the San Joaquin Valley. Averill was no where mentioned in the contract of purchase. Averill requested Stromerson to take the contract of purchase in his name. The farming operations were financed chiefly through the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company. A budget was submitted to that company setting forth the estimates of the advances necessary for the operation of the various parcels of land. A chattel mortgage upon the crops to be produced was given to secure the advances, the mortgagor, at Averill's request, being the person in whose name the land stood. The notes for which the mortgages were given to secure were endorsed by Averill. The advances were repaid chiefly by the returns from the crops raised. Bank accounts were kept, first in the name of Averill, Lincoln, Davis and Stromerson, from which checks were issued to defray the farming expenses. Later the accounts were designated from time to time, Averill and associates, Stromerson, and Lincoln and Stromerson. Advances received from the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company were paid into the accounts, the one receiving it depending upon the state of depletion at the particular time. Payments on the contract of purchase were made from these accounts. Stromerson drew salary checks on the accounts. All the land was farmed as a unit operation. Davis and Averill gave Stromerson orders with respect to farming the 562 acres which he carried out. In connection with the agency, Averill testified on cross-examination:
‘Q. And he (Stromerson) was your agent for all purposes? A. Yes, sir.
‘Q. What were his duties, under the agency? A. Well, he carried the contract in his name, and he carried the deed to the 160 acres in his name, the same as Davis and the same as Lincoln did.’
Averill had offered to form a trust of the properties farmed and give Stromerson, Lincoln and Davis an interest. When the latter were discussing such offer as set forth in a trust agreement, Stromerson stated that he would prefer to have an 80-acre parcel as his own. He asserted no claim to the 562 acres, and stated that if the three of them would ‘stick together’ they could get some land from Averill.
Under these circumstances we believe that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conclusion that plaintiff Stromerson was acting as Averill's agent in the purchase of the 562 acres of land. Plaintiffs discuss at length the testimony given by Stomerson but it does nothing more than create a conflict in the evidence which has been resolved against them by the trial court.
Reference is made to conduct on defendant's part in regard to an assignment of the contract of purchase. Stromerson assigned the contract in blank and it was delivered to the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company as security for advances. Defendant obtained the contract from that company and wrote his name in as assignee and endeavored to have the vendor accept the assignment. The vendor refused. Later, at the demand of the company, defendant drew a line through his name and signed a statement on the contract that he withdrew as assignee. It was within the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Defendant testified that he supposed he had a right to fill his name in the blank space as assignee although he stated that Stromerson had not so authorized him. As the evidence shows that Stromerson was acting as defendant's agent, the contract and the rights thereunder were defendant's property. Hence, it cannot be said that his conduct was so reprehensible as to make his testimony inherently unbelievable.
Plaintiffs particularly refer to asserted admissions on the part of defendant that they were the owners of all rights in the property under the contract. The instances to which reference is made are not necessarily admissions, and do not require a reversal of the judgment. Prior to the execution of the contract of purchase Stromerson applied for and obtained a federal land bank loan on the 160 acres (not here involved) and defendant admitted that if the person to whom the application was mede said that he told him plaintiffs were the owners, he did so. It is a crime to make false statements in obtaining such loans. However, the parcel involved is not in question in the instant litigation, and it was at most merely an impeachment on a collateral matter. We cannot say that the credibility of defendant was so impaired that his evidence could not be believed by the trial court.
In connection with the above loan defendant appeared as a creditor of Stromerson and signed an agreement that the receipt of $900 should constitute a full satisfaction of his claims against plaintiffs. As above indicated that occurred prior to the transaction involving the property here in question. The purpose of having the land in the names of the various associates and having them apply for the loans such as was done on the 160 acres, was because of a restriction on the amount that could be loaned to one person. Mr. Holliday, the man to whom application was made knew of that practice. The reason for defendant's claim of $900 from the loan was because he desired the funds to pay for pumps. He never considered there was any obligation owing from plaintiffs to him; he claimed the property instead.
In connection with the payment of the note given to Allen for the down payment on the purchase price, certain checks were received from Stromerson by defendant, but they were demanded by the latter from the former as amounts to which he was entitled from an account created by the farming operations. They did not constitute a loan.
Reference is made to other asserted admissions of defendant but they are either not necessarily inconsistent with his claim that Stromerson was his agent, or only concern the credibility of witnesses with which we are not concerned.
