FRANCIS v. PEOPLE (1986)

OPINION

Petitioner was charged by information with murder, plus the special circumstance that the victim was killed intentionally to prevent his testimony in a criminal matter.   The information also charged petitioner with kidnapping.   Both counts alleged petitioner was armed.   Petitioner pleaded not guilty and denied all allegations at the arraignment.   Trial was set for July 29, 1985.

Petitioner's motion to set aside the special circumstance allegation under Penal Code section 995 ¹ was denied on July 16, 1985.   On July 17, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition pursuant to section 999a and requested a stay.   We denied the petition and request for stay on July 26, 1985.   On the same day, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court and again requested a stay.

On July 29, 1985, the Supreme Court notified the superior court by telephone that it was issuing an interim stay as to the petitioner only “[p]ending final determination of the petition.”   Counsel for both parties were in superior court when the stay was announced.   A copy of the stay was sent to the superior court.   On August 29, 1985, the Supreme Court denied review and the stay dissolved by its own terms.

On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion in superior court to dismiss pursuant to section 1382 and the speedy trial provisions of the California and United States Constitutions.   The trial court held hearings on December 5, 12 and 17.

The Clerk of the California Supreme Court testified that upon denial of the petition, entry was made in the docket and notice would have been sent to this court and postcards mailed to the “parties,” the public defender and the Attorney General.   The public defender received his postcard.

The deputy attorney general testified that as no response had been ordered by the high court, the case remained “unassigned” and the folder kept with other unassigned cases in a miscellaneous file.   If a postcard had been received from the Supreme Court, it would have been put in petitioner's file.   He testified there was no card in the file.   However, he also testified that had he received the card he would not have notified the district attorney.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court testified that the court treats the Attorney General's office as the representative of the superior court in the writ proceedings.   Although the superior court received notice of imposition of the stay because of the time considerations, it does not receive notice of the lifting of the stay or denial of the petition.   The Attorney General explained that although the Attorney General's representation of the People's interest as real party in interest usually suffices on behalf of the superior court, the Attorney General's office does not technically represent the superior court.

The chief deputy district attorney testified he was assigned to the case from the beginning, but was unaware of rule 28 of the California Rules of Court.²  He was present in court when the trial court received notice of the stay from the Supreme Court, but made no attempt to determine when or if a petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court.   He did not remember seeing a letter from the Attorney General to the district attorney's office that the Fifth District Court of Appeal denied the petition for a writ to this court.

The district attorney explained that in other cases where there had been a stay he “would be given notice by either the Court or someone that the stay had been lifted and it's time to go to trial.”   The district attorney stated that his office received the California Official Reports.   Petitioner's counsel requested and received judicial notice of the 1985 California Official Reports, dated October 3, 1985, with minutes of the Supreme Court proceedings showing the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner's attorney also testified.   He received the postcard from the Supreme Court showing the petition for review was denied the first week of September.   He knew the petition was denied because of periodic telephonic checks with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Defense counsel testified he did not formally notify the superior court of the denial, but did in casual conversation tell one judge and a research attorney that the petition was denied.   When asked about the case by a detective with the sheriff's department, counsel said he should discuss it with the district attorney.   Counsel did not tell the district attorney about the denial.

In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion.   A petition for a writ of prohibition or mandate was filed in this court and we requested preliminary opposition from the People, real party in interest.   We then issued an order to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted.

I

DISCUSSION

Petitioner seeks dismissal of charges under Penal Code section 1382, the California Constitution, article 1, section 15, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution for denial of a right to a speedy trial.

Article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution provides:  “The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial․”  This right has been given definiteness in part by section 1382:

“The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the action to be dismissed in the following cases:

“․

“2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a superior court within 60 days after the finding of the indictment or filing of the information or, in case the cause is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order granting a new trial from which an appeal is not taken, or an appeal from the superior court, within 60 days after such mistrial has been declared, after entry of the order granting the new trial, or after the filing of the remittitur in the trial court, or after the issuance of a writ or order which in effect grants a new trial, within 60 days after notice of the writ or order is filed in the trial court and served upon the prosecuting attorney, ․”

As the court explained in Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90:

“In our view section 1382 constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper judicial sanction for violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and as a legislative determination that a trial delayed more than 60 days is prima facie in violation of a defendant's constitutional right.”

