IN RE: John S. (1977)

John S., a minor admitted by his parents to a private mental hospital, petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release.¹ The court ordered a hearing and appointed the public defender to represent the minor. At the hearing minor's parents opposed the petition, and minor's father filed a declaration setting out minor's history of involvement with dangerous explosives and with powerful drugs. According to the declaration, minor had seriously injured himself with explosives on two occasions, had been using various drugs, and had been incapacitated by drugs both before and after his admission to the hospital; minor had showed only limited progress in the private mental hospital because he failed to confront his problems; in father's opinion, it would not be feasible or proper at that time for minor to return to the family home. Counsel for minor contended the father's allegations could be easily disproved. The court did not undertake to evaluate these contentions or inquire into the facts, but granted the petition as a matter of law: ‘I do hold that although the parent has the right to place a minor into a locked facility, into a mental health hospital, that the minor has the right to demand and will automatically be ordered released unless there is a filing under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. [LPS Act.]² * * * [Minor] is now ordered released as soon as he can be processed. He is now ordered released from further confinement which, as I have indicated, I find involuntary because he does not want to remain.’

Parents appeal the order granting minor's release.³

I

The appeal presents preliminary procedural questions of mootness and of authority for representation.

First, is the cause moot? Subsequent to the superior court's order directing minor's release, stayed by this court pending appeal, parents moved him from the private mental hospital to a private halfway house and school. Minor has since reached the age of majority and is now free from parental custody and control. Yet the issue in this case remains of broad public concern. Similar though not identical cases are pending in the California Supreme Court (In re Roger M. S., Crim. 19558) and in the United States Supreme Court (Kremens v. Bartley, 75–1064; Parham v. J. L., 75–1690). The issue presented here may often arise yet persistently evade review by reason of passage of time or cessation of the challenged conduct. (Carroll v. Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 178–179, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325.) Parents and minor remain strongly at odds on the underlying legal question (cf. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Employment (1961) 56 Cal.2d 54, 58, 13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487), and we do not consider parents' removal of minor from the private mental hospital an abandonment of their appeal. (Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 666–667, n. 4, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337.) We therefore exercise our inherent discretion to resolve the issue presented by exhaustive briefs on appeal. (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737; see Kates and Barker ‘Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory,’ 62 California Law Review 1385, 1387–1388, 1433–1435 (1974).)

Second, does the public defender possess authority to represent minor? Parents contend he lacks statutory authority to undertake such representation, and they argue that since they may be held liable for the cost of the public defender's services to minor (Gov.Code, § 27,712) the appointment infringes their exclusive authority to contract for services rendered to the minor. However, Government Code section 27706, subdivision (d), authorizes the public defender to represent any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings under the LPS Act (Phillips v. Seely (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 104, 113, 117 Cal.Rptr. 863), and the superior court's appointment of the public defender to represent minor was thus consistent with its substantive ruling that minor is entitled to the protection of LPS Act. Duties of the public defender include collateral and incidental activities that promote the accomplishment of his statutory mandate. (Ligda v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811, 825, 85 Cal.Rptr. 744.) A natural corollary to representation of persons under the LPS Act is representation of persons who claim they are entitled to rights under the Act, even if it should ultimately be determined they are not entitled to those rights. (As to the right to counsel in a LPS proceeding see Thorn v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 666, 675, 83 Cal.Rptr. 600, 464 P.2d 56.) A further basis for representation may be found in Government Code section 27706, subdivision (e), which allows the court to order the public defender to represent any person entitled thereto under the juvenile court law, for, as we discuss later, the petition for habeas corpus may tender issues germane to the juvenile court law. Finally, subdivision (g) of the same section authorizes the public defender to represent any person under detention ‘in a proceeding of any nature.'⁴ We think the reach of this subdivision is sufficiently broad to encompass unwanted detention of any description. In any event since minor petitioned for writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf, the cause would be before the court whether or not the public defender appeared on his behalf.⁵ Both the court and the litigants profit from the labors of counsel. In our view the petition tendered issues appropriate for public defender representation and the court's appointment of the public defender to represent minor was proper. We note that the parents have not been charged for the public defender's services nor is there any present indication the public defender will seek an order for such charges; hence we need not resolve the inchoate issue of the parents' liability for services of counsel to the minor.⁶

II

The appeal presents a single substantive question: Are parents, as natural guardians of their minor child, authorized to detain their child in a private mental hospital for treatment without the child's consent and without reference to the standards and judicial oversight of the LPS Act?

