PEOPLE v. RUANE (1994)

APPEAL from an order of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles County.   John Vernon Meigs, Temporary Judge.  (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.)   Reversed.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran and Otis L. Hubbard, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Belger and Norris, Michael Norris for Defendant and Respondent.

Pursuant to rule 63 of the California Rules of Court the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court certified the instant proceeding to us indicating “a transfer is necessary to settle an important question of law, specifically, whether the fact a suspect is observed driving a motor vehicle means, as a matter of law, there is an ‘immediate danger ․ of the escape of the perpetrator’ within the meaning of Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (a)(3).”

Insofar as is relevant here, this subdivision provides that any city's police officers are peace officers whose authority extends “to any place in the state ․ [a]s to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the peace officer's presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense.”

The context in which the certified question is posed makes clear that the appellate department was not unaware of the Newtonian law which resolved this issue as to bodies in motion several centuries ago.   That is, without doubt, a moving vehicle, if not stopped, will immediately disappear from the scene.

It is, of course, at least theoretically possible that a peace officer outside his own immediate jurisdiction might by radio solicit help from the police of the city where the offense occurs and passively follow the suspect until he either chances to bring his vehicle to rest voluntarily or the requested assistance is able to intercept the pursuit.   Too, in some instances the officer might be able to both identify the subject driver and obtain the license number of the vehicle so that in the future someone else might undertake appropriate investigative proceedings.   Nonetheless, if the crime observed is one demanding immediate action, it obviously would be completely unrealistic to place such time consuming restrictions on our nation's most limited number of officers.

As a consequence, if an interpretation of subdivision (a)(3) of section 830.1 of the Penal Code were actually necessary to the resolution of this appeal, the answer to the certified question would obviously be in the affirmative, at least to the limited extent the term “escape” is concerned.   However, after we had granted certification we discovered that this subdivision was not actually involved.

The instant prosecution in the Inglewood Judicial District of the Municipal Court charges defendant Joseph Mark Ruane with violating subdivisions (a) and (b) of Vehicle Code section 23152.   Before trial could be had he successfully moved to suppress all evidence of his apparent intoxication by challenging his stop in the City of Hawthorne by a police officer employed by the City of El Segundo.   Although the trial court refused to permit the introduction of the evidence necessary to establish the very facts which it acknowledged would be determinative, the limited evidence which it did receive was uncontradicted.

Officer Marjorie Jacobs, employed by the Patrol Division of the El Segundo Police Department, testified that while on duty at approximately 2 a.m.   on March 28, 1993, she observed a vehicle stopped in the southbound left turn lane of Aviation Boulevard waiting to turn left onto 135th Street.   She then saw it make such a turn even though the signal light controlling such a movement remained red.   She followed, initiated a traffic stop and the vehicle came to a rest on 135th Street at the 405 freeway overpass, a location she estimated to be three-quarters of a mile within the City of Hawthorne.   Defendant, the car's driver, appeared to be intoxicated and failed to pass various field sobriety tests.

Despite the fact such an inappropriate practice has been often criticized (see People v. Hallman (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1330, 1338 et seq.;   People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586, 600, and cases cited therein), the trial court proceeded to entertain defendant's written suppression motion even though that document contained neither specific information, nor suggestive hint, regarding the theories of suppression which defendant believed might render his detention and subsequent arrest illegal.   Consequently, Officer Jacobs was not asked (1) to what extent the City of El Segundo encompassed Aviation Boulevard at 135th Street ¹ or (2) if the chiefs of police of the Cities of El Segundo and Hawthorne had entered into a reciprocal agreement giving their officers authority to operate within the other's boundaries.²  She merely indicated that the stop itself was effected in Hawthorne.

It was only after the officer had completed her testimony and the People had rested that defendant revealed any basis for his suppression motion.   Regrettably, as noted, the trial court, even though it announced its belief that the “out-of-jurisdiction issue ․ is going to be a pivotal issue in this case,” refused the People's request “to reopen just briefly [in order to] clear the whole issue up.”   Instead, and despite the fact it also expressed the mistaken belief that the traffic violation had occurred outside the boundaries of El Segundo merely because the stop itself had been completed in Hawthorne, it simply continued the matter to a later date so that points and authorities on this potentially immaterial question could be presented.

Even more unfortunately, at this subsequent hearing it remained adamant in its refusal to permit the truth to be revealed either by the receipt of additional testimony or the taking of judicial notice of the true boundaries of the two cities and the existence of their reciprocal authorization agreement.   Instead, it concluded as a matter of law that the officer had lacked jurisdiction to signal defendant to stop and, as a consequence, it suppressed all proofs of defendant's potential guilt.   Since the People were unable to proceed in such a vacuum, the action was dismissed.   They appeal and the appellate department reversed, as do we.

