CARRILLO v. WHITTIER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT (1984)

Plaintiffs, five Mexican-American citizens and voters who are residents in the Whittier Union High School District (hereinafter District), appeal from an adverse judgment in their challenge to the constitutional validity of electing members of the District's school board by the at-large system.   By their complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the at-large system utilized by the District violates their equal protection rights under article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution ¹ and prayed for an injunctive order requiring the defendants ² to adopt a system of electing school board members from geographically defined areas within the District.

In support of their claim that the at-large system unconstitutionally discriminates against Mexican-American voters, the complaint alleged (1) that Mexican-Americans are a residentially concentrated minority in the south and west areas of the District, and (2) that previous elections show racially polarized voting patterns which prevent them from electing trustees of their choice.   The complaint alleged that the at-large election system has the purpose and effect of discriminating against Mexican-Americans by diluting and minimizing their voting strength and so denies them the equal right to elect candidates representative of their interests in the areas in which they are concentrated.

The answer, in addition to denials, alleged that the at-large system was racially neutral and had neither the effect nor the purpose or intent of discriminating against plaintiffs or their interest as Mexican-American voters.   It alleged that all persons have full access to the electoral processes regardless of ethnicity, that the elections have not evidenced any significant racially polarized voting, and that the District and its trustees have been responsive to the educational needs and interests of Mexican-American pupils.³

After a nonjury trial lasting 12 days in which over 100 exhibits were received from each side, the court rendered judgment denying all relief requested by plaintiffs.   In its statement of decision, the court found (1) that the Mexican-American population was fairly well spread throughout the entire District, and that such population was not residentially concentrated nor disadvantaged or discriminated against due to a disparate socioeconomic level as compared to Anglo residents of the District;  (2) that the evidence did not support plaintiffs' contention that there was racially polarized voting in any of the elections from 1973 through 1981;  (3) that the evidence did not support plaintiffs' contention that Mexican-Americans have been unable to elect school board members of their choice;  (4) that the District at-large election system does not exclude Mexican-Americans from the political process, nor does it minimize or dilute their voting strength;  (5) the District has been fully responsive to the needs and interests of Mexican-American pupils and residents with regard to all aspects of the District's educational program and policies, that the District's at-large system was not created, operated, or maintained as a purposeful device to discriminate against Mexican-Americans or their interests.

THE DISTRICT AND ITS ELECTION SYSTEM

The Whittier Union High School District is responsible for public secondary education for pupils in grades nine through twelve in a 40.65-square mile area of Los Angeles County.   It includes almost all of the City of Whittier, parts of Santa Fe Springs, Downey, Norwalk and La Mirada as well as unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County known as South Whittier, North Whittier, West Whittier and Los Nietos.   In the same geographical area, elementary education is the responsibility of five public elementary school districts which encompass kindergarten through the eighth grade.⁴

The District has had some Mexican-American population since its formation in 1900.   According to the 1970 census, its population was 182,047 of which 43,327 (23.8%) were listed as being of Hispanic origin.   By the time of the 1980 census, the population had declined to 178,584, of which 65,540 (36.7%) were listed as being of Hispanic origin.   Although the District's total student enrollment declined from 12,500 students in 1969–1970 to about 9,500 students during 1981–1982, the Hispanic enrollment increased from 20.8 percent to 43.5 percent during that same period.

From 1972 to 1979, the District maintained seven high schools.   Because of the declining enrollment, two of the schools ceased operation as regular schools, but one was retained as a central campus and also functions as a Districtwide learning center for special classes, adult education and other programs.

The governing board of the District consists of five members, elected at-large from the entire District, without any restrictions as to where the members reside within the District.   Election is for a term of four years, or for the remaining portions of unexpired terms.   The elections are held every two years;  vacancies arising between elections are filled either by election or by appointment by the board.   An unexpired term is filled at the next election in the case of an interim appointment by the board.   Members of the board of trustees need only receive a plurality of the votes cast in order to be elected.   Voters in school board elections may cast as many votes as there are positions open for election.   Voters are not required to cast more than one vote, even if there are two or more positions open for election.   Candidates receiving the most votes are elected in accordance with the number of positions open.

INTRODUCTION

We are met at the threshold of our review of the court's judgment with the question of the appropriate inquiry that a court is required to make upon a claim that an at-large system of election dilutes or cancels out the voting strength of a minority or ethnic group in a manner constitutionally repugnant to that group's equal protection rights.

Almost forty years ago, in holding non-justiciable a challenge against a malapportioned state Legislature, Justice Frankfurter expressed concern that voting rights cases might plunge the judiciary into a “political thicket.”   (Colegrove v. Green (1946) 328 U.S. 549, 556, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 90 L.Ed. 1432.)   Courts have long since become thoroughly embrangled.

In Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, the court held that voters complaining of malapportioned districts stated a justiciable claim.   Drawing back from the brambles, the court pronounced a caveat:  the judiciary should not trench on the authority of a coordinate political branch “to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.”  (Id., at p. 226, 82 S.Ct. at p. 714.)   In Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, which engendered the constitutional rule of one person, one vote, the court had occasion to remark that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.  [Fn. omitted.]”   While Baker and Reynolds established the requirement of quantitative population equality in political representation, a qualitative dimension emerged as minority groups impelled the courts to consider claims of underrepresentation in electoral districts with impeccable mathematical equality.   The challenges primarily hinged on the use of multimember or at-large electoral systems to attenuate minority voting force.⁵  We encapsule the vicissitudinous history of the landmark cases in which the federal courts have slogged through the thicket of minority vote dilution claims.

FEDERAL PRECEDENTS—EVOLUTION OF A STANDARD OF DILUTION

The analysis of the at-large electoral system here challenged requires, first, a recognition that, from the inception, the Supreme Court has refused to hold that such a selection process is invalid per se.  (Fortson v. Dorsey (1964) 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401.)   In Fortson, voters in a multimember district alleged that, unlike voters in a single-member district, they could not elect their own representative, since the preferences of voters in a discrete area would be defeated by voters in other areas, thus diluting their vote in contravention of the one person, one vote norm.   The court repelled the challenge without dealing with the qualitative issue, observing that so long as the Reynolds ' imperative of substantial equality was met, the constitutional mandate was satisfied.  (Id., at pp. 438–439, 85 S.Ct. at p. 501.)   However, recognizing that undervaluation of one group and overvaluation of another might accrue by means other than population disparities, the court qualified its approval of multimember districts by remarking that such districts may be found unconstitutional if “designedly or otherwise, ․ [they] ․ would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”  (Id., p. 439, 85 S.Ct. at p. 501.)   The Fortson formulation was transposed into sharper dicta in Burns v. Richardson (1966) 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376, in which the court again declined to promulgate a per se rule in favor of a single-member district.   Nevertheless, the court held that the Equal Protection Clause would be offended by proof of an “invidious effect” or an “invidious result,” without, however, stating what standards or guidelines would suffice to identify or define dilution of the vote.  (Id., at p. 88, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1294.)

