DOWNEY DODGE INC v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (1984)

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of dismissal that followed the sustaining of respondents' demurrer to appellants' second amended complaint.   Motor vehicle dealers such as appellants are permitted to operate unregistered vehicles upon public highways if special dealer plates are attached to the vehicles.   (Veh.Code, § 11714, subd. (b);  § 11715, subd. (a).) ¹  The fee for special dealer plates is the fee for vehicle registration established in section 9250.  (§ 9262, subd. (b) in 1981, relabeled § 9262, subd. (e) by Stats. 1982, ch. 1273, No. 7 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 475–476.)   In 1981 the Legislature enacted urgency legislation, effective September 17, 1981, and operative January 1, 1982, that increased the annual section 9250 vehicle registration fee from $11 to $22.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 541, § 25, p. 2181.)   The Legislature also enacted section 9250.8 as urgency legislation, effective September 29, 1981, that imposed a special additional $1 registration fee for three years beginning January 1, 1982, earmarked for the California Highway Patrol.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 933, § 2, p. 3521.)   Appellants seek refunds of the increased fees they paid to respondent Department of Motor Vehicles in November 1981 for special dealer plates for the calendar year 1982 pursuant to sections 9250 and 9250.8.   Appellants also seek a declaration that collection of the fees was unlawful.   We affirm the order of dismissal.

I

 Appellants contend that they were unlawfully charged the section 9250 registration fee increase in November 1981 even though the legislation imposing it was not operative until January 1, 1982.   The dispute centers on the fact that, although the fee for special dealer plates is the same fee as for registration, the payment of fees for special dealer plates is made on a different time schedule than payment for registration or renewal of registration.   Registration must be renewed on or before the date the current registration expires.  (§ 9553.)   However, in 1981 section 11717 provided that all special dealer plates expired at midnight on December 31, 1981, and required that they be renewed for use in 1982 by midnight on November 30, 1981.   Any renewal of special dealer plates made after November 30, 1981, was assessed a 20 percent penalty fee.  (§§ 9553;  9554.)

 Appellants' argument is fatally undermined by the fact that, as mentioned above, the section 9250 fee increase was enacted as urgency legislation that became effective on September 17, 1981.  (Stats. 1981, ch. 541, § 25, p. 2181.)   If the effective date of a statute occurs prior to its operative date, the meaning of the operative date is primarily a matter of legislative intent.  (People v. Hinojosa (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 57, 62–66, 162 Cal.Rptr. 793;  cf. Tevis v. City & County of San Francisco (1954) 43 Cal.2d 190, 194–195, 272 P.2d 757.)   For instance, in Ross v. Board of Retirement (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 188, 191–195, 206 P.2d 903, the court analyzed the legislative intent behind a retirement benefit statute and determined that an employee's right to certain retirement benefits vested on the day the statute became effective, not the day it became operative.  “[T]he operative date is merely a date of convenience ․  Otherwise the operative date is a false factor—the key or controlling date is the ‘effective’ date.”  (Id., at p. 193, 206 P.2d 903, accord, Wilson v. Board of Retirement (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 195, 205, 319 P.2d 426;  Thurston v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 618, 621, 256 P.2d 588.)

 “[S]tatutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers—one that is practical rather than technical and that will lead to a wise policy rather than to mischief or absurdity [citation].”  (People v. Hinojosa, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at pp. 65–66, 162 Cal.Rptr. 793.)   Appellants ask us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to apply a January 1, 1982 fee increase to the calendar year 1982 special dealer plates.   Appellants in effect argue that the different time schedule for payment of special dealer plate fees should have resulted in dealers receiving 1982 special plates for 1981 fees.   Such a result would be directly contrary to the clear directive of section 9262 that the fee for special dealer plates equal the prevailing registration fee.   The more reasonable interpretation is that the operative date refers to the date that the registration or special plate is valid and usable, not the date the fee is paid.

