GARRISON v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT (1995)

Here, we hold that amendments to complaints filed under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA—Pub.Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) ¹ , adding indispensable parties, must be filed within the statutory period provided by section 21167, subdivision (b).

Background

John S. Garrison (Garrison) appeals the trial court's dismissal of his suit against respondent/defendant Board of Directors of the United Water Conservation District (United), following the court's sustaining of United's demurrer to Garrison's first amended petition for writ of mandate without leave to amend.

United held public hearings in May and June 1993 on the question of compliance with CEQA for its proposed project of using seven gravel pits, located near the Santa Clara River, as percolation basins and eventually as water reservoirs.   This project, entitled the Fox Canyon Seawater Intrusion Abatement Project (Fox Canyon Project or Project), included a “pilot project” involving the conversion of one gravel pit, called the Noble Pit.   Prior to the aforementioned hearings, United commissioned an environmental study of the Noble Pit pilot project, and concluded pursuant to this study that there was no substantial evidence the pilot project would have a significant impact on the environment.

Garrison attended the public hearings with his present counsel, Richard L. Francis (Francis).   Garrison said nothing at the hearings;  however, Francis, as an individual, objected at the hearings to United's failure to obtain an environmental impact report (EIR).²  Francis argued the Fox Canyon Project involved multiple gravel pits, which could not be segmented one basin at a time for CEQA analysis, and therefore adopting a negative declaration ³ regarding the subject basin would not address the future cumulative environmental impacts of the Project.   Francis also argued United failed to assert on what basis it considered itself the lead agency for the Project.⁴

Despite Francis' objections, United approved the pilot project and adopted a negative declaration on June 9, 1993.

On behalf of himself and the general public, Garrison filed a petition for writ of mandate on July 8, 1993, seeking an order and injunction that United vacate its approval of the pilot project and its adoption of the negative declaration.   The petition contained substantially the same grounds that Francis had asserted at the aforementioned public hearings.

United demurred to Garrison's petition on the ground he had not alleged facts showing exhaustion of his administrative remedies.   United claimed that, although Garrison attended the public hearings on the pilot project, he was not on the record as having made a single comment.   CEQA requires a petitioner in superior court to have commented at the public hearing.  (See our discussion, infra, on administrative remedies pursuant to § 21177.)   United stated that, although other members of the public had expressed objections to the adoption of the negative declaration, Garrison was personally obligated to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The trial court sustained United's demurrer and granted Garrison leave to amend.   Garrison filed his first amended petition for mandamus on November 2, 1993.   The only substantial change from the original petition was the allegation of Garrison's capacity:  “Petitioner, JOHN S. GARRISON, brings this lawsuit as a duly authorized individual member of and in a representative capacity on behalf of, THE COALITION FOR AQUIFER HONESTY, an unincorporated association composed of, among others, Richard L. Francis and John S. Garrison, and formed on or about July 8, 1993.”

United again demurred, contending Garrison and the Coalition for Aquifer Honesty (Coalition) failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.   United argued the Coalition was created merely as a device to sidestep the exhaustion requirement.   It further contended the Coalition became a party to the suit after the pertinent statute of limitations had run.   The trial court sustained this demurrer without leave to amend.

Administrative Remedies

 Section 21177, subdivision (b), provides:  “No person shall maintain an action or proceeding unless that person objected to the approval of the project orally or in writing during the public comment period provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.”   Subdivision (b) requires parties to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing legal challenges under CEQA.   (Corona–Norco Unified School Dist. v. City of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 997, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 803.)   The statute's purpose is to inform the decision-making body of the contentions of the interested parties before litigation is instituted, so that it has the opportunity to address the contentions and hopefully render litigation unnecessary.  (Ibid.)

The exemption from subdivision (b) is section 21177, subdivision (c).  (Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1749–1750, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 308.)   Subdivision (c) states:  “This section does not preclude any organization formed after the approval of a project from maintaining an action ․ if a member of that organization has complied with subdivision (b).”   This exemption signifies that “[t]he purposes of CEQA ․ are not served by requiring proof in the record of compliance with the requirement [under subdivision (b) ] that a person objecting to the Project present his or her comments, orally or in writing, at the appropriate stage of the proceedings when there is no real dispute that the requirement was in fact met.”  (Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood, supra, at p. 1750, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, emphasis added.)

 The exemption provided for in subdivision (c) applies here.   It expressly allowed formation of the Coalition after United's approval of the negative declaration since a member of the Coalition, Francis, complied with subdivision (b) by objecting to the issuance of a negative declaration.   His ground for the objection, that an EIR was required under CEQA, formed the substantive basis of Garrison's amended petition for mandamus.   Since United was given the opportunity to consider the need for an EIR prior to the institution of this suit, the requirements for exhaustion of administrative remedies were met here.

Statute of Limitations

We affirm the judgment of dismissal solely on this ground.