As we stressed in In re Reginald C. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1077–1078:

“An adversary system, despite it's acknowledged shortcomings as a method for ascertaining the truth,[fn] has much to commend it whenever there are sincerely disputed questions of guilt or innocence to be resolved.   Where, however, the only issue before a court is whether or not it should subject society to the self-immolation of the exclusionary rule in order to penalize, and thereby hopefully to educate, an offending officer and inspire him to improve (People v. Lara (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 237, 241 [166 Cal.Rptr. 475] ), it behooves every trial judge to do his utmost to determine exactly what it was the officer did.

“The high price our citizens must pay whenever we in the judiciary blind ourselves to the truth, should never be exacted merely because counsel have failed to ask sufficient appropriate questions.   No possible gain occurs when (1) a court refuses to consider evidence acquired in a perfectly lawful manner, or (2) an officer is ‘punished’ despite the complete propriety of his conduct, or (3) a[n] offender is misled concerning his countrymen's expectations of him by being spared the consequences of his own indisputably antisocial behavior.   (See generally United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897,—et seq.  [81 L.Ed.2d 677, 696 et seq., 104 S.Ct. 3405].)

“In sum, the court's determination here [to recall an officer on its own motion after the People had rested in order] to fully satisfy itself as to the facts was entirely correct;  any other course of action would have constituted an inappropriate abandonment of its responsibilities.

“ ‘ “․ ‘It apparently cannot be repeated too often for the guidance of a part of the legal profession that a judge is not a mere umpire presiding over a contest of wits between professional opponents, but a judicial officer entrusted with the grave task of determining where justice lies under the law and the facts between the parties who have sought the protection of our courts.   Within reasonable limits, it is not only the right but the duty of a trial judge to clearly bring out the facts so that the important functions of his office may be fairly and justly performed.’  [Citation.]” '  (People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 256 [152 Cal.Rptr. 439, 590 P.2d 15].)”  (Second emphasis added, omitted footnote quoted below.) ³

Pursuant to section 909 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b) of the California Rules of Court, and section 459 of the Evidence Code, once this appeal was transferred to us we corrected the shortcomings in the record and found that Aviation Boulevard actually marks the boundary of the two cities and that a reciprocal agreement did exist on the date in issue.⁴  Although the latter documents, which we attach hereto, contained a paragraph reading, “[w]e would request communication with our headquarters prior to making contacts so as to provide us with knowledge and an opportunity to be of assistance should the need arise[,]” failure to make such a request before promptly effecting a stop for a traffic violation would not render “illegal” the observations resulting therefrom.   Consequently, the actions of Officer Jacob were entirely appropriate under either or both subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Penal Code section 830.1 and the trial court's ruling regarding lack of jurisdiction was erroneous.

Nonetheless, since this needlessly vexed proceeding is before us, we shall briefly discuss what rulings might have been proper had the facts been otherwise.   As the trial court correctly concluded, an infraction is a “public offense” (Pen.Code, § 16), albeit one which, a jury trial not being authorized, is not a crime punishable by imprisonment.  (Pen.Code, § 19.6.) To the extent that the lead opinion of the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court in People v. Battle (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, held to the contrary, it is disapproved.

In People v. Hamilton (1986) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, the Appellate Department of the Fresno Superior Court recognized Battle's error.   However, it also went too far insofar as it appears to hold that any police officer may stop and “cite” a driver for a non-dangerous traffic infraction anywhere within the state solely because, as we already have observed, a failure to do so would permit the driver to “escape.”   We suspect that while it did not rest its decision thereon, the court's reasoning must have been influenced by the fact that the on-duty City of Clovis police officer who there intended to issue a citation for an offense he observed committed in Fresno, apparently had the authority so to do under subdivision (a)(2) of section 830.1 of the Penal Code due to the consent given him by the Fresno City Chief of Police and the Fresno County Sheriff.   We do not believe that the court in Hamilton truly intended to grant jurisdiction to all the officers from the hundreds of other cities and counties within this state, even while on vacation and in private vehicles, to pursue, stop and “arrest” Fresno residents in order to enforce what those officers might regard as improper, but non-dangerous, traffic offenses.⁵  Consequently, to that extent, it too is disapproved.

In Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 730, we earlier considered an instance where a Hawthorne police officer also had observed a car being operated illegally along a boundary line, there between the Cities of Hawthorne and Inglewood.   Its operator was “driving erratically, making several lane changes which caused drivers of other vehicles to make sudden stops to avoid collision.”  Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 733.)   We held that the stop effected by the officer in Inglewood was proper.

