PEOPLE v. TELLEZ (1984)

Following the partial denial of his motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5,¹ defendant, Jesus Tellez (hereafter appellant), was convicted by jury of one count of receiving stolen property in violation of section 496.   He was granted three years' probation on the condition that he serve the first 180 days in county jail and pay a $1,500 fine.   On appeal, he challenges the trial court's decision not to grant his motion to suppress in full.

The evidence in question is a number of cases of beer seized from a pickup truck by Santa Cruz County officers.   The truck belonged to a young man named Timothy Nelson, who was using it to haul away the contents of appellant's garage at the latter's request.   Appellant was out of town at the time, but another young man, Greg Michelosen, was looking after his apartment for him.   Pursuant to a phone call earlier in the day from appellant, Michelosen unlocked the garage for Nelson and helped him load the cases onto his truck.

The two young men were interrupted in their activity by Deputy Sheriff Robert McKinley, who had been dispatched to detain them for investigation of stolen beverages.   The Santa Cruz County sheriff's office was acting on information provided by Mr. Walter Reese Bettencourt, Jr., a local wholesale beer distributor.   Mr. Bettencourt had become suspicious that his son Bruce, a student of appellant's, was stealing beer from his distributorship and delivering it to appellant's residence.   A retired officer of the Santa Cruz Sheriff's Department who lived across the street from appellant and had agreed to watch for large quantities of beer in the area, provided the tip which led Deputy Sheriff McKinley to detain Nelson and Michelosen.

Deputy Sheriff McKinley informed the young men that his supervisor was en route and would like to talk to them, if they wouldn't mind waiting.   They said there was no problem.   Shortly thereafter, Sergeant David Deverell arrived at the scene and questioned the boys as to why they were removing the beer from appellant's garage.   Michelosen provided him with a telephone number at which appellant could be reached, and appellant confirmed to Sergeant Deverell that the boys were moving the boxes at his request.

Walter Bettencourt was called to the scene, and he identified the cases of beer in the truck as products stolen from his warehouse.   A crime scene investigation unit was called to photograph the cases of beer and the truck, and then the beer was released to Mr. Bettencourt.

Appellant argues that the cases of beer were illegally seized in that no warrant was obtained and there were no exigent circumstances which could justify this omission.

 We decline to address appellant's contention as we hold that appellant has no standing to assert a violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the seizure of this property.

The truck searched was owned by Timothy Nelson and was parked outside of appellant's garage when the officers secured it.   Appellant therefore had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents thereof.

 Article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution states that “relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding ․”  Added by an initiative measure (Proposition 8) approved by the people of California, this section was intended to “allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases ․,” subject to the recognition that it “could not affect federal restrictions on the use of evidence.”   (Proposition 8, Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, reprinted in Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 302, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274, original emphasis.)   At a minimum, therefore, subdivision (d) was intended to nullify state constitutional provisions on the admissibility of evidence which are more restrictive than comparable federal ones.  (See, e.g., People v. Martin (1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855.)   This places the burden on appellant to assert his Fourth Amendment claim under federal precedents.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.”  (Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165, 171–172, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965, 22 L.Ed.2d 176;  see also United States v. Payner (1980) 447 U.S. 727, 731, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2444, 65 L.Ed.2d 468.)   Herein appellant's rights were not transgressed and he lacks standing to contest the introduction of evidence seized in violation of another's.

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.

ANDERSON, Associate Justice.

SCOTT, Acting P.J., and BARRY–DEAL, J., concur.