GRIFFIN HOMES INC v. CITY OF SIMI VALLEY (1990)

OPINION AND ORDER

A developer files an action against a city alleging that the city's slow-growth ordinance interferes with the developer's property rights.

Here we hold, among other things, that the developer has stated a cause of action for violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C., § 1983), and an action in traditional mandamus to attack the validity of an adverse administrative decision denying the issuance of building permits to the developer.   We also hold that the developer has not stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation.

BACKGROUND

Griffin Homes, Inc., a California corporation, (Griffin) owns two large parcels of land located in the City of Simi Valley (City).   It seeks to build 187 homes on a parcel known as Greenbriar and 217 homes on a parcel known as Hopetown.   Griffin expects to complete its development in 1992.

On July 21, 1986, City enacted a “growth control” ordinance which limits the number of building permits that City may issue during a given year.   The measure provides that proposed construction projects are to be evaluated by a point system and then placed in a queue based upon their ranking under the point system.   The ordinance provides, in part, that:  “[R]ecipients shall be maintained in order, ․ until the project has received all of its grants to complete buildout․  [¶]  Once a developer has accumulated enough building permits to build one phase (approved portion) of a project, he shall begin construction on that phase before he can pull permits for the next phase.   Such a project shall not lose its place in the queue.”

On October 13, 1986, a tentative map and zone change was approved by City for Greenbriar.   On December 24, 1987, Griffin applied for a permit to build 63 units on phase 1 of Greenbriar.   On April 25, 1988, Griffin alleges that it was ranked by City as first in the queue and, consequently, received City's authorization to build 63 units on Greenbriar.   Griffin contends that it was required to, and did, construct $2,840,481 worth of roads, sewers, and flood control improvements that were largely beyond the infrastructure needs generated by Greenbriar.   However, Griffin's best laid plans began to go awry:  it charges that City, following the award of the permit to build 63 units, denied its application to complete Greenbriar and removed Griffin from the queue.

On February 22, 1988, a tentative subdivision map was approved for the Hopetown project.   Griffin claims to have expended $2,500,000 for certain off-site road widening and drainage projects that have little to do with the Hopetown project.   On March 28, 1988, Griffin deeded 188 acres of its Hopetown property to the Rancho Simi Open Space Conservancy Agency, a joint powers agency formed by City and the Rancho Simi Recreation and Park District.   In exchange, Griffin received $1,000,000 in cash, as well as various fee waivers and sundry considerations.   Griffin contends that these include a grant from the City giving it the right to build all of its Hopetown project within a four-year period.   On May 17, 1988, Griffin applied to build 217 units on Hopetown.   However, City has, thus far, refused to allow Griffin any allocation grants on Hopetown.

Griffin protested City's refusal to allow for the prompt construction of any more units upon Greenbriar and its refusal to allow for immediate development of Hopetown.   On January 23, 1989, the city council rejected Griffin's application to build additional units upon the two parcels.

On July 28, 1989, Griffin filed a petition seeking a writ of mandate to compel City to comply with the slow-growth ordinance, as well as an action for declaratory relief, inverse condemnation, specific performance, and damages for violation of its civil rights.   In the complaint, Griffin alleges that, having been placed in the queue, it was entitled under the terms of the ordinance to build to completion its Greenbriar project.   Griffin also asserts that it purchased and improved the Hopetown parcel, as well as constructed the necessary infrastructure upon the parcel and donated the park land, in reliance upon City's assurances that 217 homes could be built upon the parcel.

City filed a demurrer.   On January 18, 1990, respondent superior court sustained portions of the demurrer without leave to amend.   The court found that, although Griffin had labeled two of its causes as being for traditional mandamus, these causes were in fact for administrative mandamus, and, as such, were barred by the statute of limitations.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5.)   The court also ruled that Griffin had no federal civil right remedy because it had not alleged the deprivation of a federally protected right.   Demurrers to the remaining causes of action were sustained, but with leave to amend.

Griffin sought relief by way of extraordinary writ.   This court granted an alternative writ relating to the January 18th ruling.

