PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION (1979)

Plaintiffs, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant, State Board of Equalization (hereafter board), declaring that article XIII A, section 2, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution, does not entitle plaintiffs to a reduction and rollback of the property tax assessments levied against them by defendant board.

Plaintiffs are public utility corporations which provide electricity, water, gas and steam throughout much of the state. In May 1978, the market value of plaintiffs' facilities was computed by the board in accordance with the then prevailing formula. One month later, the electorate approved article XIII A, an initiative amendment to article XIII, which provided, in pertinent part: “s 1. (P)(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties. . . .

“s 2. (P)(a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under ‘full cash value’ or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to reflect that valuation. For purposes of this section, the term ‘newly constructed’ shall not include real property which is reconstructed after a disaster, as declared by the Governor, where the fair market value of such real property, as reconstructed, is comparable to its fair market value prior to the disaster.”

In the latter part of June 1978, plaintiffs petitioned defendant board for a reconsideration of their respective assessments in light of the recently enacted amendments to article XIII. The board refused to adjust the assessments. It rejected plaintiffs' contention that the tax rate limitation of section 1, subdivision (a), and the valuation formula established in section 2, subdivision (a), applied to state-assessed property, despite the fact that this position was supported by the board's chief counsel.

On July 10, 1978, plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief in the superior court. The petition sought to compel the board to apply the “rollback” provisions of article XIII A, section 2, subdivision (a) to plaintiffs. The superior court issued an alternative writ of mandamus directed to the board on July 11, 1978.

The board demurred to the petition, and on August 2, 1978, after the matter had been argued, the court issued a minute order denying the writ and dissolving the alternative writ.

In an effort to have this issue resolved prior to the final preparation and distribution of the 1978-79 public utility tax rolls, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the California Supreme Court on August 11, 1978. The petition was denied without opinion on August 21, 1978. At that time, the Supreme Court had not yet decided the constitutionality of Proposition 13.

On August 30, 1978, an order and judgment in the superior court action was filed, declaring that the provisions of article XIII A, section 2, subdivision (a), did not apply to state assessees such as plaintiffs. The court dissolved the alternative writ of mandate and denied the peremptory writ prayed for.

On appeal, we must first confront a procedural question, namely, whether plaintiffs, as a condition precedent to the commencement of the instant action, were required to pay the property taxes assessed and seek a refund. Defendant board argues that the proper remedy for plaintiffs was to pay the tax and then apply for a refund, pursuant to section 5096 et seq. of the Revenue and Taxation Code, in each of the counties in which plaintiffs own property. The board bases its position on three theories: first, the refund procedure provides an adequate remedy at law, therefore, the equitable action filed by plaintiffs is inappropriate; second, the state Constitution prohibits legal proceedings to enjoin the collection of taxes and favors the refund procedure provided for by statute; and, third, by not filing for a refund, plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Equitable remedies such as a writ of mandamus can be barred by the presence of a legal remedy if that remedy is plain, speedy and adequate. (See Code Civ.Proc., s 1086.) Plaintiffs argue, convincingly, that since they own property in numerous counties (one of the plaintiffs owns property in 50 counties in the state), to pay the tax and then seek refunds in all these counties is not a plain, speedy and adequate legal remedy, and that their equitable action, therefore, should not be barred.

The major case in point is San Diego etc. Ry. Co. v. State Board (1913) 165 Cal. 560, 132 P. 1044. There, the petitioner sought mandamus in the California Supreme Court following the board's decision that petitioner's railroad was subject to county and local taxation. The court held that mandamus was a proper method to obtain review of the board's decision, since it involved a question of law and the railway had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (P. 564, 132 P. 1044.) In a more recent decision, the California Supreme Court explained San Diego in these terms: “In that case mandamus issued to compel action by the state board to preclude local taxation of the petitioner's assets. The writ was timely to prevent the collection of local taxes and its denial would have compelled the petitioner to sue for recovery of taxes from a number of local taxing authorities.” (Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Quinn (1960) 54 Cal.2d 507, 512, 6 Cal.Rptr. 545, 547, 354 P.2d 1, 4.)

