IN RE: Jacy JOHN (1985)

INTRODUCTION

While confined in state prison, Jacy John (“John”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.   That court issued an order requiring the Department of Corrections to show cause before this court why John should not be granted conduct credit for preconviction time she spent in Patton State Hospital pursuant to section 1370 of the Penal Code.   We deny the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1983, John was prosecuted for grand theft.   On May 5, 1983, defense counsel raised a doubt on the record as to John's competence, and the court appointed psychiatrists to evaluate John's competence.   On June 3, 1983, the court held a hearing, adjudged John incompetent to stand trial under section 1368 of the Penal Code, and ordered John committed to Patton State Hospital for treatment.   Proceedings were suspended pending John's stay in the hospital.

After 343 days in the hospital, John was adjudged competent to stand trial.   She pleaded nolo contendere, and was sentenced to three years in state prison.   The court ordered John to receive 110 days of credit for the actual time she spent in county jail, 54 days of good and work time for her stay in county jail, and credit for the 343 days she spent in the state hospital.   John now contends that she should have received an additional 172 days of good and work time credits for the time she spent in Patton State Hospital, claiming the court's denial of those credits constitutes a denial of equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions.

DISCUSSION

John asserts that federal and state equal protection doctrines mandate that she receive the same conduct credits as narcotics addicts committed for post-conviction rehabilitation (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 3001, 3050, 3051, 3201) and Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders (“MDSOs”) (Pen.Code, §§ 1364, 1365), who may participate in post-conviction rehabilitation programs.   We disagree.

 If, as a result of a mental disorder or a developmental disability, the accused is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or her and is unable to assist counsel in presenting the defense in a rational manner, then he or she is incompetent to stand trial.  (Pen.Code, § 1367.)   If the court finds that the accused is incompetent to stand trial, it shall order the accused to be committed to a state hospital for care and treatment to facilitate the speedy restoration of the accused to competence.  (Pen.Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1).)   Criminal proceedings are suspended while the accused is in the state hospital.   The term of commitment to the state hospital is not tied to any sentence, as the accused has not been tried or convicted at the time of commitment.   The purpose of such commitments is to restore the competence of the accused, if possible, not to impose punishment.  (See People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148, 150, 191 Cal.Rptr. 592 (overruled on another ground in People v. Waterman (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 977, 215 Cal.Rptr. 534, 85 D.A.R. 2354);  accord People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 481, 195 Cal.Rptr. 233.)

Penal Code section 4019 provides that an accused may earn credits for good and work time for preconviction confinement in a city or county jail, industrial farm, or road camp.   That statute makes no mention of time spent in a state hospital for treatment under the terms of Penal Code section 1370.   Section 1375.5 of the Penal Code specifies the credits that persons committed because of incompetence to stand trial are to receive in the event that they recover their competence to stand trial, proceedings recommence, and they are convicted and sentenced.

“Time spent by a defendant in a hospital or other facility as a result of a commitment therein as a mentally incompetent pursuant to this chapter shall be credited on the term of any imprisonment, if any, for which the defendant is sentenced in the criminal case which was suspended pursuant to Section 1370 or 1370.1.

“As used in this section, ‘time spent in a hospital or other facility’ includes days a defendant is treated as an outpatient pursuant to Title 15 (commencing with Section 1600) of Part 2.”  (Pen.Code, § 1375.5.)

We note that Penal Code section 1375.5 makes no mention of conduct credits, but seems to sanction credit only for actual time spent in the hospital.   In contrast, section 3201, subdivision (c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code makes specific provision for conduct credits for narcotics addicts.¹  Similarly, section 1364 of the Penal Code makes specific provision for MDSOs to earn conduct credits while participating in rehabilitation programs.²  The fact that the Legislature has not explicitly provided for conduct credits in the context of incompetency commitments, but has done so in other contexts, strongly suggests that the Legislature does not deem conduct credits appropriate for persons temporarily committed for treatment under the provisions of Penal Code section 1370.   Citing People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689, 200 Cal.Rptr. 546, John asserts that there is no basis for the legislative distinction between mentally incompetent defendants on the one hand and MDSOs and narcotics addicts on the other, and that the distinction violates the state and federal doctrines of equal protection.   We disagree.

“To establish a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or of the California Constitution, a defendant must demonstrate that he is being treated differently from similarly situated persons.”  (In re Huffman (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 558, 562, 212 Cal.Rptr. 527.)   To prevail on her equal protection claim, John must demonstrate that she is similarly situated to MDSOs and narcotics addicts.

 A review of the legislative schemes applicable to mentally incompetent defendants on the one hand and MDSOs and narcotics addicts on the other reveals that John, and others committed temporarily because of incompetence to stand trial, are not similarly situated to MDSOs or narcotics addicts.

The Legislature has declared that persons cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while mentally incompetent.  (Pen.Code, § 1367.)   Defendants adjudged mentally incompetent are referred to a hospital or other approved treatment facility for “care and treatment” to “promote the defendant's speedy restoration to mental competence.”   The term of treatment is flexible, depending on the progress of the individual.  (Pen.Code, § 1370.)   Punishment may be imposed only if the accused recovers his or her mental competence, is tried, and is convicted.