On February 20, 1990, Griffin filed an amended complaint.   Included in the amended complaint were causes of action for declaratory relief, specific enforcement, rescission, and inverse condemnation.   City demurred to these causes of action.

On March 22, 1990, respondent court sustained, without leave to amend, City's demurrer to the inverse condemnation cause of action.   The trial court was of the view that Griffin had failed to allege sufficient facts suggesting there to be no economically viable use of the land, and that City's granting to petitioner the right to build homes on 63 of the 187 lots on one of the two parcels constituted an economically viable use of Griffin's property.

The trial court overruled the demurrer as to the causes of action for declaratory relief, specific performance, and rescission.   The court noted that it had previously overruled the same demurrer upon the ground that the ordinances were for the purposes of growth management, and were not zoning ordinances within the meaning of Government Code section 65009(c).   It also held that the procedures set forth in Government Code sections 65864, et seq. are not the exclusive method for local agencies to enter into development agreements and that the question of the existence of a contract was, therefore, one of fact.

Neither side was entirely pleased with the ruling of the trial court.   The parties sought review by way of petitions for extraordinary relief.   We denied the petition filed by City and Rancho Simi Open Space Conservancy Agency, but issued an alternative writ of mandate on Griffin's petition.   (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66.)

DISCUSSION

A. An Observation

Perhaps due to a perceived uncertainty or confusion in the law, complaints seeking relief in inverse condemnation and related causes of action suffer from a profusion of facts.   They are so fact-specific that they read more like declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment than like a traditional complaint.   This case is no exception.

While working our way through Griffin's 66–page complaint, we thought nostalgically of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10 which states that “[a] complaint ․ shall contain ․ the following:  [¶] (a) a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”   Long ago, Justice Field lamented:  “In numerous instances before us, pleadings [are] filled with recitals, digressions and stories, which only tend to prolixity and obscurity.”  (Green v. Palmer (1860) 15 Cal. 411, 414.)

Despite our sympathy with counsel's dilemma, we are not prepared to say that complaints for inverse condemnation are exempt from Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10.   Brevity is the soul of a well-pled complaint.   Providing too many details obscures rather than enlightens.   If the future brings us a coherent body of inverse condemnation law, perhaps this problem will disappear.

B. Civil Rights Action

 We must decide whether Griffin has sufficiently alleged that the City, in implementing its slow-growth ordinance, has deprived it of rights secured by the Constitution or by laws of the United States and the State of California.   We are guided by the rule that the demurrer admits all material facts that are properly pled.  (Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 549, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137;  Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 323, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171.)

Griffin charges that the trial court took too narrow a view of the law relating to federal civil rights actions.   It asserts that the superior court was operating under the mistaken impression that such actions under United States Code section 1983 are limited to issues of racial discrimination in the absence of an adequate state remedy.

 “Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals alleging deprivations of their constitutional rights by action taken ‘under color of state law.’ ”  (Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy (1979) 440 U.S. 391, 399, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1176, 59 L.Ed.2d 401.)   An action under United States Code section 1983 exists independently of any state remedy and is not limited to incidents of racial discrimination.  (Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123;  Ellis v. Dyson (1975) 421 U.S. 426, 432–433, 95 S.Ct. 1691, 1695, 44 L.Ed.2d 274;  Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 841, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125.)   Nor is it necessary for one to exhaust state remedies prior to seeking relief under section 1983.  (Rutherford v. City of Berkeley (9th Cir.1986) 780 F.2d 1444, 1447.)

 A civil rights action is generally unavailable to review garden-variety zoning disputes;  nonetheless, such an action may lie where a municipality's refusal to grant a building permit deprives a developer of some federal statutory or constitutional right.  (See, e.g. Bateson v. Geisse (9th Cir.1988) 857 F.2d 1300, 1303;  but cf., Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook (1st Cir.1982) 680 F.2d 822, 833;  Chongris v. Board of Appeals of Town of Andover (1st Cir 1987) 811 F.2d 36, 46.)

