SCHMIDT v. VALLEY MOBILE PARK INVESTMENTS (1985)

Petitioners brought suit under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.Code, §§ 51 et seq.) ¹ for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.   They contend real parties' exclusion of anyone under the age of 25 years from living at its mobile home park violates the Civil Rights Act.   We agree.

FACTS

The Santa Ynez Valley, a semi-rural area in northern Santa Barbara County, contains a number of small communities, the best known of which are Solvang and Buellton.   Real parties operate a mobile home park in the town of Buellton.   The park contains 232 mobile home spaces and houses approximately 430 persons.²

In April of 1983 petitioner, Toni Schmidt, (hereafter referred to as Schmidt) learned that there were five mobile homes for sale in real parties' park.   Schmidt, who at the time was 23 years of age, planned to live in a mobile home with her nine-year-old daughter and her younger sister.

On May 3, 1983, petitioners brought this suit.   On May 11, 1983, Schmidt entered into a contract to purchase a three bedroom mobile home located in real parties' park for the sum of $35,500.   The sale transaction was contingent upon real parties' approval of petitioners' application for residence.   On May 16, 1983, an agent for real parties informed Schmidt that her application to live in the park had been rejected due to real parties' policy of not allowing anyone under the age of 25 to reside there.

Petitioners moved for summary judgment.   The court denied the motion.   The trial court expressed its view that the Legislature, in enacting Civil Code section 798.76, carved out an exception to the Civil Rights Act by permitting mobile home parks to exclude families with children.³  The court held that, “as a matter of law, under any set of facts, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief.”

 A. AVAILABILITY OF WRIT RELIEF

 The fact that a trial court has committed some manner of error in denying a motion for summary judgment does not, in and of itself, entitle a disgruntled litigant to immediate review before an appellate court.  (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851, 92 Cal.Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379.)   The employment of the extraordinary writ is, generally speaking, not a particularly favored method of reviewing rulings made in the law and motion departments of the trial court.  (Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1072, 212 Cal.Rptr. 140;  Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 405, 410, 93 Cal.Rptr. 338.)

All too often, counsel lose sight of the fact that the purported error committed by the trial judge may, (1) be cured prior to trial;  (2) have little or no effect upon the outcome of trial;  or (3) be properly addressed on appeal.  “If reviewing courts made themselves routinely available to intervene by writ whenever a litigant claimed a mistake had been made in the law-and-motion department, trials would be delayed, litigants would be vexed with multiple proceedings, and judgment appeals would be kept waiting.”  (Burris v. Municipal Court (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 236, 111 Cal.Rptr. 539.)

 Pretrial appellate intervention may be necessitated by some, but by no means all, matters bearing upon public weal or having significant legal impact.  (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 675, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.)   The issues tendered in this petition relate to the availability of housing to families with young children, a matter of “vital statewide importance.”  (Health & Saf.Code, § 50001;  see also Gov.Code, § 65913;  Health & Saf.Code, §§ 50003, 50004;  Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.) ⁴

Recent years have witnessed a serious decrease in the number of housing units available to families with children.  “This shortage is inimical to the health, safety, and welfare of residents of this state and the sound growth of its communities.”  (Health & Saf.Code, § 50003.3.)   The prompt resolution of the issues tendered in this petition will serve to remove one significant barrier to families with children who are presently being denied the right to reside in adequate housing.

 B. DOES CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY SCHEME ALLOW MOBILE HOME PARKS TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF AGE?

California's Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:  “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and ․ are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”  (Civ.Code, § 51.)

The Act has been interpreted to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in condominium and rental housing.  (O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427;  Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 721, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

The Supreme Court in Marina Point held discrimination against children in housing to be plainly at odds with the most fundamental notions of humanity:  “A society that sanctions wholesale discrimination against its children in obtaining housing engages in a suspect activity.   Even the most primitive society fosters the protection of its young;  such a society would hardly discriminate against children in their need for shelter․”  (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 744, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

Within the Marina Point decision are dicta setting forth the proposition that, in certain instances, the Legislature may properly allow for discriminatory practices to exist in housing.   The Supreme Court mentioned, by way of example, that housing set aside for the special needs of the elderly, under Civil Code section 798.76, does not violate the Civil Rights Act.   (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 742–743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)   The court neglected, however, to specify which age group might be classified as being “elderly citizens” and be thereby entitled to reside in a mobile home park which denies housing to children.

Civil Code section 798.76 provides that the operator of a mobile home park may force a purchaser of a mobile home to comply with the park's adult-only rules.   Significantly, the statute in question does not propose the content of such rules.   Nor does the statute provide any definition of the term, “adult.”