It is contended by plaintiffs that there was a fatal admission in defendant's answer which is contrary to the finding that defendant was the owner of the property. The claim is untenable. In their complaint plaintiffs alleged that defendant claimed an interest in the contract of purchase and the property embraced therein but that defendant's claim was without right. In a separate allegation, paragraph III of the complaint plaintiffs alleged: ‘That plaintiffs * * * are husband and wife, and that the property described herein is the community property of said H. C. Stromerson and Leone Stromerson, his wife.’ Although that paragraph was not denied by defendant he did deny that plaintiffs entered into the contract and that the plaintiffs are the owners of the property or the contract; and alleges that Stromerson acted as defendant's agent, and that the contract and property are owned by defendant and plaintiffs have no interest therein. Under these circumstances there cannot be any doubt that there was a sufficient denial to raise the issue. The failure to deny paragraph III did not constitute an admission that plaintiffs were the owners. That paragraph was concerned with the character of plaintiffs' ownership as between themselves if they were owners at all. Their ownership under any circumstances was denied.
It is asserted by plaintiffs that the statute of frauds is a bar to defendant's recovery. Particular mention is made of Civil Code, section 1624(4), requiring a writing subscribed by the party to be charged as an essential prerequisite for ‘an agreement * * * for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.’ And section 2309 requiring that authority to enter into a contract required by law to be in writing must be given by an instrument in writing. Defendant asserts that those sections may be relied upon only by the principal as against claimed liability to a third person on a contract made with the latter for the principal; and further that there is no statute of frauds affecting the case, and that he is not therefore required to and does not rely upon either a constructive or resulting trust to escape the statute.
Consideration must be given however to section 852 of the Civil Code which reads: ‘No trust in relation to real property is valid unless created or declared: 1. By a written instrument, subscribed by the trustee, or by his agent thereto authorized by writing; 2. By the instrument under which the trustee claims the estate affected; or, 3. By operation of law.’ First it must be determined whether the interest of a vendee under a contract to purchase real property where a down payment is made and possession is given to him, is real property. Under such circumstances the vendee acquires an equitable title to the property in fee simple. Elliott v. McCombs, 17 Cal.2d 23, 109 P.2d 329; Miller v. Dyer, 20 Cal.2d 526, 127 P.2d 901, 141 A.L.R. 1428; 25 Cal.Jur. 603. The interest of a vendee under a contract in the circumstances here presented holds an interest in real property within the contemplation of the statute of frauds. 27 C.J. 201; Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed. vol. 2, § 491; and cases collected 38 A.L.R. 1348. It therefore must follow that the contract to purchase the property in the case at bar, conferred the equitable title thereto upon Stromerson. The instrument was in his name alone as vendee, hence the equitable title ran to him. It was the same as if he had received the deed from the vendor except that under those circumstances he would have held the legal rather than the equitable title. Any agreement to transfer such equitable title would be within the statute of frauds. Likewise, a trust in relation thereto would be a ‘trust in relation to real property’ as contemplated by section 852 of the Civil Code.
The agency agreement between Stromerson and defendant, which as we have seen the evidence established, necessarily included a promise upon Stromerson's part to take the equitable title in his name, hold it for defendant and transfer it to him. That agency agreement was therefore in effect a trust agreement also. An agent who holds title for the principal is a trustee as well as agent for the principal. See Civ.Code, § 2219; Restatement, Agency, § 423.
The rules with respect to the rights of undisclosed principals or disclosed principals where such disclosure appears only from evidence outside of the contract, it being made solely in the agent's name, to the person with whom the contract is made, do not affect the foregoing conclusion. Those principles are concerned only with the liabilities as between the agent and the other contracting party, and the latter and the principal. Furthermore, it has been held that those principles may not be invoked in violation of the statute of frauds. Corporation of America v. Harris, 5 Cal.App.2d 452, 43 P.2d 307. The essence of the matter is that the equitable title was acquired by Stromerson at defendant's request to hold for him. The agency agreement was therefore in effect an agreement to hold real property in trust, and unless it can be said there is a resulting or constructive trust which need not be in writing (Civ.Code, § 852), defendant may not enforce the agency agreement. The existence of a constructive trust or resulting trust will render inapplicable the statute of frauds whether we consider section 852 of the Civil Code, having to do with trusts, or Civil Code section 1624(4) and 2309, having to do with the requirement that an agent's authority be in writing, assuming that the latter sections are applicable in a controversy between the agent and his principal.