 The parties do not quarrel with the general proposition that arbitrary and unreasonable governmental interference with vested property rights will give rise to a civil rights cause of action.  (See, e.g. Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106;  Littlefield v. City of Afton (8th Cir.1986) 785 F.2d 596, 604–607.)   The federal constitution recognizes that a property owner has the right to the economically viable use of his or her land, and the right not to have that land taken by the government without due process of law and payment of just compensation.   (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

 On occasion, a governmental entity may, by acting under the guise of some otherwise reasonable measure, be instead attempting to either exact illegal concessions from the builder, or zone the builder's property into inutility.  (See e.g., First Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250;  Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677;  Lockary v. Kayfetz (9th Cir.1990) 908 F.2d 543;  Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley (9th Cir.1989) 882 F.2d 1398, 1409;  see also Frieden:  The Environmental Protection Hustle (MIT Press 1979).)   If proven, such conduct by government constitutes an incursion into a landowner's rights of such magnitude as to deny the “justice and fairness's guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255, 262–263, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

 One's right to engage in a trade may not be predicated upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights.  (See, e.g. Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 336, 347, 222 Cal.Rptr. 854;  Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 259, 220 Cal.Rptr. 2.)   The arbitrary and irrational interference by government with property rights will give rise to an action under section 1983.  (Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. (1976) 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752.)

 Thus, an illegal exaction of property occurs where the government requires that, as a condition for the issuance of building permits, a builder dedicate property for public use where such use bears no relationship to the benefit conferred.  (E.g., Associated Home Builders, etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1971) 4 Cal.3d 633, 641, 94 Cal.Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606;  Grupe v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 148, 165, 212 Cal.Rptr. 578;  Remmenga v. Coastal Com. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 623, 627, 209 Cal.Rptr. 628.)  “Where the conditions imposed are not reasonably related to the landowner's proposed use but are imposed by a public entity to shift the burden of providing the cost of public benefit to one not responsible for or only remotely or speculatively benefiting from it, there is an unreasonable exercise of police power.”  (Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Com., supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 259, 220 Cal.Rptr. 2.)

The complaint alleges that City was manipulating its authority to grant building permits to exert leverage on Griffin to build improvements and these improvements had little or no relationship to the subject projects at hand.   Griffin alleges that, in reasonable reliance upon City's inducements, it spent considerable sums to construct infrastructures upon all of its parcels, to completely grade the entire 47.5 acre Greenbriar site, and to install $2,840,481 worth of infrastructure that is unrelated to the 63 homes it was subsequently allowed to build.   Griffin contends that it built these improvements in reasonable reliance upon City's promise to allow the prompt construction of Greenbriar.   The net result of this series of events, according to Griffin, is that it presently has 63 homes sitting in the middle of a completely graded 47.5 acre site.

Griffin alleges that, as a distinct wrong, it has been prevented from making any economic use of the Hopetown parcel.   It alleges that Hopetown lies vacant and unused.   Griffin avers to have transferred 188 acres of Hopetown land to City's open space agency for one-third of the market value, dedicated a 13–acre local park, and to have spent $3,500,000 for infrastructure that is largely a benefit to the region, rather than to the specific project.   Griffin alleges that its actions were undertaken with the understanding that City would allow full development of Hopetown over a four-to-five year period.

If true, the allegations we have previously discussed, support the claim of an illegal exaction.   Griffin must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence that its property rights were substantially impaired by the City's actions.   We recognize that not every allegation in the civil rights cause of action supports such a cause of action.   Nevertheless, the demurrer should have been overruled.  “[A] general demurrer will be overruled if the complaint contains allegations of every fact essential to the statement of a cause of action, regardless of mistaken theory or imperfections of form which make it subject to special demurrer.  [Citations.]”  (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3rd ed. 1985) § 902, p. 342.)

We therefore conclude that the cause of action under 42 United States Code section 1983 states sufficient allegations to have withstood an attack by way of demurrer.

 City contends that Griffin's civil rights claim is not ripe for adjudication inasmuch as there is no allegation that City has adopted a permanent ban on development of the subject property.  (Williamson Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126.)   In Williamson, a developer's plans for using a parcel of land had been frustrated as a consequence of a change in certain zoning laws.   The developer, however, had not submitted any plans to the local governmental entity that was responsible for enforcing the zoning law.   The Supreme Court ruled that the claim was not ripe for adjudication until “the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”   (Id. at p. 186, 105 S.Ct. at p. 3116.)