Some attempt at promulgating guidelines on the issue of undervaluation of minority voting strength in a multimember election system was undertaken in Whitcomb v. Chavis (1970) 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363, where a claim of impermissible dilution of black voting power was rejected by giving a more restricted reading to the “results” or “effect” concepts.   The court held that the “results” formulation of Fortson and Burns was not met simply by establishing that black ghetto residents were disproportionately underrepresented in the Indiana Legislature.   The court found it significant that the evidence did not demonstrate that the electoral system denied blacks equal access to the political process, noting the absence of a showing that blacks were not allowed to register, vote, or choose a political party and participate in its affairs.   Essentially, the Whitcomb court perceived dilution in terms of unequal access to the political process and observed:  “The voting power of ghetto residents may have been ‘cancelled out’ as the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”  (Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 153, 91 S.Ct. at p. 1874.)

In White v. Regester (1972) 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 the Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that a multimember district violated the constitution.   In White, the court examined an at-large voting procedure in two Texas state legislative districts which the lower court had found unconstitutionally diluted the voting power of blacks and Mexican-Americans.  (Reference is next made to the latter group.)   In affirming, the focus of the court was not on the intent or purpose underlying use of the electoral system but its “impact” in obstructing minority access to the political process.   The court unanimously concluded that based on “the totality of the circumstances,” the adverse impact of the multimember district on Mexican-American voters constituted invidious discrimination.  (Id., at p. 769, 93 S.Ct. at p. 2341.)   The court reaffirmed, however, its prior decisions holding that multimember districts were not unconstitutional per se.   Without articulating an objective standard for concluding that the at-large system was being used perniciously to debase minority voting power, the court stressed the effect and result of the voting system as it enumerated specific factors which it held justified the decision of the lower court as to Mexican-Americans:  Texas' historical mistreatment of that ethnic minority (which comprised 29% of the county's population) in the areas of employment, economics, health and politics;  cultural and language barriers making participation in political and community life difficult, a history of poll taxes and obstructive registration procedures which resulted in low voter registration;  as a “residual impact of this history” the fact that only five Mexican-Americans had been elected to the Texas Legislature from the county since Reconstruction;  and the insensitivity of county officials to Mexican-American interests.   The White court explicitly disclaimed that discrimination was established by a minority's failure to achieve proportional representation.  (Id., at pp. 765–766, 93 S.Ct. at pp. 2339–2340.)   Contrary to the earlier intimations in Fortson and Burns, it bottomed a denial of equal protection on whether or not a fair access to the political process existed and not on qualitative representation results.

In the years following White, the former Fifth Circuit became the crucible in which vote dilution law was formed.⁶  (See Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections:  The Dilution Problem (1976) 10 Ga.L.Rev. 353, 397, fn. 29 and pp. 371–387, for a review of its work.)   The seminal case is Zimmer v. McKeithen (5th Cir.1973) 485 F.2d 1297, affirmed on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall (1975) 424 U.S. 636, 638, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 1084, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (aff'd. without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals).   In Zimmer the court applied the decisions in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, and White v. Regester, supra, to overturn an at-large voting system in Louisiana which it found violative of the equal rights provision.   In seeking to formulate the evidentiary norms that a plaintiff must demonstrate to prove unconstitutional vote dilution, the court categorized eight factors to be considered, four of which it classified as “primary” and four “enhancing.”   The court stated that unconstitutional dilution exists:  “․ where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is made.   Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirement, anti-single shot voting provisions[⁷ ] and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts.   The fact of dilution is established upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors.  [Fns. omitted.]”  (At p. 1305.)

For the next eight years, the Zimmer factors continued to be applied as the criteria in the Fifth Circuit and controlled the adjudication of numerous voter dilution cases.⁸  As a commentator has pointed out, until 1978 plaintiffs in the Court of Appeal “could show a discriminatory result in either of two ways:  by proving some ‘invidious effect’ under the Fortson-Burns formulation or by proving denial of equal access to the political process under the Whitcomb-White-Zimmer formulation.   In most cases these formulations produced identical results.”  (Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:  Abandoning the Intent Standard (1983) 69 Virginia L.Rev., pp. 715, 725.)

The case of Nevett v. Sides (5th Cir.1978) 571 F.2d 209 foreshadowed a change in the approach to voter dilution law by the Fifth Circuit, motivated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court requiring plaintiffs to prove a “discriminatory purpose” in equal protection cases involving employment discrimination and exclusionary zoning.  (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597;  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450.)   In a major redefinition of constitutional norms applied to at-large challenges, the court injected the requirement of a racially motivated intent to discriminate as an element in proving a claim of violation of equal protection.  (Nevett v. Sides, supra, 571 F.2d at p. 218.)   But it also ruled that “the Zimmer criteria provide a factual basis from which the necessary intent may be inferred.”  (Id., at p. 223.)

