WILLIAMS v. PEOPLE (1986)

By way of Petition for Writ of Prohibition/Mandate, Edward Williams has challenged an order denying his motion to quash the jury venire for his murder trial.   We issued alternative writ and order to show cause.

I

FACTS

Petitioner is charged with first degree murder.  (Pen.Code, § 187.)   At trial in the West Judicial District of Los Angeles Superior Court, sitting in Santa Monica, he challenged each of two jury panels on the basis that neither panel represented a fair cross-section of the community.   Petitioner moved to quash the venire or for mistrial, asserting that the black population which is jury-eligible for that judicial district is unconstitutionally underrepresentative of the total jury-eligible black population of Los Angeles County.

At hearing on the motion, petitioner called Raymond Arce, Director of Juror Services for Los Angeles County, who testified that 11.4 percent of the total population of Los Angeles County are blacks presumptively eligible to serve as jurors, and in the West Judicial District, where this trial is being held, 5.6 percent of the total population are blacks presumptively eligible to serve as jurors.   A survey of jurors in the Santa Monica courthouse for the three-month period preceding this trial indicated that 4.5 percent appearing for jury duty were black.   Petitioner argued that he was thus deprived of a representative cross-section of the country-wide community.   The court denied the motions, finding that petitioner had not met the burden of a prima facie showing of significant underrepresentation of a cognizable group.

Petitioner seeks either a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent superior court from taking further action in the matter except to declare a mistrial and transfer the case to one of two specified judicial districts or, in the alternative, a writ of mandate directing respondent to vacate its denial of motion to quash venire.   We issued a stay and alternative writ of mandate.   After complete review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly found the petitioner had not made the required prima facie showing of systematic underrepresentation.   We therefore discharge the alternative writ and deny the petition.

II

FAIR CROSS–SECTION REQUIREMENT

 A criminal defendant is entitled to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.   This right is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 697, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 and by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.  (People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 48–49, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433.)   This does not mean that a party is entitled to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or is composed of any particular individuals;  what it does mean is that a party is entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.   (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)

 “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community;  (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;  and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”  (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586–587;  People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 50, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433.)   If such a prima facie violation is demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to come forward with available evidence of explanation and justification, so that the court may determine whether the county is doing all that can reasonably be expected to achieve the constitutional goal of fair cross-section.  (People v. Buford (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 288, 299, 182 Cal.Rptr. 904.)

A. Distinctive Group

 Petitioner's claim is that blacks are underrepresented in the jury venire in the West Judicial District of Los Angeles County.   Blacks are a cognizable, distinctive group for purposes of the first prong of fair cross-section analysis.  (People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 51, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433;  Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 20, fn. 45, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.)

B. Underpresentation

To meet the second prong of the Duren test, petitioner had to show that blacks were underrepresented in jury venires in relation to the number of such persons in the community.   But before we can evaluate the statistical showing of underrepresentation made by petitioner, we must first determine what community the jury venire must fairly represent.   Is it all of Los Angeles County as petitioner argues; ¹  the particular judicial district in which the trial is had as real party argues; ²  or the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse as suggested but not decided by the Supreme Court in People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 at pp. 48, 71, fn. 1, 73, 75, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433?