Civil Code section 798.76, hardly a piece of model legislation, is susceptible of two meanings.   One reading of the statute suggests that the Legislature may have intended to delegate to owners of mobile home parks the right to determine whom to consider adult.   On the other hand, one may deduce from a reading of the same statute an intention on the part of the Legislature to subject to the Civil Rights Act any “adults-only” house rules prepared by the operators of mobile home parks.

 In interpreting the language contained in section 798.76, we are aided by certain rules governing statutory construction.   Statutes relating to the same subject must, wherever possible, be reconciled in order to retain their force.  (Modesto Irr. Dist. v. City of Modesto (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 652, 656, 27 Cal.Rptr. 90.)   It is well established that a specific provision should be construed with reference to the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in such a way that the various elements of the overall scheme are harmonized.  (Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 918, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.)   This rule applies even though one statute (Civ.Code, § 798.76) deals specifically and in greater detail and the other statute (Civ.Code, §§ 51 et seq.) legislates more generally with the subject.  (Western Mobile Home Assn. v. County of San Diego (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 941, 949, 94 Cal.Rptr. 504.)

In order to reconcile section 798.76 with the Civil Rights Act, it is necessary to trace the history of the former piece of legislation.  (E.g., Lara v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 399, 130 Cal.Rptr. 668.)   Preceding the Marina Point and O'Connor decisions, occupants of mobile home parks had little reason to fear the invasion of children into their special preserves.   Case law at the time firmly held age discrimination to be neither unconstitutional nor in violation of the Civil Rights Act.   (E.g., see Flowers v. John Burnham & Co. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 700, 98 Cal.Rptr. 644.)   Moreover, efforts in the legislature to amend the Civil Rights Act to bar discrimination against children in rental housing were unsuccessful.  (See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 721, 735–736, fn. 7, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

In 1975, existing law notwithstanding, legislation allowing for adults-only housing in mobile home parks was enacted.  (Former Civ.Code, § 798.10.)   In 1978 the adults-only legislation was moved to its present location in Civil Code section 798.76.  (Stats.1978, ch. 1031, § 2, pp. 3178, 3183.)

The Supreme Court's approval of section 798.76 was made in the context of protecting housing available to the elderly.   The court held this exception to the Civil Rights Act to be rationally sound due to the fact that mobile home parks provide a number of features that “․ correlate closely with the special needs of senior citizens․”  (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 743, fn. 11, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)  “In light of the public policy reflected by those legislative enactments, age qualifications as to a housing facility reserved for older citizens can operate as a reasonable and permissible means under the Unruh Act of establishing and preserving specialized facilities for those particularly in need of such services or environment.  [Citation, fn. omitted.]   Such a specialized institution designed to meet a social need differs fundamentally from the wholesale exclusion of children from an apartment complex otherwise open to the general public.  [Fn. omitted.].”  (Id. 30 Cal.3d at pp. 742–743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, emphasis added.)   In other words, the court was of the view that section 798.76 permits discrimination in mobile home parks only in those instances that said facilities are designed to meet needs which are unique to the elderly.

Section 51.2 was enacted in 1983 in the wake of O'Connor and Marina Point, with the purpose of clarifying the present state of the law.   That section declared that age discrimination in all housing—save housing designed to meet the special physical and social needs of senior citizens—was prohibited by the Civil Rights Act.   Section 51.2 provides:

“(a) Section 51 shall be construed to prohibit a business establishment from discriminating in the sale or rental of housing based upon age.   Where accommodations are designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens, a business establishment may establish and preserve such housing for senior citizens, pursuant to Section 51.3 of the Civil Code.

“(b) This section is intended to clarify the holdings of Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, and O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427.”

Section 51.3 authorizes the maintenance and construction of housing designed to meet the needs of senior citizens.  Section 51.3(c)(3) defines “housing” as including all residential accommodations save mobile home parks.

Real parties have seized upon the language contained in section 51.3(c)(3).   They assert that the provision manifests the clear intent of the Legislature to allow age discrimination in mobile home parks.

 One must, however, read section 51.3(c)(3) in conjunction with section 51.2 and case law.   In Marina Point, the Supreme Court stated that “․ age qualifications as to a housing facility reserved for older citizens can operate as a reasonable and permissible means under the Unruh Act of establishing and preserving specialized facilities for those particularly in need of such services or environment.  [Citations.].”  (Id., 30 Cal.3d at pp. 742–743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)  Section 51.3 is designed to implement this language.