Under current legislation, MDSOs and narcotics addicts may engage in rehabilitative treatment programs administered by the Department of Corrections during their post-conviction terms of imprisonment, as part of their sentence.  (Pen.Code, § 1364;  Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 3050, 3051, 3201.)  “Extension of conduct credits to CRC [California Rehabilitation Center] inmates simply recognizes that CRC addicts are really in a mode which more closely resembles that of punishment than treatment, and that CRC inmates are subject to effective control by a credit system.   Addicts subject to a narcotics commitment are not treated in a state hospital, but rather are treated in a security setting under the control of the Department of Corrections.   Moreover, the term for a CRC commitment is tied in with a determinate sentence.  (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3201.)   In this respect, CRC addicts are similarly situated to MDSOs subject to the punishment model․”  (In re Huffman (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 558, 564, 212 Cal.Rptr. 527 (fn. omitted).)

Recent cases have recognized that the enactment of Penal Code sections 1364 and 1365 in 1981 constituted a change in the MDSO program from a treatment to a punishment mode.   Hence, MDSOs are to be treated like narcotics addicts with respect to the granting of conduct credits for time spent in rehabilitative programs.  (In re Huffman (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 558, 564, 212 Cal.Rptr. 527;  People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689, 694, 200 Cal.Rptr. 546;  People v. Brunner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 761, 766, 195 Cal.Rptr. 367.) ³  The circumstances associated with treatment of persons adjudged incompetent to stand trial are different from those of the punishment mode applicable in the MDSO and narcotics addict contexts.   Persons incompetent to stand trial are treated before being tried or convicted only for the purpose of restoring their competence, not for the purpose of punishment.   MDSOs and narcotics addicts participate in rehabilitative programs as part of their punishment and are entitled to conduct credits earned in the course of their punishment.

“The purposes of the provision for ‘good time’ credits seem self-evident.   First, and primarily, prisoners are encouraged to conform to prison regulations and to refrain from engaging in criminal, particularly assaultive, acts while in custody.   Second, section 2931, subdivision (c), induces prisoners to make an effort to participate in what may be termed ‘rehabilitative’ activities.”   (People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 233, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.)

 Conduct credits provide incentives for inmates to conform their conduct with prison regulations.   The goal of a commitment under Penal Code section 1370 is to restore the patient to mental competence, not to punish or rehabilitate him or her.  (See People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 234, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92;  People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148, 150, 191 Cal.Rptr. 592 (overruled on another ground in People v. Waterman (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 977, 215 Cal.Rptr. 534, 85 D.A.R. 2354).)   The term of commitment under Penal Code section 1370 is not affected by the conduct of the individual, but is instead dependent upon his or her restoration to competence.⁴  The trial court properly denied John conduct credits for the time spent in treatment at Patton State Hospital.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 3201, subdivision (c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides in pertinent part:“Any person committed pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 3050), whose execution of sentence in accordance with the provisions of Section 1170 of the Penal Code was suspended pending a commitment pursuant to Section 3051, who has spent, pursuant to this chapter, a period of time in confinement or in custody, excluding any time spent on outpatient status, equal to that which he or she would have otherwise spent in state prison had sentence been executed, including application of good behavior and participation credit provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code, shall, upon reaching such accumulation of time, be released on parole under the jurisdiction of the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority subject to all of the conditions imposed by the authority and subject to the provisions of Article 1 (commencing with Section 3000) of Chapter 8 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code.”

2.   Penal Code section 1364 provides in pertinent part:“All [post-conviction] days of confinement in a state hospital [as a sex offender] for testing and treatment shall be credited to the person's term of imprisonment and the provisions of Section 2931 [conduct credits for inmates] shall apply.”

3.   People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689, 694, 200 Cal.Rptr. 546 held that the Legislature has, in the enactment of Penal Code section 1364, manifested an intent that MDSOs henceforth receive conduct credits for time spent in rehabilitative programs.   In addition, the court held that since the Legislature has stated in essence that MDSOs are now similarly situated to narcotics addicts, all MDSOs are to be treated like narcotics addicts and accorded conduct credits for time spent in rehabilitative programs, including MDSOs sentenced under the former statutory scheme.  (People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689, 694, 200 Cal.Rptr. 546.)   We are presented with no such expression of legislative intent in this context.

4.   The recent case of People v. Cramp (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 632, 208 Cal.Rptr. 675 distinguished treatment during a Penal Code section 1370 commitment from psychological evaluation of an inmate preparatory to a competency hearing.   The Cramp court held that an inmate sent to a state hospital for evaluation who is subsequently found competent to stand trial must be accorded conduct credits.   However, that court did not state a holding in conflict with that of People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148, 150, 191 Cal.Rptr. 592, which held that persons committed to state hospitals pursuant to Penal Code section 1370 for treatment are not entitled to conduct credits.   There is no question of credit for psychological evaluation time here.   John was evaluated in jail and received good and work time credits for all the time spent in county jail before conviction.People v. Jennings, supra, has recently been summarily reversed by a divided panel of the same division which decided People v. Jennings, supra, and People v. Cramp, supra.  (People v. Waterman (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 977, 215 Cal.Rptr. 534, 85 D.A.R. 2354.)   For the reasons stated above, we believe that People v. Jennings was correctly decided.

LUCAS, Associate Justice.

SPENCER, P.J., and L. THAXTON HANSON, J., concur.