IT CORPORATION v. COUNTY OF IMPERIAL (1982)

In 1980, Imperial County issued a conditional use permit to IT Corp., allowing IT to operate a toxic waste disposal site near the Superstition Hills in Imperial County.   Soon a dispute arose between IT and the County about the types of waste the permit allows IT to handle.   The permit authorizes IT to handle “geothermal waste, pesticide containers and other Class I materials.”   IT argues “other Class I materials” refers to a list of diverse wastes found in the Environmental Impact Report and Operations Plan prepared as part of the application process for the permit;  the County argues the language refers only to wastes resulting from emergency spills.

IT sought an injunction to restrain the County from amending the permit to reflect the County's restrictive interpretation of the disputed language.   The County cross-claimed, asking IT be enjoined from handling the diverse wastes it contends are covered by the permit.   Both sides asked for a preliminary injunction.   The superior court found the permit was ambiguous and took extrinsic evidence on its meaning.   The court found The County Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors had intended to authorize handling of only geothermal and pesticide wastes and interpreted the permit in the narrow manner advocated by the County.   Based on this finding, the court enjoined IT from disposing of the types of waste in dispute pending outcome of a full trial.   IT had been handling those wastes for eight months before the preliminary injunction was issued.   IT appeals.

 It is clear from the court's notice of intended decision and preliminary injunction the only issue given consideration was the interpretation of the permit.   Extensive testimony and documentary evidence was taken on that issue and the court's findings show a thorough review of the evidence.   However, this focus on the interpretation of the permit fails to address the considerations central to a request for a preliminary injunction:  the relative hardships the injunction will cause and preservation of the status quo pending trial.   Were we reviewing an order for a permanent injunction, a reasonable decision on the merits would be dispositive.   Where a preliminary injunction is sought, however, a review of the strength of the parties' cases on the merits alone is insufficient.

 In considering a request for a preliminary injunction,

“ ‘the trial court must determine which party is the more likely to be injured by the exercise of its discretion [citation] and it must then be exercised in favor of that party [citation].’ ”  (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889.)

Although the probable outcome of a full trial on the merits is relevant, where a preliminary injunction is sought the court should not decide the ultimate rights of the parties but rather should consider how injury to the parties can be minimized during the pendency of the action (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 125 Cal.Rptr. 915;  California State University, Hayward v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 533, 121 Cal.Rptr. 85;  Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 835, 116 Cal.Rptr. 487;  Wilms v. Hand (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 811, 226 P.2d 728).   Even if we were to assume there is greater strength to the County's case on the merits, no preliminary injunction in favor of the County should issue if the harm to IT caused by granting the injunction greatly outweighs the harm which the County will suffer if it is denied.   If the rule were otherwise, a hearing on a preliminary injunction would be indistinguishable from a full trial.

The injury to IT from the preliminary injunction is clear;  it will have to turn away many customers and face the prospect of lost revenues and good will.   The only harm the County alleges it will suffer is disobedience of its zoning laws.   No evidence was offered to show handling of the wastes in issue at the Superstition Hills site is unsafe or a hazard to any resident of the County (reports from two public agencies state the site is completely safe).   Admittedly, a party has no right to violate a valid law, regardless of the cost of obedience.   However, the County's interest in law enforcement will be vindicated at trial.   If pre-trial disobedience alone is held to outweigh tangible, pecuniary loss, a governmental entity will never have to show any real harm in order to get a preliminary injunction.   No such exception to traditional preliminary injunction analysis appears in the case law.  (See State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Star (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 736, 87 Cal.Rptr. 450.)   Balancing of the hardships favors IT.

 Another purpose of a preliminary injunction should be to maintain the status quo pending trial (Socialist Workers etc., Committee v. Brown, supra;  State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Star, supra).   In this case, IT had been accepting the wastes the County objects to for several months before the injunction was issued.   The injunction disrupted rather than preserved the situation which existed when the parties came to court.

 The court said it “found this a very tough case and a close case”;  there was a great deal of conflicting evidence on the proper interpretation of the permit.   This magnifies the error of issuing a preliminary injunction based on a survey of the merits alone.   A preliminary injunction is exceptional relief which should not be granted except in a clear case of right or where the harm caused by denial would be overwhelming (Gosney v. State of California (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 921, 89 Cal.Rptr. 390;  Benda v. Grand Lodge of Intern. Assn. etc. (9th Cir.1978) 584 F.2d 308;  2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Provisional Remedies, § 78, p. 1516).

 The court also failed to consider the effect of the injunction on the public interest;  the judge told the parties from the bench it was not his role to assess the public interest implications of the injunction.   That was error;  “in determining the availability of injunctive relief, the court must consider the interests of third persons and of the general public.”  (Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 39 Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548.)   The amicus curiae trial brief filed by the California State Department of Health Services, urging the court to deny the County's injunction request, attests to the public interest elements present in this case.

 On any trial of this matter, the court should proceed in such a way as to insure the final interpretation of the permit does not discriminate, directly or indirectly, against wastes from outside the county.   A result which disallows wastes from outside the county which are of the same types of those allowed within the county would be improper.

Order reversed.

GERALD BROWN, Presiding Justice.

COLOGNE and STANIFORTH, JJ., concur.