ARTUKOVICH v. ASTENDORF (1942)

The appellant is suing the County of Los Angeles for damages assertedly sustained because of personal injuries received in an automobile accident. According to the complaint, he presented no claim in conformity with the provisions of the Political Code, and in ruling upon a demurrer, the Superior Court held that, because of such allegation, no cause of action was stated. The appellant now attacks the judgment of dismissal, subsequently entered in favor of the county, upon the ground that the claim statute does not apply to a minor.

The action is one authorized by section 400 of the Vehicle Code, St.1935, p. 152, which imposes upon a county liability for the negligence of any employee driving an automobile owned by it while acting within the scope of his employment. The complaint alleges that the appellant, while a ward of the juvenile court, was being transported to a forest camp in a county truck driven by Astendorf, a deputy probation officer of the county; that Astendorf drove the truck in such a negligent manner as to cause it to overturn; and that as a result of the accident, the appellant was severely injured. The county relies upon section 4075 of the Political Code, enacted prior to section 400 of the Vehicle Code, which provides that ‘all claims against any county * * * whether such claim be founded upon contract * * * or upon any act or omission of the county or any officer or employee thereof * * * shall be presented to the board of supervisors as herein provided before any suit may be brought on any such claim * * *.’

Courts are not in agreement concerning the application to minors of statutes requiring the filing of claims as a prerequisite to suit against public corporations. In several decisions of the District Court of Appeal, it has held that minors are bound by such statutes. Phillips v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 78, 35 P.2d 187; Myers v. Hopland U. E. School Dist., 6 Cal.App.2d 590, 44 P.2d 654; Carpenter v. Eureka Casualty Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 533, 58 P.2d 682. And this view apparently represents the weight of authority. Baker v. Town of Manitou, 8 Cir., 277 F. 232; City of Birmingham v. Weston, 233 Ala. 563, 172 So. 643, 109 A.L.R. 970; Peoples v. City of Valparaiso, 178 Ind. 673, 100 N.E. 70; Palmer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 165 Iowa 595, 146 N.W. 827, Ann.Cas. 1916E, 558; Dechant v. City of Hays, 112 Kan. 729, 212 P. 682; Thomas v. City of Coffeyville, 145 Kan. 588, 66 P.2d 600; Madden v. City of Springfield, 131 Mass. 441; Davidson v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 454, 69 N.W. 670; Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 171 Minn. 57, 213 N.W. 557, 59 A.L.R. 404; Schmidt v. City of Fremont, 70 Neb. 577, 97 N.W. 830; Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 60 Utah 589, 228 P. 213; Robinson v. City of Memphis, 171 Tenn. 471, 105 S.W.2d 101; see cases collected in 31 A.L.R. 619; 59 A.L.R. 411; 109 A.L.R. 975; McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., vol. 6, sec. 2893. These decisions proceed upon the theory that where a statute is general in terms, containing no exception in favor of minors, it must be presumed that the legislature intended no such exception and none may be engrafted upon the statute by the courts under the guise of judicial interpretation.

But this conclusion is reached only by ignoring the more fundamental rules of statutory construction. Statutes should be given a reasonable interpretation consistent with the dictates of justice, and courts have adhered to the rule that the legislature's intention will not be presumed to include harsh or absurd consequences unless the language is so clear as to admit of no doubt. Civ.Code, sec. 3542; San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irr. Co. v. Stevinson, 164 Cal. 221, 128 P. 924; Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 248 P. 917; Helping And Home v. County of San Diego, 26 Cal.App.2d 452, 79 P.2d 778; 23 Cal.Jur. 722. Furthermore, statutes, although general in terms, are deemed to have been enacted with full recognition of well-established rules of law and the settled public policy of the state (23 Cal.Jur. 784 et seq.), and a construction of them as containing exceptions in conformity with such rules of law or public policy, does not amount to judicial legislation.

From time immemorial the legal status of infants has been recognized as singular, and because of their tender years and lack of understanding the law has refused to hold them to the same accountability as adults. In many situations comparable to the present one, special exceptions in favor of infants have been made by the legislature and the courts. For example, statutes of limitations do not run against the claim of an infant until he attains his majority. Secs. 328, 352, 1272, Code Civ.Proc. An infant cannot be guilty of laches. 21 C.J., J., Equity, 241, cases cited n. 65; 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 122, cases cited n. 3. The doctrine of estoppel has no application to minors. Estate of Hill, 67 Cal. 238, 7 P. 664. A minor under the age of 18 years cannot make a contract relating to real property, sec. 33, Civ.Code, and many other agreements entered into by an infant may be disaffirmed by him either before his majority or within a reasonable time thereafter. Sec. 34, Civ.Code. And children under the age of 14 are deemed incapable of committing crimes in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they were aware of its wrongfulness. Sec. 23, Pen.Code.