There can be no doubt that a fiduciary relationship exists between an agent and his principal. Civ.Code, §§ 2322, 2228–2239; 1 Cal.Jur. 788. It should be equally clear that where an agent is employed to purchase real property and purchases it in his own name and denies the trust, he holds it as a constructive trustee, even though the principal advanced none of the purchase price. That principle follows from the rule that the breach on the part of the agent of his fiduciary duty constitutes constructive fraud. Such a trust is not banned by the statute of frauds. Civ.Code, § 2224; Restatement, Agency, § 414; Restatement, Restitution, § 194; Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., vol. 4, § 1024; and cases collected 42 A.L.R. 10, 54 A.L.R. 1195, 135 A.L.R. 232. Such cases as Bauman v. Wuest, 32 Cal.App. 217, 162 P. 434, representing a contrary view, failed to consider the existence of a constructive trust ensuing from the constructive fraud resulting from the breach of the fiduciary relation, discussing only a resulting trust, and spring from an early English case, Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Eden 515, Id., 1 Cox 15, which has been overruled. See Heard v. Pilley, L.R. 4 Ch.App. 548; Rochefoncauld v. Boustead, 1 Ch. 196; Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., vol. 4, § 1024. The same result follows from an application of the above rule where the property was taken in the name of the agent at the principal's request, as distinguished from the case where it was to be taken in the agent's name contrary to the instructions of the principal. The breach of the fiduciary relation is even more pronounced because by having the agent take the property in his own name shows a greater degree of trust and confidence existing between the principal and the agent. The only difference is that the breach of the fiduciary relation comes with the repudiation by the agent of his duty to hold the property for his principal when he repudiates his trust, rather than a breach in the inception when he acquires property in his name for himself when he sould have acquired it for the principal and in the latter's name.
Stromerson thus held the property as constructive trustee for defendant. A constructive trust is predicated upon the proposition that the person holding the property is under an equitable duty to convey it to another because of considerations springing from fraud or unjust enrichment, while ordinarily a resulting trust arises where property is transferred under circumstances that raise an inference or presumption that the person who makes the transfer does not intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest, the intention of the parties being a factor of importance. In the instant case it may well be said that Stromerson held the title for defendant as a resulting trustee. Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the consideration is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom the payments are made. Civ.Code, § 853. Where, as here, Stromerson was acting as defendant's agent, and assuming that the funds for the payment on the contract of purchase came from an account in his name as agent in the farming operations, which account was supplied by advances by the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company on crops to be raised on the various properties and income from produce, the funds were those of defendant, principal. It is not significant that the agent Stromerson signed the note for the down payment and also the contract, thus probably incurring personal liability, because he was loaning his credit to his principal; even if he advanced the funds necessary from his own assets, such would be a loan to the principal. In either event it would be implicit in the agency-principal relation between Stromerson and defendant that the latter would reimburse the former for any outlays made on his behalf, and protect him from loss resulting from the assumption of personal liability. The fact that the purchase price paid for property, in cases involving resulting trusts, is derived from money borrowed from the one to whom title is transferred, or the income from the property, and is in fact paid by the grantee is not an obstacle to the creation of a resulting trust; the grantee may advance or loan his credit as well as the money. Watson v. Poore, 18 Cal.2d 302, 115 P.2d 478.
We are not inclined to reverse the judgment on the ground that neither a resulting or constructive trust was pleaded. The trial of the case was long, the testimony covering 1,300 pages of transcript. The case was vigorously contested and all of the facts explored. It is alleged in the complaint that Miller & Lux, Inc. was the owner of the property and on March 6, 1936, it and Stromerson entered into the contract here in question; that by reason of the contract Stromerson is the owner of the contract and the equitable owner of the property; that defendant claims an interest in the equitable title to the property and the contract but his claim is without right and he has no interest therein. Defendant in his answer admits that he claims an interest in the property, denies that Stromerson entered into the contract and avers that the contract was the property of defendant; that the contract was signed by Stromerson at defendant's request as his agent; denies that Stromerson is the owner of the property or the equitable owner of the property, or that Stromerson was in possession of the property and alleges that Stromerson's use and cultivation of the property was as the defendant's agent. The court found that Miller & Lux, Inc. entered into the contract with defendant; that defendant executed the contract by and through Stromerson, and Stromerson in executing the same acted as defendant's agent, and ‘for the sole use and benefit of’ defendant; that the contract belonged to defendant and he held possession of the lands and ‘has paid all sums which have been paid on account of the purchase price, provided for in said written agreement * * *’; that defendant is the equitable owner of the property, and Stromerson has no interest therein. Those pleadings and findings embrace substantially all of the facts necessary to establish a resulting or constructive trust. It appears therefrom that the agency existed; that the contract was made by Stromerson as defendant's agent; and that the purchase price was paid by defendant. The resulting or constructive trust flowing therefrom is a conclusion of law from the facts established and need not be specifically found in those terms. With the inferences and implications which flow from those findings we are satisfied that they are sufficient under the circumstances to establish a resulting or constructive trust.