 Among the comprehensive set of conditions and guidelines governing the creation of senior citizen housing projects contained in section 51.3 is the requirement that the project consist of at least 150 dwelling units if in a metropolitan area, or at least 35 dwelling units in any other area.   Given the fact that a number of mobile home parks contain fewer than the required number of spaces, this condition becomes incapable of application to mobile home parks.   It is therefore evident the Legislature intended that mobile home parks be exempt from the detailed regulations of section 51.3, applicable to housing generally but not from the prohibition against arbitrary discrimination in rental housing against families with children found in the Unruh Act.

 A mobile home park catering to adult exclusivity per se cannot be said thereby to meet the criterion of compelling societal interest.⁵  To the contrary, the exclusionary policies under review in the present petition frustrate this state's legislative policy barring arbitrary discrimination in housing.  (O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 794, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427;  Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115;  In re Cox (1971) 3 Cal.3d 205 at p. 216, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992.)   We conclude that the Legislature intended that Civil Code section 798.76 allow the proprietor of a mobile home park to draft rules excluding children only where the facility is reserved for senior citizens.

The assertion of real parties that section 798.76 grants the right to exclude children from mobile home parks is confuted by an array of legislative measures, firmly in existence both prior and subsequent to its enactment, which are designed to enlarge the number of safe and adequate housing units available to families.

 It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the Legislature does not enact statutes that would overturn laws of existing public policy.  (In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 215, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992.)  “Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, a court will never attribute to the Legislature the intent to disregard or overturn a sound rule of public policy.”  (Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142, 152, 23 Cal.Rptr. 592, 373 P.2d 640.)   We are unable to find any evidence supporting the proposition that the Legislature, in enacting section 798.76, intended to overturn its policy of encouraging the availability of housing for families.

In 1938 the Legislature enacted the Housing Authorities Law in an effort to provide safe housing for low income individuals and families.  (2 Deering's Gen.Laws Supp., Act 3483;  repealed 1951.)   This law was promptly attacked as being an illegal expenditure of public funds.   The Supreme Court, in rejecting this challenge, made the following observation:  “․ [I]t is our view, and we are satisfied that both reason and authority support us, that the proposed elimination of slums and the erection of safe and sanitary low-rent dwelling units for persons of the prescribed restricted income will do much to advance the public welfare and to protect the public safety and morals and are in fact and law public purposes.”  (The Housing Authority v. Dockweiler (1939) 14 Cal.2d 437, 450, 94 P.2d 794.)

In 1970 the Legislature once again addressed its concern that the housing needs of families were not being met.   The Legislature found that “․ there continues to exist throughout the state a seriously inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons and families of low income.   This condition is contrary to the public interest and threatens the health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of the people of this state.”   (Health & Saf.Code, § 33250;  see also Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512, 519, 143 Cal.Rptr. 247, 573 P.2d 465.)

It declared the federal policy (as set forth in 42 U.S.C., § 1441), of “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, to be a “priority of the highest order.”  (Health & Saf.Code, § 50002;  see also former Health & Saf.Code, §§ 37120 et seq., 42000, 41003, 41002, and 44104.)

With the intensification of social problems attending inadequate housing for families, came the heightened concern of this state's lawmakers as reflected in subsequent legislation.   In 1977 it was declared that “․ there exists within the rural and urban areas of the state a serious shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing which persons and families of low or moderate income, including the elderly and handicapped can afford.”   (Health & Saf.Code, § 50003.)   The Legislature stated that it was the “․ public purpose to encourage the availability of adequate housing and home finance for persons and families of low or moderate income․”  (Health & Saf.Code, § 50004;  see also Knight v. Halsthammar (1981) 29 Cal.3d 46, 53, fn. 3, 171 Cal.Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268.)

Government Code section 65580, enacted in 1980, declared:  “The availability of housing is of vital statewide importance, and the early attainment of decent housing and a suitable living environment for every California family is a priority of the highest order.”  California Administrative Code, section 6438, title 25, implementing Government Code section 65580, requires that county and cities examine the housing needs of large families, minority households, the elderly, and the handicapped.

Legislative concern notwithstanding, the plight of low and moderate income families in locating housing became of epidemic proportions as the decade of the 70's drew to a close.  (See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)   In 1980 the Legislature found there existed a “․ severe shortage of affordable housing, especially for persons and families of low and moderate income․”  (Gov.Code, § 65913.)   In 1984 the Legislature found that “․ because of economic, physical, and mental conditions that are beyond their control, thousands of individuals and families in California are homeless.”  (Stats.1984, ch. 1691.)

