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PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnny D. BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a person convicted of a felony is entitled to work performance and good behavior time credit (hereafter good time credit), pursuant to Penal Code section 4019,[FN1] for the period in which he was incarcerated in the county jail prior to his sentence.
Appellant Johnny D. Brown was convicted on his plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter on December 9, 1977. On May 5, 1978, he was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. The trial court found that Brown had been held in custody in the Alameda County jail for 228 days prior to sentencing, and pursuant to section 2900.5 granted credit for that time served. However, the trial court refused to grant appellant's request for an additional 32 days' credit for good time served at the jail, to which he claimed he was entitled pursuant to section 4019.
Legislative authorization for good time credit appears both in sections 2930-2932 and in section 4019. Sections 2930-2932, part of the Determinate Sentencing Law which became effective July 1, 1977, gives felons serving prison sentences the right to good time credit. However, those sections make no reference to good time credit for any presentence confinement. Section 4019 predated the enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Law, and set forth three categories of individuals entitled to good time credit for time spent in a county jail and certain other institutions. Reference to good time credit for presentence confinement appears only in section 4019, subdivision (a)(1);[FN2] therefore, it is to that subdivision that we must look for appellant's eligibility for the credit he seeks.
Respondent asserts that appellant cannot come within that subdivision because, analyzed grammatically, it applies only to a person who ultimately serves time in the county jail under a “judgment of imprisonment,” which respondent argues is a misdemeanor sentence. Thus respondent's construction of section 4019 excludes defendants who spend time in jail prior to a felony conviction and prison sentence from entitlement to section 4019 credits.
Respondent's parsing of the section appears grammatically accurate. However, as hereinafter discussed, such a construction results in a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection of the law to appellant.
Under respondent's construction of section 4019, a pretrial detainee who eventually is convicted of a misdemeanor and is sentenced to county jail (hereinafter detainee/misdemeanant) will receive good time credit against that sentence for his presentence jail time. According to sections 2930-2932, an individual charged with a crime who makes bail, then is tried, convicted of a felony, and sentenced to prison will get good time credit against his full sentence. Only the presentence detainee eventually sentenced to prison (hereinafter detainee/felon) is denied a reduction of his full sentence by good time credit, because he is denied any good time credit for his presentence confinement. It is the latter distinction, that between the detainee/felon and the felon who serves no presentence time, which raises constitutional problems.
Prior to the enactment of sections 2930-2932 as part of the Determinate Sentencing Law, only misdemeanants (and those in jail as a condition of probation or pursuant to contempt proceedings) were entitled to good time credit. (s 4019.) Thus a permissible distinction between detainee/misdemeanant and detainee/felon existed, as no felon received any good time credit. The Legislature then enacted sections 2930-2932 providing for good time credits for prison inmates, similar to the good time credits provided misdemeanants under section 4019, but without any express provision for recognizing the presentence good time of felons.
Respondent argues that the different treatment of the pretrial detainee and the individual convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison, in their entitlement to good time credit, is no denial of equal protection as the two are not similarly situated. Respondent first emphasizes that the purpose of awarding good time credit is to encourage inmates' good behavior. Respondent then argues that a pretrial detainee, unlike an individual convicted and committed to a term of imprisonment, has other inducements to good conduct: the hope of acquittal, the possibility of leniency in sentencing, the possibility of lower bail or release on his own recognizance. Respondent therefore apparently concludes that because the pretrial detainee has so many incentives, there is no reason to offer him the additional carrot of credit for his good behavior.
However, respondent's argument ignores the fact that section 4019 unquestionably provides that the calculation of good time credit for misdemeanants is to include consideration of all presentence time. Hence, the Legislature does not share respondent's view as to the distinction between pretrial detainees and those convicted. Nor do we. We perceive no rational basis for the distinction. With the creation of good time credit for the sentenced felon, the Legislature's failure to grant the detainee/felon good time credit for his presentence time created an impermissible distinction between the two.
In support of our conclusion, we note that in In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 156, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 651, 588 P.2d 789, 791, the court stated:
The history of section 2900.5 points to the Legislature's intent. When this section was first enacted the original wording provided that all the days a defendant spent in jail from the date of arrest to the day on which sentence was imposed should be credited upon the defendant's sentence. The legislative purpose appears to have been to eliminate the unequal treatment suffered by indigent defendants who, because of their inability to post bail, served a longer overall confinement than their wealthier counterparts. (In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, 549 (114 Cal.Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657); In re Young (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 68, 75 (107 Cal.Rptr. 915); In re Jordan (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 155, 157-158 (123 Cal.Rptr. 268).)
Although the court in Rojas was discussing credit for time served, not good time credit, its language strongly suggests that with the enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Law, section 4019 as construed by respondent is unconstitutional. Clearly, under respondent's construction, the indigent detainee/felon who cannot make bail is denied presentence good time credit, thereby, resulting in his longer overall confinement as against his wealthier counterpart who makes bail, then is convicted, goes directly to prison and receives good time credit against his entire term of imprisonment.
We conclude that construing the statute as narrowly as respondent suggests would result in a denial of equal protection to appellant when he is compared with convicted felons not confined prior to sentencing.