In Mobile v. Bolden (1980) 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47, the Supreme Court radically changed the legal standard of proof in adjudicating claims of unlawful dilution of minority voting strength in an at-large election system.   The City of Mobile functioned under a commission form of government in which three-city commissioners were elected by citywide voting.   The lower court had employed a Zimmer analysis to declare the existing at-large scheme unconstitutional, relying on its findings of (1) the inability of blacks, who made up 35 percent of the city's population, to participate fully in the political process;  (2) that no blacks had ever been elected to the three-member commission;  (3) that there was massive official and private racial discrimination;  and (4) the city commissioners were unresponsive to black interests.   As enhancing factors the court found (a) the large size of the city;  (b) a majority vote requirement for election;  (c) a requirement that candidates each run for a designated position on the ballot;  and (d) the absence of a subdistrict residency requirement.   A deeply divided Supreme Court reversed, with six justices writing separately.   A majority of the court rejected the Zimmer analysis as an appropriate formula for evaluating unconstitutional vote dilution.   But only a plurality of the court addressed the grounds on which a dilution claim could be supported.   Justice Stewart's plurality opinion held that for a plaintiff to prevail in a challenge to an at-large voting system, he must prove that the plan was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination.  (Mobile v. Bolden, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 66, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1499.)   The plurality repudiated the Zimmer criteria by holding that satisfaction of those criteria was insufficient proof of discriminatory purpose.   Justice Stewart reasoned that every at-large system is racially neutral by definition since it satisfies the one person, one vote principle and thus may be attacked only by proof of invidious purpose and only under a claim of denial of equal protection rather than on other constitutional grounds.   Justice Stewart observed that the failure of blacks to achieve elective office is of little relevance given their ability to register and vote without obstruction.  (Id., at p. 73, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1502.)   The plurality categorically rejected proportional representation as a constitutional standard:  “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization.”  (Id., at pp. 75–76, 100 S.Ct. at pp. 1504–1505.)   It also minimized evidence of unresponsiveness and discrimination by public officials as having any bearing on the constitutionality of the at-large system and rejected the notion that evidence of intent could be drawn from a state's background of racial discrimination.  (Id., at pp. 73–74, 100 S.Ct. at pp. 1502–1503.) ⁹

Rogers v. Lodge (1982) 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 also involved an equal protection challenge to the at-large system of electing a county board of commissioners, in which the discriminatory intent standard of Bolden and the racial neutrality of the at-large system were reaffirmed.   Writing for a six-member majority, Justice White stated:  “At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the district.   A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts.   The minority's voting power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority lines.   While multimember districts have been challenged for ‘their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party,’ Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971) 403 U.S. 124, 158–159, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1877, 29 L.Ed.2d 363, this Court has repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se.  [Citations.]  The court has recognized, however, that multimember districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment if ‘conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population.  [Citations.]  Cases charging that multimember districts unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of racial minorities are thus subject to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases.  [Citations.]”  (Id., 458 U.S. at pp. 616–617, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 3275–3276;  emphasis added.)

Footnote 5 to the quoted paragraph reads:  “Purposeful racial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of adverse differential treatment.   Absent such purpose, differential impact is subject only to the test of rationality.   [Citation.]”

In contrast to the rejection of the Zimmer factors by the plurality in Bolden, the Rogers court appears to have retreated in part and expounded a more flexible view.   On facts substantially similar to those in the Bolden case, the lower court had found, based almost entirely on the Zimmer criteria, that the at-large electoral system in the county was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.   In affirming, the Supreme Court distinguished Bolden by observing that the trial judge had correctly noted that the ultimate issue was purposeful discrimination and had not treated the Zimmer factors as absolute indicators of such purpose.   The Rogers court endorsed the lower court's findings, as being appropriate in a totality of circumstances approach to the question of discriminatory intent, stating that direct evidence of such intent was not required since “․ an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts․”  (Rogers v. Lodge, supra, p. 618, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3276.) ¹⁰

THE CALIFORNIA BACKGROUND

No California case has dealt directly with the application of the equal protection provisions of the California Constitution to at-large systems of election.  (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7, subd. (a).)  Plaintiffs note that rights guaranteed by the California Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the federal Constitution (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 24) and may demand “․ an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were applicable.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 764, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929;  see also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 261, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779.)   They argue that article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution may sweep more broadly than its federal counterpart and may be employed to strike down official actions which not only are invidious in design but are racially or ethnically discriminating in effect or result.   (See Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 876, 880, 31 Cal.Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878;  Crawford v. Board of Education (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280, 290, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28;  Serrano v. Priest, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 768, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929;  Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 261, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779.)   Also strongly relied upon is Calderon v. City of Los Angeles (1971) 4 Cal.3d 251, 93 Cal.Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489 which involved a challenge to the apportionment scheme for the Los Angeles City Council which was based on the number of registered voters rather than on voter population.   Relying on Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401, our Supreme Court stated:  “Racial or ethnic minorities often have distinct political interests, not shared by the general public, for which they seek political redress through their elected representatives.  [Citation.]  Where, for any reason, a non-population-based scheme tends sharply to reduce the representation of such groups, it must be regarded as constitutionally suspect [citations and fns. omitted].”  (Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 260–261, 93 Cal.Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489.)

THE STANDARD OF PROOF HERE APPLICABLE

Despite the history of a shifting focus of choice in achieving a standard of proof in vote dilution claims in the federal courts and the as yet uncharted contours of the California authorities, it is unnecessary for us in this case to choose between application of the “purpose” or “intent” standard and “the discriminatory effect or result” criteria in measuring a claim of unconstitutional dilution produced by an at-large election system.   The parties have effectively made the choice for us.   This stems from the fact that virtually all evidence presented by plaintiffs was proffered to show the allegedly discriminatory effects of the District's at-large system.   The relevant circumstances bearing on discriminatory impact were extensively canvassed by testimony on both sides.   The finding of the trial court was that the District's at-large system had neither “the purpose ¹¹ or effect of discriminating against Mexican-Americans.”   For purposes of this appeal, therefore, we scrutinize the evidence to determine whether plaintiffs have proved the existence of impermissibly discriminatory results attributable to the District's at-large system.   This “results” standard requires us to assess many of the particular factors synthesized by the pre-Bolden case law and which is central to the manner in which the case was presented below.

DISCUSSION

 Plaintiffs contend that there is no substantial evidence to support the factual determinations made by the trial court.   Against such a challenge, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with an ascertainment of whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, even if contradicted, which supports the findings of the lower court, and when conflicting inferences can reasonably be drawn from the facts, the reviewing court may not substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.   (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874, 197 Cal.Rptr. 925.)   To be substantial, evidence must be “of ponderable legal significance ․ reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value, ․”  (Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644, 247 P.2d 54.)   Where evidence of this nature exists, the fact that the trial court, believing other evidence or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion is of no consequence.  (Bowers v. Bernards, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874, 197 Cal.Rptr. 925.)   Notwithstanding plaintiffs' insistent theme that there is no substantial support for the court's findings which have been recited, we hold that the essential findings are indeed based on solid, credible, and reasonable evidence.

We address the patterns of proof within the rubrics presented by the parties.   While no single factor is controlling, the bottom-line question is directed to whether plaintiffs have proven the existence of an unconstitutional dilutive impact upon their group in the implementation of the District's at-large system as it interacts with the community's social and political forces.