In Hopkins v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co. (1928) 275 U.S. 393, 48 S.Ct. 180, 72 L.Ed. 329, the United States Supreme Court held that seeking a refund was not an adequate legal remedy when the refund procedure would require separate actions against one county and sixteen municipalities and when interest was not paid. (Pp. 399-400, 48 S.Ct. 180.) The court stressed that the necessity for separate actions kept the procedure from being adequate. We believe that the language in this case supports plaintiffs' position.

None of the cases cited by the board involves a situation where the taxpayer would be forced to seek refunds from a number of government agencies. Typical of the cases relied upon is Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board (1963) 60 Cal.2d 177, 32 Cal.Rptr. 1, 383 P.2d 409. That case involved a group of taxpayers suing the California Franchise Tax Board over some deductions which had been rejected by the board. The taxpayers' refund action would have been brought solely against this one agency.

The board argues that the San Diego rationale is no longer applicable because modern procedures expedite the refund process. Specifically, the board points to section 404 of the Code of Civil Procedure and two class action cases. (Santa Barbara Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 244, 120 Cal.Rptr. 609; Lattin v. Franchise Tax Board (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 377, 142 Cal.Rptr. 130.) Section 404 allows for consolidation when civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are pending in different courts. Under this section, plaintiffs would be forced to seek refunds in each and every county in which their property is located, followed by the filing of separate complaints, before seeking consolidation. Those cases cited by the board involve plaintiffs who had joined together in a class action against one agency, rather than an action instituted against several agencies. In this instance, even under modern procedures, the refund method does not constitute an adequate legal remedy.

Without an expeditious decision on the merits, plaintiffs would be required to initiate refund actions, followed by the filing of lawsuits, in over 50 counties. While these actions are pending, local taxing jurisdictions would be in doubt as to both the validity and amount of tax revenue to be budgeted. Significantly, at the June 14 hearing, the board indicated its concern with the need for a prompt resolution of the question. It is clear that the refund procedure is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy which would serve as a bar to plaintiffs' equitable action.

The second theory advanced by the board is predicated upon article XIII, section 32, of the California Constitution: “No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.”

The courts which have applied this section and dismissed complaints where the petitioner sought judicial resolution of a tax dispute before having sought a refund, have done so on the basis that petitioner had an adequate remedy at law. (Lorco Properties, Inc. v. Department of Benefit Payments (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 809, 129 Cal.Rptr. 312; Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board of State of California (9th Cir. 1965) 348 F.2d 9.) Significantly, in these cases and in the cases cited by the board, the taxpayers-petitioners were required to seek refunds from only one source. Obviously, the policy underlying section 32 is that, since an adequate remedy awaits the taxpayer, there is no reason to hinder the tax collection process by allowing legal actions before payment. In this case, however, plaintiffs do not have an adequate legal remedy, therefore, dismissal of plaintiffs' action would not be in furtherance of the policy and rationale of section 32.

Furthermore, it does not appear that plaintiffs were necessarily seeking to enjoin tax collection. At the time they were before the trial court, the board had not yet transmitted the assessment roll to the counties and, A fortiori, plaintiffs had not received their tax bills. Plaintiffs sought to obtain a ruling on the applicability of article XIII A, section 2, subdivision (a), before the respective taxing jurisdictions were to begin the process of tax collection.

In any event, section 32 would not bar plaintiffs' cause of action for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs sought that relief under section 11440 of the Government Code, which entitles parties to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of a regulation. Under section 11371, subdivision (b), of the Government Code, regulation is defined as “every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application . . . adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it . . . .”

Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 104 Cal.Rptr. 558, provides persuasive authority for the proposition that section 11440 does not conflict with the language found in article XIII, section 32. In that case, two trucking companies, acting pursuant to section 11440, sought a declaratory judgment defining their rights and duties under a tax regulation. The board argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action under section 10276 of the Revenue and Taxation Code (repealed Stats.1972, ch. 563, s 1).¹ The court concluded that these statutes were not in conflict and held that a court could determine the validity of a tax regulation under section 11440 of the Government Code without violating the prohibition against enjoining the collection of taxes. (P. 236, 104 Cal.Rptr. 558.) The court stated that the remedy granted could not interfere with the collection of taxes. The court assumed that the board would abide by the declaratory judgment, but that if it refused, the taxpayer's remedy was to pay the assessed tax and commence action for a refund.² In any event, it was held that the prohibition of former section 10276 of the Revenue and Taxation Code did not bar the declaratory action. In our view, the same reasoning compels the conclusion that, in this instance, plaintiffs' declaratory relief action is not barred by article XIII, section 32,3 of the California Constitution.

The third theory on which the board bases its case is that plaintiffs' failure to pursue a refund constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (The board does not specify which administrative remedies could still be pursued, but it can be assumed that it is referring to the refund procedure.)

For all practical purposes, plaintiffs did exhaust their remedies by petitioning the board, both for an initial hearing and a rehearing. The board is the only agency empowered to assess utilities. (Cal.Const., art. XIII, s 19; Rev. & Tax.Code, s 721; Southern Cal. Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 119, 113 P.2d 773.) Having sought relief and reconsideration of the denial of relief from the board, plaintiffs have exhausted the only viable remedy available to them. In the cases cited by the board, the failure of the petitioner to exhaust remedies was always a failure to petition the board for an initial hearing or a rehearing. In the only case where a failure to seek a refund was a part of the failure to exhaust remedies, that fact was coupled with a failure to complete the rehearing procedure before the board. (Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board, supra, 60 Cal.2d 177, 32 Cal.Rptr. 1, 383 P.2d 409.) In none of the cases cited was the petitioner faced with the prospect of pursuing refunds in more than 50 counties.

Furthermore, the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is obviously inapplicable where the plaintiff has no administrative remedy for obtaining the judicial declaration authorized by section 11440 of the Government Code. (Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 237, 104 Cal.Rptr. 558.)

Finally, administrative remedies need not be exhausted when there is no factual question which can be decided by the administrative agency, but rather a question of law for the court. (Stenocord Corp. v. City etc. of San Francisco (1970) 2 Cal.3d 984, 987, 88 Cal.Rptr. 166, 471 P.2d 966; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 32, 37, 116 Cal.Rptr. 742.) At issue in these two cases was either a failure of the board to follow statutory procedure or the fact that the assessment itself was a nullity as a matter of law. At issue in this case is not a factual dispute but whether the assessment is governed by the Jarvis-Gann initiative. If state assessees are found to be governed by the amendment, then the assessment contemplated by the board would be a nullity as a matter of law, or it could be held that the board had failed to follow the constitutional procedure in determining the assessment. In either event, the rationale behind the requirement that administrative remedies be first exhausted does not exist in this case, since the overriding substantive question is one of law which, ultimately, must be decided by the courts and not by a state or local administrative agency.

Accordingly, we conclude that the board's procedural objections to plaintiffs' case must be rejected.

Turning to the merits of the controversy between the parties, we note at the outset that the argument advanced by defendant board is based on the fact that the property of public utilities is not assessed by county assessors but by defendant board, a body which possesses statewide jurisdiction. Article XIII, section 19, of the California Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “The Board shall annually assess (1) pipelines, flumes, canals, ditches, and aqueducts lying within 2 or more counties and (2) property, except franchises, owned or used by regulated railway, telegraph, or telephone companies, car companies operating on railways in the State, and companies transmitting or selling gas or electricity. This property shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”

As earlier noted, article XIII A, section 1, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution, provides, in part, that “The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property.” Section 2, subdivision (a) of this article states that “The full cash value means the County assessor's valuation of real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under ‘full cash value’ . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

The board contends that the language of article XIII A must be interpreted literally; that since it is the board and not the county assessor which assesses the property of public utilities, there can be no “county assessor's valuation” of property owned by public utilities. Hence, the board concludes, plaintiffs are not entitled to have the value of their property rolled back to the tax year 1975-76. The board concedes that article XIII A, section 1, subdivision (a), which limits the tax rate to one percent, is applicable to state assessees and reasons that since this is the case, plaintiffs cannot claim that they are being treated in an unfair or discriminatory manner merely because they will not benefit from the rollback provisions of section 2, subdivision (a).

In Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281, the California Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of article XIII A, observed that the ballot summary and arguments and analysis presented to the electorate might be helpful in determining the probable meaning of uncertain language in an initiative measure. In this instance, however, an examination of such material reveals that the question whether public utilities were entitled to benefit from the rollback provision of article XIII A was never addressed. The only reference to state assessees, as opposed to other property owners, appears in the “Analysis by Legislative Analyst” of the California Voters Pamphlet dated June 6, 1978. It is there stated that “This measure does not mention county assessed personal property (such as business inventories), or state assessed property such as public utilities, but the Legislative Counsel advises us that the 1 percent limit would apply to All types of taxable property.” Unfortunately, that language is of no help to us in this situation, where the general application of the one percent limit is conceded by the board and the only question is whether the rollback provision is also of general application. None of the other material contained in the voter's pamphlet sheds any light on this latter question. The most that can be said is that none of the material contains any suggestion that article XIII A would benefit one type of property owner and not another.

In the Amador case, the California Supreme Court stated that an enactment such as article XIII A “must receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction . . . .” (P. 245, 149 Cal.Rptr. p. 257, 583 P.2d p. 1300.) The court noted that each of the sections of article XIII A are “reasonably interrelated and interdependent, forming an interlocking ‘package’ deemed necessary by the initiative's framers to assure effective real property tax relief.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 231, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290.)

It is evident that section 1, subdivision (a), is broadly framed and limits any ad valorem tax “on real property” to one percent of “the full cash value of such property.” There is no hint of any intent to limit this section to a particular type of real property. Obviously, it applies to all real property in the state, however owned or assessed, and the board makes no claim to the contrary.

Section 2, subdivision (a), must be read in conjunction with section 1, subdivision (a), because section 2, subdivision (a) defines the term “full cash value” as used in section 1, subdivision (a). The definition furnished is “the county assessor's valuation of real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under ‘full cash value’ . . . .” Here again, the term “real property” is not qualified in any way and would appear to have been used in the same broad sense as in section 1, subdivision (a).

However, the board contends that the framers of article XIII A intended such a qualification when they referred to “the county assessor's valuation.” The board views this phrase as a term of art, which had the effect of limiting the broad language of section 1, subdivision (a), and granting a rollback only to those persons whose property was actually “valued” by a county assessor. Since plaintiffs' property was assessed by the board rather than by a county assessor, the board concludes that plaintiffs are not entitled to benefit from the rollback provision of section 2, subdivision (a).

We find this reasoning to be rather strained. Obviously, the board's interpretation did not occur to the authors of the various materials contained in the voter's pamphlet and it seems unlikely that it occurred to the voters who adopted article XIII A. The conclusion seems inescapable that, had the drafters of the measure wished to make it inapplicable to state assessees, they could easily have so provided in language which would be readily understandable to all.

We agree with plaintiffs that it is far more reasonable to assume that the language upon which the board relies was intended only to define a value base which property owners could readily determine by examining the information on their tax bills. It must be remembered that section 2, subdivision (a), refers to “the county assessor's valuation of real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under ‘full cash value’ . . . .” When considered in its full context, the phrase merely designates a specific numerical figure to which property owners may look in order to determine the tax advantage accruing to them under article XIII A. We doubt that the framers of the measure were concerned with the precise method by which the valuation figure came to be placed on the 1975-76 tax bill or that it was of any concern to them whether such valuation was set by the board or the county assessor. The apparent purpose of section 2, subdivision (a), was simply to direct property owners to a particular figure on their 1975-76 tax bill which would henceforth constitute the full cash value of such property, as long as no change of ownership occurred.