1. Implicit Statutory Authority. Minor first contends the question must be resolved in his favor because no statute expressly authorizes parents to detain their minor child in such a facility. Closest in point is Welfare and Institutions Code section 6002, which allows the person in charge of a private mental hospital to receive for care and treatment any person suffering from mental disorder who voluntarily and competently applies for admission, or on whose behalf a conservator with special powers has applied for admission.⁷ The statute provides that a voluntary adult patient may leave the hospital at any time but that a conservatee may leave only on notice given by his conservator. Minor reasons that because the statute fails to mention admission of minors by their parents minors cannot be so admitted under the statute.

We do not concur in this conclusion. Authority of parents to admit and remove their minor children at a state mental hospital is expressly recognized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 6000. The volition there specified is clearly that of the parents, not the minor. The section provides that ‘[i]n the case of a minor person, the application [for admission] shall be made by his parents . . .’ Further: ‘A minor person who is a voluntary patient may leave the hospital or institution after completing normal hospitalization departure procedures after notice is given to the superintendent or person in charge by the parents . . . of their desire to remove him.’ (Emphasis added.) A Fortiori the identical authority implicitly rests with the parents in the admission and removal of a minor from a private mental hospital. This same assumption, that parents control the care and treatment of their minor children, permeates our legislative codes. (E. g., Civ.Code, §§ 25.5, 25.6, 25.7, 25.8, and 34.5 [minor's limited rights to consent to certain medical treatment]; Health & Saf.Code, § 38110 [parental consent for treatment of developmentally disabled person]; Prob.Code, § 1444 [judicial consent in absence of parental consent to minor's medical treatment]; Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5325.5 [parental right to refuse lobotomy or shock treatment for minor].) Fortifying this assumption is the specific provision of section 6002 authorizing certain conservators to admit and remove their conservatees from private mental hospitals. Conservatorship is a limited form of guardianship, the conservatee being a person for whom ‘a guardian could be appointed’ (Prob.Code, § 1751; Board of Regents v. Davis (1975) 14 Cal.3d 33, 38, fn. 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 407, 533 P.2d 1047); and since parents are the natural guardians of their minor children (In re White (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 637, 640, 129 P.2d 706), they necessarily hold all rights of a statutory guardian or conservator of the person.

2. Absence of Constitutional Objection. Minor's other contention rests on the constitutional claim that his involuntary confinement in a private mental hospital on his parents' authorization violates his rights to due process and equal protection of law. Minor points out he enjoys fundamental rights as a person under the Constitution. (See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.) He notes that involuntary confinement in a mental hospital is a ‘massive curtailment of liberty’ (Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394), and he argues there is no constitutional basis for confining a mentally-ill person without treatment if he is not dangerous and can live safely in freedom. (O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 573–575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396.)

But the analysis cannot end with a summary of minor's rights. Minor's rights are limited by his dependency and by his incompetency, and to a great extent his rights must be exercised on his behalf by guardians. Because parents are the natural guardians of their children, they are charged with those responsibilities and decisions that the minor cannot properly exercise for himself. To carry out their responsibilities and make these decisions parents require necessary and appropriate authority, and hence the fundamental rights and duties of parents are involved in this cause. ‘Although the rights of parenthood are not absolute, but subject to the superior right of the state to intervene and protect the child against abuse of parental authority, the state may not constitutionally interfere with the natural liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.’ (Odell v. Lutz (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 104, 106, 177 P.2d 628, 629.) ‘The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.’ (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1543, 32 L.Ed.2d 15; see also, Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195.) The United States Supreme Court summarized its concern for parental rights in Stanley v. Illiois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551:

‘The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), and ‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,’ May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953). ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).'

Mr. Justice Traynor viewed parental rights and duties this way:

‘Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his child and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has a wide discretion in the performance of his parental functions . . .’ (Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal.2d 421, 429–430, 289 P.2d 218, 224.)