For the sake of jurisdictional and practical considerations, it has been said that “[w]ise adjudication has its own time for ripening.”  (Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show (1949) 338 U.S. 912, 918, 70 S.Ct. 252, 255, 94 L.Ed. 562.)  “The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to avoid premature judicial review of local decisions, particularly in an area such as zoning where the courts must be careful not to usurp local authority.”  (Eide v. Sarasota County (11th Cir.1990) 895 F.2d 1326, 1328.)

In contrast to Williamson, the “taking” here (i.e., the illegal exactions) was purportedly effected through direct government action, and not through regulation.   This breach of Griffin's rights occurred at the moment the City allegedly exacted illegal improvements from it.   There is no administrative recourse available for this alleged wrong.  (Hall v. City of Santa Barbara (9th Cir.1986) 833 F.2d 1270, 1281, fn. 28;  Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 780 F.2d at p. 1447.)  “A property owner has been denied substantive due process, ․ the moment a governmental decision affecting his property has been made in an arbitrary and capricious manner, regardless of whether he is later compensated for that violation.”  (Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster (11th Cir.1989) 881 F.2d 1570, 1574, fn. 8;  see also Crow–New Jersey 32 Ltd. Partnership v. Township of Clinton (D.N.J.1989) 718 F.Supp. 378, 381–382.)

The mere possibility that City may eventually grant Griffin the building permits will not remove the stain of illegal acts that resulted when City, as alleged in the pleadings, dragooned Griffin into contributing diverse municipal improvements.

C. Mandamus

 Griffin seeks to establish, by way of a petition for traditional mandamus, that City was refusing to follow its ordinance.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085;  see, e.g., Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 403, 413, 107 Cal.Rptr. 359;  Palmer v. Fox (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 453, 258 P.2d 30.)   It argues that, under the terms of the ordinance, Griffin should maintain its position at the head of the line until all permits have been issued.   Griffin claims this is not a challenge to the merits of any administrative decision.   Instead, it asserts that City refuses to abide with the earlier decision to place Griffin at the head of the line and not to follow the ordinances that require it to remain in that position until the entire project is completed.

In response, City points out that the determination of Griffin's entitlement to allocation permits was made at an administrative hearing, and its purported failure to follow its laws does not remove the action from the scope of administrative mandamus under section 1094.5.  (Cf. State of California v. Superior Court (Veta) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281.)   City contends that Griffin's “[i]nvocation of the words ‘mandatory duty’ or similar phraseology does not magically convert a Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 proceeding into a Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 proceeding.”

 Traditional mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is available when public officers, boards, and agencies refuse to perform an act that the law requires them to perform.  (C–Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 926, 934, 187 Cal.Rptr. 370.)   For example, a lawsuit seeking to declare as invalid a rule that was illegally adopted by a municipality is the proper subject for review by way of traditional mandate.  (Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802, 810, 165 Cal.Rptr. 908.)

 Review by way of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 “is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of adjudicatory administrative actions of ․ local level agencies․”  (Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont. Ed. Bar 1989), § 1.4, p. 5.)  “[T]he decision to grant or deny a development allotment application involves the basic elements of the adjudicatory process:  the application of established criteria to existing facts.”  (Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 168, 176, 196 Cal.Rptr. 670.)

The gist of the petition for mandamus is that Griffin, having been placed in the queue, claims that under the terms of the ordinance, it was entitled to build its entire Greenbriar project.   Griffin seeks to review the city council's actions rejecting its application to buildout Greenbriar.   The City contends that the resolution of this contention requires that the reviewing court look at the record of the administrative proceedings and determine whether the governmental entity “has proceeded in the manner required by law.”   As such, the present writ petition, seeking to contest the validity and application of the slow-growth ordinance, must be classified as a member of the demonology otherwise known as administrative mandate.  (Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 178, 196 Cal.Rptr. 670;  see also Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 675–677, 170 Cal.Rptr. 484, 620 P.2d 1032.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 places a 90–day statute of limitations on challenges to administrative decisions.   The complaint in the present matter was filed six months after the city council's decision to not allow Griffin to build its project.   City therefore contends that respondent court properly sustained the demurrer to the cause of action for mandamus.