As plaintiffs have correctly pointed out, resort to a valuation figure on a 1975-76 tax bill may be had just as readily by a state assessee as by any other property owner. When a tax bill is prepared, there is a secured roll which includes properties assessed both by county assessors and by the board. (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 109.) The value set by the board is allocated to each taxing jurisdiction (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 745) and a state assessment roll is sent to the appropriate county auditor. (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 756.) The auditor then applies the same tax rate to the secured property tax roll. (Rev. & Tax.Code, ss 109, 2152.) The local tax collector collects all property taxes (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 2602) in the same manner by mailing a bill to each assessee (including state assessees). (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 2610.5.) The tax bills are paid to the tax collector (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 2613) and accounted to the auditor in the same manner as with all other property on the secured roll. (Rev. & Tax.Code, s 2616.) The proceeds from taxes on all property, including state-assessed property, are then paid by the tax collector to the county treasurer. (Gov.Code, s 27401.) Except for the initial assessment, plaintiffs' property is treated in the identical manner as locally assessed property. It seems reasonable to assume that, if the drafters of article XIII A had intended that state assessees would henceforth be treated in such a disparate manner to other property owners, they would have expressed such intent in a straightforward manner and not by means of the oblique language upon which the board relies.

Also, we are of the view that the board's suggested construction of article XIII A would bring it directly into conflict with that portion of article XIII, section 19, which requires that the property of state assessees “ be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.” Because article XIII A and article XIII, section 19, are provisions of equal constitutional dignity, the task of this court is to integrate and harmonize their conjunctive operation. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) All efforts to this end, short of doing violence to the plain language and natural operation of the provisions, are legitimate and desirable. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) The purpose of such process is to avoid a finding that an existing provision has been implicitly repealed by the enactment of a more recent section. Repeals by implication are disfavored and are accepted only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between equally valid measures and “the two cannot have concurrent operation.” (In re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 212, 181 Cal.Rptr. 780, 783, 460 P.2d 980, 983.) It is apparent that, if the property of state assessees is given a current valuation and all other property is given a 1975-76 valuation, then the property of state assessees is not being taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.

The board seeks to avoid this reasoning by arguing that Southern Cal. Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 113 P.2d 773, stands for the proposition that a property owner is not unfairly or discriminatorily treated as long as his property is subject to the same Tax rate as other property, and that as long as this is the case, it is of no moment that his property is assessed at a greater value than other property. A reading of that case, however, lends no support for the board's interpretation of its holding.

In the Southern Cal. case, the plaintiff, a public utility, challenged the Board of Equalization's assessment of certain real and personal property located in the city and county of Los Angeles. The plaintiff contended that the board was guilty of constructive fraud because it had seriously overvalued the property. However, plaintiff produced no evidence of the actual value of the property in question. Instead, it based its argument solely upon certain highly speculative evidence, namely, that had the property been assessed by the city and county (which in fact had no power to do so), they would have assessed it at a substantially lower figure. The appellate court held that a factual determination of value made by an assessing authority such as the board was conclusive on the courts as long as it was honestly arrived at and was not made “ ‘in pursuance of some fixed rule or general system the result of which is necessarily discriminatory and inequitable . . . .’ ” (P. 116, 113 P.2d p. 777.) The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a case of constructive fraud by offering some evidence that a city or county assessor might have given the plaintiff's property a lower value than that set by the board. The court went on to point out that a different situation would be presented if plaintiff had been able to prove that the board had acted in violation of the constitutional provision requiring that state-assessed property “ ‘Be subject to taxation to the same extent, and in the same manner as other property.’ ” (Southern Cal. Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 114, 127, 113 P.2d 773, 776.)

Here, we are not presented with a challenge to an assessor's factual determination that a particular property is worth a particular amount. Instead, the situation is one involving a “ ‘fixed rule or general system the result of which is necessarily discriminatory and inequitable . . . .’ ” (Southern Cal. Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 116, 113 P.2d 773, 777.) Thus, the board has decided a question of law and has ruled that state assessees are not entitled to benefit by the rollback provision of article XIII A. If property belonging to public utilities such as plaintiffs is to be assessed at its current value and all other property is to be assessed as of the tax year 1975-76, then we are confronted with a valuation of the property of state assessees which will uniformly exceed, in a substantial amount, the valuation placed by county assessors upon common property throughout the state. Discriminatory treatment of this nature is precisely the sort of conduct which the court in the Southern Cal. case concluded would be in violation of the constitutional provision requiring that the property of state assessees receive the same tax treatment as other property.