‘Custody embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes the right to the child's services and earnings [citation] and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion. [Citations.]’ (Burge v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12.)

Parental rights include ability to prescribe medical treatment for their dependent children and impose therapeutic regimes on their minor children which, in the judgment of the parents, are in the children's longterm best interests. Indeed, parents not only have the right to prescribe suitable treatment but they are under a duty to do so. If they fail to take appropriate action in the child's best interests or are negligent in attending to the child's needs, they may be held liable in tort to the child for their failure to perform duties within their means. (See Gibson v. Gibson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 914, 92 Cal.Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648, a case abrogating parental immunity for torts of a parent against its child.)

Parental rights must be correlated with parental liabilities for their children's conduct. Parents are responsible for harm caused by their minor children when they should reasonably have become aware of habits or tendencies of the child which made it likely that the child would misbehave and they have failed to take steps to restrain the child's inapposite conduct and actions. (Reida v. Lund (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 698, 702, 96 Cal.Rptr. 102; Singer v. Marx (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 637, 644–646, 301 P.2d 440; see Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 974.) They bear ever-expanding statutory liability for his misconduct: willful misconduct which results in death or injury to another person (Civ.Code, § 1714.1, subd. (a)); defacement of another's property (Civ.Code, § 1714.1, subd. (b)), discharge of firearm (Civ.Code, § 1714.3); malicious injury to library property (Educ.Code, §§ 28801–28802); willful misconduct which results in injury to school property, students, or employees (Educ.Code, § 10606); negligence in permissive use of motor vehicle (Veh.Code, § 17708).

Parental rights are not unlimited or beyond review. In addition to parental liability to the child for torts, parental rights are subject to control in certain respects by the state itself. ‘Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. . . . It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare . . .’ (Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 166–167, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645, (footnotes omitted).) The state is not a full substitute parent, however, for when it steps into the area of parental controlit exercises an authority that is considerably more circumscribed than that of a parent. Without superseding parental control the state can exercise certain limited supervisory powers over children, as for example requiring their vaccination or compelling their attendance at school, and it can discourage such abuses of parental authority as child beating by punishing the parents. But the principal remeby of the state against abuse of parental rights lies in its authority to remove the child from the custody and control of parents and transfer custody and control of the child to another, as in guardianship, or assume custody and control itself, as in juvenile court proceedings. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 600 ff.) But when the state steps in to substitute its own authority for that of the parent, it does not effect a complete substitution, for the scope of its authority is less extensive and its ability to act more closely restricted by statute than that of the actual parents. Thus, while on occasion the state may substitute as a parent, it does so with something less than the full authority of the actual parent.

At bench, minor seeks to graft these limitations in the power of the state to exercise authority over him onto the authority possessed by his parents. He argues that because the state would be required to proceed under the provisions of the LPS Act if it were his guardian and had undertaken to detain him in a mental hospital, (In re Michael E. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 183, 123 Cal.Rptr. 103, 538 P.2d 231) his parents are required to follow the same procedure. Implicit in his argument is the premise that state action is somehow involved in his detention by his parents in a private mental hospital. But in this instance, the state has not acted either to restrict or enlarge parental rights. Indeed, the state has not acted at all, but has merely abstained from interfering in a conflict between parents and child. Absent abusive exercise of rights, parental rights must control. Until a child reaches majority or is otherwise emancipated from parental control, the decision to treat mental disorder and the form such treatment takes are committed to the parents.

In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788, the Supreme Court held that the state may not require parental consent as a condition for abortion of an unmarried mature minor during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy. ‘[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patients' pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.’ (96 S.Ct. at 2842, 49 L.Ed.2d at 808.) Minor generalizes from the holding of Planned Parenthood to a new constitutional rule of children's rights: ‘Parents cannot be affirmatively authorized by the state to act in serious derogation of the rights of their children to life and liberty without any semblance of due process protections for the child.’

We do not concur in minor's reading of Planned Parenthood. It cannot be doubted that parents have the right to control the upbringing of their child in ways far beyond the purview of the state, including, for example, the kind of school the child attends (Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 518–519, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070) and the religious training and education it receives. (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 213–215, 218, 232, 234, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed. 15.) Treatment of emotional and physical disorders likewise falls within the ambit of parental control. (In re Hudson (1942) 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765; In re Seiferth (1955) 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820.) Planned Parenthood presents the unique case where parental control may affect not only the present liberty of the child but its liberty for two decades to come.

