PEOPLE v. FLEMING (1984)

Charged with three counts of robbery in the perpetration of which he used a knife, and with automobile theft as proscribed by Vehicle Code section 10851, defendant Fleming pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery with a maximum sentence of six years.

He appeals from the judgment under which he was sentenced to the bargained for maximum term of six years.   On his appeal he claims only that sentencing error occurred.

We quote Fleming's several contentions of error:  “I.   The trial court committed error by failing to set forth the facts and reasoning underlying the decision to impose consecutive sentences;  II.   The absence of a proper sentencing record prejudices appellant in seeking review of the trial court's discretion;  III.   The trial court abused its discretion the premeditation aggravation under rule 421(a)(8);  IV.   The conduct of the sentencing hearing indicated an unlawful dual use of facts.”

We need not, and do not, respond to any of them.

Here Fleming's bargained for plea was fully attended by the constitutional protections demanded by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242–243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711–1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 127–135, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, and Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 110 Cal.Rptr. 329, passim.   His plea was in all respects knowledgeable and voluntary.   And an express condition of his bargained for plea was that the maximum sentence which might be imposed was six years.

Such a knowledgeable and voluntary bargain must be deemed an express concession that a prison term of six years was within the range of punishment which might reasonably be imposed upon Fleming for his admitted crimes.   And no sound reason appears why the heavily burdened trial courts of this state must recite at length the reasons for imposing such an agreed reasonable sentence.

Since:  “The law does not require idle acts” (Civ.Code, § 3532;  City of Stockton v. Stockton Plaza Corp. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 639, 655, 68 Cal.Rptr. 266), we hold that in the case before us, assuming otherwise the validity of Fleming's contentions, the trial court did not err.

In reaching this conclusion we are aided by the following authority.

“ ‘The process of plea bargaining which has received statutory and judicial authorization as an appropriate method of disposing of criminal prosecutions contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court․  Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged.’ ”  (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686.)

“In sentencing a defendant to an upper term pursuant to a plea bargain ‘the court, in stating its reasons for that sentence choice, need only give the bargain as its reason and need not give any other reason.’  (People v. Sutton (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 162, 163, 169 Cal.Rptr. 656.)”  (People v. Witherow (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 485, 488, 190 Cal.Rptr. 899.)

“ ‘[W]here a bargain is struck and the sentence is in accord with the bargain, there is no purpose to be served by the court discussing with the defendant, in the abstract, the possible range of punishments for the charge.’  (Scoggins v. Superior Court (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 873, 877, 135 Cal.Rptr. 619.)

And:  “Well established is the rule that the People will be held strictly to the terms of a plea bargain made with a criminally accused․  It seems reasonable and just, at least where no public policy, or statutory or decisional or constitutional principle otherwise directs, that the accused also be held to his agreement.”  (People v. Welge (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 616, 624, 1161 Cal.Rptr. 686;  People v. Caron (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 236, 246, 171 Cal.Rptr. 203.)

The judgment, and the sentencing thereon, are affirmed.

ELKINGTON, Acting Presiding Justice.

NEWSOM and HOLMDAHL, JJ., concur.