Accordingly, a strong minority of courts have taken the position that, in view of the various exemptions from liability accorded infants by the law, the legislature, in enacting statutes requiring the presentation of claims or notice as a condition precedent to suits against municipal corporations, did not intend by its general language to include a class of persons which the law recognizes as lacking responsibility. By certain of these decisions, all minors, irrespective of age and without regard to their physical and mental capacity, have been exempted from the operation of such statutes. McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N.E. 476, 2 A.L.R. 1359; Doerr v. City of Freeport, 239 Ill.App. 560; Costello v. City of Aurora, 295 Ill.App. 510, 15 N.E.2d 38. Other courts have extended the exception only to those infants of tender years who do not possess sufficient intelligence and understanding to be able to comprehend and comply with the requirements of the statute. Lazich v. Belanger, 111 Mont. 48, 105 P.2d 738; City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okl. 39, 191 P. 186.

Still a third view is taken by the New York courts. In that state, as a matter of law, the statutory requirement of notice is not enforced against an immature infant of 10 years of age or less. But it is applied to the cause of action of a minor over 16 years of age, and it is for the jury to determine whether a minor between the ages of 10 and 16 has sufficient mental and physical capacity to be able to comply with the statute. Murphy v. Village of Fort Edward, 213 N.Y. 397, 107 N.E. 716, Ann.Cas.1916C, 1040; Russo v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 344, 179 N.E. 762; Yablonsky v. City of New York, 128 Misc. 469, 219 N.Y.S. 121; Adonnino v. Village of Mount Morris, 171 Misc. 383, 12 N.Y.S.2d 658; Briggs v. Village of Peekskill, Co. Ct., 16 N.Y.S.2d 873. See, also, the A.L.R. notes heretofore cited.

Under the reasoning of the decisions following the minority doctrine, section 4075 of the Political Code, when considered in connection with the rules of law excepting infants from the legal responsibility imposed upon adults, must be held inapplicable to minors of such immaturity as to be mentally incapable of complying with its terms. The requirement of notice to the city authorities presupposes the existence of an individual capable of giving it. There are numerous cases holding that the failure to give notice or to file a claim as required by statute, does not bar recovery against the city for negligence when the injured person is unable to act within the statutory period by reason of physical or mental inability, and particularly when the inability arises from the very act of negligence for which the city is sought to be held responsible. Under such circumstances, the requirement of notice is excused pending the existence of the disability. Webster v. City of Beaver Dam, C.C., 84 F. 280; City and County of Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 P. 594, 72 A.L.R. 833; Randolph v. City of Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S.W. 449, 31 A.L.R. 612; Forsyth v. City of Oswego, 191 N.Y. 441, 84 N.E. 392, 123 Am.St.Rep. 605; Williams v. Village of Port Chester, 72 App.Div. 505, 76 N.Y.S. 631; Terrell v. City of Washington, 158 N.C. 281, 73 S.E. 888; 31 A.L.R. 619; contra, Johnson v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal.App.2d 389, 55 P.2d 580; Wicklund v. Plymouth E. School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252, 99 P.2d 314. To hold the statute applicable to minors who have not reached the age of understanding, or to those mentally unable to comprehend the requirements of the statute, would in effect result in depriving them of the right of action given them by the statute. Section 4075 of the Political Code by its terms, makes no provision for the filing of a claim by a person on behalf of another and, if it did, an infant has no power to appoint an agent. § 33, Civ.Code. The parent is the natural guardian of the child, as such, but he has no control over the minor's property. However, assuming that the parent or guardian of the minor is empowered to file the claim in his behalf, the cause of action should not depend upon the act of a parent, guardian or self-constituted next friend. Indeed, the negligence of the parents in omitting to give the required notice cannot be imputed to the child. Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 179 P. 203, 15 A.L.R. 401; 19 Cal.Jur. 662.

The purpose of the statutes requiring the giving of notice is to protect the municipality against fraud arising out of stale claims. This purpose is not served by a strict enforcement of the statute against those incapacitated from giving notice within the time specified, and the statute may not be reasonably construed as requiring that to be done which the claimant is wholly incapable of doing. Therefore, in accordance with the legislative policy of this state to protect the rights of minors generally, section 4075 of the Political Code should be interpreted as inapplicable to infants mentally and physically unable to comprehend or comply with its terms. Whether or not the particular infant plaintiff has reached the age of understanding to comply with the statute is a question of fact which should be determined by the jury in connection with the other issues presented in each case. Phillips v. County of Los Angeles, supra; Myers v. Hopland U. E. School Dist., supra, and Carpenter v. Eureka Casualty Co., supra, insofar as they are contrary to this conclusion, are disapproved.

The complaint discloses that appellant was 16 years of age at the time of the commencement of the action, but it contains no allegation that he was of such immature age and lacked such mental capacity as to be unable to know or take cognizance of the requirements of the law, or to comply with the statutory mandate concerning the filing of a claim with the county. This allegation is essential to the statement of a cause of action. However, the appellant should have been afforded an opportunity to supply this deficiency, and it was error for the trial court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

The judgment is reversed with directions to the Superior Court to permit the appellant to amend his complaint, if he be so advised.

EDMONDS, Justice.

CURTIS, CARTER and TRAYNOR, JJ., concurred.