A similar conclusion was reached by Division Five of this District in People v. Tennessee (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 788.   There, in Altadena, an area policed by his office, a deputy sheriff saw a car “weaving in long sweeping curves from the center lane to the curb and back again,” but which had proceeded into the City of Pasadena when it was stopped.  (Id. at p. 790.)

In each of these cases the officers' actions were justified by the fact that they were entitled to pursue the vehicle beyond their immediate jurisdiction in order to enforce the duty that had been imposed upon them within their own jurisdictions.   Their obligations in this respect did not rest upon the fact that the subject offenses may well have been deemed more dangerous than the one perpetrated by our defendant.   Therefore, their holdings are equally applicable here.

The order of dismissal based upon the trial court's granting of defendant's suppression motion is reversed.

EXHIBIT B

NOTICE OF CONSENT

WHEREAS, Section 830.1 of the California Penal Code, as amended by the California Legislature during its 1968 Regular Session, pursuant to Chapter 1222;  and

WHEREAS, Section 830.1(2) of the California Penal Code provides that the authority of a peace officer extends to any place in the state where he has the prior consent of the Chief of Police or person authorized by him to give such consent if the place is within a city, or the Sheriff or such person authorized by him to give consent if the place is within a county;

NOW, THEREFORE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT each of the signatories hereto and their successors in office hereby agree and consent that any regularly sworn, duly compensated peace officer, as defined by the California Penal Code Section 830.1, employed by the other signatory to this agreement, has peace officer authority at all times within the City or County for which each of the signatories and successors in office can give consent.

We would request communication with our headquarters prior to making contacts so as to provide us with knowledge and an opportunity to be of assistance should the need arise.

Written notice of intention to revoke this consent or any part thereof, by any signatory or a successor in office, shall be given sixty days prior to the effective date of such revocation.

DECLARATION OF TIM GRIMMOND

I, TIM GRIMMOND, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

I am the Chief of Police of the City of El Segundo.   I became Chief of Police on June 12, 1992.   This declaration is to respond to a request from the District Attorney as to whether, on March 28, 1993, the Cities of El Segundo and Hawthorne had a reciprocal agreement as authorized by subdivision (a) of section 830.1 of the Penal Code.

When I assumed the office of Chief of Police for the City of El Segundo, an agreement between the Cities of El Segundo and Hawthorne was in force.   That agreement had been entered into by my predecessor(s) in office.   A copy is attached to this declaration.   Since I have been Chief of Police, this agreement has been in force without change.

Executed on May 17th, 1994, at El Segundo, California.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This street is known as 135th as it extends east from Aviation Boulevard into Hawthorne and Utah as it extends west into El Segundo.

2.   Subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Penal Code section 830.1 provide that the authority of police officers extends to any place in the state, as follows:  “(1) As to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed within the political subdivision which employs the peace officer.  [¶] (2) Where the peace officer has the prior consent of the chief of police, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a city or of the sheriff, or person authorized by him or her to give consent, if the place is within a county.”

3.   With reference to the utility of the adversary system even as to questions of guilt or innocence, the omitted footnote stated:“Even here, however, it has been stressed that ‘The search for truth is not served but hindered by the concealment of relevant and material evidence.   Although our system of administering criminal justice is adversary in nature, a trial is not a game.   Its ultimate goal is the ascertainment of truth, and where furtherance of the adversary system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal, the adversary system must give way to reasonable restraints designed to further that goal․’  (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [96 Cal.Rptr. 594, 487 P.2d 1234].)  ‘․ “Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of the truth.” ’   (People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 520 [199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303].)”  (In re Reginald C., supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 1077, fn. 3.)

4.   Though offered an opportunity so to do, defendant elected not to dispute the verity of these facts.   Rather he filed a response that merely repeated the essence of the complaints made by counsel in In re Reginald C., supra, which we quoted at length in footnote 2 of that opinion at pages 1067–1068.   That is, he urged that if viewed as a sporting event, it would be “unfair” of us to seek now to determine the truth.   We, of course, cannot agree with appellant's premise, particularly here where the trial court actually blocked the People's attempts to establish it at trial, rather than developing it itself on its own motion as was done in Reginald C.

5.   It would seem such unlucky offenders would have to be taken into actual custody inasmuch as the officers would almost certainly lack appropriate citation forms even if they were aware of the governing Municipal Court Judicial District.

GATES, Associate Justice.

BOREN, P.J., and FUKUTO, J., concurring.