1. Ethnic Minority Concentration

 Contrary to plaintiffs' contention that certain areas in the southern and western portions of the District are heavily or predominately Mexican-American, the court found “that the Mexican-American population is fairly well spread throughout the entire District.”   This finding is supported by the evidence and contradicts plaintiffs' claim that the District is residentially concentrated into a geographically insulated ethnic barrio.   The court made explicit findings as follows:  “The majority of Mexican-Americans (33,747 per 1980 census) live in the East Whittier and Whittier City Elementary School districts, while minority (31,766 per 1980 census) live in the Little Lake, Los Nietos and South Whittier Elementary districts.   High percentages of Mexican-Americans per census tract are found in northern and central areas of the District in addition to areas in the west and south, while moderate percentages are found in the eastern, southeastern and southwestern areas of the District.”   These findings, which are supported by the evidence, refute plaintiffs' allegation that the majority of Mexican-Americans “are residentially concentrated ․ particularly in the south and west areas.”   Far from being residentially agglomerated in some discrete geographic area, there is to be found relatively higher and lower percentages of Mexican-American population in diverse parts of the District.   Plaintiffs' focus on a tendentious analysis of particular clusters of census tract figures does not subvert the court's findings.   In percentage terms of Hispanic (we follow plaintiffs' example and use this term as coequal with Mexican-American) population per census tract, high percentages (in excess of 45%) may be found in the northern and central areas of the District as well as in the west and the south.   Moderate percentages, which range from 15 to 25 percent, may be found in the eastern, southeastern and southwestern areas of the District.   Overall, the majority of the Mexican-American population lives in the two elementary districts which plaintiffs have denominated as Anglo elementary districts.   The panoramic population picture presented is far from that of a community resolutely separated into Anglo and Mexican-American sectors.   Given the perspective of a Hispanic population interwoven in significant numbers throughout most of the District, the fact that their population is low in East Whittier and above average elsewhere scarcely proves a claim of de facto residential segregation.   The essential fallacy in plaintiffs' position is that they fix their sights on discrete demographic elements in selected areas of the District rather than upon the overall diffusion of the Hispanic population distribution.   When the population spectrum is viewed in the latter context, the not unreasonable approach taken by the court, the concept of an insular minority concentration evoked by plaintiffs, is effectively dispelled.

2. Socioeconomic Ethnic Disparities

Although not alleged in their complaint, plaintiffs contended at trial that Mexican-Americans were discriminated against by the at-large election system due to a lower socioeconomic level prevailing among them when compared to Anglo or other residents of the District.¹²

 The evidence presented by plaintiffs had little probative value in demonstrating that there exists a significant disproportion in the general level of income as between the District's Hispanic and Anglo populations which inhibits the degree of electoral participation by the former group.   The only substantial income data provided by plaintiffs pertained to 1970 census figures relating to percentages of households having an income in excess of $25,000.   Such evidence is scarcely enlightening where the endeavor is to show a population grouping with a significantly depressed income level.   The evidence does not show with any clarity to what extent the respective ethnic communities fall above or below the $25,000 income figure.   Plaintiffs' evidence of a claimed unequal distribution of low incomes among Hispanics is somewhat vitiated by the fact that no attempt was made to contrast the median income of Hispanic families with a Districtwide average.   The tenor of the testimony was that with the exception of a well-to-do Anglo section, the District as a whole is not affluent, but is of a modest, blue-collar and middle class composition.   Although the testimony is strongly susceptible of an interpretation that the general level of the educational attainments of the Hispanic group does not measure up to that of the Anglo inhabitants, the record is bereft of any showing that this is due to any official discrimination or to any lack of encouragement by the District for Hispanics to improve their scholastic achievement or advance their education progress.   The evidence shows no causal nexus between the socioeconomic level of the District's Hispanic population and its unfettered ability to participate fully in the electoral process.   Such disproportion as exists between the respective communities does not sustain plaintiffs' claim of an adverse impact on their voting power.

3. Racially Polarized Voting

Courts have been mindful of the “not rare” practice of racial bloc voting (see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (1977) 430 U.S. 144, 166, 97 S.Ct. 996, 1010, 51 L.Ed.2d 229) (plurality opinion), and have acknowledged that strict racial bloc voting by a white majority may produce a discriminatory effect in an at-large election system (see Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 616, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3275).   In Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012, the court observed:  “Voting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black interests without fear of political consequences, and without bloc voting the minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of their race.”  (At p. 623, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3279.)   In Graves v. Barnes (W.D.Tex.1972) 343 F.Supp. 704, 732, affirmed sub nom. White v. Regester, supra, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 the court stated that where racial bloc voting prevails, “Mexican-Americans are frozen into permanent political minorities destined for constant defeat at the hands of the controlling political majorities.”

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that “past election returns show the existence of racially-polarized voting in the District, with Mexican-Americans voting for Mexican-American candidates and Anglos voting for Anglo candidates.”   Racially polarized voting (or “bloc voting”), as developed during the trial, exists when Anglo or white voters tend to vote for white candidates and against minority candidates, and when minority voters tend to cast their ballots for minority candidates.   In finding that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to support their contention that there was racially polarized voting in school board elections from 1973 through 1981, the court relied upon the evidence of defendants' experts, Dr. Allen and Dr. Morrison, as persuasive.   The court further found “comparisons of general population data and voting results by precincts or census tracts are insufficient to support any conclusions as to the existence or nonexistence of such polarized voting because such data does not indicate what proportion of actual voters were Mexican-American or [A]nglo, what the voter turnout was, or for which candidates the voters cast their ballots.   There are numerous factors which may have accounted for the results of the various elections from 1973 through 1981, including the relative numbers of [A]nglo and Mexican-American candidates, the seriousness and strength of campaigns of the various candidates, voter satisfaction with the performance of incumbents, voter registration and turnout, and the lack of racially oriented issues.   The analyses and opinions of defendants' experts, Dr. Allen and Dr. Morrison, concluding that these elections do not show the existence of racially polarized voting, are persuasive.   The evidence does not support plaintiffs' allegations that there was racially-polarized voting in past school board elections.”