Nonetheless, we find that Griffin's cause of action for traditional mandamus is appropriate.   The complaint alleges that the city council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it conducted a public hearing on the allocation grants.   Griffin alleges that the allocation procedure was a sham because the city council hearing included no analysis as to whether each project met the criteria.   It also avers that city council members listed projects in the order of their personal preference and openly admitted that they were not sure what they had done or why they had done it.   Griffin also alleges that, after the public hearing, the city staff revised the ranking without disclosing the criteria used.   Griffin claims that the city officials' insouciance deprived it of fundamental constitutional rights.

 It is elemental that “some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”  (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18;  see also Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287;  Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing (1975) 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1261, 1281–1295.)   The rulings of a governmental entity, arrived at without the requisite due process and administrative procedures, may be questioned by the means of traditional mandamus.  (Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. Etc. Regulation (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 372, 376, 228 Cal.Rptr. 101;  Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 219, 136 Cal.Rptr. 527.)   The first amended complaint suggests that such governmental misconduct occurred in the application process.   We find that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the demurrer as to the cause of action for traditional mandamus.

D. Inverse Condemnation

 The general rule is easily stated:  a cause of action for inverse condemnation will lie where the regulation in question does not advance a legitimate governmental interest or that it serves to deprive the landowner of all, or substantially all, of the use of its land.  (Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874, 81 L.Ed.2d 815;  Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106;  Martino v. Santa Clara Water Dist. (9th Cir.1983) 703 F.2d 1141, 1147;  Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard (1985) 39 Cal.3d 256, 217 Cal.Rptr. 1, 703 P.2d 339.)   It is extremely difficult, however, to apply the rules to specific cases.  (Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, 467 U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874, 81 L.Ed.2d 815;  Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631.)   The cases that discuss the law of inverse condemnation are “subject to no academic rule.” ¹  (See Siemon and Larsen:  The Taking Issue Trilogy:  The Beginning of the End? (1988) 33 Wash.U.J. of Urban and Contemporary Law 169, 198–199.)

 City raises the defense that Griffin's inverse condemnation claim is not ripe for adjudication.  (Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126.)   The requirement of a final administrative decision does not apply in those cases that challenge an ordinance as being arbitrary and unreasonable.  (Keystone Coal Association v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470, 494, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1247, 94 L.Ed.2d 472.)

 Among its many objections to the ordinance, Griffin avers that the regulation is arbitrary in that it does not substantially advance any legitimate state interest.  (See, e.g. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303.)   The test to be applied is whether the land use ordinance under review was arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare.  (Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, supra, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3148;  Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255, 261, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142.)   The slow-growth ordinance was enacted by City with the avowed purpose to “protect the unique, hill-surrounded environment;  enhance the quality of life;  promote public health, safety or welfare and general well-being of the community․”

There has long been concern over the harmful consequences visited upon urban centers as a result of rapid and uncontrolled growth.  “So it is that in California one sees not only the consequence of unplanned, careless, or deliberately destructive past activity;  one also gets the feeling that the worst is yet to come.   There are times when the change without apparent direction, and the growth without control, give the appearance of socially acceptable madness, of a human population irruption that may well end tragically both for the people and for the land.”  (Dasmann:  The Destruction of California (1964) p. 28.)

In 1961, sociologist Lewis Mumford chronciled the manner in which the unchecked growth of suburbs had resulted in the destruction of those characteristics that once made suburbia attractive.  “Instead of creating the Regional City, the forces that automatically pumped highways and motor cars and real estate developments into the open country have produced the formless urban exudation.   Those who are using verbal magic to turn this conglomeration into an organic entity are only fooling themselves.   To call the resulting mass Megalopolis, or to suggest that the change in spatial scale, with swift transportation, in itself is sufficient to produce a new and better urban form, is to overlook the complex nature of the city.   The actual coalescence of urban tissue that is now taken by many sociologists to be a final stage in city development, is not in fact a new sort of city, but an anti-city.   As in the concept of anti-matter, the anti-city annihilates the city whenever it collides with it.”  (Mumford:  The City in History (1961) ch. 16.)