The court in Sykes concluded that where the defendant had succeeded in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, his right to a speedy trial was encompassed by the 60–day provision of section 1382 even though not specifically covered by that section.  (Id., at p. 93, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)   The court noted that

“where the constitutional right to a speedy trial is asserted in circumstances where there are no implementing statutory provisions which might be looked to for guidance in construction or which might compel the same treatment on equal protection grounds”

a court should weigh the prejudicial effect of the delay against the justification for the delay.  (Ibid.;  see Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 734, 740, 91 Cal.Rptr. 578, 478 P.2d 10.)

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial․”  The Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1.)   To determine whether the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, announced a four-factor balancing test;  the factors being “the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to be brought to trial, and prejudice caused by the delay.”  (People v. Hill (1984) 37 Cal.3d 491, 496, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989.)

 The rights protected by the United States and California Constitutions are not coterminus.   Defendants brought to trial within the prescribed statutory period in California may be entitled to relief under the federal Constitution.  (See Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 91, fn. 9, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)   Similarly, the California Constitution may be more protective in other situations.  (See People v. Hill, supra, 37 Cal.3d 491, 497, fn. 3, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989.)

 While petitioner does not challenge the court's denial of her motion to dismiss based upon federal constitutional guaranties, nor did the trial court's memorandum opinion specifically reflect consideration of the federal standard, we note the record fails to support a dismissal under the United States Constitution.³

The trial court assessed petitioner's state constitutional claims under both section 1382 and by use of the balancing test enunciated in Jones.   Under the Sykes opinion, however, the balancing test is appropriate only where no statutory provision directly or by analogy implements the constitution.   Thus, where the provisions of section 1382 apply, the balancing test is not to be performed.

In Sykes, the court concluded a defendant who vindicates his right to retrial by way of writ rather than appeal was equally entitled to be tried within the 60 days provided by section 1382.  (Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 92–93, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)   In Matthews v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 589, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843, the defendants sought writs of prohibition in the appellate court after the trial court denied their section 995 motions.   The appellate court stayed the defendants' trial pending determination of the petitions.   The appellate court denied the petitions and the California Supreme Court declined review.   (Id., at p. 591, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843.)   Sixteen months then passed before a date for trial was set.   The defendants' motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial was denied by the trial court.   The appellate court concluded, in assessing the defendants' claims:

“The rationale of Sykes is applicable in the instant case.   We accordingly hold that where proceedings in prohibition are instituted by an accused and during the pendency of such proceedings the appellate court issues an order staying the trial, the accused, upon the denial of such petition for prohibition and the concomitant termination of the stay, must be brought to trial within 60 days from the date of the order denying the petition.”  (Id. at p. 596, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843.)

Marking time from the date on which the Supreme Court denied review, the Matthews court found that eight times the statutory period had passed and the People failed to establish good cause.  (Ibid.)  The court issued a writ of mandate requiring dismissal.  (Id. at p. 597, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843.)   Under the authority of Matthews, petitioner's claims are to be assessed pursuant to section 1382, not the balancing test of Jones.

When petitioner was not brought to trial for 90 days after the Supreme Court denied the review, she filed a motion to dismiss.  “The only duty placed upon an accused in protecting his right to a speedy trial is to ․ move to dismiss if the statutory period expires without a trial date being set.”  (Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)  “In these circumstances the defendant is not required to make any further showing, and in particular he is not required to make an affirmative showing that he has been prejudiced by the delay.”  (Id., at p. 89, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)

 When petitioner established she was not brought to trial within 60 days after denial of the petition for review, the burden shifted to the prosecution to show good cause why the case should not be dismissed.  (Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 250, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098.)   As emphasized in Owens, the trial court is to determine whether good cause existed, not to balance the extent of delay against the People's justification.  (Id. at p. 253, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098 [dismiss where just one day delay but no good cause shown];  see also People v. Fegelman (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 950, 955, 153 P.2d 436 [reverse where one day delay and no good cause shown].)  The court's determination of whether good cause existed depends upon the circumstances of each case.  (Owens v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 250, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098.)   We review the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion.  (Id., at p. 253, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098.)

In concluding “good cause” had been shown, the trial court in its memorandum opinion found:  “Under the circumstances of this case Defendant must be held to some duty to protect her right to a speedy trial since her implied waiver of that right was in effect at the time the excusable neglect first occurred.”   We reject this finding.

