IN RE: SOPHIA M. (1987)

In a petition filed March 29, 1985, appellant, then fourteen years old, was charged with the murder of her infant child.  (Pen.Code, § 187.)

After a series of continuances, a jurisdictional hearing commenced on September 6, 1985.   Appellant moved to exclude statements made in a tape-recorded interview with police subject to the People proving the corpus delicti by evidence independent of appellant's extrajudicial admissions.   The motion was taken under submission and thereafter denied.   On September 19, 1985, the court found appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

The probation department's recommendation was followed and appellant was adjudged a ward of the court, ordered to remain in her mother's home, to remain in therapy, to attend school regularly, and to complete 100 hours of community service work.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

On January 11, 1985, appellant's boyfriend, Devon, was walking home with his high school classmates, Kim and Alicia.   As the group was passing a vacant field, Devon pointed to the field and stated:  “[T]here is something gross over there.”   Devon then showed Kim and Alicia a dead infant inside a shoebox.   Devon went home and the girls ran back to school and told the high school janitor who summoned the police.

Homicide Detective Lawrence Abrao interviewed Devon, who said he was the child's father and that appellant, Sophia M., was the mother.   At trial, Devon, who was fifteen years old at the time of the offense, testified for the People.   He stated that during early 1984, he was appellant's boyfriend.   Sometime thereafter appellant discovered she was pregnant and told Devon not to tell anyone.

On January 3, 1985, appellant telephoned Devon and told him she had given birth alone.   She placed the infant inside a shoe box which she carried in a backpack, and went to Devon's home, telling Devon that “[he] didn't need to worry about it anymore.”

After disposing of the baby in the field, appellant gave a more detailed account of the incident, telling Devon that she had given birth to the child alone in the bathroom around 2:00 a.m. New Year's Eve.   Devon testified:  “[S]he said she cut the umbilical cord and that the baby whined.   And that's about it.   Then she cleaned it up and took it outside.”

In a tape-recorded interview, after waiving her Miranda rights, appellant told Officer Abrao that after giving birth to the baby, she tore the umbilical cord with her hands.   She wrapped the infant in a towel, after which the baby began to cry.   She covered the baby's mouth and carried it downstairs so her mother would not hear the crying.   Once she got downstairs, the baby began to cry again, so she covered the baby's mouth yet again.   She placed the infant in a grocery bag and dropped the bag over the back fence, then cleaned up the blood from the bathroom so nobody would know what had transpired.

Three days later, appellant retrieved the baby, cleaned her and placed her in a shoe box before going to Devon's.   En route she thought she heard the baby whimper, but then realized she was mistaken.

Dr. Fred Walker, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on the infant on January 12, 1985.   Dr. Walker concluded that the infant—weighing six and one-half pounds at birth—was full-term, as the heart and other organs were consistent with a full-term pregnancy.   No evidence of nourishment was found in the infant's stomach.   The body was moderately decomposed with no evidence of traumatic injury.   Visceral congestion of the organs, however, reflected a “slower than instantaneous death,” and was consistent with death by exposure.   He acknowledged that nothing he had observed or diagnosed was inconsistent with appellant's description of the events surrounding the birth and death of the infant.   Nevertheless, he could not conclude with certainty that the child had been born alive.

Dr. Gloria Bentinck, a psychiatrist who interviewed appellant twice, testified that appellant was extremely immature and unsophisticated with a maturity level of an eleven or twelve year old rather than her fourteen years of age.   She further opined that appellant was probably in a disassociative state during the birth due to extreme fright and panic, and that a person in such a state might believe she had heard a sound when she actually had heard nothing.

Appellant contends that her extrajudicial statements were improperly admitted into evidence without the prosecution first establishing the corpus delicti.   This precise factual issue is one of first impression in California.

“The traditional and prevailing view expressed by courts from other jurisdictions is that in a prosecution for killing a newly born baby it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the child was born alive and had an independent and separate existence apart from its mother and that the accused was the criminal agent causing the infant's death.  [Citations.]”  (State v. Doyle (1980) 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59, 63.)

“In a prosecution for murder, as in any other criminal case, the corpus delicti—i.e., death caused by criminal agency—must be established independently of the extrajudicial statements, confessions or admissions of the defendant.  [Citations.]  ‘[I]t is likewise well settled ․ that ․ the prosecutor is not required to establish the corpus delicti by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish the fact of guilt;  rather slight or prima facie proof is sufficient for such purpose.’  [Citation.] ․  ‘To meet the foundational test the prosecution need not eliminate all inferences tending to show a noncriminal cause of death.   Rather, the foundation may be laid by the introduction of evidence which creates a reasonable inference that the death could have been caused by a criminal agency [citation] even in the presence of an equally plausible noncriminal explanation of the event.   [Citations.]’  (Italics added.)   The authorities also make it clear that ‘[t]he corpus delicti may be established from circumstantial evidence, and by the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253;  see also People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624–625, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126;  Newberry v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 238, 241, 213 Cal.Rptr. 129.)