Dawson v. County of Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 77, 98 P.2d 495, also furnishes support for plaintiffs' position. There, it was held that the “ ‘tax burden’ ” placed upon real or personal property “is not measured or determined by either the rate or assessment alone but that such ‘tax burden’ is ‘the rate times the assessment’ and that it is only when the product of the two is excessive that the property bears an undue tax burden.” (P. 80, 98 P.2d p. 496.)

In this case, all parties are in agreement that the one percent tax rate applies to all property, including that of state-assessees. In the real world of today, it appears likely that, if the same tax rate is applied to all property, while the property of state-assessees is assessed differently than all other property (at current values rather than at 1975-76 value), an excessive and undue tax burden would be borne by state assessees.

One further point requires discussion. The board suggests that if the rollback provision of article XIII A is applied to state assessees, they will receive a “tremendous advantage” over other property owners because it is alleged to be a matter of common knowledge that the property of public utilities is rarely, if ever sold; therefore, such property would continue indefinitely to be valued at 1975-76 levels while other property would not.

We hearken to an admonition by the California Supreme Court in the Amador case: “We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. We do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the initiative. Rather, our sole function is to evaluate article XIII A legally in the light of established constitutional standards.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 219, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 241, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283.)

The likelihood that the adoption of this initiative measure might confer an advantage upon business property, such as that of public utilities, was one fact which was brought to the attention of the voters by the materials contained in the voters' pamphlet. The Legislative Analyst pointed out that, “By requiring that property be reassessed when sold, this initiative would, over time, cause homeowners to pay an increasing proportion of local property taxes because homes are sold more often than other types of property such as commercial and industrial.” We must conclude that the voters did not consider this consequence to be of overriding significance.

Finally, we note that the Public Utilities Commission has ordered that the major California utilities benefited by article XIII A shall pass on to the ratepayers any ad valorem tax reductions. This result is clearly consonant with the general spirit of the initiative.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for disposition in accordance with the views expressed herein.

FOOTNOTES

1.  That section was similar to section 32 and provided that “No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal or equitable process shall issue in any suit, action, or proceeding in any court against this State or against any officer of the State to prevent or enjoin the collection under this part of any license tax or other amounts sought to be collected by the board.”

2.  It should also be noted that the court's indication that the petitioner might eventually have to seek a refund was made in the context of a petitioner who had to seek a refund from only one agency.

FN3. The board argues that declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision. We disagree. The order by the board falls within the definition of a regulation as set forth in the code, so that it is an appropriate method of review under section 11440 of the Government Code.None of the cases cited in support of the board's argument involve a regulation or order subject to review pursuant to section 11440. All of the decisions involve adjudicatory decision making, the review of which is now limited to administrative mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this case, the board engaged in quasi-legislative rulemaking; that is, the board formulated a rule to be applied to all future assessments of state-assessed property, rather than adjudicating facts or applying a rule to a specific state of existing facts. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees' Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, pp. 34-35, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29; see also Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 368, 383, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892.).  FN3. The board argues that declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision. We disagree. The order by the board falls within the definition of a regulation as set forth in the code, so that it is an appropriate method of review under section 11440 of the Government Code.None of the cases cited in support of the board's argument involve a regulation or order subject to review pursuant to section 11440. All of the decisions involve adjudicatory decision making, the review of which is now limited to administrative mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this case, the board engaged in quasi-legislative rulemaking; that is, the board formulated a rule to be applied to all future assessments of state-assessed property, rather than adjudicating facts or applying a rule to a specific state of existing facts. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees' Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, pp. 34-35, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29; see also Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 368, 383, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892.)

ROUSE, Associate Justice.

TAYLOR, P. J., and MILLER, J., concur.