 The duty of the defendant was clearly stated in Sykes.   Under section 1382, the defendant must object if a trial date is set past the 60 days, or, if no date is set before the expiration of the statutory period, move for dismissal.  (Sykes, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90;  People v. Morino (1890) 85 Cal. 515, 517, 24 P. 892;  see also Hill, supra, 37 Cal.3d 491, 497.)   This is the sole duty of a defendant under section 1382.   Nothing in the statute or case law or article I, section 15 of the California Constitution suggests otherwise.

Where a defendant makes a motion or invokes the processes of the court on collateral or pretrial matters, the appellate courts have characterized the time consumed as either supplying good cause for delay (Muller v. Justice's Court (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 570, 572, 277 P.2d 866) or providing an implied waiver.  Hankla v. Municipal Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 342, 360, 102 Cal.Rptr. 896, disapproved on another point in Owens v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 238, 249, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098.)  “The choice of an analytical framework (waiver vs good cause) does not seem to have any significant impact on the resolution of the issue.”  (Zimmer, Speedy Trial:  Practice and Procedures (Cont.Ed.Bar 1981) § 2.34, p. 90.)

Under either analysis, petitioner did not forfeit the right to a speedy trial.   A period of time for which good cause will be found must be limited by its actual duration.  “Any such implied waiver is limited by its terms.”   (Hankla v. Municipal Court, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 361, 102 Cal.Rptr. 896.)   In Matthews v. Superior Court, the trial court, at the time the proceedings were stayed by the appellate court, extracted an expressed waiver of time from the defendants.  (Matthews, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 592, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843.)   The Matthews court found the indefinite waiver ineffective as not in compliance with section 1382.

“That statute specifically provides that when a cause is continued for trial beyond the 60–day period with the consent of the defendant, express or implied, the consent is to the continuance for trial to a date certain and such consent precludes a dismissal ‘if the defendant is brought to trial on the date so set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.’  (Italics added.)   Here the consent obtained was for an indefinite postponement and no date for trial was set when the consent was given.”  (Id., at p. 595, 110 Cal.Rptr. 843.)

The People claim as “good cause” the failure to receive official notice that the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.   The trial court's findings indicate that the Supreme Court did mail postcard notice to the Attorney General, but the Attorney General did not receive the postcard notification.   The court found “most likely the postcard notice to the Attorney General was lost in the mail.”

Petitioner claims the failure of official notice to the People does not constitute good cause, noting the Attorney General testified that even if he had received the postcard, the information would not have been passed on to the district attorney;  the People should have known the petition had been denied because of California Rules of Court, rule 28;  the Supreme Court's denial of the petition appeared in the October 3 advance sheet of the California Official Reports;  and the superior court had actual notice.

 First, whether or not the superior court received notice, either official notice or actual notice by way of defense counsel's comments to a judge and research attorney, is irrelevant as to whether good cause was shown.   Nothing in the statutes, rules or case law suggests that the superior court has an obligation to pass on to the People, or defense counsel, information concerning the disposition of the petition.   While the district attorney commented that on similar past occasions he “would be given notice by either the Court or someone that the stay had been lifted”, it does not appear from the record that there was a “custom” to this effect.   No legal duty or custom supports imputation of the court's knowledge to the People.

 We reject the trial court's conclusion that the failure of the Attorney General to receive the postcard from the Supreme Court constitutes good cause for delay.   Case law uniformly indicates that the failure of actual notice does not constitute good cause.

In Plezbert v. Superior Court (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 169, 99 Cal.Rptr. 340, the clerk's office failed to forward notice of the remittitur to the district attorney.   The appellate court, granting defendant's petition for a writ, found “the district attorney—not the county clerk—has the responsibility to prosecute․  [T]he risk of unexplained clerical error or neglect must rest with the prosecutor.”  (Id. at pp. 172–173, 99 Cal.Rptr. 340.)

In People v. Hill, supra, 37 Cal.3d 491, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989, defendant, incarcerated on an unrelated conviction, sent a demand letter pursuant to section 1381 that he be tried on pending charges in Santa Clara County.   The Department of Corrections erroneously informed the district attorney that defendant was unavailable.   The appellate court affirmed dismissal of charges against defendant.

“Admittedly the district attorney is not at fault, but another branch of the state government, the Department of Corrections, clearly erred.

“․ It is of no solace to this defendant that the error causing his trial to be delayed is traceable to the Department of Corrections rather than to the district attorney;  the result to him was identical.”  (Id., at p. 497, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989.)