The cause at bench is also distinguishable from those in which parents have invoked the aid of the state by committing their minor children to state mental institutions. (J. L. v. Parham (D.C.M.D.Ga.1976) 412 F.Supp. 112, probable jurisdiction noted 44 U.S.L.W. 3531; Bartley v. Kremens (D.C.E.D.Pa.1975) 402 F.Supp. 1039, appeal filed 45 U.S.L.W. 3063; In re Long (1975) 25 N.C. App. 702, 214 S.E.2d 626; see also Saville v. Treadway (D.C.M.D.Tenn.1974) 404 F.Supp. 430.)⁸ No such state assistance has been invoked here, and no state action has been taken that might require constitutional safeguards to protect persons against oppression by the state itself. Although the state licenses and inspects private mental hospitals (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 1250 et seq.), guarantees certain fundamental rights to patients (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5325), and requires reports and patient data information from private mental hospitals (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6002), it does not control either admissions or treatment policies of the private hospital to which minor was admitted. The decision to admit minor was a private one between parents, doctor, and hospital. The state in no way became a party to this parental decision involving medical treatment for their minor child, any more than it would become party to a parental decision to send their child to a private boarding school, to summer camp, or to his room.

In re Michael E. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 183, 123 Cal.Rptr. 103, 538 P.2d 231, the Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus discharging a ward of the juvenile court from any detention in a mental hospital without compliance with the strict standards of the LPS Act (See fn. 2, supra). The court based its ruling on statutory interpretation and specifically declined to reach the issue presented here, ‘whether the commitment of a minor who is not a ward of a juvenile court can be accomplished upon the ‘voluntary’ application of parent, guardian or other person entitled to the minor's custody.' (15 Cal.3d 183, 191, fn. 10, 123 Cal.Rptr. 103, 108, 538 P.2d 231, 234.) Minor contends that if a ward of the juvenile court, a juvenile delinquent, may make his own decision on treatment of his mental disorder and cannot be committed against his will without compliance with the LPS Act, minor should be afforded the same rights. This contention ignores fundamental differences between minor and a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court takes control of a minor's life when the parentchild relationship breaks down; here, minor remains under the control and custody of his parents. The juvenile court, as representative of the state, looks to statutory authority for disposition of its ward; here, parents are free to exercise their own discretion in the upbringing of their child.

We conclude, therefore, that because there are valid and compelling factual distinctions between adults and minors and between wards and dependents of the juvenile court and children of intact family relationships, a parental decision relating to private treatment of their minor child's mental disorder does not deny minor his rights to due process and equal protection of law.

3. Remedies for Parental Abuse of Authority. We recognize that parents do not always act in the best interests of their child. They may use the child as a scapegoat for their own shortcomings, they may be unable to view the problems of their child objectively, they may commit the child as a sanction for misbehavior, they may have a financial or other conflict of interest with the child, or they may be simply unwilling to assume the full responsibilities of parenthood. (See Ellis, ‘Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions,’ 62 California Law Review 840, 859 ff. (1974).) We also recognize that hospital admissions procedures do not always effectively screen out persons who do not require hospitalization. (See Rosenhan, ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places,’ 13 Santa Clara Lawyer 379 (1973).) Suitable remedies for such abuses, however, do not require the minor's release from effective adult control but rather look toward substitution of new authority for parental authority that has been found defective or abusive. Appointment of a new authority or guardian for the minor does not guarantee the minor's release from unwanted custodial detention, for the new guardian, not the minor, succeeds to the right to make that determination.