The Legislature has recognized that mobile homes are an important source of affordable shelter for low and moderate income families.  (Health & Saf.Code, § 50007.5.) ⁶  Legislation has been enacted with the specific objective of increasing the opportunity for families to secure housing in mobile home parks.  (E.g., Health & Saf.Code, § 18300;  Gov.Code, §§ 65852.7, 65852.8.)   The practice of refusing to allow families with young children to reside in mobile home parks serves to diminish the number of dwelling units available to these families and thereby frustrating this state's goal of providing adequate housing.⁷

The plight of petitioners in locating shelter serves as a graphic demonstration of the effects of discriminatory housing policies.   Most of the available rental or owner-occupied units were priced well above petitioners' ability to rent or purchase.   For example, the average cost of a single family dwelling in the Santa Ynez Valley between August 1, 1982, and August 1, 1983, was about $129,000.  (Santa Barbara Housing Element Hearing Draft (1984) p. 41.)   During the same period, the average rental rate for a three bedroom dwelling was $781.  (Id., at p. 151.)   Petitioners claim they could not afford to pay more than about $600 per month for housing.   They maintain that they would have been able to meet the $553 per month payments on the mobile home that they sought to acquire.

Given the widespread existence of restrictive practices such as those enforced in the mobile home park operated by real parties, we conclude that a family of modest means will have a difficult time locating shelter in the Santa Ynez Valley.

We are unable to infer from section 798.76 any intent on the part of the Legislature to interfere with its longstanding goal of increasing the stock of affordable housing for families.   The repeated efforts of the Legislature to alleviate the severe shortage of affordable housing would be significantly impaired were we to interpret the term “adults only,” contained in section 798.76, to mean anyone over the age of 21 years.

 Attributed to W.C. Fields is a statement that, “anyone who hates children and dogs can't be all bad.”   We can certainly understand the motivation of some adults to seek the peace and quiet of a setting that is free from the rough and tumble commotion of exuberant youth.   However, the right of an adult to enjoy such relative tranquillity is decidedly outweighed by society's vital and compelling interest in providing housing which fosters wholesome development of its children.   As the Supreme Court observed in Marina Point, “[n]either statute nor interpretation of statute, however, sanctions the sacrifice of the well-being of children on the alter of a landlord's profit, or possibly some tenants' convenience.”  (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 745, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

 Having found that the Civil Rights Act forbids arbitrary age discrimination, we need not address other points raised by petitioners.   Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent superior court to rehear petitioners' motion for summary judgment in light of the views express herein.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified.

2.   In 1984, 24 of these residents were under the age of 25 years.

3.   Civil Code section 798.76 provides:  “The management [of a mobile home park] may require that a purchaser of a mobile home which will remain in the park, comply with any rule or regulation limiting residence to adults only.”

4.   Health and Safety Code section 50001 provides:“The Legislature finds and declares that the subject of housing is of vital statewide importance to the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of this state, for the following reasons:  [¶] (a) Decent housing is an essential motivating force in helping people achieve self-fulfillment in a free and democratic society.  [¶] (b) Unsanitary, unsafe, overcrowded, or congested dwelling accommodations or lack of decent housing constitute conditions which cause an increase in, and spread of, disease and crime.   [¶] (c) A healthy housing market is one in which residents of this state have a choice of housing opportunities and one in which the housing consumer may effectively choose within the free marketplace.  [¶] (d) A healthy housing market is necessary both to achieve a healthy state economy and to avoid an unacceptable level of unemployment.”

5.   Nowhere in the record do real parties claim that their facility has been developed or renovated in some manner to meet the needs of senior citizens.

6.   The Legislature has declared that, “․ manufactured housing, which includes mobile homes, offers Californians an additional opportunity to own and live in decent, safe, and affordable housing on a permanent basis.”  (Stats.1980, §§ 1 and 3, ch. 1142, p. 3691;  see also Stats.1984, § 1, ch. 1443.)   The County of Santa Barbara's Housing Element recognizes “․ that manufactured housing can provide adequate accommodations at lower costs than other forms of housing․”  (Vol. I, at p. 28.)

7.   Studies referred to by the Supreme Court in Marina Point suggest that families with children are excluded from 60 to 80 percent of the available rental housing.  (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 729, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)   Other studies suggest that even a greater percentage of mobile home parks have adult-only restrictions.  (Note, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson:  A Victory for Children in Rental Housing—Implications for Future Expansion of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 13 Golden Gate L.Rev. (1983) 697, 710, fn. 67.)

 ABBE, Associate Justice.

STONE, P.J., and GILBERT, J., concur.