PEOPLE v. RANDALL (1982)

The People appeal the order of the superior court refusing to reinstate a felony complaint alleging one count of robbery which was dismissed by the magistrate upon a finding of insufficient evidence of force or fear in the taking of property (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 871, 871.5, 1238(a), subd. (9)).  They contend that, as a matter of law, there was sufficient evidence of the element of force to warrant trial upon a charge of robbery.¹

The facts are not in dispute.   At approximately 11 p.m. on February 11, 1981, while returning home from a bible class, Sheila Fuller brought her vehicle to a stop at the traffic light at the intersection of Compton Avenue and Imperial Highway.   She was in the inside lane with the windows rolled up, her purse within easy reach in the middle of the passenger seat.   As she awaited the change of the light in order to continue her journey, the front passenger window suddenly exploded into shards of glass and an arm reached into the vehicle and grabbed her purse.   Ms. Fuller observed appellant running from the scene with the purse.²  Within minutes, he was apprehended by police officers who observed his flight, and returned to the scene.

At the close of the preliminary examination, the magistrate expressed concern with appellant's argument that neither force nor fear had been adequately established, noting:

“THE COURT:  If it is not a robbery, it should be.   I am going to put it over until tomorrow morning and look at some force and fear cases;  and if it doesn't quite stack up, well, then it will have to fall.

“We will have the matter stand submitted, then, until sometime tomorrow when you can come down.” 3

The next day the following occurred:

“THE COURT:  People versus Ronnie Randall.   This matter was put over until this time to research some cases under both 211 of the Penal Code and 487.2 of the Penal Code.

“People found any citations?

“MR. URGO [Dep.Dist.Atty.]:  At this time, Your Honor, we would just like to reemphasize the argument I made yesterday in that the car is actually an extension of the victim in this case, being that the window was in close proximity to her, and the nature of the car being that she has complete control over its mobility;  and I believe the force necessary for a 211 would have been applied against the window of the car.

“THE COURT:  I understand the argument, and I wish it had more appeal.   The cases in the annotations to the robbery section and the grand theft person sections just don't seem to me to cover the situation that we have here for the reasons mentioned by defense counsel yesterday;  that grand theft person requires that it be from the person and not from the proximity of the person, and it was either a 1891 or 1871 case that came down with the fella who took his pants off and used them as a pillow while sleeping in the park, and someone yanked his pants away from him;  and it was determined that that was not a grand theft person, even though he had his ear to his pants, and the testimony of the victim that this was a momentary thing does seem to preclude that the taking was because of the fear, and the fear was just more startle as a result of broken glass.

“For those reasons I think the case must be dismissed, and it is dismissed.”

Upon appeal of this ruling to the superior court, that court ruled as follows:

“THE COURT:  I don't think it's covered by the robbery statute.   I think what we have is probably auto burglary if all the windows were locked, and I believe she testified to that, or a petty theft or grand theft.   The items in the vehicle, I do not think it comes under robbery.

“The motion under Penal Code Section 871.5 will be denied.”

 Appellant's contention is well taken.   Initially, it is clear from the instant record that the magistrate expressed a legal conclusion that neither force nor fear had been established in ordering dismissal of the felony complaint, as distinguished from a factual one.   While it is settled that the magistrate's factual determinations based upon conflicting evidence are binding upon a reviewing court (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 664–667, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609;  Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d 660, 665–666, 94 Cal.Rptr. 289, 483 P.2d 1241), it is equally well settled that erroneous legal conclusions have no such effect.  (People v. Lipinski (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 572, 135 Cal.Rptr. 451;  People v. Zeihm (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089, 115 Cal.Rptr. 528;  Dudley v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 977, 983–985, 111 Cal.Rptr. 797;  People v. Farley (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 215, 221, 96 Cal.Rptr. 478.)   The instant record contains no conflict in the testimony and quite adequately establishes the elements of both force and fear in the taking of Ms. Fuller's purse, sufficient to warrant trial on the charge of robbery.   Regarding the element of fear, Ms. Fuller's uncontroverted testimony that she was “afraid” is more than sufficient to warrant a finding that appellant's conduct in shattering the window instilled the fear of an immediate and unlawful injury sufficient to cause her to acquiesce in the subsequent taking of her purse.  (See People v. Renteria (1964) 61 Cal.2d 497, 499, 39 Cal.Rptr. 213, 393 P.2d 413;  People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567, 88 P.2d 238.)

 Similarly, the uncontroverted evidence adduced at the preliminary examination was more than sufficient to warrant a finding that appellant utilized the requisite force necessary to sustain a finding of robbery.   The parties expend a great deal of energy and argue at great length over whether the “force” necessary to constitute robbery requires an assault or battery upon the person of the victim.   Common sense dictates that it does not, as all that need be shown is the use of force or violence sufficient to thwart the victim's resistance.  (Cf. People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 487, 491, 176 Cal.Rptr. 687.)   On the instant record, it is clear that the force utilized to shatter the automobile window served the dual purposes of gaining easier access to the purse while overcoming any resistance which its owner might otherwise have mounted.  (People v. Harris (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 978, 989, 135 Cal.Rptr. 668;  People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782, 787, 129 Cal.Rptr. 529;  People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134, 139, 122 Cal.Rptr. 157;  People v. Clayton (1928) 89 Cal.App. 405, 411, 264 P. 1105.)   The evidence presented at the preliminary examination was more than sufficient to require that the magistrate bind appellant over to the superior court for trial on the charge of robbery.

The judgment is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both parties appear to assume that the magistrate ruled, as a factual matter, that the element of fear had not been established.   (Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 665, 94 Cal.Rptr. 289, 483 P.2d 1241.)   This assumption will be addressed serriatim.

2.   Ms. Fuller testified as follows:  “Q After this window got broken, what did you see next?   A I saw this arm come through and snatch my purse and took off with it.   Q When this happened, were you afraid?   A Yes, I was․  Q What happened after you saw the defendant reach through the window?   A I just sit there, you know, and I was nervous;  and it happened so fast, he just grabbed it and started running, and the police came․  Q This all happened so quickly, you didn't have any time to react;  correct?   A Right.   Q As soon as you saw it happening, it was over;  is that right?   A Yes.”

3.   Appellant's counsel argued at some length that, while a myriad of crimes such as grand or petty theft, malicious mischief or burglary may have been shown, the elements of robbery were not established.

L. THAXTON HANSON, Associate Justice.

SPENCER, P.J., and LILLIE, J., concur.