IN RE: Aline Ann D. (1974)

This case raises an old issue—namely what disposition can and may a juvenile court make for a minor girl whose character and conduct render her unfit for placement in any foster home, county operated treatment facility or local private treatment facility but whose character and conduct are not such as would, in case of a male delinquent, result in placement with the California Youth Authority. In its study of the juvenile court system in 1960, The Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice reported that 24 per cent of the juvenile court judges in the 20 largest counties in the state listed ‘more county level facilities for girls' as the facility and service most critically needed. (Report, Part II, p. 51.) The condition has not changed in the intervening 14 years.

The record before us shows a 16-year old girl, with a minimal (67) IQ, rejected by her mother,¹ with an absent father, who has a long history of assaultive behavior and of association with juvenile gangs. She has been placed in various local treatfacilities and has been rejected by all because of her conduct and her propensity for encouraging ‘visits' from her juvenile gang associates. The record shows that, in spite of efforts both by the probation officer and her own defense counsel, no treatment facility in Los Angeles County is either equipped or willing to accept her for placement under sections 727 and 730 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The opinion of court-appointed psychiatrists and of the deputy probation officer was that she needed either a ‘closed’ placement—i. e., one with locked doors and windows and with limited admission of ‘visitors'—but that no such institution in Los Angeles County was available for her, or else commitment to a camp facility similar to the forestry camps procided by the county for delinquent male minors. No such camp facility exists.

Because of the problems in placing the minor, a petition for review of her disposition was filed pursuant to section 777 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, a hearing was held, and the facts above set forth were brought out. With expressed reluctance, the court ordered the minor placed with the Youth Authority. She has appealed; with equal reluctance, we affirm.

I

The statutory scheme, as recommended by the Study Commission and as now embodied in section 730 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code, contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders in cases such as that now before us—namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement. It is clear that the juvenile court has, through the series of orders and administrative actions reflected in the record before us, followed that concept and that the order now appealed from is the ultimate action contemplated by sections 731 and 777.

II

Section 734 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides as follows:

‘No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.’

The formal order appealed from contains a printed recital conforming to that requirement. Counsel argue that that finding is not supported by the record because the uncontradicted reports of the court-appointed phychiatrists stated that a Youth Authority commitment would be disadvantageous to the minor because it would expose a girl, at present with no criminal record, to association with more dangerous and criminally inclined minors and because the trial court, itself, indicated that it shared that concern.²

We do not agree with counsel's contention. The requirement of section 734 is to make sure that the trial court does not make a Youth Authority commitment without first exploring all other alternatives. But every juvenile court placement involves some detrimental as well as some advantageous elements. In the case at bench, the trial court was faced with the alternative of releasing the minor entirely, with neither home, foster home nor treatment facility available, or of sending her to the Youth Authority. We cannot say that the choice that it made was not likely to be more beneficial to the minor than an unsupervised release. The finding, thus, is not without support in the record.

III

Counsel argues that, assuming that the placement order complies with the statutory requirements, it results in a denial of equal protection of the laws. However, not every differentiation in treatment is necessarily a violation of constitutional rights. We cannot say that the relatively small proportion of female minors in need of placement in the equivalent of a forestry camp does not justify the county in declining to assume the costs of a special facility for the female minors. Certainly we neither can nor should reverse the commitment in this case where the only alternative now existing or likely to exist in the near future is total release.

The order is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  ‘Q What would happen if we simply sent her home?‘A Her mother has stated that she will not accept her at home.’

2.  ‘Q [By the court] The recommendation by Dr. Pollack indicates also that he does not recommend placement with the California Youth Authority, on the ground that she is not truly delinquent in that he fears that if she becomes now involved with more delinquent and criminally oriented youths that this may influence her in of course exactly the wrong direction, and that is a concern that the Court shares with you and with her counsel, but it seems that we are powerless.’

KINGSLEY, Associate Justice.

FILES, P. J., and DUNN, J., concur.