1. Community

The term used in the fair cross-section cases is neither “county” nor “judicial district,” but “community.”   Community is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th ed. 1968), page 350, as:  “Neighborhood;  vicinity, synonymous with locality.”   This definition is consistent with the common law concept of vicinage, as preserved in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law․”  The California Supreme Court reviewed the vicinage requirement in People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705, a case challenging the jury venire drawn from a portion of Los Angeles County excluding the area where the alleged crime occurred.   The court found guidance in Alvarado v. State (Alaska 1971) 486 P.2d 891, in which the Alaska Supreme Court examined the fair cross-section requirement:  “ ‘[T]he traditional starting point for determining the community from which jurors are to be selected is the scene of the alleged offense.  [Fn. omitted.]  Hence, we feel that in determining whether the source from which a given jury is selected represents a fair cross-section of the community, we must adhere to a notion of community which at least encompasses the location of the alleged offense.  [Fn. omitted.]  It is the community in which the crime was committed that the jury must represent.’ ”  (People v. Jones, supra, 9 Cal.3d 546, 552, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705, quoting from Alvarado v. State, supra, emphasis omitted.)   Noting that both the vicinage requirement and fair cross-section requirement are guaranteed in jury trials by the Sixth Amendment, our court held that “a criminal defendant in a state criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from, and comprising a representative cross-section of the residents of the district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  (People v. Jones, supra, at p. 551, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705.)

 In Jones we find support for the assertion of real party that the community to consider for fair cross-section analysis may be as small as the judicial district in which the crime occurred, in this instance the West District.   But Jones also holds that “the outer limits of the ‘district’ as used in the Sixth Amendment are flexible, encompassing greater or smaller areas as the Legislature deems wise․”  (People v. Jones, supra, at p. 554, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705.)   We thus turn to the Code of Civil Procedure sections relating to jurors (Code Civ. Proc., § 190 et seq.) to determine what area the Legislature has designated as the district from which jurors are to be drawn.

Section 193 defines a trial jury as “a body of persons returned from the citizens of the area served by the court․”  (Emphasis added.)   Section 197 explains:  “It is the policy of the State of California that all persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court.”  (Emphasis added.)   Section 203 requires that the persons listed as available for service as trial jurors “shall be fairly representative of the population in the area served by the court, and shall be selected upon a random basis.”  (Emphasis added.)   Section 204.5 provides:  “The plan for random selection used shall be in writing and shall be designed to insure the random selection of a fair cross section of the persons residing in the area served by the court.”  (Emphasis added.)

Our next inquiry is directed to the meaning of the phrase “area served by the court.”   Section 193.2, subdivision (b) defines “court” as the superior, municipal and justice courts of this state.   However, the large geographical area and huge population of Los Angeles County have resulted in the establishment of branch courts as a means of maintaining efficient judicial administration.  (Adams v. Superior Court (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 719, 722, 104 Cal.Rptr. 144.)   The Superior Court of Los Angeles County has thus been divided into eleven separate districts wherein sessions of the court shall be held.  (Superior Court Rules, rule 300, § 1.)   The geographical district boundaries are set forth in Appendix A of the Superior Court Rules, and the West District, where petitioner awaits trial, is specifically mapped out in Appendix A–9.

The Superior Court Rules make it clear that the judicial districts are not separate courts with exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed within their boundaries.   The departments of the Central District and of the other districts designated to hear criminal cases are not designated as separate superior courts, but as the “Criminal Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court.”  (Superior Court Rules, rule 301.)   The criminal divisions in each judicial district do not have sole jurisidiction over offenses committed in that district;  indictments by the Grand Jury must be filed in the Central District (rule 300, § 2);  all other criminal cases may be filed in the Central District, in the district where one of the offenses was committed, or in the district where the preliminary hearing was held.  (Rule 300, § 3.)   Cases may be transferred from one district to another to relieve calendar congestion (rule 300, § 5), for the convenience of witnesses, or to promote the ends of justice.  (Rule 300, § 6.)   Thus a criminal division in one judicial district may try cases involving offenses committed in another judicial district.   Given this transferability of cases among branch courts and the Central District, we cannot interpret the “area served by the court” from which a jury is to be drawn to be strictly limited by the judicial district boundary lines.

 We are also not convinced that the “area served by the court” should be interpreted to include all of Los Angeles County.   In none of the Code of Civil Procedure sections did the Legislature use the term “county” to describe the area from which jurors are to be selected.  (See, e.g. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 190, 193, 197, 203, 204.5, subd. (b).)  In section 203, however, the Legislature did make particular provision as to the area from which jurors shall be drawn in Los Angeles County:  “In counties with more than one court location, the rules shall reasonably minimize the distance traveled by jurors.   In addition, in the County of Los Angeles no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence.”