Plaintiffs' challenge to the court's findings consists of an attack on the credibility of the defendants' expert witnesses and a disparagement of the foundations of their evidence.   Plaintiffs are in effect asking this court to reappraise the testimony on which the court relied, reassess it as insubstantial, and reject it in favor of the testimony produced by their witnesses.   Having examined the evidence on both sides, we conclude that there is ample fortification in the record for the findings of the court.   Testifying principally in support of plaintiffs' claim of racial polarization were two expert witnesses, Dr. Richard Drogin, a statistician, and Richard Santillan, who holds a Ph.D. in government with concentration on national and local Hispanic politics and is an assistant professor in ethnic and women studies at California State University.   Dr. Leobardo Estrada, a demographer and statistician, testified for plaintiffs on rebuttal.   Plaintiffs also presented various lay witnesses with practical experience in Whittier politics.

The major part of the defense was presented by Dr. Peter A. Morrison, a demographer who had on another occasion been called as an expert by plaintiffs' counsel, and Dr. William Allen, a political scientist currently on the faculty at the Claremont Colleges.

Dr. Drogin, having examined the District board elections for the years 1975, 1977 and 1979, presented statistical evidence based upon an analysis of correlations between enclaves of Hispanic population and frequency of votes for and against Hispanic candidates.   His calculations produced positive correlations between Hispanic population percentages and votes for Hispanic candidates and negative correlations between Hispanic population and votes for successful Anglo candidates.   He interpreted his results as showing that Mexican-American candidates received more votes in heavily Hispanic areas than in predominantly Anglo areas and that predominantly Anglo areas voted for Anglo candidates to a far greater degree than did Mexican-American neighborhoods.   However, he stated it was not his function to determine if the calculations showed polarization, stating:  “To make a judgment that an election is polarized I don't think is a statistical question, period.”   Dr. Morrison testified from a series of scattergram exhibits which he had prepared from data furnished by plaintiffs.   Dr. Allen testified not only from the scattergrams used by Dr. Morrison, but also predicated his opinions on the results of a telephone survey of actual voters who had participated in the 1981 District election.   Both Dr. Morrison and Dr. Allen concluded that they would not construe the results as showing racial polarization.

By giving short shrift and grudging respect to the testimony of Dr. Morrison and no regard to that of Dr. Allen, plaintiffs engage in a numbers game, concentrating on population figures alone, from which they conjure the specter of voter polarization along ethnic lines in all of the school board elections held in 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979 and 1981.   One of the fundamental problems in connection with plaintiffs' attempt to show racially polarized voting was the fact that statistics as to the distribution of the actual percentage of the voting population was virtually nonexistent.¹³

Dr. Morrison and Dr. Drogin were in accord that to properly test a hypothesis of racially polarized voting, information would be required as to the actual voters participating, their respective ethnic backgrounds, and which candidate received their ballot.   This was lacking, as was other critical information.   The record is devoid of evidence as to what number of the Hispanic population was of voting age or qualified to vote, how many had registered, and the percentage of registered voters that had exercised the franchise.   There is also an absence of similar data regarding Anglo voters.   Thus, the most meaningful comparisons could not be made as to the extent each group voted for Hispanic or Anglo candidates in relationship to their potential voting power.   It was left for the experts on both sides to attempt to predicate their opinions on the correlation between the population in census tracts or electoral precincts and the votes tallied by the candidates for school board office.   Both Dr. Drogin and Dr. Morrison stated that from the data in evidence it could not be told who actually voted in any of the elections by ethnic group, or who such voters preferred in their voting.¹⁴

Dr. Morrison testified that his analyses of the elections “do not prove that these elections were polarized.   They don't even demonstrate to me that polarized voting was a likely or even a probable feature of these elections.” ¹⁵  He referred to voting areas with a high Hispanic population in particular elections where an Anglo candidate outstripped the Hispanic candidate and vice versa.   He analyzed in detail the quality and character of the data incorporated into his scattergrams, their statistical significance, showed why the most effective methods of establishing racial bloc voting were absent, and provided a convincing foundation for his opinion.

Dr. Allen also contradicted plaintiffs' hypothesis of racially polarized voting.   He adopted a two-front approach.   He arranged for a voter behavior survey based on the 1981 election which he likened to an “exit poll” and engaged in a “syndrome analysis” consisting of a review of various elements which he determined might be crucial in influencing the outcome of an election.   He was assisted in forming his views by a study of the statistical analysis of District elections used by Dr. Morrison.   In this latter connection, Dr. Allen conducted an in-depth computerized analysis of all the elections in the District from 1973 to 1981.   He was ultimately of the opinion that racial polarization was not shown in the District elections and that incumbency was a predominant factor.   Dr. Allen and plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Estrada, drew conflicting conclusions concerning racial polarization from an analysis of a 1973 election in which Miss Macy, an Anglo incumbent candidate, outpolled Mr. Carrillo, one of the plaintiffs, in all the census tracts with strong Hispanic population.   Dr. Estrada believed the evidence “indicates polarized elections have taken place.”   However, he agreed that in defining racially polarized voting, “a matter of degree” is involved and it may be a “judgment call.”

In respect to one of the exhibits, Dr. Estrada acknowledged that the correlations between the variables were “not real strong,” as to racial polarization.   Nevertheless, he believed that the vice of the at-large election system lay in the predictability of the results where voting is polarized between the respective communities.   When the court inquired at what point a voting pattern was evidence of racial polarization, Dr. Estrada replied:  “I don't have a good answer to that, because, see, there is so much more involved in an election than just ethnicity.”   The colloquy continued:

THE COURT:  “Well, is it true, then, that none of these charts can really show it one way or the other?”

A. “No I think the pattern shows it leaning towards the fact that polarization does occur․”

Dr. Allen received from the Registrar of Voters a list of the registered voters in the District's election of November 1981, in which three trustee positions were in contention.   Among the candidates were three Anglo incumbents:  Pellissier, Nay and Burnett.   Deborah Guerrero was the only Hispanic candidate.   Dr. Allen selected 200 Spanish surnamed individuals who had actually voted.   These persons were contacted by telephone in February of 1982 and were comprehensively surveyed as to their attitudes in areas of political, educational and sociological concern and were asked to recall their votes in the election.   Of those who remembered voting, 61 reported that they had voted for Ms. Guerrero, 59 for Pellissier, 38 for Nay, and 29 for Burnett.   By making various extrapolations predicated on relationships of unremembered votes with voting results and other data, Dr. Allen expressed his opinion that the survey showed that the election was not characterized by racially polarized voting.   Dr. Allen's methodology was described by Dr. Estrada, as being seriously flawed,¹⁶ and using the same data but making other foundational assumptions, Dr. Estrada opined that racial polarization was shown.