II

 Appellants also contend that they were unlawfully charged the section 9250.8 special $1 fee.   Appellants claim that the fee was not intended to be added to fees for special dealer plates, and, assuming arguendo that it does apply to special dealer plates, it was improperly collected from appellants in November 1981.   At all times pertinent to this action, section 9250.8, subdivision (a), provided:  “In addition to any other fees specified in this code and the Revenue and Taxation Code, a fee of one dollar ($1) shall be paid at the time of registration or renewal of registration of every vehicle beginning January 1, 1982, and ending December 31, 1985, except those vehicles that are expressly exempted under this code from the payment of registration fees.”

We note that the exception for “vehicles that are expressly exempted” refers to statutory exemptions such as those for diplomatic vehicles (§ 9100), publicly owned vehicles (§ 9103), and fire department vehicles (§ 9104) and is not a focus of this dispute.   Appellants argue, rather, that the section 9250.8 $1 fee was not intended to apply to special dealer plate fees because the $1 fee is to be paid “at the time of registration or renewal of registration” and the special plate fee payment does not constitute registration.   However, a special dealer plate is an alternative to registration and is nonetheless a part of the overall statutory registration scheme.   For instance, the fee for special dealer plates and their renewal is “the prevailing vehicle registration fee as set forth in Section 9250.”  (§ 9262, subd. (b) in 1981, relabeled § 9262, subd. (e) by Stats. 1982, ch. 1273, No. 7 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 475–476.)

The indications that the Legislature intended to apply the $1 additional fee to special dealer plates are more persuasive.   Section 9250.8 was enacted as an urgency measure (Stats. 1981, ch. 933, § 5, pp. 3521–3522) intended to increase the uniformed field strength of the California Highway Patrol to offset what had been a gradual decline in the number of such officers.  (§ 9250.9;  Stats.1981, ch. 933, § 4, p. 3521.)   Dealers, such as appellants, whose vehicles with special plates are on the highways benefit from improved highway safety—the purpose of this special fee.

A comparison of the section 9250.8 $1 fee for the California Highway Patrol with the similar section 9250.7 $1 fee enacted in 1971 to fund a program to deal with abandoned vehicles also supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to apply section 9250.8 to special dealer plate fees.   The language of section 9250.8, subdivision (a), parallels section 9250.7, subdivision (a), with one major exception.   The $1 fee for abandoned vehicles applies “[i]n addition to the registration fees specified in Section 9250 and any weight fee.”  (§ 9250.7, subd. (a), emphasis added.)   In enacting the $1 fee for the Highway Patrol, the Legislature apparently intended a wider application since section 9250.8 must be paid “[i]n addition to any other fees specified in this code and the Revenue and Taxation Code.”  (§ 9250.8, subd. (a), emphasis added.)   We hold that the Legislature intended that the section 9250.8 $1 fee be added to the fees for special dealer plates.

Appellants also contend that respondents improperly added the section 9250.8 $1 fee to the fee payable in November 1981 for 1982 special dealer plates.   The contention, which parallels appellants' argument concerning the operative date of the section 9250 fee increases, is based on the fact that the section 9250.8 fee is to be paid “beginning January 1, 1982, and ending December 31, 1985.”   As discussed above, dealers were required to apply for special dealer plates for the calendar year 1982 in November 1981 or to face a penalty.  (§ 9553;  Stats.1971, ch. 1214, § 35, p. 2355.)   Section 9250.8 was adopted as urgency legislation that became effective September 29, 1981.  (Stats.1981, ch. 933, § 5, pp. 3521–3522.)   The urgency of the legislation was based in part on the need for increased Highway Patrol units in the 1981–1982 fiscal year.   (Ibid.)  We hold that the Legislature intended the section 9250.8 fee to be added to the fees collected in November 1981 for special dealer plates for use beginning January 1, 1982.   Of course, assuming that the operation of section 9250.8 is not extended beyond its current termination date, dealers who pay in 1985 for special dealer plates for use beginning January 1, 1986, will not have to pay another section 9250.8 $1 fee at that time.

The order of dismissal is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.

DALSIMER, Associate Justice.

L. THAXTON HANSON, Acting P.J., and DUNNUM, J.,* concur.