Nor is there any inconsistency between the pleadings and the findings or the latter and the evidence. True, it is found that defendant was in possession of the property while it is alleged by defendant that Stromerson cultivated it, but the possession of the agent is that of the principal. The finding that the contract was that of defendant when it was in the name of Stromerson, means nothing more than that the entire beneficial interest in the contract and property was vested in defendant because of the circumstances presented.
Plaintiffs refer to the rule that the evidence must be clear and convincing to establish a resulting trust. We are convinced from the record that the evidence was sufficient. That rule is primarily for the trial court, the determination of that court being tested by the same rules with relation to substantial evidence as apply in other cases (25 Cal.Jur. 248.)
For several reasons it cannot be said that the parol evidence rule was violated in admitting evidence to vary the terms of a written agreement (the contract of purchase) in showing that Stromerson was acting as defendant's agent in signing the contract because the contract was in his name alone. Suffice it to say that the contract directly involved was the agency contract not the contract of purchase. The latter contract was not the written memorial of the relation between Stromerson and defendant.
Plaintiffs make many assignments of error with respect to the introduction and rejection of evidence. At the outset it must be remembered, in considering whether prejudicial error was committed, that this is an equity case tried by the court without a jury. Plaintiffs complain of the admission of evidence with relation to defendant's first contact with Stromerson with reference to going to Madera County, and of Lincoln and Davis having title to property in their names for defendant and the status between them and defendant. Those matters give the general background of the relations between Stromerson and Averill and the complete picture of the farming enterprise in which all were engaged. Stromerson had been advised by defendant of the relationship between Davis and Lincoln and defendant in respect to the lands, title to which stood in their names. Stromerson working as a foreman, Davis as superintendent, and Lincoln as foreman, employed on the project as a whole. The evidence had some relevancy. In any event it was not prejudicial.
It is urged that Lincoln and another employee were improperly permitted to testify that Stromerson never made any claim to be the owner of the property. While it may be generally true that evidence of a person's failure to assert a claim to property is not admissible unless the circumstances require him to speak, all the circumstances here indicate the lack of prejudicial error.
A copy of a note given to Allen for the down payment on the purchase price of the property was introduced over plaintiffs' objection that no proper foundation was laid. Although on cross-examination defendant would not say the copy was an exact duplicate of the original, the whereabouts of which was unknown, he did testify on direct examination that it was a copy. There was no serious dispute that the note was given for the amount stated in the copy, the difficulty being in regard to the signatures it bore. Defendant testified that he executed it, and it appeared that Stromerson also signed it.
Objection is made to the acceptance in evidence of a letter from counsel for Miller & Lux, Inc. to defendant. It is not clear that the objection to the admission of the letter was not withdrawn by plaintiffs. In any event no prejudicial error flowed from the mere statement therein that the writer had contacted plaintiffs' counsel and the latter ‘had promised to have a conference with Mr. Stromerson * * * at which time Mr. Stromerson would definitely state whether or not he claims any interest in this contract.’ That did not necessarily carry the inference that Stromerson was not claiming the property.
Other errors are claimed with reference to the reception of evidence. We are convinced from an examination of the record that in some of the instances referred to no error occurred, and in others if error was committed, it was not prejudicial.
It is claimed that inasmuch as in another action a court came to a contrary conclusion as to the ownership of the 160 acres which was affirmed on appeal (Stromerson v. Averill, supra), the present judgment may not stand because wholly inconsistent therewith. We are not so persuaded. The 562 acres here involved was purchased some time after the said 160 acres, and while it was all involved in the same general dealings between defendant and Stromerson and the farming operations, we cannot say that squarely contrary results have been reached in separate judgments on the same issue.