Plaintiffs would have us disregard the postulations of Dr. Allen, which were accepted by the court, and resolve the conflict of evidence to their advantage.   This we cannot do.   Dr. Allen's testimony was buttressed by a dispassionate analysis of the survey returns which fully supports his opinion.

In sum, far from showing invidious racial polarization, there was a demonstration that to a greater or lesser degree Anglo and Hispanic candidates were acceptable in areas of each other's group population majority.   A voter polarization concept does not find its ideal setting when a series of elections suggests that Anglo sections are voting for Hispanics in substantial numbers and Mexican-American census tracts are voting for Anglos, unless more refined measurements can be made.   While it is undeniable that in certain areas Hispanic and Anglo candidates made strong showings in areas where they had large populations representative of their group, defendants' witnesses clearly pointed out why a substantial measure of polarization was not established in the light of other voting patterns which militated against such conclusion.

 We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to negate plaintiffs' claim of discriminatory effects resulting from alleged ethnic bloc voting and to support a finding that racial polarization did not exist in any appreciable degree.

4. Inability of Mexican-Americans to Elect Candidates of Their Choice

Preliminarily, we advert to the mechanical aspects of the District's selection system and find notably absent the panoply of Zimmer features which have been held to facilitate the submergence of minority interests.   There is no requirement of a majority vote for election.   No anti-single shot provision prevails, thus allowing Hispanic voters to concentrate their voting strength on the candidate of their choice.   There are no inhibitions against Hispanic voter registration or participation in the electoral process.   There is no pervasive history of ethnic discrimination in the District and certainly none of recent vintage.¹⁷  There was no showing of official unresponsiveness, as will be seen infra.   There was no showing of election campaign tactics involving appeals to racial prejudice.   Finally, the at-large system of school board election is not a tenuous policy in California.   It is used in approximately 80 percent of all such elections.

 Plaintiffs contend that because of racially polarized voting and their minority status, voters in areas with high percentages of Hispanic population have been unable to elect candidates of their choice.   This argument is seriously undermined, as we have seen, by plaintiffs' inability to convincingly demonstrate that their voting strength is diluted by an appreciable level of racially polarized voting.   The evidence shows that in the five elections between 1973 and 1981, only one Hispanic candidate, Mr. Salas, emerged victorious in 1979.   Plaintiffs stress that this victory was accomplished with Anglo support in order to defeat the candidacy of Mr. Magana, a “militant” who ran stronger in Hispanic precincts.   However, other testimony was presented to show that Mr. Salas was held in high esteem by professional educators, that he had served as a school board trustee for some years in an elementary school district with a strong Hispanic population in the District, and that he ran well in Hispanic areas.   It could not be said that he was foisted on the voters.¹⁸

Between 1973 and 1981, there were 17 open seats, which were contested for by 8 Spanish-surnamed candidates and 35 others.   Of these 8 candidates only Mr. Carrillo in 1973, and both Mr. Salas and Mr. Magana in 1979, engaged in full-blown campaigns.   However, Mr. Carrillo had absented himself from the District for some years and only returned shortly before filing his candidacy.   Hispanic candidates in other years ran truncated, minimal campaigns.   On the other hand, their victorious opponents campaigned vigorously and were often incumbents with name recognition who ran well in Hispanic-dominated precincts.   It cannot be said that these were not decisive factors which affected the choices made by the voters.   Plaintiffs claim that the percentage of votes drawn by Mr. Carrillo in 1973, Mr. Estrada in 1977, and Ms. Guerrero in 1981, in the southern and western areas of the District, would have insured their election but for the dilutive effect of the at-large system.   But speculation as to whether a manipulated restructuring of the District's system might produce a safe constituency for a particular group is not so much the point as whether plaintiffs have proven that the existing system unconstitutionally dilutes Hispanic voting strength.   Plaintiffs have failed to show to what extent the District's eligible Hispanic voters have actively involved themselves in the electoral process.   No data is provided touching on the relative percentage of Anglo and Hispanic voter registration or voter turnout in the five elections during the decade in question.   This obscurity makes it difficult to judge the degree of voter energy and interest in the respective communities, a factor which may have had critical influence in the election outcomes.   Lacking such information, and given the strong showings made by Anglo voters in Hispanic sectors coupled with their vigorous campaigns, operative factors not inherently attributable to the at-large system could well be responsible for the election losses of which plaintiffs complain.   The record is too inconclusive to establish plaintiffs' claim that the District's voting system is ethnic-conscious and dooms to inevitable and predictable frustration the choice of Hispanic voters.

5. Responsiveness of the District to Hispanic Needs and Interests 19

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the District's school board did not represent Hispanic interests and that its governance “has been discriminatorily unresponsive to the needs and interests of the Mexican-American residents.”   The trial court found that the District was “highly responsive in all areas identified as of special interest and need with regard to Mexican-American students․”

 At trial, the principal educational policy issues of concern to Hispanics were identified as bilingual education, compensatory education and affirmative action.   Notwithstanding expressions of dissatisfaction by some of plaintiffs' witnesses, there was compelling testimony that the District has comprehensively and successfully dealt with each of these needs and interests.   There is in force an expansive bilingual program which has received input and support from parent advisory committees which is adapted to the needs of individual students.   Compensatory education programs are in place which are designed to enhance the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children and have benefited Hispanic students.   Testimony also showed an effective and energetic affirmative action program sponsored by the District.   The evidence supports the finding that the District is responsive to the needs and interests of the Hispanic population within its ambit of governance.

6. The District's At-Large System Does Not Operate to Impair Hispanic Equal Protection Rights

In determining that plaintiffs did not sustain their constitutional challenge to the at-large system, the trial court relied upon the record which we have examined in our antecedent discussion.   Our review of that record has demonstrated that it contains substantial evidence supportive of the court's determination that the system does not produce effects which operate to achieve a dilution of Hispanic voting power in derogation of the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.   Our duty as an appellate tribunal is limited to such a review.  (Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 51, 60, 148 Cal.Rptr. 596, 583 P.2d 121.)   We are not called upon to either endorse or disavow an at-large selection process as a matter of preferred or disfavored social policy.   That responsibility obviously rests in other sectors of the body politic.

The court's statement of decision meets the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 632.