Habeas corpus is an appropriate procedure to tender the issue of abuse of parental authority when brought on behalf of a minor child undergoing some form of custodial detention, whether of a private institutional nature or one involving direct parental restraint. The writ serves as a device to trigger inquiry into parental abuse of rights, and it can bring before the court, directly or indirectly, the full panoply of remedies and procedures whose common purpose is to free the child from control of abusive parents. These remedies include substantive provisions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 600, which allow the state to supersede parental control and make a minor dependent of the court. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 725, 726); and various provisions that authorize transfer of control over the minor from parents to a guardian (Prob.Code, §§ 1405, 1440; Civ.Code, §§ 203, 204, 232, 4600.) The common element in these statutory provisions substitutes third-party control for abusive or defective parental control and transfers custody and control over the child to some other party.⁹ These procedures involve quite different solutions from the drastic one adopted by the superior court, which would release minor to the streets on no showing other than the minor's desire to leave the hospital. Since it has never been judicially determined whether minor qualifies for involuntary confinement under the strict standards of the LPS Act, it is possible that minor's release could leave parents in the untenable position of bearing full responsibility for minor's support (Civ.Code, §§ 196a, 197) and liability for his conduct (cf. Weisbart v. Flohr (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 281, 291, 67 Cal.Rptr. 114), cut off from what they believe to be the only effective way to care for him.

In sum, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is a suitable procedure with which to examine into possible abuse of custodial detention, which, if found, allows the issue of the minor's custody and control to come before the superior court. While a petition for habeas corpus is not a substitute for guardianship proceedings (Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 593, 601, 107 P.2d 1), when unwanted detention is involved it becomes an appropriate vehicle to bring guardianship and dependency issues to the attention of the court. These issues, however, are factual and involve abuse of parental authority and application of appropriate remedies to correct such abuses. The trial court erred in ordering the minor's discharge as a matter of law.

The order granting the writ of habeas corpus is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (a) provides: ‘Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.’ Welfare and Institutions Code section 5275 authorizes review by writ of habeas corpus for persons detained for treatment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 5000 ff.)

2.  The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 500 et seq., applies to a person who is dangerous to himself or others or is gravely disabled due to mental disorder. He may be detained in a mental health facility for three days for evaluation and, subject to judicial review, for an additional fourteen days for intensive treatment and an additional fourteen days if he is suicidal. Further detention, for ninety-day periods, is permitted, subject to judicial review, if he has threatened or attempted to cause physical harm to others and presents imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others.

3.  Penal Code section 1507 authorizes appeal from an order granting relief on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This court stayed the superior court's order pending determination of the appeal.

4.  Section 27706:‘. . .‘(d) Upon request, or upon order of the court, he shall represent any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings under Part 1 (commencing with Section 5000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.‘(e) Upon order of the court, he shall represent any person who is entitled to be represented by counsel but is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 500) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.‘. . .‘(g) Upon the order of the court or upon the request of the person involved, he may represent any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in a proceeding of any nature relating to the nature or conditions of detention, of other restrictions prior to adjudication, of treatment, or of punishment resulting from criminal or juvenile proceedings.’

5.  Minor was assisted in preparation of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and his request for release by a deputy counselor in mental health, an officer of the superior court. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 6775 et seq.)

6.  Ingram v. Justice Court (1968) 69 Cal.2d 832, 841–842, 73 Cal.Rptr. 410, 447 P.2d 650, holds that the court may not review the public defender's determination that a person is not financially able to employ counsel. Nevertheless, the court, and even an opposing party upon a proper showing, may question the authority of counsel who purport to represent a party. (People v. Mariposa Co. (1870) 39 Cal. 683.)

7.  Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, provides for court appointment of a conservator for persons, including minors, gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. The conservatorship is analogous to that authorized by Probate Code section 1701, et seq. The court must specify that the conservator shall have the right to place his conservatee in a psychiatric hospital. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5358.)

8.  In Melville v. Sabbatino (1973) 30 Conn.Sup. 320, 313 A.2d 886, the court ordered petitioner, a seventeen-year-old minor, released from a private mental hospital where he was involuntarily held by his parents' request. Connecticut statutes, however, permit any minor the age of sixteen or over to apply for voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital. The court concluded, as a matter of logical statutory interpretation, that a minor the age of sixteen or over also should have the authority to demand his own release.

9.  Minor might also seek emancipation from parents. The emancipated child is in all respects his own person, with the same independence as though he had attained majority. (Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5 Cal.3d 565, 580, 96 Cal.Rptr. 697, 488 P.2d 1.)

FLEMING, Acting Presiding Justice.

COMPTON and BEACH, JJ., concur.