Appellant argues that the first element of infanticide, e.g., live birth, was not established independent of her extrajudicial admissions, since the pathologist was unable to conclude with certainty that the infant had been born alive.   Citing cases from other jurisdictions, appellant contends that in order to establish the corpus delicti, proof of live birth must approach certainty or at least rise to a level beyond that found in the pathologist's testimony in the instant case.¹ .  Bennett v. State (Wyo.1963) 377 P.2d 634, 635–637 [doctor had no doubt that child had been born alive based on evidence that it had breathed.];  People v. Ryan (1956) 9 Ill.2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516, 519 [autopsy doctor opined that child had been born alive based on gas in lungs.]

The cases cited by appellant, however, did not concern the admissibility of a defendant's extra-judicial statements, but instead involved questions of the sufficiency of the evidence.   Thus, the reviewing courts looked to all of the evidence adduced, rather than solely examining evidence independent of the defendant's extra-judicial statements.   Accordingly, we find those authorities unpersuasive.

We conclude that the standard of proof of the corpus delicti articulated in People v. Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d 105, 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253, applies with equal force to prosecutions for infanticide, and that no reason suggests creation of a new rule which would impose a greater burden of proof on the prosecution in infanticide cases.   The purpose of the rule is to “ ‘protect a defendant from the possibility of fabricated testimony out of which might be wrongfully established both the crime and its perpetrator.’   [Citations.]  [It] ․ arose from ․ judicial concern that false confessions would lead to unjust convictions.  [Citation.]”  (Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 397, 157 Cal.Rptr. 809.)   Infanticide is not a unique crime requiring a different application of the corpus delicti rule;  appellant is no more in need of protection from her own confession than any other criminal defendant.

 We conclude that the proper standard of proof of the existence of the corpus delicti is prima facie evidence—here, of live birth and of death by criminal agency.   And such proof is found on the present record in the testimony of the pathologist, according to which it was a reasonable inference that the infant was born alive and died from exposure and starvation caused by a criminal act or omission.

Appellant cites Singleton v. State (1948) 33 Ala.App. 536, 35 So.2d 375 for the proposition that there was insufficient evidence of death by criminal agency.   In Singleton, the court held that the prosecution had not met its burden of showing death by criminal agency where one doctor could not say what had caused the infant's death, while the other doctor testified that death could have been caused by hemorrhage.   The court there held that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's objections to the admission of her extrajudicial statements.  (Id., 35 So.2d at pp. 379–381.)  Singleton, however, did not apply California's standard of proof regarding the corpus delicti, which, as we have held, requires only slight evidence from which the elements of the crime may be inferred.  (People v. Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253.)   Indeed, none of the cases cited by appellant articulated the quantum of proof necessary to establish a corpus delicti independent of a defendant's admissions.   Under California law, the prosecution need only introduce evidence “ ‘which creates a reasonable inference that the death could have been caused by a criminal agency [citation] even in the presence of an equally plausible noncriminal explanation of the event.  [Citations.]’ ”  (Id., at p. 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253.)

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting appellant's tape-recorded admissions.

Appellant next contends that there is insufficient evidence to support her voluntary manslaughter conviction.

In resolving this issue, we are bound by well-established rules governing appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence.   In People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144, our high court explained these guiding principles as follows:  “ ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid value—from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’  [Citation.]  In applying this test, we must ‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’  [Citations.]”  (Id., at p. 578, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.)

 Voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill, while involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing.  (People v. Broussard (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 193, 197, 142 Cal.Rptr. 664;  People v. Cisneros (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 399, 423, 110 Cal.Rptr. 269.)   Appellant contends that the evidence of intent to kill was insufficient, and that her conduct was merely negligent.   Contrary to her contention, however, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that she intentionally killed her infant.   According to her tape-recorded admissions, she twice stifled the infant's crying in order to prevent detection, then placed the child in a paper bag and dropped it over the back fence in the cold of winter.   Whatever the state of her moral culpability at the time—and this was of course purely a factual question—we cannot say as a matter of law that such conduct was involuntary, amounting to mere criminal negligence.

People v. Chavez, supra, 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 176 P.2d 92, cited by appellant, is inapposite.   There, the defendant gave birth alone in a bathroom.   She cut, but did not tie off, the umbilical cord, wrapped the infant in a newspaper and concealed it under the bath tub.   The autopsy revealed that the child was a full-term infant which had apparently suffocated or bled to death due to the umbilical cord not being tied off.   The court rejected the defendant's contention that insufficient evidence supported the involuntary manslaughter conviction and affirmed the judgment.  Chavez, since it did not address the question of whether sufficient evidence of intent to kill existed, has no bearing on the present case.

We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial Court's conclusion that appellant intended to kill her infant.

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See also (People v. Chavez (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 623, 627–628, 176 P.2d 92 [autopsy physician opined that the baby had been born alive based on evidence that it had breathed and experienced heart action.] )

NEWSOM, Associate Justice.

RACANELLI, P.J., and HOLMDAHL, J., concur.