The Hill court, reiterating Sykes, emphasized:  “ ‘The risk of clerical error or neglect on the part of those charged with official action must rest with the People, not the defendant in a criminal action.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)

The People appealed the defendant's successful section 995 motion in People v. Kerwin (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 466, 100 Cal.Rptr. 240.   Not until over six months later was defendant's private counsel notified of the appeal.   Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal noting that any trial of defendant would fail to meet the speedy trial guaranties of the United States and California Constitutions.   The court granted dismissal applying section 1382 and finding the “state-caused delay” did not supply good cause.  (Id. at p. 473, 100 Cal.Rptr. 240, but see People v. Hernandez (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8–9, 212 Cal.Rptr. 563.)

The court in People v. Pickens (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 800, 806, 177 Cal.Rptr. 555, rejected “computer error” as supplying good cause for failure to hold defendant's preliminary hearing within 10 days of his arraignment. (§ 859b.)   The People had been misinformed by the municipal court calendar system of the date set for the preliminary hearing and were not prepared to proceed on the preliminary hearing date.   The trial court dismissed.   The appellate court affirming the dismissal stated:  “Clerical error or miscalculations on the part of the court administrators and their computers is not the fault of the defendant and not the equivalent of good cause.”  (Pickens, supra, at p. 806, 177 Cal.Rptr. 555.)

Finally, in Wilborn v. Superior Court (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 898, 1 Cal.Rptr. 131, defendant sought review by way of writ of denial by the trial court of her motion to dismiss.   The appellate court issued the writ and the Supreme Court granted a hearing.   The Supreme Court filed its opinion denying the writ but issued no remittitur.   The superior court and the district attorney received notice of the decision but took no action, apparently awaiting remittitur.

In issuing a writ of mandate requiring the superior court to dismiss the information, the court found:

“The only reason given for not bringing the instant case on for trial within the 60–day period is that the court, although knowing that the decision of the Supreme Court became final on May 3, 1959, entertained the mistaken belief that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the case until a remittitur was filed.   Apparently the district attorney was under the same impression for he made no effort to set the case for trial within the 60–day period.   While this may explain why the case was not set for trial within the 60–day period, it cannot serve as a sufficient excuse for depriving petitioner of her constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.”  (Id., at pp. 901–902, 1 Cal.Rptr. 131.)

Ignorance or misunderstanding of the Rules of Court does not suffice to supply good cause for delay.

The Supreme Court in People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 570, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, concisely summarized the thrust of case law finding good cause under section 1382:

“In reviewing trial courts' exercise of that discretion, the appellate courts have evolved certain general principles.   The courts agree, for example, that delay caused by the conduct of the defendant constitutes good cause to deny his motion to dismiss.   Delay for defendant's benefit also constitutes good cause.   Finally, delay arising from unforeseen circumstances, such as the unexpected illness or unavailability of counsel or witnesses constitutes good cause to avoid dismissal.   Delay attributable to the fault of the prosecution, on the other hand, does not constitute good cause.   Neither does delay caused by improper court administration.”  (Fns. omitted.)

The People cite two cases to support the trial court's exercise of discretion.   In People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772, 775–777, 26 Cal.Rptr. 596, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of good cause where the trial court granted two continuances as a codefendant's counsel was engaged in another trial and the People, relying on the codefendant's possible change of plea and concomitant dismissal of charges against the defendant, needed additional time to subpoena witnesses when the codefendant decided to stand upon his plea of not guilty.   In People v. Erb (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 650, 652, 45 Cal.Rptr. 503 (see People v. Erb (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 159, 160, 66 Cal.Rptr. 274), the court found that the defendant's incarceration in another county supplied good cause for continuing his arraignment until he could be present.   The circumstances of these cases do not aid respondent.

 Here, either the Supreme Court failed to mail notice to the Attorney General, the notice was mailed but not delivered, or the notice was received by the Attorney General's office but not placed in petitioner's file.   Under any analysis, it was a breakdown in the system established by the courts not attributable to petitioner.  (People v. Hill, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 497, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989.)   Use of the postal system, without the added precaution of certifying or registering the mail, is a choice made by the court system to effect notice, just as choosing to have calendaring controlled by a computer.  (People v. Pickens, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 806, 177 Cal.Rptr. 555.)   The People are charged with the duty to bring defendants to trial in a timely manner and the risk of error or neglect must rest with them.  (Plezbert v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 172–173, 99 Cal.Rptr. 340.) ⁴

The time limits of section 1382 have existed since 1880 and have been strictly guarded by the courts.   In 1973, both Sykes and Matthews were decided.