We are mindful that we are obliged to construe statutes, if possible, to uphold their constitutionality. (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 948, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669.) It is also a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the court should ascertain the purpose of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) Consideration must be given to the consequences of a particular interpretation; the apparent purpose of a statute will not be sacrificed to a literal construction. In addition, a practical construction is required when a technical construction would lead to “mischief or absurdity.” (Stanley v. Justice Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 253, 127 Cal.Rptr. 532.)
Our task is therefore to construe the statute in such a way as to eliminate its unconstitutionality, yet preserve its provisions which are not unconstitutional, and in so doing achieve a result “which the Legislature would have intended to put into effect if it had foreseen the constitutional restriction.” (In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 736, 122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 581, 537 P.2d 406, 413.)
As we have stated, section 4019 evidences a general legislative intent that good behavior during presentence confinement is to be rewarded with credit against a sentence. In addition, a 1978 amendment to section 2900.5 is indicative of legislative intent to broaden rather than narrow the categories of individuals entitled to good time credit.
At the time Brown was incarcerated section 2900.5 gave a person convicted of a felony credit against a state prison sentence for time served in custody prior to the commencement of that sentence. However, section 2900.5 made no reference to work or good time credit authorized by section 4019. Effective June 28, 1978, section 2900.5 was amended and now reads, in pertinent part: “(a) In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, including but not limited to any time spent in a jail, . . . all days of custody of the defendant . . . Including days credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.)
Under respondent's construction of section 4019, this amendment does not assist appellant as he does not fall within one of the categories listed in section 4019. The amendment has, however, been construed to entitle to section 4019 good time credit felony probationers whose probation is subsequently revoked, and who are sentenced to state prison. (People v. Doganiere (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 237, 150 Cal.Rptr. 61.) Even reading section 4019 as respondent suggests, this amendment to section 2900.5 must be interpreted as illustrative of a legislative plan to enlarge rather than restrict eligibility for good time credit.
Therefore, to avoid an unconstitutional result, yet effectuate legislative intent, we conclude that section 4019 must be construed to entitle all defendants, whether sentenced eventually to county jail or to state prison, to presentence good time credit as described in section 4019, subdivision (b).
Our conclusion is reinforced by the principle that when a statutory classification arbitrarily excludes some but not all of those similarly situated in relation to the legitimate purposes of the statute, a reviewing court may correct the discriminatory classification by invalidating the invidious exemption and thus extend statutory benefits to those whom the Legislature unconstitutionally excluded. (Hayes v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 224, 98 Cal.Rptr. 449, 490 P.2d 1137.) Had the Legislature explicitly excluded those in appellant's class from the entitlement to presentence good time credit, this court could have invalidated the exemption.
We are also mindful that an individual confined in county jail on a particular charge may eventually be tried and convicted either of a felony and sentenced to prison, or of a misdemeanor and sentenced to county jail. It is necessary for the custodial authority to keep records regarding each detainee so that ultimately appropriate good time credits can be awarded. Whether the detainee becomes a misdemeanant by sentence, a probationer, or an imprisoned felon should not affect the requirement of such record keeping.
Although the credits awarded pursuant to sections 2930-2932 are not precisely the same as section 4019 credits, they are sufficiently similar so that the difference in their method of calculation presents no equal protection problem.
By our holding all felons are entitled to section 4019 credits for their period of presentence confinement from July 1, 1977, the effective date of sections 2930-2932.
Judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to recompute appellant's credit time served in accordance with the views herein expressed.
FOOTNOTES
1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2. Section 4019 provides:(a) The provisions of this section shall apply in all of the following cases:(1) When a prisoner is confined in or committed to a county jail, industrial farm, or road camp, or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp, including all days of custody from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving of the sentence commences, under a judgment of imprisonment, or a fine and imprisonment until the fine is paid in a criminal action or proceeding.(2) When a prisoner is confined in or committed to the county jail, industrial farm, or road camp or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp as a condition of probation after suspension of imposition of a sentence or suspension of execution of sentence, in a criminal action or proceeding.(3) When a prisoner is confined in or committed to the county jail, industrial farm, or road camp or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a definite period of time for contempt pursuant to a proceeding, other than a criminal action or proceeding.(b) For each one-fifth of a month in which a prisoner is confined in any of the foregoing cases, one day shall be deducted from his period of confinement for each of the following:(1) When it appears by the record that he has satisfactorily performed labor as assigned by the sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp, one day shall be deducted from his period of confinement by order of such sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent.(2) When it appears, by the record, that he has satisfactorily complied with the reasonable rules and regulations established by the sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent for the conduct of such prisoners, and that his conduct is reported by the officer in charge of the jail, industrial farm or road camp to have been satisfactory, one day shall be deducted from his period of confinement.(3) No deduction may be made for any period of confinement within any calendar month which period is less than one-fifth of such month.(Added by Stats.1976, c. 286, p. 515, s 4.)
SCOTT, Associate Justice.
WHITE, P. J., and FEINBERG, J., concur.
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Docket No: Cr. 18320.
Decided: March 27, 1979
Court: Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.
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