 Plaintiffs made a timely request for a written statement of decision concerning specific controverted issues of fact.   The statement of decision prepared by the District was adopted by the court.   Plaintiffs challenge the statement as inadequate to comply with the court's duty to issue a decisional statement “․ explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial.”  (Code Civ.Proc., § 632.)   It is settled that Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires the court to set forth only findings of ultimate rather than evidentiary facts “because such findings include by necessary intendment the findings on all intermediate evidentiary facts necessary to sustain them.   [Citation.]”  (Bulmash v. Davis (1979) 24 Cal.3d 691, 700–701, 157 Cal.Rptr. 66, 597 P.2d 469.)   A perusal both of the items enumerated in plaintiffs' request and the court's statement of decision discloses that the controverted issues were addressed in their entirety and in the explicitly articulated manner mandated by the statute.   Plaintiffs' contention cannot be sustained.

The court correctly excluded documentary evidence relating to other at-large systems.

 Plaintiffs offered into evidence a group of exhibits directed at showing the discriminatory impact of at-large elections.   One category included reports of the work of the United States Civil Rights Commission, reports undertaken by committees or political subdivisions of the California Senate and Assembly on at-large elections, and a report concerning the federal Voting Rights Act which dealt with similar themes.   Other exhibits were proffered to show the disproportionately low degree of Hispanic representation in California city councils and school boards using at-large election processes.   Also included was a private study of a restructuring of the electoral system in two Texas cities.   The thrust of all of the material was critical of the at-large systems.   The court rejected this evidence as irrelevant and consisting of inadmissible hearsay.   Plaintiffs assert prejudicial error.   We disagree.

 General rules concerning relevancy of evidence are stated as follows:  “No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence” (Evid.Code, § 350) and relevant evidence is defined as “․ having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”  (Evid.Code, § 210.)   The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that at-large systems of election are not constitutionally invalid per se.  (Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 617, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3275;  Mobile v. Bolden, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 66, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1499 (plurality opinion);  White v. Regester, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 765, 93 S.Ct. at 2339.)   It is only when the suspect features we have discussed coexist to produce results dilutive of voting power that the system succumbs to a constitutional challenge.   At issue is the nature of the effects generated in the constituency under attack, and that system must be judged within the context of its own discrete experience, regardless of philosophic or political generalizations concerning the validity of any particular electoral institution.   As stated in Nevett v. Sides, supra, 571 F.2d at p. 224, quoted with approval in Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 621, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3277, in discussing the Zimmer factors:  “The task before the fact finder is to determine, under all the relevant facts, in whose favor the ‘aggregate’ of the evidence preponderates.  [Fn. omitted.]   This determination is peculiarly dependent on the facts of each case.   It comprehends ‘a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the [at-large] district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise’ [citation].”  (Emphasis added.)   The relevant evidence was extensively developed through an examination of the concrete experiences of the District with alleged racial polarization, the ability of the ethnic minority, or lack of it, to elect “its” candidates, and similar factors which bore on the claim of impermissible vote dilution.   Evidence of the effect of at-large election systems in other jurisdictions would have as little probative value on this critical issue as would evidence that an at-large system is a valuable tool to defeat parochial ward politics, or that under such a system, black mayors have recently been elected in Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia, and a Hispanic governor in New Mexico.   The infinite array of variables would lead the court away from making “the intensely local appraisal” required to recognize constitutionally impermissible practices within the boundaries of the District.   The court's ruling was sound.

Despite the court's ruling, plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Santillan, used the excluded documents in his testimony, fully described their contents, quoted from the documents, and showed how they buttressed his opinion that at-large elections have a discriminatory effect on Mexican-American political participation.   Dr. Santillan was permitted to testify that the United States Civil Rights Commission recommended conversion of at-large systems into single member district elections to prevent discriminatory dilution of minority voting strength.   Plaintiffs clearly suffered no prejudice by the exclusion of the documents.

Other documents prepared by Dr. Santillan covering cities in proximity to Whittier, and indicating the number of Hispanic city councilmen elected in at-large elections, were clearly hearsay and irrelevant.

 On the other hand, since the relevancy test was met, the court received oral and documentary evidence concerning elections to the elementary school board districts encompassed by the District.   Plaintiff Carrillo prepared voter analyses of Whittier City elementary school elections for 1975 and 1977 which were received in evidence.   He described his own election as an elementary school trustee, and a list showing the Hispanic composition of the trustees of the constitutent elementary schools came into evidence.   Plaintiff Ortega testified to the success of Hispanic candidates for school board at the elementary school level.   At least three other witnesses gave similar and virtually cumulative testimony concerning Hispanic electoral perceptions, campaign tactics and candidate success in elementary school districts.   One of them, Mr. Gutierrez, testified at length on his electoral strategy in winning election against an Anglo candidate to the board of trustees of Rio Hondo Community College.   This testimony was received because the college district includes the high school district as well as other adjacent territory.   Mr. Gutierrez reviewed the geographical distribution of his votes in the college district election.   He attributed his defeat for election three years later by an Anglo to the support his opponent got from the teachers' union and the voter turnout in the Whittier area.²⁰  We perceive no reason to disturb the judgment on grounds of exclusion of evidence.

DISPOSITION

We have concluded that the District's present system, taken as a whole, does not infringe constitutional principles and is entitled to stand.   The judgment is therefore affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   The complaint also relies on the 14th and 15th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, but appellants state that “this adds nothing of substance to their state constitutional freedoms in this case.”

2.   Defendants are the District, its superintendent, and the incumbent District trustees.   The Registrar of Voters of Los Angeles County was released as a party defendant on his stipulation to conduct future elections as directed by the court.

3.   By way of affirmative defense, it was also alleged that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not exercising reasonable and feasible procedures for initiating changes in the at-large system as prescribed by Education Code section 5019 et seq.   While tangentially alluded to at trial, this ground is not pressed on appeal, and we do not consider its merits.

4.   The elementary districts are East Whittier, Whittier City, Little Lake, South Whittier and Los Nietos.

5.   The cases to be discussed treat multimember or at-large systems virtually interchangeably.   In an at-large system, which is a particular form of the multimember system, more than one candidate is elected to represent a district, which, as here, constitutes the entire electoral entity.   The same procedure is used in a multimember district, the chief difference being that the multimember district is one of several districts which make up the total electoral entity.   An alternate system divides the electoral entity into wards or districts, each of which elects a single member.   See generally Blacksher and Menafee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden:  Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?  (34 Hastings L.J. 1, 3, fns. 10–12 (1982).)

