GENERAL PIPE LINE CO OF CALIFORNIA v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION (1935)

The plaintiff commenced this action for declaratory relief, and secured a judgment, from which the defendants prosecute this appeal.

The appellants and respondents agree upon the question involved, which is as follows: ‘Is it the duty of the State Board of Equalization under the provisions of section 14 of article 13 of the Constitution and section 3663a of the Political Code, to assess the intercounty oil pipe line of plaintiff company, when such property is used for private and not public utility purposes, or should such property be assessed by local assessors?’

The pertinent language of the section referred to reads as follows: ‘All pipe lines, flumes, canals, ditches and aqueducts not entirely within the limits of any one county, and all property, other than franchises, owned or used by (1) railroad companies including street railways, herein defined to include interurban electric railways, whether operating in one or more counties, (2) sleeping car, dining car, drawingroom car, and palace car companies, refrigerator, oil, stock, fruit and other car-loaning and other car companies operating upon the railroads in the State, (3) companies doing express business on any railroad, steamboat, vessel or stage line in this State, (4) telegraph and telephone companies, (5) companies engaged in the transmission or sale of gas or electricity, shall be assessed annually by the State Board of Equalization, at the actual value of such property.

‘All property so assessed by said board shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.’

Section 3663a of the Political Code requires the Board of Equalization to assess the property enumerated in section 14, article 13, of the Constitution (as amended, see St. 1933, p. 3074), giving them the authority to exact and require the information for that purpose.

In the instant case, the board required the respondent to report upon its pipe line, part of which is in Orange county and part in Los Angeles county, whereupon this action was commenced to determine the right of the board to assess.

The appellants insist that the plain, unambiguous language of the constitutional amendment places the responsibility upon the Board of Equalization. While the respondent argues that the amendment was adopted for the sole purpose of returning the property of public utilities to the tax rolls of the counties and hence should be construed to refer only to property of public utilities.

It is to be observed that proposition 30, which was adopted by the people at the special election held in June, 1933, included not only the amendment now under scrutiny, but also a number of other constitutional changes dealing with such subjects as appropriations from the general fund, power of the Legislature to tax counties and cities, the limitation on expenditures by political subdivisions of the state, appropriations for the support of schools by the state, taxation of banks and several others. In fact, the tax structure of the state was to a large extent recast. When we read the language of section 14 of article 13, already quoted, we notice that the words ‘All pipe lines, flumes, canals, ditches and aqueducts not entirely within the limits of any one county, and’ might have been omitted from the amendment had it been the intent to include within its scope only the property of public utilities. In other words, there are two classes of property enumerated in the section—first, pipe lines, flumes, etc., and, second, all property, other than franchises, of public utilities. We entertain no doubt that the clearly expressed intent of the amendment was to make the Board of Equalization, for the sake of uniformity and in order to avoid the temptation which might exist in one of the counties to assess at more than its just proportion, the assessor of the property described, whether the lines or ditches be extensive, as in the case of a water department of a municipality, which in legal parlance is more properly classified as a municipal utility than as a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction of the railroad commission (see 22 Cal. Jur. 9; City of Pasadena v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 P. 25, 10 A. L. R. 1425; Water Users', etc., Ass'n v. Railroad Commission, 188 Cal. 437, 207 P. 682; Jochimsen v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. App. 715, 202 P. 902), or comparatively small as may be the case otherwise. One of the first rules of construction is that where the language is plain and unambiguous there exists no room for construction. We think such is the present case.

The parties to this action requested the trial court to determine what constitutes an intercounty pipe line, i. e., what particular property is included in a pipe line. As we view the case, the question here involved relates to the duty of the Board of Equalization, and the litigation does not include a dispute over what constitutes a pipe line. The subject not having been presented as it might have been had there been a bona fide dispute over such a question, we are inclined not to attempt a limitation or definition other than to say it should include all appurtenances necessary or advisable for the proper functioning of the pipe line.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment should be, and is, reversed.

THOMPSON, Justice.

We concur: WASTE, C. J.; SHENK, J.; LANGDON, J.; PRESTON, J.; SEAWELL, J.