Plaintiffs have filed a petition in this action for leave to introduce additional evidence. It appears therefrom that since the entry of the judgment, the appeal from which is here considered, defendant has commenced by filing a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Fresno County, an action against Stromerson to recover $35,572.69 claimed to have arisen from an open book account and representing ‘monies loaned and advanced’ by defendant to Stromerson; and that a writ of attachment has been issued in that action and levied upon the property here in question. In affidavits accompanying the petition it is stated that the major portion of the sum claimed in the complaint is money ‘claimed to have been loaned by (defendant) * * * to (Stromerson) * * * to enable plaintiffs to pay for leveling, plowing, cultivating and otherwise improving’ the property here involved. It is asserted by plaintiffs that such conduct on defendant's part consisted in the assumption by him of a position wholly inconsistent with that taken in the instant action in which he claims Stromerson acted as his agent and had no beneficial interest in the property; that defendant in that action is attaching property which he asserts in the instant action is his own; and that such conduct renders defendant's testimony inherently improbable and false. Defendant stated at the oral argument of this appeal that the action was instituted to prevent the running of the statute of limitations. We are not inclined to grant plaintiffs' petition in order to reverse the judgment. The situation is in some respects analogous to the pleading of inconsistent defenses in the same manner. It is the general rule that one of such defenses cannot be used to destroy or considered as constituting a waiver of the other. See Miller v. Chandler, 59 Cal. 540; Billings v. Drew, 52 Cal. 565; Harding v. Harding, 148 Cal. 397, 83 P. 434; Buhne v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264; Calexico Lumber Co. v. Emerson, 54 Cal.App. 239, 201 P 612; 21 Cal.Jur. 134. As we have seen, defendant commenced the second action merely to toll the statute of limitations if the judgment in the instant action was reversed on this appeal. Plaintiffs' remedy is to plead, for whatever effect it may have. the judgment in the instant action as a defense to the second action.
We agree with plaintiffs that the court has failed to require defendant to do equity in the case and further proceedings should be had. The nature of the action has been heretofore discussed. Such cases as this should not be tried piecemeal. The entire issue between the parties should be adjusted. As it stands, Stromerson assumed personal liability under the contract to purchase the property. If defendant does not discharge the obligation, it is shouldered upon Stromerson, defendant's agent. Further, it appears that there may be outstanding notes and chattel mortgages upon which Stromerson is liable in connection with his conduct as an agent for defendant, and the court made no finding with respect to the financial obligation, if any, existing between the parties. As we have seen, the decree determines that the contract and property belong to defendant and that Stromerson has no interest therein. It rests upon a theory of agency and a constructive or resulting trust arising therefrom. There necessarily was implicit in the agency agreement an agreement upon the part of defendant, principal, to reimburse the agent Stromerson for any detriment suffered by him in carrying out his duties. It is the general rule that unless otherwise agreed, the principal owes a duty to his agent to reimburse him for or exonerate him from authorized payments made by the agent on behalf of the principal, and payments and obligations under contracts upon which the agent is authorized to make himself liable. Schwarting v. Artel, 40 Cal.App.2d 433, 105 P.2d 380; Dolman Co., Inc., v. Rubber Corporation of America, 109 Cal.App. 353, 293 P. 129; Restatement Agency, § 439. It does not appear that there was any agreement between defendant and Stromerson that the former was not to exonerate the latter from or reimburse him for obligations incurred by the latter on behalf of the former, but on the contrary the circumstances point to an implied agreement that such exoneration and reimbursement would be made. Also, where the resulting or constructive trustee takes title with the consent of the beneficiary he is entitled to reimbursement. See Watson v. Poore, supra; Robles v. Clarke, 25 Cal. 317; Woodard v. Wright, 82 Cal. 202, 22 P. 1118; Milloglav v. Zacharias, 33 Cal.App. 561, 165 P. 977. The conduct of Stromerson in giving his personal credit on the contract and the crop mortgages was at the direction of defendant, his principal. He may also have rendered services and made expenditures for which he has not been reimbursed. The trial court should therefore take an accounting, ascertain the nature and extent of the outstanding obligations which Stromerson has assumed, the value of any services he has rendered and the amount of any expenditures he has made in the course of his duties as agent for defendant including the contract of purchase, and make such order in the premises as a condition to defendant's recovery as will protect plaintiffs from liability under those obligations and reimburse them for such services and expenditures if any.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court to take such further proceedings as may be necessary to determine what if any obligations plaintiffs or either of them have assumed as agent or trustee for defendant, and any amounts due from defendant to plaintiffs or either of them arising out of the transaction in relation to the acquisition, development or operation of the property involved in this action, and render judgment accordingly, making any amount due plaintiffs a lien upon defendant's interest in said property, and providing for the release, discharge and exoneration of plaintiffs and each of them from any obligations in connection with the purchase, development or operation of said property, and thereupon make a decree quieting defendant's title to said property subject to the payment of such lien and the discharge of said obligations by defendant.
SHENK, CURTIS, and TRAYNOR, JJ., concurred.
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Docket No: Sec. No. 5368.
Decided: February 01, 1943
Court: Supreme Court of California.
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