Section 21167 provides:  “Any action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the following acts or decisions of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with this division shall be commenced as follows:  ․ [¶] (b) Any action or proceeding alleging that a public agency has improperly determined whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment shall be commenced within 30 days after the filing of the notice․”   Subdivision (b) is applicable to Garrison's suit.⁵

United's negative declaration was filed June 10, 1993.   Garrison's original petition for mandamus was filed within the allowable 30–day period on July 8, 1993.   The first amended petition, however, was filed after this period expired, in November 1993.

Garrison's reliance on the relation-back theory of amended pleadings to escape the 30–day limitations period is unavailing.

 A court may, in the furtherance of justice, allow a party to amend any pleading by adding the name of any party.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 473.)   California courts have shown a liberal attitude toward allowing amendment of pleadings to avoid the harsh result imposed by a statute of limitations.   (Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 19, 108 P.2d 906.)   Thus, proper amendments to the original complaint “relate back” to the date of the filing of the original complaint, despite the amendments being made after the statute of limitations expired.  (Olsen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 737, 742, 47 Cal.Rptr. 242.)   Here, Garrison contends that, since his first amended petition left the substantive basis of the suit unchanged and no “new party” was added by the amendment (merely a change in capacity), the amendment was only one of form and should be allowed to relate back to his original complaint, thereby avoiding the running of the CEQA statute of limitations.

Garrison's relation-back theory cannot be utilized here.

 Section 21167 applies when review is sought on CEQA grounds.   (Committee for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 847, 859–860, 237 Cal.Rptr. 723.)   The statute operates as a statute of limitations specially for actions premised on alleged violations of CEQA.  (International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 265, 271, 171 Cal.Rptr. 875.)   As such, it takes precedence over general statutes of limitations.  (Walters v. County of Plumas (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 460, 469, 132 Cal.Rptr. 174;  Committee for a Progressive Gilroy, supra, at p. 859, 237 Cal.Rptr. 723.)

 The Legislature has determined pursuant to section 21167 and other provisions that the public interest is not served unless challenges under CEQA are promptly filed.  (Oceanside Marina Towers Assn. v. Oceanside Community Development Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 735, 741, 231 Cal.Rptr. 910;  Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 836, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560.)   This legislative intent compels us to hold as a public policy matter that any amendments adding indispensable parties to CEQA lawsuits must be filed within the pertinent limitations periods contained in section 21167;  in our case, the 30–day limitations period pursuant to subdivision (b).

 Promoting the prompt resolution of CEQA litigation does not defeat the laudatory provisions of section 21177, subdivision (c), allowing any organization formed after the approval of a project to file a CEQA action.   In every such situation, compliance with subdivision (b), requiring prior public comment on the issues pleaded in a CEQA suit, is necessary.  (Subd. (c).)

 Nor is our holding inconsistent with the legislative intent that CEQA be interpreted in a manner to afford the fullest protection to the environment.  (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 563–564, 276 Cal.Rptr. 410, 801 P.2d 1161.)   Since the parties have participated in the administrative hearings, filing a mandamus petition in the superior court within 30 days is not a burden and does not prevent full litigation on the merits.   Our holding, moreover, is consistent with case authority that the act's strict procedural requirements are to be followed.⁶  (Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 836–837, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560.)   The public's interest in CEQA compliance does not conflict with the public's other interest in avoiding bureaucratic morass and delay.   Violations of this latter policy could actually interfere with environmental protection goals.

The fundamental interest in the expeditious processing of CEQA challenges requires that one may not challenge an agency's failure to comply with the act “at any time without limitation.”  (Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 939, 231 Cal.Rptr. 748, 727 P.2d 1029.)   Our decision here gives effect both to the important goals of avoiding bureaucratic delay and promoting public comment on projects that may have environmental significance.

The judgment dismissing this suit is affirmed.

The parties shall pay their own costs on appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.

2.   Section 21100 requires a state agency to prepare an EIR on any project which may have a significant effect on the environment.

3.   “Negative declaration” is a written statement briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project will not have a significant effect on the environment and does not require the preparation of an EIR.  (§ 21064.)

4.   “ ‘Lead agency’ means the public agency which has the principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant effect upon the environment.”  (§ 21067.)

5.   Section 21167 establishes differing limitations periods for filing suits under CEQA depending on the nature of the public agency's action.   Subdivision (a) provides actions alleging no attempt at compliance with CEQA shall be commenced within 180 days of the public agency's decision;  subdivision (c) mandates a 30–day filing period for suits alleging EIR's do not comply with CEQA;  subdivision (d) applies a 35–day filing period for actions challenging determinations that CEQA does not apply to projects, or a 180–day limitations period if notices of such determinations are not filed;  and subdivision (e) provides a 30–day filing period for any other acts or omissions by public agencies not complying with CEQA.

6.   Under certain circumstances, courts have permitted the unique procedural requirements of CEQA to be ignored.   This has occurred in cases where the responsible public agency has attempted to hide substantial changes in an approved project and then claimed invulnerability from suit based on the short limitations period.   No such factor of impropriety is involved here.  (See Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 837–838, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560.)

STEVEN J. STONE, Presiding Justice.

GILBERT and YEGAN, JJ., concur.