Laws, such as the Simi ordinance, that serve to protect a community from the ill effects of haphazard urbanization, and which promote the orderly development, are a proper exercise of the police power.  Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68;  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1370, 258 Cal.Rptr. 893.)

Griffin argues that governmental goals relating to the supply of affordable housing conflicts with City's goal of protecting the environment through the means of slowing urban development.   Quite possibly, the slow-growth ordinance may hamper Simi's ability to accept the fair share of regional housing needs for low-income families.  (Associated Home Builders Etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 601, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473;  Gov.Code, §§ 65913 et seq.;  Health and Saf.Code, §§ 50000 et seq.;   see also Hansen v. Department of Social Services (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 283, 297, 238 Cal.Rptr. 232.)   If so, City may be subject to a collateral attack premised upon the ground that the general plan lacks a due consideration of the housing needs of low-income persons.  (See, e.g. Southern Alameda Span. Sp. Org. v. City of Union City, Cal. (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 291, 295–296;  Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (1975) 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713.)

 These competing interests, however, do not alone render growth control laws invalid.  “The desirability of encouraging subdividers to build low-cost housing cannot be denied and unreasonable exactions could defeat this objective, but these considerations must be balanced against the phenomenon of the appallingly rapid disappearance of open areas in and around our cities.”   (Associated Home Builders, etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, supra, 4 Cal.3d 633, at p. 648, 94 Cal.Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606.)   Cities and counties possess the legislative discretion to determine which of the conflicting imperative must be chosen in order to promote public welfare.  (See, e.g., Gov.Code, §§ 65302, 65030, and 65030.1;  Barancik v. County of Marin (9th Cir.1988) 872 F.2d 834, 837;  Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 604, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473.)

Legislative choices in this area are presumed to be valid and “so long as it remains ‘a question upon which reasonable minds might differ,’ there will be no judicial interference with the municipality's determination of policy.”   (Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 605, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473.)   Further, Griffin has failed to cite any authority that would, upon a claim of inverse condemnation, overturn local growth control ordinance on the ground that it conflicts with state policy goals relating to the provision of affordable housing.

 Failing in a facial attack upon the slow-growth ordinance, Griffin attempts to plead around the ripeness doctrine by alleging that, as a consequence of City's actions, it will never receive any more allocation grants.   This conclusionary statement, however, is belied by allegations contained in the amended complaint.   Griffin alleges it did not expect to complete the development until 1992.   There is no allegation that City has issued a final determination that would preclude the possibility of Griffin's completing its projects by this date.

 Significantly, there is no factual allegation to support the notion that Griffin will forever be prevented from building all of its proposed homes.   Instead, the City's enforcement of the ordinance may serve to delay the construction of these dwellings.  (See Pardee Construction Co. v. City of Camarillo (1984) 37 Cal.3d 465, 473, 208 Cal.Rptr. 228, 690 P.2d 701.)   The reasonable delay by the government in approving a project is not tantamount to a taking.  (First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 258 Cal.Rptr. 893;  Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 862, 868–869, 241 Cal.Rptr. 787.)   It follows that Griffin's claim for inverse condemnation is premature and not ripe for adjudication.  (Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Recl. Assn. (1981) 452 U.S. 264, 297, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2371, 69 L.Ed.2d 1.)

CONCLUSION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order of January 18, 1990, sustaining City's demurrer to Griffin's civil rights action, and sustaining the demurrer to the petition for mandamus without leave to amend.   Respondent superior court is directed to enter a new order overruling the demurrer to the civil rights action and the action for mandamus.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We borrow the wisdom of Jack Point.  (See Gilbert & Sullivan, The Yeoman of the Guard.

GILBERT, Acting Presiding Justice.

ABBE and WILLARD *, JJ., concur.