 The People have the duty to afford petitioner a speedy trial.   Whether, under these circumstances it is the duty of the Attorney General or the district attorney to track the case to guard against clerical error is not for us to determine.  (See Sykes, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)   It is clear from the testimony below that neither office felt any obligation to monitor the case.   Indeed, the Attorney General admitted that even had he received postcard notification of the summary denial he would not have notified the district attorney.

While not dispositive, we note the denial of the petition for review appeared in the minutes of the Supreme Court in the October 3 advance sheet.   Additionally, rule 28 of the California Rules of Court provided notice to all concerned that, at the latest, the Supreme Court must act upon petitioner's petition for review by October 24 or it was deemed denied.   The passage of this date prompted no inquiry by the court or the People, either through the Attorney General's office or the concerned district attorney's office.⁵

The trial court abused its discretion in finding the failure of official notice constituted good cause.  (People v. Hill, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 497, 209 Cal.Rptr. 323, 691 P.2d 989;  Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90;  Plezbert v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 172–173, 99 Cal.Rptr. 340.)

We find nothing in the record which affects the People's right to refile charges against the petitioner.  (Pen.Code, § 1387.)

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the dismissal of the information filed against petitioner.

I also concur, having joined in the opinion which faithfully applies current law.   However, I am not at all sure that the interest of justice, the statute concerned, and due process, require a per se dismissal rule to apply in circumstances of this kind.   Our high court may want to reexamine this longstanding rule of law.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2.   Rule 28(a), as noted by the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, provides that the Supreme Court must order review of petitions for review within 60 days of the filing of the petition, with 30 days extension available if the court so orders.  Rule 28(f) provides that if no action is taken by the Supreme Court within the time limits of rule 28(a), a petition is deemed denied.

3.   A little over one year passed between the filing of the information and petitioner's motion to dismiss.   However, petitioner evidently agreed the case would not go to trial until July 29th.   When seeking review of this court's denial of her writ she requested and received a stay on the trial date.   At most, the three months' time between the California Supreme Court's denial of the petition for review and petitioner's motion to dismiss was not agreed upon by petitioner.   (See People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 154, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452.)   The reason for delay was the failure of the Attorney General and the district attorney to receive official notice of the Supreme Court's denial and not take independent action to determine the resolution of the petition.  (See Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531, 92 S.Ct. at p. 2192.)   Petitioner's counsel knew of the denial yet did not in any way actively assert petitioner's right to be speedily tried.   Finally, as noted by the trial court, petitioner made no showing of prejudice flowing from the delay.

4.   In their return to our order to show cause, the People asked us to reject the line of cases holding clerical error does not constitute good cause, arguing at great length that the penumbral rights of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, section 1 of the California Constitution, and the preamble to article I, section 28(a), the “Victim's Bill of Rights”, support rejection of this established case law.First, insofar as our conclusion is compelled by California Supreme Court decisions, we are bound thereby.  (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)   Second, section 1382, subdivision (2), was last amended in 1982.  (Stats. 1982, ch. 433, § 1.)  “Statutes are to be interpreted by assuming that the Legislature was aware of the existing judicial decisions.  [Citation.]  Moreover, failure to make changes in a given statute in a particular respect when the subject is before the Legislature, and changes are made in other respects, is indicative of an intention to leave the law unchanged in that respect.”  (Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 618, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657.)

5.   “ ‘․ A speedy trial requires prompt action upon the part of all who are officially concerned, at the least to the extent that adjudication of a defendant's rights shall not be stifled by the procrastination of officials.’  People v. Guaracha [1969] 272 Cal.App.2d 839, 852 [77 Cal.Rptr. 695].)”  (Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 94, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.)   The representative of the Attorney General's office indicated there was no procedure in cases such as this to transmit information of the denial of a petition to the district attorney.   Such procedure should exist.  (Ibid.)  And, although not mandated by the California Rules of Court, we suggest that the Clerk of the Supreme Court send such notification not only to all counsel of record, but to the superior court and the responsible district attorney's office.

PAULINE DAVIS HANSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

WOOLPERT and BEST, JJ., concur.