“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read together and reconciled whenever possible.”   (Estate of Gibson (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 733, 736, 189 Cal.Rptr. 201.)   Moreover, “[a] specific statute expressly dealing with a particular subject controls and takes precedence over a more general statute covering the same subject.”  (Merandette v. City and County of San Francisco (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 105, 113, 151 Cal.Rptr. 580.)   Consistent with these rules of statutory construction, we read sections 193, 197 and 203 together and conclude that the population of the “area served by the court” of which the jury venire must be fairly representative, when applied to Los Angeles County, means the population of the area within a 20-mile radius of each of the branch courts of the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

Our interpretation finds support in all four of the opinions written in People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433, a case challenging the representative nature of juries at the Long Beach branch of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.   The plurality opinion by Justice Broussard highlights our question:  “We recognize that Long Beach juries are not selected evenly from all parts of Los Angeles County.  Code of Civil Procedure section 203 provides that ‘in the County of Los Angeles no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence.’   It is likely that most of the jurors interviewed by Dr. Butler at the Long Beach courthouse came from within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse, a fact which may account to some degree for the discrepancy in racial representation between the persons interviewed and the county population.  [¶ ] The parties, however, presented evidence and argued this case on the assumption that all juries in Los Angeles County must be representative of the entire county.   The principal question before us is whether evidence based on total county-wide population figures, rather than jury-eligible population, is adequate to make out a prima facie case;  for the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that it is.   The state has not attempted to rebut this prima facie showing by arguing that the Long Beach juries need only represent those persons living within 20 miles of the courthouse, and has not attempted to show that such juries were truly representative of that limited area.”   (Harris, supra, at p. 48, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433.)

Justice Grodin, in a concurring opinion, notes that there may be merit in the view that the more appropriate focus for statistical analysis is the area within a 20-mile radius from the Long Beach courthouse, a matter that could have been examined upon remand, had that disposition prevailed.  (Harris, supra, at p. 71, fn. 1, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433)

Justice Mosk, in his dissent, explains:  “The leading cases on the subject of jury selection [citations] require that a defendant be provided trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.   Our code uses the term ‘area served by the court’ (Code Civ.Proc., § 197), not the county in which the court is situated.   It takes only a cursory knowledge of the demography of Southern California to realize that Long Beach courts serve an area completely distinct in population characteristics from the totality of Los Angeles County.   Indeed, Long Beach is closer to the county seat of Orange County (21 miles) than it is to the county seat of Los Angeles (23 miles).   The defendant has produced no statistics relating to the ethnic composition of the community or area that is Long Beach, or from the supervisorial district in which the city is located (see Code Civ.Proc., § 206a).   Figures for the entire County of Los Angeles are not only irrelevant but in this instance significantly deceptive.”   (Harris, supra, at p. 73, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433, orig. emphasis.)   Justice Kaus, in a separate dissent, agreed with Justice Mosk that “there is no showing that population figures for the whole of Los Angeles County are relevant with respect to a 20-mile radius from Long Beach.”   (Harris, supra, at p. 75, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433.)

