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CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. LIBERTY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT
This case presents another circumstance requiring a determination whether a dispute between a public school employee and the employing school district (district) lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), or can be initiated and resolved in the courts. The employee, Joseph Hernandez, and his union appeal from a judgment dismissing their action with prejudice after the trial court sustained the district's demurrer to their complaint without leave to amend, on the grounds that the PERB had exclusive jurisdiction.
Appellants filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” seeking a declaration that the district is required to pay Hernandez a higher salary, for reasons set forth below, and to reimburse him for past wages due. In four causes of action the complaint alleges, inter alia, that Hernandez, a classified employee, was originally hired by the district on September 10, 1974, and, except for a layoff between September 4, 1978 and July 30, 1979, remained so employed. The first cause of action alleges the breach of a written employment contract. The second cause of action alleges a violation by the district of Education Code sections 451031 and 45160.2 The third cause of action alleges a breach of a collective bargaining agreement,3 and the fourth cause of action alleges a violation of Education Code section 35021.4 We hold that the PERB does not have exclusive jurisdiction, and that the demurrer should have been overruled.
The Educational Employment Relations Act (Gov. Code, §§3540, et seq.) which governs, in part, public educational employment, is based on “standard collective bargaining concepts well established in other private and public sector contexts ....” (San Lorenzo Education Assn. v. Wilson (1982) 32 Cal.3d 841, 845-846, 113 LRRM 2106.) Consequently, resort may be had to precedents involving similar labor legislation. (San Lorenzo, supra; see also Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 87 LRRM 2453; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 96 LRRM 2792.) Basically, these legislative acts grant jurisdiction to an administrative labor board over activities generally defined as unfair labor practices. (See 29 U.S.C. §158 [National Labor Relations Act]; Lab. Code, § 1153 [Agricultural Labor Relations Act].) They do not remove all jurisdiction from the courts over contractual disputes which do not involve unfair labor practices. (San Lorenzo, supra; Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Educational Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259.) The operative statute defining employer unfair practices in the EERA is Government Code section 3543.5,5 which is quite similar in its content to that contained in the NLRA and ALRA. Accordingly, if the legal dispute herein does not involve an unfair practice or an alleged violation of the EERA, jurisdiction lies with the courts rather than with the PERB. (San Lorenzo, supra; Fresno Unified School Dist., supra.)
The complaint does not charge the district with coercion, unilateral action, refusal to bargain collectively, discrimination against appellant because of union activities, or any other traditional unfair labor practice or activity proscribed by Government Code section 3543.5 or the EERA. Rather, although the action is framed in declaratory relief language, appellants are seeking back wages based upon alleged breaches of contract and a violation by the district of statutory obligations imposed upon it by the Education Code. A breach of an agreement between the parties is not, in and of itself, considered an unfair labor practice which will deprive the courts of enforcement jurisdiction. (Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. East Bay U. of Mach., Loc. 1304 (1965) 344 F.2d 300, 58 LRRM 2387, cert. den., 382 U.S. 826, 60 LRRM 2233; McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Carpenters (1957) 49 Cal.2d 45, 40 LRRM 2709; Breitegger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 283, 88 LRRM 2600; Shaw v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 587, 86 LRRM 2486.) The PERB has no authority to enforce agreements between the parties. (Gov. Code, § 3541.5, subd. (b);6 San Lorenzo, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 853; Fresno Unified School Dist., supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 264.) Since no unfair practice or violation of the EERA is pleaded or involved here, we must conclude that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain this action.
The district argues that even if the demurrer cannot be sustained on the grounds stated, it should be sustained on statute of limitations grounds. Its reliance on Government Code section 945.6, which requires an action brought on a claim against a public entity to be filed within six months of notice is misplaced. Government Code section 905, subdivision (c) specifically excludes from the claims requirement those claims by public employees for “fees, salaries, [or] wages ...,” and Government Code section 945.8 provides that, except in other instances not alleged to be at issue here, the normal statute of limitations for actions against defendants other than public entities shall control when no claim is required.
Appellants' first and third causes of action alleging breach of written agreements are governed by the four-year period of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 337. The second and fourth causes of action are based on liabilities created by statute and are governed by the three-year period of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (1). Whether or not any period preceding the filing of the complaint has been tolled while appellants pursued the grievance procedure, as they claim, must be determined by the trial court. (See Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, and Campbell v. Graham-Armstrong (1973) 9 Cal.3d 482.)
The judgment is reversed and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
1. Education Code section 45103 states, in pertinent part: “The governing board of any school district shall employ persons for positions not requiring certification qualifications .... [¶] Employment of either full-time or part-time students in any college work-study program, or in work experience education program shall not result in the displacement of classified personnel or impair existing contracts for services.”
2. Education Code section 45160 states: “The governing board of any school district, including city boards of education, shall fix and order paid the compensation of persons a part of the classified service and other employees not requiring certification qualifications employed by the board unless otherwise prescribed by law.”
3. The complaint alleges that his initial employment was covered by a written employment agreement, and subsequently his union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the district.
4. Education Code section 35021 states, in pertinent part: “... No district may abolish any of its classified positions and utilize volunteer aides, as authorized herein, in lieu of classified employees who are laid off as a result of the abolition of a position; nor may a district refuse to employ a person in a vacant classified position and use volunteer aides in lieu thereof. [¶] It is the intent of the Legislature to permit school districts to use volunteer aides to enhance its educational program but not to permit displacement of classified employees nor to allow districts to utilize volunteers in lieu of normal employee requirements.”
5. Government Code section 3543.5 states: “It shall be unlawful for a public school employer to: [¶] (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter. [¶] (b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to them by this chapter. [¶] (c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative. [¶] (d) Dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any employee organization, or contribute financial or other support to it, or in any way encourage employees to join any organization in preference to another. [¶] (e) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse procedure set forth in Article 9 (commencing with Section 3548).”In addition, Government Code section 3541.3, subdivision (i) provides, in part, that the PERB has the power and duty to investigate alleged violations of the EERA.
6. Government Code section 3541.5, subdivision (b) states: “The board shall not have authority to enforce agreements between parties, and shall not issue a complaint on any charge based on alleged violation of such an agreement that would not also constitute an unfair practice under this chapter.”
HANING, Judge:
LOW, Presiding Judge and KING, Judge, concur.
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Docket No: No. 1 Civil 51767.
Decided: April 12, 1983
Court: Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.
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