6.   The six states of the old 5th Circuit were divided into two circuits on October 1, 1981.   Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas now comprise the 5th Circuit, while former members Alabama, Florida and Georgia are in the newly created 11th Circuit.

7.   The absence of an “anti-single shot” requirement is helpful to minority voters.   Where “single-shot” (sometimes called “bullet”) voting is permitted, it enables a minority group to win in an at-large election if it concentrates its vote on the candidate of its choice and the majority vote is split among a number of candidates.  (City of Rome, Ga. v. United States (D.D.C.1979) 472 F.Supp. 221, 244, fn. 90, aff'd.  City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980).)

8.   The arbitrary bifurcation into primary and enhancing factors created problems of assigning weights to the Zimmer factors and one court disclaimed such “scorekeeping.”  (Bolden v. City of Mobile, Alabama (S.D.Ala.1976) 423 F.Supp. 384, 402, aff'd. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.1978), rev'd. Mobile v. Bolden (1980) 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47.)   In other cases, points were allocated to the respective sides depending on the absence or presence of certain of the Zimmer factors (United States v. Board of Sup'rs of Forrest City (5th Cir.1978) 571 F.2d 951;  David v. Garrison (5th Cir.1977) 553 F.2d 923, 929–930).

9.   In 1982, in order to overcome the effect of the Bolden decision, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to shift “the focus of a vote dilution claim under the statute to a discriminatory ‘effect’ or ‘result’ as opposed to motive or intent.”  (See Buchanan v. City of Jackson (1983) 708 F.2d 1066, 1072.)

10.   The circumstantial evidence relied on in Rogers to determine whether a discriminatory purpose actuates the use of an at-large system consisted of (1) the existence of bloc voting along racial lines together with the fact that no black had ever been elected to the board of commissioners;  (2) the lingering effects of past discrimination resulting in low black voter registration;  (3) a general exclusion of blacks from the political processes;  (4) unresponsiveness on the part of the elected officials towards the requirements of the black community;  and (5) the depressed socioeconomic status of blacks due in part to inferior education and discrimination in employment and housing.

11.   On appeal, plaintiffs have abandoned their position at trial that the District's at-large system was designedly discriminatory.

12.   On this score, the court found as follows:“Neither does the evidence support plaintiffs' contention, ․ that Mexican-Americans in the District are disadvantaged or discriminated against due to a disparate socio-economic level as compared to [A]nglo residents of the District.   There was insufficient evidence to support any contention that Mexican-Americans in the District suffer from a poverty or low-income socio-economic level, or that there is any ghetto or barrio community within the District where such conditions might be suspected to exist to any degree which could affect the ability of Mexican-Americans to effectively participate in the electoral or political processes.”

13.   Dr. Allen was able to provide some voting figures in connection with his telephone survey of 200 Spanish surnamed voters who participated in the 1981 election.

14.   The data bases used by both Dr. Drogin and Dr. Morrison were basically similar, despite plaintiffs' contention that Dr. Morrison's figures were inaccurate.   Dr. Drogin testified that though there were several differences, “their overall effect was fairly random and did not influence the patterns which resulted.”

15.   Dr. Morrison testified that because of limitations in the available data, it was possible to explain the figures on his scattergrams as being consistent with polarized voting but he would not draw such a conclusion.   He explained why by discussing a phenomenon described as the “ecological fallacy.”

16.   A serious flaw claimed by plaintiffs was the problem of recall for whom the respondents voted for.   Dr. Allen most adequately explained how this was accounted for in his technique.   Plaintiffs take issue with Dr. Allen's inclusion in his survey results of some respondents with Spanish surnames who were “non Hispanics,” that is, claiming heritage such as Filipino, Puerto Rican, Portuguese, Italian, etc.   Dr. Allen cogently explained the affinity of such Spanish surnamed people with Hispanic ethnicity.   Plaintiffs also allude to Dr. Estrada's challenge to Dr. Allen's extrapolations with respect to the percentage of registered Hispanic voters whom he assumed had cast their ballots for various candidates in 1981.   This matter dealt principally with allowances made for those voters who did not have a precise recollection of all the votes they cast.   Dr. Allen supplied a logical explanation for his system of distributing votes within the overall context of the available election data.

17.   The Hispanic community has been no stranger to lamentable acts of bigotry in the District.   Plaintiff Carrillo testified that in the late thirties, movie theatres in the District restricted Mexican-Americans to the balcony, that they could not go to the public swimming pool every day of the week, and that the William Penn Hotel did not admit Mexican-American guests.   Another witness testified that in 1950 he was told by a salesman that houses in a tract being built in Whittier were not for sale to Mexican-Americans.

18.   We were informed at oral argument that Mr. Salas was re-elected in 1983.

19.   Some cases applying the Zimmer factors had assumed unresponsiveness by elected officials to be a necessary element of a claim of voting dilution.   E.g., Blacks United, Etc. v. City of Shreveport (5th Cir.1978) 571 F.2d 248, 254.   This view was rejected in Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012, in which the court stated:  “The Court of Appeals held that ‘proof of unresponsiveness by the public body in question to the group claiming injury’ is an essential element of a claim of voting dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment․  Under our cases, however, unresponsiveness is an important element but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in determining whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred.”  (Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 625, fn. 9, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3280, fn. 9;  original emphasis.)

20.   Since the court correctly decided the evidentiary issues, we note only in passing that the court correctly denied plaintiffs' request that judicial notice be taken under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) of certain of the documents we have mentioned.   Their reliance on Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, 153 Cal.Rptr. 511 is misplaced.   A question of legislative intent in enacting a statute was at issue in the Post case, and the materials noticed were reviewed as part of the legislative history leading to enactment of the statute.   Post is not applicable here.   Plaintiffs' attention is also invited to the rule that the official character of a document will not make otherwise inadmissible material resulting from a legislative investigation admissible.  (Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403, 38 Cal.Rptr. 183.)   The documents offered were voluminous (one consisted of 1600 pages), and were replete with compounded hearsay, opinions, conclusions and statements of an inadmissible nature.   Plaintiffs offered these documents in toto, without designating any specific portions which might possibly be admissible.   Such procedure is inappropriate.  (See Marocco v. Ford Motor Co. (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 84, 88–89, 86 Cal.Rptr. 526.)

AUERBACH, Associate Justice.* FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

FEINERMAN, P.J., and ASHBY, J., concur.