 We are satisfied that the 20-mile zone described in section 203 is a reasonable and fair interpretation of “community” for the purpose of fair cross-section analysis.   Provisions limiting the geographical area from which jurors are chosen for service in order to minimize inconvenience to jurors and expense to the county are constitutionally permissible, as long as the system of jury selection is in compliance with the cross-sectional principle.   (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d 719, 728, 104 Cal.Rptr. 144.)   Although any such delineation, be it county, judicial district, or 20-mile radius, is to some extent arbitrary, the 20-mile area avoids the most obvious pitfalls of the other two boundaries.   It is geographically much larger than the individual judicial districts, and thus encompasses a broader range of the “distinctive groups” which comprise Los Angeles County than do the districts.   This alleviates the ethnic segregation of juries which might result from such a limited “community.”   For example, if the jury need only be representative of the judicial district, a white defendant being tried in the South Central District, sitting in Compton, would only be entitled to a jury venire representative of that district's population, which includes 25 percent juror-eligible blacks;  a black defendant being tried in the West District, sitting in Santa Monica, would face a venire representative of a juror-eligible population which is only 5.6 percent black.   Such gross ethnic deviations based on district-wide boundaries invite disparate distribution of justice in each of the branch courts.   On the other hand, the 20-mile radius is not so far-ranging as to unfairly dilute the demographic makeup of the vicinage in which the offense was committed.  (See People v. Simmons (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1072–1073, 211 Cal.Rptr. 60 and People v. Crenshaw (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 702, 705–706, 162 Cal.App.3d 202H, 207 Cal.Rptr. 779 [dilution argument raised but rejected for city within Contra Costa County].)

III

CONCLUSION

 We conclude that in order to make a prima facie showing of violation of the fair cross-section requirement in the jury venire in a judicial district of Los Angeles County, a criminal defendant is required to show that the representation of a “distinctive group” in the venire from which jurors are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the percentage of such persons residing within a 20-mile radius of that court, and that the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the distinctive group in the jury-selection process.

 Petitioner presented statistics showing the percentage of juror-eligible blacks in Los Angeles County, the percentage of juror-eligible blacks in the West Judicial District, and the percentage of blacks who actually appeared for jury duty in the West Judicial District for the three-month period preceding his trial.   He did not present statistics showing the percentage of juror-eligible blacks within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse, the area we have deemed the community which must be fairly represented in the jury venire.   In the absence of this evidence, we agree with the trial court that no prima facie showing of underrepresentation was made.

 However, petitioner's motion was obviously made without benefit of our definition of community;  he should not be foreclosed from renewing his motion and making the relevant statistical showing of juror-eligible blacks residing within the 20-mile radius of the Santa Monica courthouse.   Moreover, because of the difficulty in obtaining such statistical data, the trial court should order the Director of Juror Services Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to provide such data to the petitioner and the prosecution in order to enable the petitioner to consider properly the renewing of his motion and the prosecution to respond appropriately in the event a renewed motion is made.

If petitioner is successful in showing under-representation of blacks on jury panels in relation to the number of such persons in the community, i.e. the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse, he still must meet the third prong of the Duren standards for prima facie showing;  he must show that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.   The record provides some support for this showing in the testimony of Jury Commissioner Arce, who explained that jurors are assigned to the courthouse nearest their residence which needs jurors.   This is not a random assignment from the permissible 20-mile area, but a more local assignment, and if it is shown that this is a cause of the underrepresentation, then petitioner will have made his prima facie showing of a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.   The burden will then shift to the prosecution to come forward with available evidence of explanation and justification, if it can, so that the court can determine whether the county is doing all that can reasonably be expected to achieve the constitutional goal of fair cross-section.  (People v. Buford, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 288, 299, 182 Cal.Rptr. 904.)

DISPOSITION

The alternative writ is discharged.   The petition is denied.   The stay issued by this court is vacated.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner's position is supported by Amicus Curiae State Public Defender who asserts that the community of which the jury must be representative is the county, or perhaps the area within a 20-mile radius of the courts in Los Angeles, but in no event should it be confined to the judicial district.

2.   Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argues the community is limited to the judicial district.   However, this position is based on a comparison with the San Francisco Bay Area, where a similar number of people contained in a similar number of square miles are divided into six separate counties;  it asserts that if all of Los Angeles County is the relevant community, then all six of the bay area counties must be combined to make up a comparable community.   Interesting though its position is, we find the bay area comparison irrelevant to the demographics and geography of Los Angeles County.

LILLIE, Presiding Justice.

THOMPSON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.